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ABSTRACT 
 
This study considers the perspective that Management Control Systems (MCS) have a 
general impact on managers’ extent of dysfunctional behaviour. More specifically, this 
study models, and empirically tests, the effects of several control systems, namely 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Budgetary Participation (BP) and Reliance on 
Accounting Performance Measures (RAPM) on two ‘broader’ forms of dysfunctional 
behaviour (gaming and information manipulation). Furthermore, task uncertainty (TU) 
and the superior’s style in the use of controls (diagnostic vs. interactive - INT) are the 
first two selected contextual variables, with MCS modelled as an intervening 
mechanism between these contextual variables and dysfunctional behaviours. In 
addition, insights from the institutional / legitimacy perspectives are used to develop a 
third contextual variable - known as the legitimating nature of control systems (LNC), 
as perceived by managers – to be separately modelled as a moderating variable.  
 
Based on 130 responses of functional managers from a sample of Australian 
manufacturing companies, the findings regarding SOP provide new evidence on a much 
used control system in its role as a mechanism constraining gaming practices whilst the 
findings relating to BP are particularly significant in demonstrating the primarily 
motivational benefits of BP and its role in defusing both information manipulation and 
gaming practices. Notably, it brings empirical support to the theoretical arguments for 
participative budgeting (Shields and Shields, 1998) in contrast to claims that it 
encourages budget games (Hansen et al., 2003; Lukka, 1988). However, RAPM is 
found to have a significant enhancing effect on both the managers’ extent of 
information manipulation and gaming activities but it does not have a significant 
intervening effect for TU. This is in sharp contrast to Hartmann’s (2000; 2005) 
expectations on the central role of uncertainty in the RAPM contingency framework. 
The ‘beneficial’ nature of an ‘interactive’ superior, as argued in Simons (1995; 2000), 
is put into question with the finding that such an outlook might actually enhance 
managerial dysfunctional behaviour. The overall implications of this interactive style 
and the levers of control framework are also considered in the light of recently 
published studies. Finally, the findings suggest that a higher agreement to LNC 
interacting with the various control systems appears to intensify instances of 
dysfunctional behaviour. This also provides empirical evidence on the extent to which 
legitimacy arguments - rather than efficiency/rational ones - may be pertinent in 
understanding the role of controls in organisations.  
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Chapter 1  
 Introduction to the Study 
 
1.0 Preamble to the Study  
 
Control systems seek to bring commonality of goals and process coordination within 
organisations. The need for goal sharing and coordination of activities and functions has 
become increasingly important among organisations in view of the increasing pressures 
on private companies to become more competitive and profitable to satisfy the 
requirements of their stakeholders. This continuous need for ever-improving bottom 
line performance indicators has largely influenced the internationalisation of business, 
in terms of seeking new markets and/or new sources of inputs, and in order to respond 
to the needs of customers. In parallel, government bodies and non-governmental 
organizations face new challenges from their own stakeholders, who demand more 
streamlined and efficient operations. A significant number of public services have now 
been privatised and subject to the same competitive pressures.  
 
In such a context, public and private organisations alike have been reconsidering their 
internal processes. These processes are a key element to a better performance and/or 
efficiency, implying more congruence between the various sub-units and responsibility 
centres towards the organisation’s goals and objectives. From this perspective, one can 
argue that control systems imply some level of regulation on the employees/agents’ 
behaviour in an organization but also some level of empowerment to carry out their 
tasks.  
 
In this respect, control systems involving tools such as budgets, variance reports, 
standard operating procedures, or performance-based remuneration or more recent 
techniques such as the balanced scorecard are specifically designed to ensure goal 
congruence. Thus, control systems facilitate the monitoring or regulating of the 
behaviour of directors, managers and other supervisory personnel in an organization. In 
contrast, contemporary management theories also suggest managers have been 
empowered in terms of having authority to take decisions whilst being accountable to 
the higher levels of management. With this increased empowerment, control systems 
are expected to keep a ‘watchful eye’ on directors, managers and other supervisory 
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personnel/employees. But considering the fact that there is always a ‘day of reckoning’ 
or eventually accountability for outputs and outcomes through the feedback mechanism 
of control systems, there remains a motive for the subordinate managers to engage in 
practices aimed at ensuring the desired picture on their performance, whether or not it 
represents actual performance.  
 
In the context of an acute competitive environment, such practices can have very 
dysfunctional effects on the decision making processes and evaluation at the various 
levels of management. For example, top management relies on the reports and data 
provided by the various levels of management to take decisions and actions. If such 
reports provide biased information, smoothed data or if managers have deliberately 
engaged in ‘gaming’ practices to ensure a favourable set of numbers, then these could 
lead to misguided decisions and sub-optimal performance for the organization as a 
whole. It would therefore be critical for directors, senior managers and consultants to 
develop a more comprehensive understanding of the relationships between particular 
control system/devices and these dysfunctional behaviours of subordinate managers, 
and of the potential contextual variables which could influence such relationships.  
 
Various forms of dysfunctional behaviours have been previously identified and 
management control systems (MCS) research identified some key terms/concepts such 
budgetary slack, managerial short term orientation, manipulation of performance 
measures specific to particular control systems or contexts (e.g. Onsi, 1973; Dunk, 
1993a; Merchant 1990; Chow et al., 1996). The focus of this study is on more general 
instances - yet less researched ones - of managerial dysfunctional behaviour. More 
specifically, the study will consider the dysfunctional behaviour of ‘gaming’ and 
‘information manipulation’.  
 
Hence, a key objective of this study is to investigate the existence and extent of such 
‘dysfunctional behaviour’ that arises from the use of management control systems in 
organizations. Although there have been some empirical studies on the link between 
dysfunctional behaviour and control systems, the findings have not been conclusive 
(Jaworski and Young, 1992, p. 17; Van der Stede, 2000, p. 610; Marginson and Ogden, 
2005, p. 436) and these studies have primarily considered one control system at a time 
(mainly budget-based). Consequently, dysfunctional behaviour appears to have been 
conceptualised in a restricted way and principally associated to budgetary slack. In 
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contrast, this study will model the effects of several control systems on several forms of 
dysfunctional behaviour1 and will hence seek to identify and measure dysfunctional 
behaviour in a broader perspective.  
 
In addition, the impact of contextual variables on the MCS-dysfunctional behaviour link 
will be examined. Following an extensive review of the mainstream literature, task 
uncertainty and superior’s use of controls (diagnostic vs. interactive) are the first two 
selected contextual variables. This study proposes to use the path analysis technique to 
model MCSs as intervening mechanisms between contextual variables and 
dysfunctional behaviour. Hence, apart from the practical benefits mentioned earlier in 
developing a better understanding of dysfunctional behaviour for supervisory managers 
and MCS consultants, there are notable theoretical improvements in terms of 
considering various control systems and the proposed contextual variables. Chenhall 
(2003, p. 161) states that there is scope to persist with contingency-based research to 
uncover generalisable findings and it is believed that this study will contribute towards 
renewing the interest in this body of management accounting research.   
 
Furthermore, Chenhall (2003) makes a compelling case for integrating more 
interpretive and/or critical elements in MCS research, based on alternative theories and 
propositions. In this respect, elements and insights from institutional theory have been 
used to develop a third contextual variable – known as the legitimating nature of 
controls, as perceived by functional managers - to be considered in this study as a 
moderating variable in the hypothesised relationship between MCS and dysfunctional 
behaviour. There has been very little empirical investigation on the impact of 
institutional factors in the MCS literature and this part of the study takes a more 
exploratory stance in developing insights as to how such variables could influence the 
use of MCS in organizations.  
 
Finally, the quest for generalisable findings has also been a key impetus in the decision 
to collect data in a country (Australia) where a significant number of MCS studies were 
carried out.  
 
                                                
1
 It would be important to note at this stage that a broad definition of dysfunctional behaviour could 
include illegal acts (e.g. falsification or forgery) but this study will only consider legal (but not necessary 
ethical) acts. 
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1.1. Management Control System (MCS) 
  
There are diverse views on the nature, purpose and scope of MCS and the number of 
academic areas that research on this topic is clear evidence of such diversity. 
Organisational behaviour, accounting, management, public sector administration, and 
information systems are just some of these areas. Hence, the two following definitions 
may not be generally applicable ones but they certainly tie up to the challenges faced by 
organisations:  
“A MCS is a set of interrelated communication structures that facilitates the 
processing of information for the purpose of assisting managers in 
coordinating the parts and attaining the purpose of an organisation on a 
continuous basis” (Maciariello and Kirby, 1994, p. 1) 
 
“Management control is the process by which managers influence other 
members of the organisation to implement the organisation’s strategies. The 
system used by management to control the activities of an organisation is 
called its management control system.” (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998, p. 
17) 
 
There are five implications that can be highlighted from these definitions. Firstly, MCS 
considers only management-level structures and hence focuses on managers’ interaction 
with controls. The main reason for such emphasis is related to the established notion 
that control is one of the four basic functions of the management process, others being 
planning, organising and leading (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998). So, the manager, 
irrespective of his/her hierarchical level and the category of his/her responsibility centre 
(cost, profit or investment), is the focus of MCS studies2.  
 
Secondly, the finality in an MCS is traditionally towards organisational goals (or 
objectives), which can presumably be achieved or not, as measured by some 
performance indicators. Anthony and Govindarajan (1998) focus on the links between 
MCS and strategies but eventually the implementation and success of those strategies is 
also assessed by a performance measure. These performance indicators need not be 
financial ones, but have gradually been understood as a combination of financial and 
                                                
2
 Although some aspects of organisational control system can clearly also apply to all non-managerial 
staff of a company. 
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non-financial measures, such as the one pioneered by Kaplan and Norton’s (1992) 
balanced scorecard. More recently, Merchant and Van der Stede (2007, p. 25) refer to 
such controls as results controls, which are prevalent in most organizations.  
 
Thirdly, whilst Maciariello and Kirby (1994) narrowly relate MCS to a set of 
communication structures, Anthony and Govindarajan (1998) view MCS as an 
influence process. These views are not contradictory but they indicate how individual 
control systems reflect several dimensions, which then will have different consequences 
at the organisational (company, division, department) and/or individual (manager) level. 
This study aims at exploring further this influence process but from the point of view of 
the possibly unintended consequences i.e. dysfunctional behaviour.  
 
Fourthly, in spite of the positive aspects being highlighted in both definitions, control 
systems are constraining mechanisms. As later stated by Maciariello and Kirby (1994, 
p. 8), control systems involve “steering the organisation” and “bringing unity out of 
diverse efforts of subunits and or individuals”. Managers, who traditionally exercise 
power and control, may resent the “straightjacket” characteristics of, and resist (or 
avoid) compliance to, MCS. Similarly, both the academic and professional literature 
refer to the use of ‘tight’ (or loose) controls, in terms of how far they are made 
congruent, specific and timely in relation to organizational objectives (Merchant and 
Van der Stede, 2007, p. 119) 
 
Fifthly, while this is not explicit in both definitions, all the authors give predominance 
to the study of formal control systems (existing and established by the organisation) 
rather than informal ones3 (relationships developed by individuals or groups within an 
organisation). Formal control systems are easier to identify across organisations and 
time, easier to research and resulting findings can be, to a certain extent, generalised. In 
addition, virtually all the formal control systems are considered to have cybernetic 
properties i.e.:  
“..a system in which standards of performance are determined, measuring 
systems gauge performance, comparisons are made between standards and 
actual performance, and feedback provides information on the variances.” 
(Fisher, 1995, p. 14) 
                                                
3
 For example, personal contacts and networks and peer pressures.   
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In light of this definition, it is without surprise that management accounting researchers 
have focused on the usefulness of financial-based management control systems, the 
most visible part being the budgetary process. However, the consequences of non-
financial components of an MCS have also been studied. Two examples would be the 
effect of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and the effectiveness of decentralisation 
i.e. the delegating of authority and control to lower-level management4. But in most 
cases, the previous research questions have generally taken a very straightforward 
orientation: do these management control systems actually result in better organisational 
performance and/or more motivated managers? There have also been studies that 
considered the MCS as a dependent variable and thus researched the antecedents of 
MCS rather than their consequences i.e. what has caused management control systems 
to be in this particular state? Whilst these particular lines of research are important, the 
role of this inquiry would be aimed at bringing findings that are relevant to the main 
MCS research orientation for this study i.e. is the MCS adequate to detect and prevent 
dysfunctional behaviour or is it in fact encouraging such behaviour? 
 
1.2. Accounting-led MCS Research 
 
MCS is a generic term encompassing various individual control systems/mechanisms. 
As such, it would have been difficult to argue as to the adequacy of MCS in general and 
thus, management accounting research has given prominence to specific control 
components which one could refer to as management control sub-systems and 
management control mechanisms. These terms will be further defined in Chapter 2, but 
suffice to say that the budgetary process would be viewed as a control-subsystem, 
which can itself be broken down into various control mechanisms such as the extent of 
a subordinate manager’s participation in budget/target setting. In fact, there has been 
more emphasis on the effectiveness and other possible consequences of similar control 
mechanisms in contrast to other ‘higher levels’ of MCS. However, the findings have not 
been very consistent at the outset. For example, whilst positive associations were 
expected and found between the level of budgetary participation and organisational 
performance, some studies actually observed negative relationships. Similar situations 
                                                
4
 Other examples of non-financial controls (including SOPs) can be integrated / viewed within Simon’s 
(1995; 2000) levers of control framework, namely as part of belief, boundary and/or diagnostic systems. 
In addition, a recent MCS empirical study by Widener (2007) investigated the use of ‘personnel’ controls 
i.e. ex-ante control mechanisms often centered on human resource policies that help ensure personnel will 
perform in congruence with firm goals (2007, p. 380).   
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were noted in research on other control mechanisms such as the extent of reliance on 
accounting performance measures for performance evaluation (also referred to as 
RAPM or budget emphasis)5. Emmanuel et al. (1990, p. 160) consider budgetary 
planning and control as the most visible use of accounting information in the 
management control process. Budgets can serve multiple roles in organizations such as 
acting as a system of authorization, a means of forecasting and planning, a channel of 
communication and coordination, a motivational device, and a means of performance 
evaluation and control (Emmanuel et al., 1990, p. 162). However, research has mainly 
focused on the discrete steps in the budgetary process, mainly at the beginning and end 
of the typical budgeting cycle (Hartmann, 2000, p. 453).  
 
In light of the inconsistent findings described earlier, management accounting research, 
under the influence of researchers such as Gordon and Miller (1976), Waterhouse and 
Tiessen (1978) and Otley (1980), resolutely evolved from a universalistic perspective - 
control sub-systems or mechanisms are either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, in relation to a pre-
determined outcome variable - to a contingency perspective i.e. the relationship 
between a control sub-system is dependent upon certain situational variables faced by 
the organisation.   
 
It would be important to note that MCS research has generally steered towards the 
positive consequences of MCS, such as performance, satisfaction, attitude or 
motivation, possibly and initially as a result of the ‘positively posited’ contingency fit 
propositions put forward by Otley (1978) - described in more detail later). Negative 
consequences have been, in comparison, less considered in cross-sectional empirical 
studies and more in case study contexts (e.g. Argyris, 1952, 1953; Hopwood, 1972). 
However, subsequently, the interest in dysfunctional behaviour grew with empirical 
studies that focused on ‘proxies’ of dysfunctional behaviour such as job-related tension 
(JRT) or stress (e.g. Hirst, 1983) and separate elements of dysfunctional behaviour such 
as smoothing/falsifying (Flamholtz, 1979), data manipulation and short-term orientation 
(Merchant, 1990; Chow et al, 1996), invalid data reporting (Hayes and Cron, 1988), and 
budgetary slack (Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Onsi, 1973). Other studies of ‘dysfunctional 
                                                
5
 However, it has to be acknowledged there have been more recent MCS studies examining the combined 
and inter-dependent nature of various control systems as an organizational control package (Otley, 1980). 
In particular, Simon’s (1995; 2000) work on the levels of control (LOC) provides a useful 
conceptualisation to study the relationships between the various types of MCS (e.g. Widener, 2007). 
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behaviour’ in specific professional settings also emerged, which were labelled 
differently i.e. under-reporting of time and premature sign-off practices by external 
auditors (e.g. Alderman and Deitrick, 1982; Otley and Pierce, 1996; Pierce and 
Sweeney, 2004; 2006). Within the management control literature however, there 
appears to have been a more determined interest on the budgetary slack6 phenomenon 
(Dunk and Nouri, 1998; Fisher et al., 2002a; 2002b; Davila and Wouters, 2005) but 
particular in the case of slack, there have been arguments and recent evidence 
supporting the beneficial impact of budgetary slack (e.g. Van der Stede, 2000; Davila 
and Wouters, 2005).  
 
The above might be construed as an attempt to paint an overall positive - and perhaps 
somewhat fatalistic - view of dysfunctional behaviour, as later implied by Argyris 
(1990), in his description/understanding of organizational and individual defensive 
routines7: 
“Organizational defensive routines can lead people to feel helpless and 
cynical about changing them. This leads people to distance themselves from 
tying to engage the defensive routines in order to reduce them. As a result, 
organizational defensive routines not only become unmanageable (it is difficult 
to manage what is undiscussable), but they become the source of much 
distorted information. The distortion of the information is taken for granted 
because it is seen as necessary for the survival of the players as well as for the 
organization” (emphasis added, 1990, p. 506).  
 
Furthermore, the reason for this apparent focus on the positive influence of controls 
may be due to an intrinsic and a subjective positive image that accountants have for 
MCS. Wilken (1989. p. 45) rightly stated that “accountants tend to see control as a 
solution; sociologists as a problem”. Indeed, the interpretive and critical accounting 
literature is replete of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on how and why 
accounting/control systems are seen as ‘good’ rational-led legitimating devices (e.g. 
Berry et al., 1985; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Covaleski et al., 2006). Also, it 
appears that the more general phenomenon of dysfunctional behaviour, i.e. the 
intentional violation of control system rules and procedures (Jaworski and Young, 1992, 
p. 18) did not have a fundamental “appeal” within the empirically-led management 
                                                
6
 Budgetary slack may be defined as the deliberate manipulation of budgets/targets by the subordinate 
manager, in a bid to ensure easy attainment of the budget/targets. 
7
 Argyris (1990) uses the term organizational and/or individual defensive routines almost synonymously 
to the term dysfunctional behaviours. However, the word ‘defensive’ seems to suggest that it is a rational 
and natural (hence positive and acceptable) reaction to stimuli (e.g. threat) as opposed to the negative 
label of ‘dysfunctional’.  
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accounting literature – although certain elements of dysfunctional behaviour (as noted 
above) were being studied in more detail. In this respect, it is believed there is room for 
a more in-depth and cross-sectional empirical investigation in the unintended and 
dysfunctional consequences of control sub-systems/mechanisms, particularly as 
conceptualised in Jaworski and Young’s (1992) paper. 
 
1.3. Contingency Theory  
 
Contingency Theory stems from research in organisational design. It suggests that "the 
best way to organise is contingent upon specific circumstances that the organisation 
finds itself in" (Ezzamel and Hart, 1987). The main contingency factors affecting 
organisational design would be environment, technology, age & size of organisation, 
and power distribution (internal and external). 
 
The contingency theory of management accounting is drawn from the organisational 
literature and has been used to identify the variables that impact on the effectiveness of 
a firm's MCS. In other words, contingency theory asserts that there is an interaction 
between MCS control sub-systems (or mechanisms), contingent variables and 
organisational performance (or individual-based outcome variables such as motivation 
or satisfaction). In the words of Otley (1980, p. 84), the control sub-system/mechanism 
must "match or fit" with contingent factors affecting this particular organisation, to 
impact into the correct performance. Hence, a lack of “congruence” between a (or a set 
of) contingent variable(s) and the control sub-system/mechanism will have no, or at 
worst negative, consequences.  
 
Thus, since the end of the 1970s, the contingency paradigm has dominated the 
management control systems literature. Whilst a number of “traditional” contingency 
variables (environmental uncertainty, technology, strategy, size) have been transposed 
to the MCS research area, a host of new variables were also drawn from the behavioural 
sciences area. Variables such as personality, stress, leadership style, national culture, 
organisational commitment and trust have been argued to be of relevance, in view of the 
potential interpersonal and psychological dimensions of management control systems. 
This has significantly expanded the number of research studies - whose methods were 
predominantly empirical and based on correlation and regression techniques – greatly 
assisted by the increasing access to computer and statistical software. The dependent 
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and independent variables are gathered from responses via mailed questionnaire surveys 
and are primarily interval-level data, sought across various industries (cross-sectional). 
For example, Shields and Shields (1998) reviewed 47 budgetary participation studies 
and 36 (77%) correspond to the above descriptions8. Paradoxically, important findings 
were made from case studies but have been deemed to be insufficient to be generalised 
and have hence led to more empirical demonstration (e.g. Marginson and Ogden, 2005, 
p. 451). Two often quoted examples of such findings are the impact of budgets on 
people (Argyris, 1952) and the relationship between MCS and strategy (Simons, 1990, 
1991 and 1994). Whilst the use of survey methods and their related empirical 
techniques have led to considerable insights in the use of MCS, these methods and 
techniques have inherent limitations and interpretation issues which have affected the 
validity of some of the findings. Hartmann and Moers (1999; 2003) have highlighted a 
number of these issues in relation to the use of moderated regression analysis (MRA) in 
contingency-based research. 
 
Furthermore, the multiplicity of contingency-based MCS research does not seem to 
have led to more consistent and coherent findings. Chapman (1997) claims that there is 
still a lack of an overall contingency framework, “...leaving no obvious starting point 
for an explanation of an increasing body of often contradictory results”. Fisher (1995, 
p. 45) concurs to this view and adds that both theoretical and empirical analysis in MCS 
research has been too piecemeal to generate a coherent frame of reference. For example, 
when locus of control (a personality trait) is empirically found to be a contingent 
variable in determining the effectiveness of budgetary participation (Brownell, 1981; 
1982b), how can this finding be of interest in developing an overall contingency 
framework for MCS? Schoonhoven (1981) already highlighted this lack of overall 
coherence and considered that contingency theory: 
“....is not a theory at all, in the conventional sense of theory as a well-
developed set of interrelated propositions. It is more an orientating strategy or 
meta-theory, suggesting ways in which a phenomenon ought to be 
conceptualised or an approach to the phenomenon ought to be explained.” 
(Schoonhoven, 1981, p. 350). 
 
Schoonhoven’s perspective is a very crucial one since it clearly limits the “benefits” of 
the contingency paradigm. Indeed, contingency arguments have been used to justify the 
                                                
8
 The remaining studies are based on lab-experiments (17%) and field research or case studies (6%). 
Incidentally, lab experiments are also empirically based but data collection is made through observation 
of participants’ reactions to games, scenarios or other stimuli.   
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inclusion of a particular contextual variable in the effectiveness of MCS but in contrast, 
these arguments cannot be used to reject a specific contextual variable. This brings us to 
more recent calls for theory-based contingency research rather than simply testing 
whether a contingent variable is significantly interacting with the MCS sub-system.  
 
Chenhall (2003, p. 157) correctly reminds his readers that the term contingency means 
that something is true only under specified conditions and there is no “one” contingency 
theory but rather a variety of theories that seek to explain and predict the conditions. In 
particular, he suggests that future MCS studies should use organizational theory as a 
coherent and rich basis for examining contextual factors. In this context, Chapman 
(1997) and Hartmann (2000) suggest that uncertainty, as conceptualised by Galbraith 
(1973), is a key concept when explaining and predicting the appropriateness of MCS. A 
second related concept, which was earlier identified by Simons’ (1991, 1994) case study 
research, is the superior’s interactive vs. diagnostic use of MCS. Simons (1991, 1994) 
was able to identify this particular behaviour in his study of a limited number of 
business unit managers who were involved in a strategic change process. Although 
Simons (1991, 1994) was focusing on the contingent impact of strategy on MCS, this 
nevertheless showed some links to Chapman’s (1997, p. 201-202) theoretical 
propositions for investigating uncertainty – in particular the proposition that one’s use 
of the internal accounting system would vary under different states of uncertainty. In 
spite of the fact that Chapman (1997) was most probably referring to a subordinate 
manager’s perspective, there is no reason why this cannot be transposed to the 
supervisor’s level. So far however, there have not been any recent empirical attempts to 
link Simon’s (1991, 1994) case study findings of interactive vs. diagnostic use to a 
cross-sectional context9.   
 
The contingency paradigm has been regularly criticised and alternative theories have 
been put forward (e.g. Hopper and Powell, 1985; Scapens, 1994). Hopper and Powell 
(1985, p. 441) criticised contingency-based studies as they portray management in a 
technical role, matching organisational design to the dictates of contingent factors, but 
these studies tend to disregard the discretion possessed by key decision-makers and how 
values, beliefs and ideologies may influence choices. In the latter context, the inherent 
                                                
9
 However, during the write up phase of this thesis, a number of empirical studies have been recently 
published on Simon’s (1995)  interactive use of controls e.g. Bisbe and Otley (2004), Tuomela (2005), 
Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2007), Henri (2006), and Widener (2007). 
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characteristics of rationality, objectivity, and neutrality for MCS may be less applicable. 
While Scapens (1994, p. 312) related these characteristics to the economically rational 
maximising behaviour of individual managers, Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that 
organisational forms and procedures (including MCS) may also exist and interact for 
political and symbolic reasons. This represents a shift from the technically-oriented 
perspective to a more interpretive one - what is presented below as an institutional 
theory-based perspective  
 
1.4.   Institutional Theory-Based Perspective  
 
Institutional theory contends that organisational environments are characterised by the 
elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual organisations must conform if 
they are to receive support and legitimacy (Scott and Meyer, 1983, p. 149). This 
conformity is achieved through isomorphism i.e. the resemblance of a focal 
organisation to other organisations in its environment (Deephouse, 1996, p. 1024). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 147) have identified three mechanisms of the 
isomorphic process, namely: 
(i) coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the 
problem of legitimacy,  
(ii) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty, 
and 
(iii) normative isomorphism, associated with professionalisation. 
 
According to Kondra and Hinings (1998, p. 744), institutional theory has taken a variety 
of guises but generally the central thrust has been to explain the isomorphism of 
organisational fields and the establishment of institutional norms. However, the concept 
of legitimacy is more of topical interest within the institutional paradigm. Legitimacy is 
“granted” by regulatory agencies, professional or trade associations, or generalised 
belief systems that have defined how specific organisations are to conduct themselves 
(Suchman, 1995). Therefore, organisational survival is as much related to technical 
efficiency and/or profitability as it is to legitimacy. In fact, one could even expect that 
for certain categories of organisations (such as public sector organisations) that 
legitimacy dominates technical rationality. For example, various governmental 
organisations pride themselves of having achieved ISO (International Standards 
Organisation) certification, which may be interpreted as indication of potential for 
efficiency rather than being efficient in itself. In a similar vein, Meyer and Rowan 
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(1991) argue that whilst organisations have incorporated a variety of rational 
procedures, processes and rules (including formal accounting systems), their primary 
reason for doing so was to maintain appearances and help confer legitimacy upon the 
organisation (cited in Carruthers, 1995, p. 315; also, referred to in Scapens, 1994).  
 
The evidence as to the relevance of legitimacy compared to technical/economic value is 
diverse. Whilst authors such as Meyer and Rowan (1991) and Powell and DiMaggio 
(1991) have based their arguments on case study evidence, there has been recent 
empirical research into the validity of the legitimacy argument. For example, in a study 
of commercial banks, Deephouse (1996) found instances of isomorphism (i.e. banks 
conforming to business strategies adopted by other banks, irrespective of the impact on 
the individual bank’s performance) and found evidence of a relationship between such 
behaviour and an increased media/regulatory endorsement (i.e. increased legitimacy). 
More revealingly, Staw and Epstein (2000) observed increased external legitimacy (as 
measured by increased reputation) but comparatively lower consequences on 
performance further to the adoption of a popular management technique (TQM - Total 
Quality Management) by a sample of Fortune 500 companies. However, cross-sectional 
empirical evidence involving MCS mechanisms and processes has yet to be uncovered. 
Nevertheless, there has already been very insightful case study research into the 
legitimising and ceremonial aspects of budgets, which are briefly considered below.  
 
For instance, Berry et al. (1985) explored the use of accounting and controls system in 
the National Coal Board (NCB) and found a dual use of the systems internally 
(reflecting ambiguity and uncertainties) and externally (to convey an image of 
rationality and efficiency). This ‘decoupling’ was also observed in a study of nursing 
departments in Covaleski and Dirsmith (1983). Abernethy and Chua (1996) carried out 
a longitudinal field study of a large public hospital in Australia - during material 
changes made (amongst others) to its accounting control system - and concluded that 
some of the changes were attributed to institutional pressures coming from the 
regulators and professionals towards enhancing organizational legitimacy. Also, Hoque 
and Alam (1999) examined the relationship between newly established TQM practices 
in an organization and its Management Accounting Systems (MAS). They argued that 
TQM appeared to have been adopted for legitimacy reasons i.e. to gain acceptance from 
outside parties, whilst leading to a change in the MAS. Within the context of three non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in an African country, Goddard and Assad (2006) 
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identified the process of navigating legitimacy, whereby the NGOs adopt accounting 
and reporting practices (internal or external-led) to fit the specific demands and 
requirements of the donors and stakeholders. As a result, “donor-led” accounting 
practices and systems have become prominent in the studied NGOs to re-assert and 
enhance the organization’s credibility vis-a` -vis the donors. However, the emergence of 
these accounting mechanisms has not penetrated and influenced the operational aspects 
and the authors observe that there is little relevance associated to internal accounting 
information needs (2006, p. 395). 
 
In addition, ‘ceremonies’, ‘myths’ and ‘rituals’ are also very much related to the 
institutional framework, whereby certain practices and policies within organizations are 
enforced without apparent rationale and presented in non-questionable fashion, even if 
these practices or policies may not be the most efficient or the most appropriate way to 
run the organization. Cyert and March (1963) already highlighted the ‘ceremonial’ or 
‘ritualistic’ nature of the budgetary system and considered the budget as “...both the 
substance and result of political bargaining processes that are useful for legitimising 
and maintaining systems of power and control within organisations” (cited in Covaleski 
and Dirsmith, p. 1, 1988). In a similar vein, Pfeffer (1981) viewed that the objective and 
rational characteristic of the budgetary process will be primarily used to legitimise 
subjective and political decision-making processes.  Brunsson (1989) used a number of 
case studies in the local government sector to illustrate the use of budget within the 
above-mentioned perspective. Similarly, Robson and Perez (1999) explored the 
budgetary participation process in a subsidiary and found instances of ritualistic and 
taken-for-granted behaviours by the various individual managers, especially related to 
the fact that decisions for budgetary allocations were already made and the budgetary 
participation was merely a ritual to commit the subordinates to the plan of action. Also, 
this case study research observed attempts by sub-unit or functional managers (e.g. 
Robson and Perez, 1999, p. 397-398) to enter in a ‘gaming’ process and the need to 
protect their own department. This confirms the possibility of legitimacy being an 
important concept not only for the organisation towards the ‘external’ environment, but 
also for sub-unit departments.    Indeed, it was noted that the legitimacy concept could 
also be applied to the internal participants, as stated by Meyer and Rowan (1977, cited 
in Tiessen and Waterhouse, 1983, p. 263) in the context of management accounting 
systems (MAS): 
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“The application of socially sanctioned assessment criteria such as accounting 
performance measures serves the purpose of legitimising organisations with 
internal participants and external constituents. MAS performance measures, 
therefore, play and important ceremonial role.” 
 
In conclusion, the concept of legitimacy appears to be a valid one within the realm of 
management control systems, but has been so far limited to budgetary practices in 
general. It clearly provides a potential additional variable to the contingency framework 
as a way to understand the variables influencing management control systems. It would 
thus be interesting to assess the empirical relevance of institutional-based variables in 
MCS within the existing contingency paradigm  
 
1.5. Main Research Questions 
 
In light of the various issues raised in Sections 1.2 to 1.4, the following research 
questions are of pertinence: 
(1) To what extent do particular types of management control systems generate or 
limit dysfunctional behaviour, amongst subordinate managers in the application 
of those sub-systems?  
(2) To what extent is the relationship between MCS sub-systems and dysfunctional 
behaviour influenced by contingency variables?  
(3) Do institutional theory-inspired concepts, as perceived by a sub-unit manager, 
moderate the relationship between MCS sub-systems and dysfunctional 
behaviour? 
 
1.6. Objectives of Study 
 
The objectives of the study are as follows: 
(1) To model and empirically test explanations of dysfunctional behaviour(s) 
among middle-level, functional managers arising from specific sub-systems of 
an MCS.  
(2) To extend the model and evidence to include the effects of two previously 
researched contextual variables, specifically task uncertainty and the superior’s 
interactive vs. diagnostic use of controls. 
(3) To identify and provide evidence on the effects of an institutional-theory led 
factor on the relationships between MCS and dysfunctional behaviour.    
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1.7.  Scope of Research and Methods 
 
As mentioned earlier, MCS is a generic term and this study will select specific 
management control sub-systems/mechanisms. The selected management control 
mechanisms are budgetary participation (BP) and reliance on accounting performance 
measures (RAPM). In view of the financial orientation of these two control 
mechanisms, a non-financial control sub-system, namely standard operating procedures, 
is also chosen. Since inter-relationships between these control sub-systems/mechanisms 
are not assumed in this study, their impact on dysfunctional behaviour, as moderated by 
contextual variables, will be considered individually.   
 
BP and RAPM are the two sub-mechanisms that have been selected for this study on the 
grounds that there are still strong criticisms in terms of their lack of theoretical and 
empirical coherence within the contingency paradigm. For example, Hartmann (2000, p. 
465) outlined the important symptoms of this absence of coherence in terms of the 
relatively large number of hypotheses not supported and the even lower success rate of 
studies aimed at replicating previous findings in the context of RAPM studies. In a 
similar vein, Shields and Shields (1998, p. 50) contend that research in participative 
budgeting has numerous micro and independent theoretical and empirical models, but is 
devoid of general or integrative models.  
 
The selection of contextual variables has been considered after an extensive review of 
current theoretical and empirical arguments. Task uncertainty was viewed to be of 
considerable interest in light of the support expressed in the literature (Galbraith, 1973; 
Hartmann, 2000). In fact, in the case of budgetary participation studies, it was found 
that quite a number of contextual variables (such as functional area, environmental 
uncertainty, process automation, product standardisation and job difficulty) implicitly or 
explicitly related to task uncertainty. Hayes and Cron (1988) is one of the few studies 
that have examined the issue in the context of Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) practices. 
They predict an increase in dysfunctional behaviour as a result of higher task 
uncertainty but did not provide cross-sectional empirical evidence to support their 
claims.  
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The second contextual variable was identified by Simons (1987b, 1990, 1991, 1994) 
and adapted in Abernethy and Brownell (1997). Based on a series of case studies, 
Simons found that senior management used various components of MCS differently and 
labelled the use of controls as either being ‘interactive’ or ‘diagnostic’. According to 
Abernethy and Brownell (1997, p. 191), a defining feature of the interactive use of 
controls is the continual exchange between top management and lower levels of 
management, as well as interactions within various levels of management across 
functions, with a view to promoting the development of new ideas, opportunities and 
initiatives and to facilitating organizational learning (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Tuomela, 
2005; Henri, 2006). By contrast, a ‘diagnostic’ use of control systems would imply less 
direct involvement of senior management and would typically require input of superiors 
only in ‘exceptions’ situations. According to Henri (2006, p. 533), a diagnostic use of 
control represents a ‘negative’ force because it focuses on mistakes and negative 
variances. This study will thus hypothesise that the superior’s perceived style of use of 
controls will impact on the various MCS designs, thereby influencing the extent of 
dysfunctional behaviour.   
 
The third variable would represent the institutional dimension and is inspired by the 
main concept of legitimacy. This study will hypothesise that the perceptions of 
subordinates concerning the purpose of control functions will indicate the extent to 
which legitimacy, rather than efficiency, is relevant in the organisation. Since the study 
focuses on functional middle managers, it will be proposed that respondents will be 
subject to institutional influences within the organization, subsumed within the 
construct of the legitimating nature of controls (as perceived by these managers), and 
which can be associated to the need to maintain appearances and rational behaviour 
within the organisation.  The third contextual variable has been devised after a detailed 
review of the literature. Given the complexity of the issues, several questions and 
concepts were initially drawn up and tested. It is also noted there is no published study 
in the MCS domain which sought to empirically measure such a variable at a sub-
organizational level. One key element in institutional or any interpretive theory is the 
“context-driven” nature of the theory. Questions were therefore aimed at capturing the 
context i.e. the perceptions on the purpose of control systems in organizations. Hence, it 
remains to be seen as to what is the dominant view amongst subordinate managers on 
the organization’s motives in having a particular MCS (‘legitimating’ or a ‘rationality 
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motive’.  It is contended that such perceptions would influence the managers’ extent of 
dysfunctional behaviours.  
 
The proposed empirical schema is therefore shown in Figure 1.1. The arrows denote the 
hypothesised relationships in summary form since there are several (three) control 
system variables and (two) dependent variables. The first model depicts the intervening 
relationship of MCS between the two contextual variables (superiors’ use of controls 
and task uncertainty) and dysfunctional behaviour. The second (separate) model 
considers the moderating influence of the legitimating nature of controls on the 
relationship between MCS and dysfunctional behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Proposed Empirical Schemas (Model 1 and Model 2) 
 
This empirical study will be based on data collected from mailed questionnaire surveys. 
The target sample will be Australian functional managers of manufacturing companies, 
predominantly involved within the marketing and production functional areas, since it is 
believed that they are the main category of managers that interact with management 
control systems. The list of managers and companies will be identified from established 
business directories. Whilst the MCS and task uncertainty variables will be measured 
using constructs adapted from previous studies, the forms of dysfunctional behaviour, 
superior’s use of controls and the perceptions on the legitimating nature of controls will 
be developed to a greater extent.  
 
In light of the issues with methodology and statistical analysis raised in previous 
reviews of contingency studies (e.g. Kwok and Sharp, 1998; Hartmann and Moers, 
1999; 2003), there will be a rigorous application of validity tests, mainly from the use of 
principal components analysis (PCA). Although confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is 
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deemed statistically stronger than PCA, there are however more stringent assumptions 
relating to the number of observations. Also, whilst the path analysis technique (using 
OLS-estimated regression) has been the primary tool of analysis once all the variables 
have been tested for validity, there is now strong support for using structural equation 
modelling to estimate path relationships (Jaccard and Wan, 1996; Chenhall, 2003). 
However, the use of this more powerful technique is again dependent on large sample 
size which may or may not be forthcoming in this current study.  In addition, the 
moderating regression analysis (MRA) remains the main technique for investigating the 
moderating relationships for the second model.   
 
1.8. Expected Benefits of the Study 
 
Firstly, this study aims at increasing the body of knowledge in understanding the 
dysfunctional consequences of various sub-systems/mechanisms of an organisation’s 
MCS. Can (all) control systems reduce dysfunctional behaviour or are there specific 
control systems which in fact enhance the extent of managers’ dysfunctional behaviour? 
Research into such consequences will be of importance to companies, senior 
management and management consultants, who are involved in the setting up of MCS. 
More specifically, the negative consequences of MCS, if proven, would then need to be 
weighed against the traditional views that such systems lead to relatively more positive 
consequences. 
 
Secondly, in spite of two decades of extensive research into the relevance of 
contingency-based MCS, the findings remain equivocal and an overall MCS 
contingency framework has yet to be finalised. Researchers have consistently identified 
theoretical and empirical shortcomings in previous studies and encouraged further 
contingency-based research. This study therefore takes the view that the selected 
contingent variables are based on theoretical arguments, put forward by Simons (1994; 
1995; 2000) and Hartmann (2000). The two selected contextual variables (Task 
Uncertainty and Superior’s Interactive vs. Diagnostic Use of Controls) are, in their own 
right, relevant variables in the management control literature. Task Uncertainty has 
been a long standing contingent variable in the literature but its actual impact has been 
difficult to establish and model empirically. Superior’s Use of Interactive vs. Diagnostic 
Controls is relatively a new variable in the literature, but which is posited to be very 
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relevant, based on case study evidence and the recent empirical evidence (e.g. Bisbe and 
Otley, 2004; Henri, 2006) 
 
Thirdly, and whilst exploring some existing contextual variables, this study takes the 
view that the institutional perspective (and in wider terms, the interpretive perspective) 
also needs to be also considered. The institutional-led accounting studies have already 
convincingly argued for the relevance of the concepts of legitimacy, myths and rituals 
in the budgetary process. However, previous published research has been based on 
qualitative case studies and this study will attempt to operationalize an institutional-
oriented variable and hypothesise it as a contextual variable of interest in MCS.  
 
1.9. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The remaining structure of the thesis will be as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 will provide a review of the theoretical and empirical literature review on the 
contingency paradigm in management control systems. The scope of MCS will be 
defined and a categorisation of the various MCS dimensions used in management 
accounting research will be proposed. Then, a review of the findings related to the 
selected MCS sub-systems/mechanisms will be detailed. A third part will consider the 
use of dependent variables in contingency theory-based studies and a discussion on the 
need to focus on dysfunctional behaviour. This chapter will also highlight the main 
issues and limitations arising from the research methods applied in contingency-based 
research. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an analysis of lessons learned and 
provide detailed explanation of the research gaps to be taken up by this current study.  
 
Chapter 3 will consider the perspective of institutional theory. A general review of the 
aspects and implications of the theory will be presented. Whilst the DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983) view of new institutionalism will be analysed, this chapter will also 
examine the more critical views of Brunsson (1989) on the institutional processes 
within organisations. A review of current institutional-based accounting research will be 
also presented. These will lead towards suggesting the use of an institutional theory-
based variable in the MCS area. 
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Chapter 4 will put forward the detailed hypotheses for the study, in terms of the 
relationships between the selected individual components of MCS and dysfunctional 
behaviour, as influenced by the relevant contextual variables. The hypotheses will first 
consider the direct effects and the implications of indirect effects in understanding MCS 
and dysfunctional behaviour. On a separate level, the influence of the legitimating 
nature of controls will be examined.  
 
Chapter 5 will detail the research methods applied in this study. In particular, a mail 
questionnaire survey will imply a sample selection, the questionnaire design, a 
validation through pilot testing, the questionnaire administration and the procedures to 
ensure against response bias. The selection of, and justification for, constructs for the 
various dependent, independent and control (demographic/antecedents) variables will 
also be presented. 
 
Chapter 6 will analyse and discuss findings from the data collected. All the independent 
and dependent variables will be first tested for validity and reliability, and the 
hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4 will be considered. These hypotheses are broadly 
categorised in relation to the testing of the direct effects, the intervening effects (task 
uncertainty and superiors’ style of use of controls) and the moderating effects 
(legitimating nature of controls). 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 will provide a reflection on the main findings and contributions to the 
extant literature. The implications of these findings for management control research 
will be considered, taking into account any limitations that may be of relevance to 
future research. In light of these implications, specific research suggestions and 
recommendations are formulated.   
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Chapter 2 
MCS: Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review 
 
2.0. Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the state of the theoretical and empirical literature 
pertaining to the study of management control systems. Over the last four decades, the 
MCS literature has been dominated by the contingency paradigm, the continuous re-
definition of what constitutes an ‘MCS, and the quantitative-led implications and 
findings that remain connected to the role of contextual factors in MCS design and use. 
Although the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings (and consequent methods) have 
now become more diverse, it remains pertinent to present this chapter vis-à-vis this 
dominant paradigm and the concurrent methodologies.  This chapter also seeks to 
demonstrate the relative dearth of research on the empirical implications of managerial 
dysfunctional behaviours as a consequence of MCS.  
 
As a result, the key parts of this chapter relate to (1) an analysis of contingency theory 
(2) the orientations adopted in defining management control systems, (3) the empirical 
evidence on the selected control systems/mechanisms, (4) an evaluation of the 
contingent variables used in MCS research and the ones selected for this study, (5) a 
review of outcome variables, whether they related to the positive and negative 
consequences of MCS, and finally (6) a critical assessment of the research methods 
used. The chapter will end with an analysis of lessons learned and the resulting research 
gaps and opportunities that will be considered in this current study.  
 
2.1. The Contingency Paradigm in Management Accounting and Control Systems 
 
Contingency theory assert that organisations structure and design their management 
accounting and control systems (MACS) in relation to a set of external and internal 
contingent factors, in a bid to maximise managerial performance and effectiveness. 
Examples of such factors would be the level of technology and environmental 
uncertainty faced by the respective organisations. This is in contrast to the traditional 
approach whereby the design of an accounting information system (AIS) had focused 
on “....searching for the most desirable method of generating financial data to promote 
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effective decision making” (Gordon and Miller, 1976, p. 59) i.e. a normative 
connotation whereby: 
“…little attention had been given to the need for environmental, 
organisational and decision making style attributes in the design of an AIS. 
Also overlooked in much of the previous work is the contingent nature of most 
decision making”. (Gordon and Miller, 1976, p. 59)  
 
Consequently, researchers in the 1970s were more inclined to consider the 
appropriateness of a contingent approach to MACS although a contingency theory was 
yet to be conceptualised at that time (Otley, 1980, p. 84, 1980). 
 
2.1.1. Early “Contingency-Implicit” Studies 
 
Burns and Stalker (1961), Woodward (1965), Hopwood (1972) and Khandwalla (1972) 
are examples of studies where contingent factors and MACS design were intuitively 
linked to explain seemingly contradictory results (Hopper and Powell, 1985). In fact, 
Hopwoods’ (1972) results on the budget constrained (B.C) style vs. profit constrained 
(P.C) style sparked an important development in the contingency theory formulation 
when they were compared to the results of Otley (1978). The latter used measures 
comparable to Hopwood’s (1972) study and found that:  
“…Hopwood’s results were driven by the technical inadequacies of the 
accounting system as a means of performance evaluation in the interdependent 
cost centres.” (cited in Otley and Fakiolas, 2000, p. 502) 
 
This refers to Otley’s (1980, p. 86) earlier statement of “…an important situational 
difference which is suggestive of a contingent explanation10”. Similar evidence of such 
situational difference is found in Khandwalla (1972), where the sophistication of 
accounting and control systems was related to the intensity of competition the 
organisation faced. The environment was thus considered as an important factor in 
explaining managers’ use of the information provided by the accounting and control 
system.  
 
Otley (1980, p. 88) also acknowledges the influence of organisational literature in the 
development of a contingency theory and cites the early work of Burns and Stalker 
                                                
10
 This situational difference related to the degree of interdependence between responsibility centres.  
Hopwood (1972) studied interdependent cost centres whereas Otley (1978) selected independent profit 
centres 
  
24
(1961). The relevance of organisational structure within a contingency paradigm was 
eventually applied and tested in various studies such as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), 
Bruns and Waterhouse (1975), Sathe (1978), Watson and Baumler (1975), and 
Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978). As mentioned earlier, the conceptualisation of a 
contingency theory for MCS design might have been a lesser priority at that time. Otley 
(p. 91, 1980) summarises the attempts at a theoretical formulation, such as those by 
Gordon and Miller (1976) and Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978).  
 
2.1.2. Early Theoretical Propositions 
 
Gordon and Miller (1976) proposed three “archetypes” in relation to specific features of 
the AIS (1976, p. 570) i.e. a classification of organisations into three categories11 based 
on environmental, organisational, and decision style characteristics exhibited by these 
firms. However, it might be argued that such broad categorisation was an 
oversimplification of the relationship between contingent variables and AIS design.  
Furthermore, Otley (p. 91, 1980) criticises the proposition due to the lack of 
consideration of organisational objectives and effectiveness in the model.    
 
In contrast to Gordon and Miller’s (1976) framework, Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978) 
use only two categories of contingent variables: environment and technology. The 
various departments/units within the organisation are viewed as either being operational 
functions or management functions (Otley, 1980, p. 91). The former will focus on the 
technology factors whereas the latter is expected to consider environmental factors and 
therefore, the design of control systems would be dependent upon the needs of each 
department/unit. Since the distinction between operational and management functions 
falls within the “organisation structure” factor, Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978) 
conclude that organisation structure is itself contingent on technology and environment.  
 
Alternatively, Otley (1980, p. 96) proposes his own “minimum necessary contingency 
framework” whereby he defines a contingent variable as one that cannot be controlled 
or influenced by the organisation12. The organisational control package is viewed as one 
“setup” and is made up the AIS design, organisational design and other control 
                                                
11
 Firms would be categorised as “adaptive”, “running blind” or “stagnant bureaucracy” firms. 
12
 As an exception to this “rule”, organizational objectives will be regarded as a contingent variable, 
despite being a “controllable” factor.   
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arrangements. In contrast with previous theoretical attempts, Otley (1980, p. 97) 
formalises organisational effectiveness as a dependent variable whereby the “..proposed 
framework takes ends as given and is concerned with the most effective means of 
achieving them”.  
 
Otley (1980, p. 94) also argues that it would be very difficult to assess the impact of 
each component of the organisational control package on effectiveness, such as 
separating the AIS design from the control process13. Therefore, 
“The organisation adapts to the contingencies it faces by arranging the factors 
it can control into an appropriate configuration that it hopes will lead to 
effective performance.” (Otley, 1980, p. 96) 
 
This adaptation or arrangement of factors can be viewed as a reaction by the 
organisation to a set of contingency factors, and a contingency theory is expected to 
provide the necessary underpinnings in understanding and, by extension, in 
generalising such reaction. Indeed, Otley (1980, p. 84) expects that: 
“…a contingency theory must identify specific aspects of an accounting system 
which are associated with certain defined circumstances and demonstrate an 
appropriate matching”. 
 
The “demonstration of an appropriate matching” is of central importance to Otley 
(1978) since it implies the need for an “outcome effect” to validate a contingency-based 
model. The outcome could be performance, effectiveness, satisfaction, or even more 
positive (or less negative) attitudes to work. Evidently, the selection of a suitable 
outcome variable is critical and a review of the outcome variables will be presented 
later in the chapter (Section 2.7.1).  
 
Bearing in mind Otley’s (1978) model, Fisher (1995) situates the contingency approach 
of relating MACS to performance ideally between two extremes: the situation specific 
and the universalistic approaches (Hambrick and Lei, 1985). The former approach 
implies that the relationship between any component of organisational design (such as a 
control system), situational factors and performance is firm-specific and thus cannot be 
generalised, whereas the latter perspective assumes that there is an optimal 
organisational design which would hold, to a certain extent, for all firms and situations 
(Fisher, 1995, p. 29).  
                                                
13
 In this example, these two components are clearly complementary ones. 
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2.1.3 Validating Contingency Theory in MACS Research 
 
In light of the previous section, it needs to be determined whether Otley’s expectation 
has been actually fulfilled during the last two decades or so. Chapman (1997, p. 187) 
highlights the “fundamental appeal” of the contingency theory paradigm and argues that 
part of this appeal may lie in the simplicity of the original proposition. However, he 
cites earlier reviews by Otley (1980), Dent (1990), and Langfield-Smith (1997) where 
they agree on:  
“……the lack of an overall framework for the analysis of the relationship 
between contingent factors and accounting, leaving no obvious starting point 
for an explanation of an increasing body of often contradictory results” 
(Chapman, 1997, p. 189) 
 
Nevertheless, Chapman (1997) contends that the contradictions and lack of framework 
may in fact be related to a diverse understanding of the notion of contingency by 
researchers. He refers to a “…lack of communication between different schools of 
research” (1997, p. 189) on the contingent nature of accounting. If one considers the 
various empirical studies14 reviewed by Chapman (1997), it appears that Otley’s 
contingency proposition may have been applied on a piecemeal and uncoordinated 
fashion: an issue that was already raised by Fisher (1995, p. 24). This assertion is not a 
criticism of the individual studies, and their related findings within each “school of 
research” per se, but rather indicates the absence of common strand linking these 
studies to contingency theory.  
 
As an illustration of this lack of coordination and the inherent difficulties in developing 
a contingency framework, a study by Otley and Pollanen (2000) reviewed the research 
on the use of budgetary criteria in performance evaluation15. Although they consider 
(2000, p. 483) that studies in this area produced a number of findings and significant 
results, they also conclude: 
“Even so, the work is characterised by a number of number of deficiencies. 
Different authors have tackled different aspects of the issue; different studies 
use different subsets of variables; in many cases, the same variable is 
measured in importantly different ways……….each new piece of work has 
chosen to vary some aspect of the research design so that it is impossible to 
gauge the general validity of any of the reported work.” (2000, p. 483-484)       
                                                
14
 The “streams” of studies reviewed by Chapman (1997) are on Reliance of Accounting Performance 
Measures (RAPM), Centralisation of Control & Accounting, and Strategy & Accounting. 
15
 For example, Hopwood (1972), Otley (1978), Brownell (1982a, 1985), Dunk (1989), Harrison (1992). 
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The above comments thus highlight a significant number of problems relating to the 
selection of variables, which need to be further examined. 
 
2.1.4. Issues in Selecting Contingency Variables 
 
The lack of communication mentioned by Chapman (1997) in the previous section 
could also be related to the selection (or non selection) of contingency variables. In the 
context of MCS studies, Fisher (1998) noted that there has been little work in the 
identification of relevant contingency variables whereby: 
“A contingent variable is relevant to the degree that businesses that differ on 
that variable also exhibit major differences in how control attributes or actions 
are associated with performance”. (Fisher, 1998, p. 48) 
 
In the absence of a clear list of relevant contingencies, researchers have focused on a 
limited number of contingent variables, which a priori should have an impact on MCS. 
This created the perception that:  
“Contingency studies have come to be seen as large scale, cross sectional, 
postal questionnaire-based research, which examine the interaction of a 
limited number of variables.” (Chapman, 1997, p. 189) 
 
Chapman illustrates this arbitrary selection (or non selection) of “a limited number of 
variables” by referring to the research on the impact of strategy. He cites Langfield-
Smith (1997, p. 189) who expressed surprise as to the absence of business strategy as a 
variable in MCS research prior to the 1980s, despite early support by Chandler (1962) 
and Mintzberg (1973). The absence of the strategy variable could have been related to 
the difficulties in isolating the different aspects of strategy within an organization. 
Within the same context, Chapman (1997, p. 190) reminded that contingency theorists 
already warned of the inability of the study to “….provide generally applicable results, 
[but] only locally accurate ones”. In this respect, Chapman (1997, p. 190) also refers to 
Miles and Snow (1978), whose attempts to create a simpler and more generalised 
framework for describing strategic behaviour, was achieved at the expense of accuracy.  
 
The treatment of strategy as a variable (see also Hofer, 1975) in contingency studies 
highlights the problem of a “trade off” between the three qualities of contingency-based 
research: simplicity, generality and accuracy (Weick, 1979). Such a trade-off may be 
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viewed as necessary to analyse the results of “strategy-based” studies but it may also 
inherently impede the development of an overall contingency framework. Furthermore, 
as stated by Fisher (1998, p. 49), some of these variables (such as environmental 
uncertainty) capture very broad aspects and may in fact “hide” more specific and 
relevant ones or may exhibit strong cross-correlations between them.  
 
Mauldin and Ruchala (1999) also highlight the lack of a substantive basis to suggest 
which variables, and/or which combinations of variables, are important. It may be true 
that there are very strong, empirically validated, relationships for variables such as 
environmental uncertainty, technology and strategy but this does not necessarily mean 
they are the most important ones. Indeed, the authors make a very pertinent observation 
that illustrates the paradox of the contingency paradigm: 
“...it is difficult to argue against inclusion of any of the contingent variables, 
yet equally difficult to determine their completeness or to know which 
combinations of factors make sense and are more important.” (1999, p. 324)  
 
Such criticisms were earlier voiced by Schoohoven (1981), who does not consider 
contingency theory to be a theory at all (1981, p. 350) but rather an orientating strategy. 
The latter assumes the necessity of relating structures (such as accounting and control 
systems) to the existing perceived conditions (internal and external) in a bid to achieve 
effectiveness. “Consistency”, “matching”, “fit” thus became the keywords for 
contingency theory, but there was no guidance as to which contingency variables should 
be used. 
 
2.1.5. Contingency Variables: A Selected Inventory 
 
The relative consistency in the use of contingency variables, in terms of their meanings 
and measurement, in empirical studies is also an area of contention. Ideally, it is 
expected that successive studies can build on existing knowledge, such as variable 
measurement and definition, to create consistent additions to the theoretical contingency 
propositions. However, this has not been completely the case. For illustration purposes, 
a non-exhaustive list of 47 contextual (refer to Appendix 2.1) variables used in 
management accounting studies was identified for analysis. The selected empirical 
studies were in the area of budgetary participation, RAPM, incentive bonus system, and 
MACS design. The list also includes brief definitions and measurement constructs for 
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each variable together with a list of studies that have applied the variable. The following 
observations can be made. 
 
The “self-evident” (Emmanuel et al., 1990, p. 60) importance of the external 
environment as a contingency variable has been extensively researched but also 
diversely interpreted and operationalised. Within the selected list, there are seven 
different contingent variables which purport to capture the effects (partial or complete) 
of the environment namely: environment, environmental uncertainty, environmental 
volatility, intensity of market competition, market factors, product life cycle, and 
perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU). All these variables are measured by 
survey-based questions, except for environmental volatility (computed from accounting 
numbers). The PEU construct is the most common one with the general focus being laid 
on the relative predictability of the various components of the external environment 
(such as customers, competition, suppliers, regulatory bodies). However, there have 
also been narrowly defined variables (e.g. product life cycle and market factors) that 
prevent greater consistency in the interpretation of the impact of the “environment” 
factor.      
 
One other potential issue relates to the use of different constructs to represent the same 
variable and may also affect the comparison of contingency-based studies. For example 
PEU has been operationalised differently, based on Khandwalla (1972)/Miles and Snow 
(1978) or Duncan (1972). In turn, Govindarajan (1984) and Gordon and Narayanan 
(1984) have further modified these original measures. Tymon et al. (1998) provides a 
detailed review of the different scales used and concludes that: 
 “...accounting PEU research, particularly that based upon Duncan (1972), 
has often diverged from conceptualising PEU as a strategic construct. In doing 
so, the meaning of PEU has often been confounded with other well established 
constructs, most notably, role ambiguity.” (Tymon et al, 1998, p. 43). 
 
In a similar vein, the strategy variable has also viewed from diverse dimensions or what 
are commonly known as typologies. There are three main typologies that have been 
applied but one has yet to identify which one provides a better description of the 
strategic orientations of a company. Langfield-Smith (1997, p. 227) has mentioned the 
issue as to whether respondents understand and view themselves as applying one of 
these three typologies. In contrast, Merchant (1990, 1985b) did use the company’s own 
terminologies to avoid interpretation problems. 
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Furthermore, the contingency paradigm may have encouraged the development of 
different contingency factors that focus (fully or mostly) on the same underlying 
variable of interest. This clearly leads to ambiguous interpretations when comparing 
studies. For example, the variable “functional differentiation” has been used by several 
studies but the arguments/propositions used invariably ties it to task uncertainty. 
Therefore, functional differentiation may not be necessarily a variable of interest in 
such studies as long as it is linked to differences in task uncertainty. Also, 
organisational commitment (as defined by Nouri and Parker, 1996, p. 211) does not 
appear different from goal congruence (Jaworski and Young, 1992, p. 26) since both 
definitions refer to the adoption of organisational goals and values by the individual.  
 
On the other hand, variables such as locus of control, authoritarianism, interdependence, 
and leadership style (consideration and initiating structure) have been consistently 
defined and applied in the various studies, thus reducing the possible confounding 
effects of different measurement. Also, in some situations, studies have used 
synonymous terms for the same variable but measured it consistently e.g. 
manufacturing flexibility (or customisation) and task difficulty (or job difficulty).  
This review of contingency variables reveals, to a certain extent, a multiplication of the 
variables of interest and their measurement scales, thus confirming the earlier comments 
of Otley and Pollanen (2000) made in the context of RAPM studies. Given that 
contingency theory does not provide for a “conceptual barrier” to select the contingent 
variable of interest, there is the increasing possibility that research in the field of MACS 
may be directed towards “discovering” new variables rather than confirming the 
relevance of the existing ones.    
 
2.1.6. Interpreting Contingency-based Findings 
 
Chapman (1997, p. 190) observes that contingency researchers happen to have very 
unsophisticated perceptions of the accounting function i.e. “…a purely formal and 
routine technology…”, and their relationship with the contingency factors such as 
environmental uncertainty. Similarly, Hopper and Powell (1985) argue that 
management, as a whole, is portrayed as a technical role involving the “…matching of 
organisational design to the dictates of contingent factors”. This is reminiscent of the 
objectivist approach whereby “...societies, organisations and control systems are seen 
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to have an empirical existence independent of any individual’s cognition, and needs and 
goals have been imputed to each...” (Hopper and Powell, 1985, p. 441) 
 
More importantly the use of accounting information in organisations, with respect to a 
host of contingent variables, appears to have been interpreted in a gradually normative 
fashion rather than remaining a positive one. In other words, a correct match between 
MAS design and contingent factors will imply effective performance. Hence, 
“….effective operation of enterprises is seen as dependent upon there being a 
suitable match between its internal organisation (including structures, styles of 
leadership and decision making), and the nature of the demands placed upon it 
by its tasks, size, environment and members’ wants” (Hopper and Powell, 
1985, p. 441) 
 
Hopper and Powell (1985) review the various approaches to understanding 
organisational and social aspects of management accounting and are critical of 
contingency theory. They contend that, although a contingency theory foundation was 
supposed to describe and measure practice (and eventually explain relationships 
between organisational performance, MCS design and contingency variables), 
contingency studies may have been used to justify, and generate, normative models (i.e. 
a strict cause and effect relationship). The correlation and regression techniques that are 
frequently used in contingency studies may have encouraged such reasoning. As quoted 
from Hopper and Powell (1985, p. 441): 
“i.e., thus, what is slips into what should be. What might be is not addressed. 
By emphasizing technological determinism and neglecting how control systems 
may be a product of social cultures, ideologies and power struggles, attention 
is deflected from alternatives based on different values”  
 
The criticisms voiced above by Hopper and Powell (1985) and Chapman (1997) seem 
to indicate that contingency-based studies have diverged from its ideal “middle 
position” (as described earlier by Fisher, 1995) by being too situation specific 
(Chapman’s comments on piecemeal findings) or too normative oriented (Hopper and 
Powell). In addition, Hopper and Powell (1985) refer to comments made in the 
literature (e.g. Schreyogg, 1980; Cooper, 1981) whereby “ …all criticise contingency 
theory for paying insufficient attention to the discretion possessed by key decision 
makers and how values, beliefs and ideologies may influence choices”. Thus, the 
prescriptive orientation that contingency studies have taken may have clouded the 
“real” variables of interest and ignored the interactive aspect i.e. social cultures, 
ideologies and power struggles. At this stage it is unclear as to how such so-called “non-
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technical” variables can be modelled with success within the contingency paradigm, 
which pre-supposes strong technical (hence, rational) relationships. For example, the 
relevance of national culture as a situational variable in MCS studies16 has been 
researched and observed, but there have been quite a few non-significant results or 
contradictory findings (Chow et al, 1999, p. 442).   
 
2.1.7. Seeking Commonality: Chapman’s (1997) Arguments 
 
In an attempt to extract some commonality towards developing an overall contingency 
framework, Chapman (1997, p. 1997) reviews three contingency studies that have 
looked at the impact of environmental uncertainty on organisation structure, namely 
Burns and Stalker (1961), Woodward (1965) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). He 
argues that the style of communication is in fact the real variable of interest and the 
determinant that responds to uncertainty. Therefore, “….structure might be seen as a 
proxy for communication, not a solution in its own right” (Chapman, 1997, p. 198). 
Chapman (1997, p. 199) justifies his assertions by referring to earlier propositions made 
by Galbraith (1973), who also reviewed the three above-mentioned studies in a bid to 
analyse the “uncertainty” variable. Galbraith (1973) viewed uncertainty as a shortage of 
information and consequently expected organisations to provide updated and regular 
information to ensure task performance in such conditions. 
 
Building on the writings Galbraith (1973), Chapman (1997, p. 200) concludes that the 
“uncertainty” definition17 as applied in most contingency studies is far from 
representing all the elements or “subsets” of uncertainty. He further argues that the 
usual elements of uncertainty applied in contingency studies are in fact complexity 
variables. According to Chapman (1997, p. 1997), this confusion is at the root of the 
“perceived” and “actual” uncertainty differences put forward by Gordon and Narayanan 
(1984) - whereby some organisations would fail to recognise the level of uncertainty 
they were actually facing. Indeed, it was an assertion that conveniently avoided the 
issue as to the appropriateness of the research instruments for describing and measuring 
uncertainty. Chapman (1997, p. 201) concludes that Galbraith’s (1973) proposition, 
where organisations are viewed as information processing entities, is a more adequate to 
                                                
16
 Refer to Chow et al. (1999) for a review of studies linking management control and national culture 
(based on Hofstede’s taxonomy, 1980, 1991) 
17
 Which include elements such as environment, technology and interdependence. 
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the contingency framework. Hence, the contingent variables earlier identified become 
measures of complexity whereas uncertainty is considered to be the major determinant 
in the design of the structure and processes of an entity’s information system.  
“Uncertainty is caused not only by the interaction of a number of external 
contextual factors, but critically also by factors such as the level of 
organisational knowledge and understanding of how these impact on internal 
processes” (Chapman, p. 201, 1997) 
 
Chapman (1997) then attempts to illustrate his proposals using earlier organisational 
typologies that relate uncertainty, decision-making and the role of information and 
control systems. More specifically, he makes use of Hopwood’s (1980) notion of 
answer machines and learning machines. In a low uncertainty situation, the accounting 
function has “all the answers” and there will be high reliance on budget-related 
measures. In a high uncertainty situation, the accounting numbers are deemed to be 
insufficient or even outdated to enable the organisation to take decisions. This would 
perhaps imply more reliance on non-financial information. However, it is unclear as to 
how such a condition could result into accounting being a learning machine. Chapman 
(1997, p. 202) expresses some doubts: 
“The process through which we might expect accounting to become a tool for 
learning however is more complex and revolves around the meaning attached 
to accounting numbers.”  
      
Chapman also raises difficulties that one may experience in observing the above-
mentioned processes using questionnaire surveys although he concedes that a successful 
“..comprehensive view of the contingent nature of accounting..” (1997, p. 202) may 
depend on such methods.  In substantive terms, the PEU variable has been successful in 
providing a different, but very relevant, perspective of uncertainty as opposed to the 
complexity variable. In so doing, it also highlights the problems faced by contingency 
researchers in describing and measuring, accurately and completely, contingent 
variables, as seen earlier in the review of some selected contingency variables. 
However, there is one issue that appears to be brushed aside in Chapman’s framework: 
information is not processed by organisations but rather by individuals. Thus, can one 
model an organisation as a monolithic entity when information processing and 
requirements are considered? 
 
When Chapman (1997) referred to the causes of uncertainty (earlier quotation on 
uncertainty), he also raised one limitation: 
  
34
“The implication of this is that, far from being unexpected, different responses 
to similar external stimuli might be almost inevitable” (1997, p. 201) 
 
This lack of consistent responses may indeed be related to the different perceptions of 
the same information set by different managers within the same entity. Or more 
interestingly, there could be a need to integrate other theories to the contingency 
paradigm to seek more accurate explanations of such inconsistent results.  
 
2.1.8. Integrating Alternate Theoretical Perspectives (Chenhall, 2003)  
 
Chenhall (2003) provides a more recent and thorough review of contingency-based 
MCS studies. Apart from the extensive review he conducted on the types of MCS being 
researched and the selected contingent variables, he proposes the integration of various 
theories within the contingency-based MCS literature. He argues (2003, p. 157) that 
there is no specific contingency theory, but rather a variety of theories that may be used 
to explain and predict the conditions under which particular MCS will be found or 
where they will be associated with enhanced performance. In view of the multiplicity of 
events and contextual settings that are likely to affect MCS, Chenhall (2003) raises the 
possibility that future MCS studies can be improved by integrating insights from 
alternate theoretical perspectives. Although the author implicitly predicts that such 
theories would shed light on the positive outcomes of MCS, there is no reason to 
believe that similar benefits can be obtained when researching on more negative 
outcomes, as proposed in this study.  
 
The alternate theories elaborated by Chenhall (2003) are agency theory (the role of 
incentive schemes), population-ecology theory (issues relating to birth and death of 
organisations), psychology theories (trust, organisational commitment etc), and 
behavioural economics (impact of cognitive limitations on decision making). In 
addition, one criticism of contingency-based research is that it has relied on traditional, 
functionalist theories and has not applied more interpretive and critical views (Chenhall, 
2003, p. 159). For example, one possible interpretation would be that MCS does not 
necessarily lead to effectiveness or organisational benefits but is rather used for political 
and power purposes. Hence, MCS are not only seen as passive mechanisms to be used 
by managers to assist in optimizing resource allocation. They are in fact used to 
legitimate particular power relationships within organisations and the MCS 
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implementation may be motivated by mimicry and compliance rather than a need for 
enhanced efficiency (Chenhall, 2003, p. 160) 
 
The key question remains whether such theories can be combined with the traditional 
contingency model. On the basis of past research and arguments, Chenhall (2003, p. 
160) believes it would be possible for:  
“A contingency-based approach attempts to map variables and demonstrate 
potential relationships between these variables, which may include power and 
politics, and indicate potential links with outcomes “  
 
This argument is a critical one in that it is important to note that integrating alternate 
theories does not mean unifying the functional and alternate approaches. This is one of 
the motivations behind investigating the use of institutional theory-based variables in 
this study. The latter theory will be reviewed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
 
2.1.9. Concluding Remarks 
 
Insofar as MCS research is concerned, it can be argued from the above review that the 
contingency paradigm remains at a crossroad. In view of Chapman’s (1997) and 
Chenhall’s (2003) earlier comments, it has taken root within the MCS literature in 
providing a simple and clear direction for researchers but it is now clearly beyond the 
definition of a mere ‘orientating strategy’. Contemporary authors argue that the 
contingent perspective has not provided the answers but arguably these answers are 
dependent on the nature and depth of the contextual factors, the variable under study 
(i.e. level and complexity of MCS) and the outcome variable. In this respect, one cannot 
criticise the theory simply because the arbitrarily selected variables did not provide the 
intended impact on the arbitrarily selected outcomes. In this view, Chenhall’s (2003) 
proposal to integrate alternate theories is beneficial in the sense of developing a more 
in-depth analysis and understanding of the so-called contextual factors and/or results. At 
the same time, Chapman’s (1997) comments re-assert the primacy of the ‘uncertainty’ 
factor in MCS, as inspired by the initial writings of Burns and Stalker (1961), 
Woodward (1965), Lawrence and Lorsh (1967) and Galbraith (1973). These recent 
theoretical/conceptual reviews by Chapman and Chenhall are thus supportive of further 
contingency research that would consider the applicability of the ‘alternate theory’ and 
‘uncertainty’ factors. As a result, these are considered (separately) in this study. In 
addition, and despite the absence of a “consistent picture” relating contextual factors 
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and components of management accounting and control systems (MACS), contingency 
theory remains fundamentally appealing in view of some of its relative successes in 
specific MACS sub-systems. Recently published MCS studies show a continued 
reliance on contingency thinking, in terms of not only seeking to understand the 
moderating effects of these variables but also their effects as antecedent variables (e.g. 
Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007; Widener, 2004). The next section will provide a 
detailed review of the control sub-systems selected for this study. 
2.2. Management Control Systems: Definitions and Scope 
 
This section reviews the various terms, definitions and scope that have been applied in 
management accounting research literature since the early 1970s to describe 
management accounting and control systems in an organisational context. Also, a more 
focused review of the different mechanisms/dimensions of management control 
systems, and a tentative classification of these mechanisms/dimensions, is proposed. 
The overall objective of these reviews is to highlight commonalities and inconsistencies 
in these definitions, hence providing a base for the selection of a theoretically sound, 
and empirically testable, definition and scope of management control systems (MCS).  
2.2.1. Comparing the Definitions and Conceptualisations of MCS 
 
Appendix 2.2 provides, in chronological order, a list of those studies that have 
considered the definitions (or descriptions) of the following terms: accounting systems, 
accounting information systems (AIS), information & control systems, management 
information systems (MIS), management accounting system (MAS), and management 
control systems (MCS). The definition is summarised, together with the context or 
objectives adopted in each study.  
 
The management accounting literature contains a substantial amount of research on the 
impact of budgets, budgetary controls and/or budgetary process on managerial 
performance. However, issues relating to definitions of budgetary controls and 
processes and the scope of research into the use of budgetary information (a formal 
control mechanism) have been far less controversial. Briers and Hirst (1990), Otley and 
Pollanen (2000) and Hartmann (2000) provide a thorough review of such research and 
its implications, and a illustration of the lack of controversy can be seen from 
Merchant’s (1984, in Appendix 2.2, No. 8) definition of budgeting as a part of a MCS.   
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On the other hand, a review of definitions in the remaining empirical and theoretical 
literature on MCS reveals disagreements and inconsistencies. For example, Hopwood’s 
(1972) description of accounting systems is a very broad one, emphasising the 
informational aspects of the system. Yet his study focuses only on performance 
evaluation i.e. one control aspect of the accounting system. His subsequent definitions 
(Hopwood, 1977; 1978), however, became more specific, when he considered control 
systems to be separate from the information system.  
 
One attempt at identifying individual components of the accounting system resulted in 
the term “management accounting system”, which is viewed by Otley (1980, p. 91) as 
one type of formal control mechanism - i.e. directed at ensuring proper behaviour. Other 
researchers, such as Tiessen and Waterhouse (1983), Macintosh and Daft (1987), Amat 
et al. (1994), Chia (1995), and Sim and Killough (1998) have also shared similar views. 
However, Gordon and Narayanan (1984) argued that MAS-oriented research has in fact 
been concerned with information system characteristics rather than control system ones. 
This view has become manifest in studies of the MAS information dimensions of scope, 
aggregation, timeliness and integration, as put forward by Chenhall and Morris (1986) 
and applied – sometimes inconsistently - in several studies (e.g. Mia and Chenhall, 
1994; Chong 1996; Mia and Clarke 1999; Tsui, 2001). Alternatively, it is observed that 
the term “management control systems” has been defined fairly consistently throughout 
the literature. As stated by Anthony and Govindarajan (1998), 
“The system used by management to control the activities of an organization is 
called its management control system. Management control is the process by 
which managers influence other members of the organization to implement the 
organization’s strategies”.  (1998, p. 17) 
 
MCS is referred to as a formal (cybernetic) control system with an overall aim of 
regulating behaviours within the organization. So far, research in MCS has been 
restricted to the relationships between managers and their superiors, and thus does not 
consider the effects/consequences/effectiveness of control systems on non-managerial 
staff. Hence, Merchant’s (1989) definition (cited in Fisher, 1995) is more relevant i.e. 
MCS aims at ensuring that mid-level managers carry out organizational objectives and 
strategies. In contrast to Shields et al.’s (2000, p. 185) traditional view of the cybernetic 
control model where targets (budget or standards) are compared to actual output as a 
basis for corrective action or performance evaluation, Anthony and Govindarajan (1998, 
p. 7) contend that management control must take a more flexible perspective and would, 
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in fact, involve all managerial activities18. This has allowed for a gradual inclusion of 
non-financial based measures/controls e.g. Abernethy and Lillis (1995), Fisher (1995 
and 1996), Chow et al. (1996), Langfield-Smith (1997), Anthony and Govindarajan 
(1998) and Davila (2000)19. Chenhall (2003, p. 129) made a more recent attempt at 
defining MCS but argued that MCS is a broader term that encompasses MAS and also 
includes other controls such as personal or clan controls, and perceives MCS as 
“passive tools” providing information to assist managers. This is in contrast to Anthony 
and Govindarajan’s (1998) perspective since they consider MCS to be an “active tool” 
for managerial activities.  
 
In parallel, Simons (1995; 2000) reviews the conceptualisation of control systems in the 
context of strategy implementation. He argues that MCS are in fact information-based 
systems that ‘become’ control systems when they are used to maintain or alter patterns 
in organizational activities (1995, p. 5). To some extent, he sought to transcend the 
various previously used distinctions – i.e. active/passive, formal/informal and 
financial/non-financial – and posits that the control of business strategy is achieved by 
the combined use and integration of four levers of control, namely belief systems, 
boundary systems, diagnostic control systems and interactive control systems. More 
crucially however, he argues that the power of these levers in implementing strategy 
does not lie in how each is used alone, but rather in how the forces create a ‘dynamic 
tension’ (Simons, 2000, p. 301). As a result of this dynamic tension, it is argued that 
control features can be complementary i.e. increasing the emphasis on one control 
component increases the benefit received from other control components (Tuomela, 
2005; Widener, 2007). However, the focus of Simon’s conceptualisations of controls is 
more generic, focusing more on strategy-controls linkages and how these are 
collectively used rather than on the nature, feature or characteristics of management 
controls per se and how they each individually influence behaviour. 
 
Nevertheless, and based on the above-mentioned definitions, it can be stated that MCS 
research tends to focus on the control aspects of an organisation’s management 
information system. The various forms and mechanisms of MCS will now be 
considered as categorised by the MCS literature.   
                                                
18
 Planning, Coordinating, Communicating, Evaluating, Deciding and Influencing (1998, p.7). 
19
 Davila (2000, p. 395) devised a new measure of MCS design (as a dependent variable) using 3 main 
characteristics, after having identified six types of information most frequently reported through the 
organizations’ formal systems. 
  
39
 
2.2.2. Categories of Control Systems 
 
The literature provides different categories and types of management control systems. 
For example, Westerlund and Sjostrand (1979, cited in Otley, 1980) classify formalised 
control systems as “means of control” for long-range or short-range activity. Examples 
of some of the means of control for short-range activity are regulations, budgets, 
directions, checklists, standards, resource allocation and delegation of decisions. The 
long-range activity “means of controls” are mostly in the form of long term planning 
documents (for investment, recruitment and selection and promotions). 
 
An alternative categorisation of control practices was also proposed by Merchant 
(1982), where he classified control mechanisms as (i) specific-action controls, (ii) 
results-of-decisions controls and (iii) personnel controls (cited in Kren and Kerr, 1993, 
p. 162)20. The first category focused on authority-limit controls (e.g. authority limits, 
standard procedures and manuals) while the second category considered the extent of 
formal meetings to review decisions and required explanations for variances. Finally, 
personnel controls related to the extent of use of informal contacts meetings with 
superiors and the use of belief/boundary systems (e.g. Marginson, 2002; Widener, 
2004).    
 
As explained in the previous section, Simons (1995; 2001) developed a generic and 
broader conceptualisation of control systems by referring to belief systems (used to 
inspire and direct the search for new opportunities), boundary systems (used to set 
limits on opportunity seeking behaviour), diagnostic controls (used to motivate, 
monitor, and reward achievement of specified goals), and interactive controls (used to 
stimulate organizational learning, and the emergence of new ideas and strategies). For 
example, a mission statement could be seen a belief system whilst a standard operating 
procedure could be an example of a boundary system. However, the budgetary 
participation could have both interactive features (i.e. stimulate learning and new 
ideas/strategies) as well as a diagnostic ones (used to motivate and monitor). 
Furthermore, according to Simons (1995, p. 7), these four levers create opposing forces 
of effective strategy implementation. Whilst belief systems and interactive control 
                                                
20
 There is a fourth category, known as information system controls, which relates to informational 
characteristics rather than control ones. 
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systems create positive and inspirational forces, the other two levers create constraints 
and ensure compliance with orders. It is this interplay of forces – operated by senior 
managers – that creates a dynamic tension. For example, one can consider that belief 
systems motivate managers towards exploring new opportunities but at the same time, 
boundary systems seek to constrain the exploration spurred on by the belief systems. 
The notion that these two opposing forces are complementary has been empirically 
investigated recently (e.g. Widener, 2007).  
 
On the other hand, Fisher (1995) refers to Giglioni and Bedeian’s21 (1974) distinction 
between general control mechanisms and formal control systems. The former is applied 
via standard operating procedures, firm structure, firm culture and human resource 
policies whereas the latter category must be based on performance targets, actual and 
feedback i.e. a cybernetic model (Fisher, 1995, p. 26). According to Fisher (1995), the 
general control mechanisms are not formal control systems per se, but they do impact 
on the operation and effectiveness of formal control systems.  
 
While general control mechanisms, such as firm culture and firm structure, can indeed 
be viewed as being indirectly related to an organisation’s control system, it is difficult 
to consider standard operating procedures (SOP) as being potentially less important 
than other formal control systems (such as a budgetary control system). Macintosh and 
Daft (1987, p. 51) define SOP as the set of written rules, procedures, policies and 
operating manuals used to guide managers as they administer their departments. They 
also include general policy guidelines, job descriptions and prescriptions for how 
managers should handle operational situations that might arise. The auditing literature 
generally refers to the term “internal controls” to describe some of the standard 
operating procedures. SOP do form an important part of any public or private sector’s 
organisational control system. It could also be interpreted as having “cybernetic” 
characteristics, but with a selective feedback mechanism i.e. arising only when 
departures from the standard (e.g. rules) are noted.  
 
Insofar the “formal” control systems are concerned, Fisher (1995) comments that most 
of the MCS research has focused on budgeting systems and incentive compensation 
schemes. The financial nature of these control systems has indeed attracted accounting 
                                                
21
 Cited in Fisher (1995, p. 25). 
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research into this area and there has been less emphasis on non-financial control 
systems. As a case in point, the research into incentive compensation scheme as a 
control system (e.g. Fisher and Govindarajan, 1993) has focused solely on financial 
rewards (Fisher, 1998, p. 28). Given that incentive schemes are generally made up of a 
mix of financial and non-financial rewards (such as promotion), findings into the 
adequacy of this control mechanism could be significantly limited. Fisher (1995, p. 28) 
also provides a list of macro control attributes that have been used to describe the 
general orientation of control systems. A summary explanation of each attribute is 
detailed in Table 2.1 below.  
 
Macro Control 
Attribute 
Description 
 
Tight vs. Loose Degree of actual enforcement of the control system.    
Objective vs. Subjective Extent to which the system is based on pre-determined formula 
and policies, rather than on subjective evaluation 
Mechanistic vs. Organic Extent to which the control system is applied methodically 
without consideration to contextual factors or exceptions.  
Short Term vs. Long Term Extent to which control system is based on short term or long 
term performance measures 
Group vs. Individual Extent to which the control system’s targets are applicable to 
all sub-units within the organisation or tailor-made to each sub-
unit 
Interactive vs. Programmed Extent of involvement of evaluator in the control system 
process. 
Administrative vs. 
Interpersonal 
Administrative control systems would imply greater emphasis 
on subordinate budget participation, on achievement of budget 
targets and more detailed budget data. 
Behaviour vs. Outcome Extent to which control system focuses on regulating behaviour 
(the means) rather than assessing results (the end) only. 
Table 2.1 : Macro Control Attributes - Summarised from Fisher (199522) 
 
In addition, some of these attributes can also be applied to sub-control systems, thus 
providing a different outlook of the same control system e.g. the criteria used for a 
performance related compensation scheme can be classified in terms of its degree of 
objectivity. Also, given the common view that financial measures are short-term based 
and tend to apply to all sub-units within an organisation (Fisher, 1995, p. 28), a criteria 
for a compensation scheme can thus be also be classified as short term or group 
oriented. More recently, Chenhall (2003) has focused on the organic vs. mechanistic 
control attributes to classify controls. Overall, whilst these macro control attributes 
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 One could add to this classification the interactive vs. diagnostic use of control systems, as suggested 
by Simons (1995; 2000) 
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appear useful to model MCS, it also seems that researchers have investigated control 
systems using different mindsets and contexts.  
 
2.2.3. Classifying the Researched MCS Dimensions. 
 
Based on review of the MCS literature, 16 different dimensions23, individual aspects 
and/or perspectives of the management control system (at diverse levels) have been 
identified and reported in Appendix 2.3. One can thus map that MCS has been 
researched at three distinct levels or tiers: 
(a) Tier 1: Management Control Systems in General (Dimension No. 1, 2 and 3) – 
Studies like Simons (1987a) and Kren and Kerr (1993)24 have focused on the state 
and impact of MCS in general. Data was sought on the individual aspects of the 
control systems but were eventually subsumed or factored within ad-hoc 
categories. Simons (1990), Marginson (2002) and Widener (2007) also adopted 
this level of MCS as the event to be researched and used case study methods to 
describe and analyse the effects of control systems. 
 
(b) Tier 2: Major Control Sub-Systems – The major control sub-systems that have 
been researched at this level are the structuring of activities (No. 4), standard 
operating procedures (No. 5 and No. 6) and the budgeting process (No. 9, No. 10 
and No. 11). There have been different dimensions used to represent these major 
control sub-systems. For example, standard operating procedures was viewed 
solely in terms of the extent of activities which are controlled by 
manuals/procedures (Chow et al, 1999, p. 458), compared to Macintosh and Daft’s 
(1987) characteristics of SOPs (number of pages, number of books, extent to 
which adherence to SOP is reflected in performance evaluation etc.).  
 
Similarly, the budgeting process was operationalised in terms of operating budget 
and statistical reports (non-financial dimension) characteristics (Macintosh and 
Daft, 1987) while budget-related behaviour (BRB) attempted to summarise all the 
control aspects of the budget. However, there are notable similarities between both 
dimensions such as “extent of responses/explanation to variances” and 
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 These do not include contemporary innovations in MCS such as Activity-based costing, balanced 
scorecards, target costing (as mentioned in Chenhall,2003) 
24
 Adapted from Merchant (1982). 
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“Subordinate’s Influence on Budget/Target Setting”. It is also noted there have 
been very little research applying general aspects of sub-control systems for 
performance appraisal system and compensation schemes25.  
 
(c) Tier 3: Individual Management Control Mechanisms – This is the category where 
researchers have mostly focused on such as budgetary participation (No. 7), 
reliance on accounting measures for performance evaluation (No. 14) and budget 
performance/rewards linkages (No. 15). In these cases, individual aspects of 
control sub-systems were selected presumably in an attempt to obtain more 
focused and consistent results, thus avoiding potential confounding effects of too 
many dimensions of management control systems (as in (a) and (b) above). 
Inevitably, those of direct relevance to accountants (i.e. the use of financial 
measures/numbers) were privileged. In addition, the simplification of the control 
variables in these studies may overlook very relevant inter-relationships between 
the different control sub-systems and mechanisms, as argued by Fisher (1995). 
However, the inclusion of too many control components within a contingency 
framework may lead into an un-interpretable and unmanageable model. 
 
2.2.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Despite widespread agreement to the “textbook” definition of MCS (i.e. Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 1998, p.7), the extant research has operationalised MCS in very different 
ways. A tentative category of such dimensions/aspects has been proposed. Whilst there 
are unexplored avenues in the research of major sub-control systems (such as 
performance evaluation and compensation), this study aims at linking MCS to 
dysfunctional behaviour and at integrating alternate theories within the contingency 
paradigm. Consequently, an initial focus on established control mechanisms (Tier 3) 
that have been extensively used and validated (especially within the contingency 
paradigm) is more realist and feasible. However, emphasis on one tier of MCS may also 
be too limited, especially if these control mechanisms are predominantly financially 
oriented (i.e. reliance on budget or accounting performance measures). Thus, analysis of 
the effects of control systems at different ‘tiers’ may provide a more complete insight. 
                                                
25
 Both Tiers 1 and 2 can be used in the same research, as is apparent in Bisbe and Otley’s (2004) study of 
the interactive use of budgets, balanced scorecards, and project management systems – which was then 
combined into an overall ‘interactive use of management control systems’.  
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In light of the analysis made in this section, the following control sub-systems/control 
mechanisms will be studied, as a representative “sample” of the organization’s MCS: 
(1) Standard Operating Procedures (Control Sub-System) 
(2) Subordinate’s Participation in Budget/Target Setting (Control Mechanism) 
(3) Reliance on Accounting Performance Measures (RAPM) for Subordinate’s 
Performance Evaluation – also referred to as Supervisory Evaluation Style or 
Budget Emphasis (Control Mechanism) 
 
The next section will now analyse the findings/results of studies relating to the three 
above-mentioned control sub-systems/mechanisms within the contingency paradigm.  
 
2.3. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
 
A review of the MCS literature reveals that very few studies have considered SOPs 
independently of the other elements and mechanisms of control system. The contexts, 
periods and methods in which these studies have been conducted are sufficiently diverse 
to invalidate strict cross-study comparisons but they do provide valuable insights as to 
the importance of further investigation of standard operating procedures.  
 
2.3.1. Rockness and Shields (1984)  
 
This study is based on Ouchi’s (1977) organisational control framework, which 
hypothesises a contingency relationship between task characteristics and organisational 
controls (Rockness and Shields, 1984, p. 166). More specifically, the importance 
attached to controls will be a function of the four components of task characteristics: 
primary ones (knowledge of the transformation process and measurability of the output) 
and secondary ones (task complexity and task interdependence). Also the organisational 
controls can be further classified as social, behaviour and output controls. According to 
Ouchi (1977), SOPs are one major type of behaviour control since they consist of “...a 
set of formal rules and operating procedures about how tasks should be performed” 
(cited in Rockness and Shields, 1984, p. 167). In a situation where there is a high 
knowledge of the transformation process and a correspondingly low timely 
measurability of output, it was hypothesised that behaviour controls would be more 
applicable. Based on responses from R&D project supervisors in non-profit and profit 
organisations, a positive and significant association (0.18) between behaviour controls 
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and knowledge of transformation process was found. Although this study brings 
evidence of the importance of SOPs in a specific task characteristic and so within a 
different setting (i.e. research and development organisations instead of traditional 
“business” units), the absence of an outcome variable (e.g. effectiveness, performance, 
efficiency) prevents further analysis on the relative “success” of the SOPs/task 
characteristics combination. In addition, only one item was used to measure the extent 
of rules and operating procedures (five-point Likert-scale from none to extreme). 
 
2.3.2. Macintosh and Daft (1987)  
 
In contrast to Rockness and Shields (1984), Macintosh and Daft (1987) focus on only 
one aspect of task characteristics, namely departmental interdependence. Van de Ven et 
al. (1976) define interdependence as the extent to which departments depend upon each 
other and exchange information and resources to accomplish their respective tasks. 
There are three levels of departmental interdependence namely pooled, sequential and 
reciprocal. Whilst pooled interdependence implies very minimal workflow between 
departments (or close to unit autonomy or independence), sequential interdependence 
involves “production chain” linkages between the different units where every output 
becomes an input for another department. Finally, reciprocal interdependence denotes 
continuous interchange and coordination between departments to complete the 
product/service. For example, such level of interdependence will be expected within 
firms which manufacture only tailored products (Bouwens and Abernethy, 2000, p. 
224).  
 
Macintosh and Daft (1987) hypothesised that the extent of SOPs26 is positively 
correlated to the extent of pooled interdependence among departments, since “..it is in 
such situations that the bureaucratic techniques of categorisation and impersonal 
application of rules have been most beneficial” (Thompson, 1967, p. 17). On the other 
hand, higher levels of interdependence cannot be controlled by SOPs because activities 
are not standardized, requiring more management intervention, hence leading to a 
negative correlation hypothesis between the extent of SOPs and the extent of 
sequential/reciprocal interdependence. Six different measures (Appendix 2.3, No. 6) 
were used to represent the extent of SOP measures and a positive correlation was found 
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 Macintosh and Daft (1987) also investigate the link between interdependence and two other control 
systems - operating budget and statistical reports - but this section focuses solely on SOPs.  
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between all the measures, except for “extent of adherence to SOPs to evaluate 
performance”, and extent of pooled interdependence. In addition, a non-significant 
correlation was observed between SOPs and sequential interdependence, while a 
negative association was found between the extent of reciprocal interdependence and 
SOPs (except for “extent of adherence to SOPs to evaluate performance”). Hence, there 
is indication of a “reversal of importance” for SOPs in relation to a higher level of 
departmental interdependence.  
 
In spite of the results fitting the hypotheses, the relationship between department 
interdependence and SOPs is that of a simple empirical association. Macintosh and Daft 
(1987, p. 58) do report on the motivational force of the control system and the fact that 
department managers were highly satisfied with the SOPs. However, this observation 
was not empirical supported i.e. a fit between SOPs, interdependence and an outcome 
variable such as manager’s effectiveness, satisfaction or motivation level. As in the case 
of Rockness and Shield’s (1984) findings, the results of Macintosh and Daft (1987) only 
bring some persuasive evidence as to the contextual relevance of SOPs. Causality and 
interaction of SOPs had yet to be empirically demonstrated. 
 
2.3.3. Chow, Kato and Merchant (1996) 
 
Chow et al. (1996) investigated the use of organizational controls and their effects of 
two forms of dysfunctional behaviour, namely data manipulation and management 
myopia in two companies: one in Japan and one located in the US. Amongst the studied 
organizational controls were ‘procedural controls’ which were related to procedures for 
hiring personnel, spending discretionary monies and making capital expenditures. The 
control variables were measured in terms of how tight these were operating in the 
manager’s environment. Based on a questionnaire responses from a sample of 22 
managers in each company, it was found that faced with same level of control tightness 
(including procedural controls), both sets of managers would engage in dysfunctional 
behaviours (short term orientation and manipulation of performance measures) but as 
hypothesised, US managers appear to engage more in the dysfunctional behaviours. 
Nonetheless, this is one of the rare empirical studies that (indirectly) considered SOPs 
and dysfunctional behaviour. However, the sample size is relatively small and related to 
two companies only. 
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2.3.4. Chow, Shields and Wu (1999)   
 
This study examines the relevance of national culture (Taiwan) in affecting the design 
of, and preference for, MCS sub-systems ranging from participative budgeting, standard 
tightness, performance-contingent financial rewards to structuring of activities. The 
latter is of particular interest since it refers to the existence of written policies rules, 
standardised procedures and manuals which specify how to and sometimes, how not to, 
perform activities (Chow et al., 1999, p. 447). The operationalisation of SOPs is based 
on eight items (7-point scale), representing major classes of activities such as the 
purchase of capital equipment, the hiring and firing of personnel, the sourcing of inputs, 
and the pricing of outputs.     
 
While the authors expected that SOPs of foreign-owned firms will have adapted to the 
local conditions and hence be no different than the SOPs of the locally owned 
companies, the national culture variable is expected to influence on the preference for 
MCS. In the latter case, the only “contingency” variable would be the ownership of 
these companies (Taiwanese, Japanese or United States), meaning a de facto 
relationship between national ownership and the respective national culture dimensions 
(using Hoftstede’s scores). Based on the three cultural dimensions of individualism, 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance, Chow et al. (1999, p. 447) predicted that 
preference for SOPs will be highest for Taiwanese firms, lowest in U.S. firms and 
Japanese firms being in the middle. Based on MANOVA and ANOVA tests, it is found 
that the extent of SOPs is lowest for the Japanese-owned companies but there are no 
significant differences between U.S- and Taiwanese-owned firms. In the case of SOPs 
preferences, no significant differences are noted among these three categories of 
companies. In view of these findings, the authors raise one important caveat, namely the 
accuracy of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions at the level of individual controls (1999, p. 
456) and propose that alternative ways of operationalising and structuring national 
culture be investigated.  
 
2.3.5. Research on SOPs: Conclusion 
 
A detailed review of the few studies that have investigated SOPs has been provided. 
The contingency variables that were considered were task characteristics, departmental 
interdependence and national culture. Positive associations were found between SOPs 
  
48
(even if differently operationalised) and (i) knowledge of the transformation process, 
and (ii) departmental pooled interdependence. On the other hand, evidence on the 
impact of national culture on the extent of, and preference for, SOPs remains mixed.  
 
Surprisingly, direct empirical evidence on the impact of standard operating procedures 
in organisations appears very scant. It could be argued that the non-financial nature of 
the sub-system may have caused this lack of interest among accounting researchers. 
However, it has to be acknowledged that other studies indirectly consider SOPs by 
including them within broader MCS ‘label’. For example, Widener (2007) examines 
boundary systems in organizations, which could arguably include SOPs, but her 
variable measurement is limited to measuring perceptions on the organization’s code of 
business conduct (2007, p. 785). Overall, SOPs are an unavoidable set of procedures in 
public and private organisations. The increasing computerisation and automation of 
enterprises has resulted into a significant part of these procedures being inbuilt and 
monitored by software applications. In such a context, the adequacy and effectiveness 
of such a prominent, if not omnipresent, control sub-system should be of considerable 
interest, within a contingency and/or institutional paradigm. Therefore, by selecting 
SOPs as control sub-system, this study aims at providing more detailed insights on the 
use of SOPs in enterprises.    
 
2.4. Budgetary Participation 
 
Budgetary Participation has been one of the most researched topics in management 
accounting for over 40 years (Shields and Shields, 1998, p. 49). Indeed, the extent to 
which a subordinate should be involved in budget/target setting is an important 
component within an organisation’s management style. The review will primarily be 
based on Shields and Shields’ (1998) categorisation of budgetary participation empirical 
studies (surveys and experiments), namely on:  
(1) The direct or indirect effects of participative budgeting on dependent variables,  
(2) The effect of moderator (contextual) variables on the relationship between 
budgetary participation and a dependent variable, 
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(3) Budgetary participation acting as a moderator variable (i.e. hypothesised as a 
contextual factor) on the relationship between an independent variable and a 
dependent variable27.  
 
Although the most common assumed reasons for budgetary participation are to increase 
motivation and sharing of information, Shields and Shields (1998, p. 50) note that 
studies have also considered a host of other outcome variables such as performance, 
attitude, tension and satisfaction. In addition, the pioneering study of Argyris (1952) has 
also outlined various negative behavioural aspects of the budgeting process. This has 
resulted in research on the budgetary slack phenomenon (Schiff and Lewin 1968, 1970; 
Lowe and Shaw, 1970; Onsi 1973). Budgetary slack, as an outcome of budgetary 
participation, has indeed become one other focal topic within the budgeting literature. In 
view of its potential similarities with the proposed dependent variables for this study 
(dysfunctional behaviours), a fourth research category will focus on the budgetary 
participation-slack (with or without moderator variables) relationship.  
 
2.4.1. Direct or Indirect Effects of Participative Budgeting 
 
Given that motivation was one of the main objectives underlying subordinate 
participation in setting budgets, earlier studies have considered direct relationships 
between the extent of participation and motivational-led variables. For example, 
Searfoss (1976), Kenis (1979), Merchant (1981) found a significant positive 
relationship between participation and motivation. Also, Brownell and McInnes (1986) 
used path analysis to model motivation as intervening between participation and 
performance (i.e. an indirect relationship). However, no direct positive association was 
noted between participation and motivation whereas Kren (1990) only observed a 
marginally significant positive relationship in an experimental setting. Murray (1990, p. 
106) argues that the way motivation was differently operationalised in these studies may 
have influenced the results since the studies focused on different aspects of motivation, 
namely intrinsic value associated with goal accomplishment, effort expended and the 
value associated with both intrinsic and extrinsic outcomes weighed by their 
expectancies. Also, there are some strong arguments for indirect relationships between 
                                                
27
 Most of the studies involving budgetary participation and another independent variable have been 
related to investigating budget emphasis (or performance evaluation style). Since performance evaluative 
style is the second control mechanism of interest in this study, empirical findings in this respect will be 
considered later in this chapter (Section 2.5).  
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participation and motivation e.g. through goal commitment. Indeed, Locke (1968, p. 
185) asserted that the “most direct effect of participation is probably to commit the 
subject to the decision reached.”   
 
In relation to the findings on other outcome variables, role ambiguity was significantly 
negative related to participation (Chenhall and Brownell, 1988) while managerial 
attitude was positively related to participation (Mia, 1987; Milani, 1975; Merchant, 
1981).  Yet, Ivancevich (1979) found no relationship between attitude and participation.  
More controversial findings are however related to the participation-performance link. 
Whilst Brownell (1982a) and Brownell and McInnes (1986) showed positive 
relationships in their research, negative relationships were observed (Kenis, 1979; 
Steers, 1979), and even justified on the grounds that authoritarian target setting leads to 
better performance (cited in Mia, 1988, p. 466). In view of such inconsistent results, 
Shields and Shields (1998, p. 50) blame the lack of theoretical models and the use of 
“performance” as a sole dependent variable (i.e. without any mediating or indirect 
“outcome” variable) in budgetary participation research. However, the use of indirect 
relationship models to link budgetary participation to performance, namely through path 
analysis techniques, have not been entirely satisfactory. For example, Nouri and Parker 
(1998) have investigated the mediating effect of organisational commitment, as 
suggested by Locke (1968). Based on responses from functional managers within a 
large multinational corporation and a self-rated weighted average job performance 
(adapted from Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985), the results only indicate partial 
mediation via organisational commitment but still a significant positive direct 
relationship between participation and performance.  
 
Shields and Young (1993) attempted a survey-based research on participation-
performance relationship via one mediating variable: budget based-incentives. Their 
respondents were corporate controllers from Standard & Poor 500 firms. While the path 
analysis (1993, p. 271) displayed positive association between participation and budget-
based incentives, the extent of budgetary participation was found not to have any 
indirect or direct impact on performance. Given the prominence of financial measures 
in the dependent variable, the absence of significant correlation with other variables in 
the model is not very surprising. Irrespective of sample size problem raised by the 
authors, the design of the performance construct in Shields and Young (1993) may have 
resulted into very different results, compared to those of Nouri and Parker (1998). 
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Kren (1992a) investigated the influence of job-relevant information (JRI) as an 
intervening variable between participation and performance. JRI refers to the 
information which helps a manager to improve his or her action choice through better-
informed effort (Kren, 1992a, p. 512). In light of previous studies supporting a direct 
JRI-Performance link (Campbell and Gingrich, 1986), it is argued that budgetary 
participation, by involving further subordinates in the decision making process, will 
increase JRI. Using path analysis, it was found that (i) direct participation-performance 
relationship was not significant but (ii) path coefficients for participation to JRI and JRI 
to performance were significant.  
 
Finally, the study by Shields et al. (2000) principally looks at the inter-relationships 
between participative standard setting and performance via the mediating influences of 
two control mechanisms/attributes (standard tightness and standard based incentives) 
and that of job-related stress. However in the context of this review, it would be 
relevant to note that a direct positive and significant relationship was also found 
between participative standard setting and job performance. Furthermore, as 
hypothesised by Shields et al. (2000, p. 196), job-related stress does empirically prove 
to be a mediating variable of interest for linking control systems to job performance. 
Job performance was based on self-ratings - adapted from Mahoney et al’s (1963) eight 
dimensions of managerial activity - rather than on financial measures.  
 
In conclusion, in spite of some conflicting findings, the participation-performance 
linkage appears to have validity, in spite of intuitive comments (notably by Shields and 
Shields, 1998, p. 50) on the irrelevance of such links. Participation-motivation links 
have been viewed as more reasoned and have been validated while organisational 
commitment has proved to be a mediating variable of interest. However, the use of path 
analysis to identify indirect relationships has not explained more than the direct ones, 
except for Shields et al. (2000) and Kren (1992a). The existence of some inconsistent or 
weak results in the budgetary participation has caused researchers to invoke the 
influence of moderator variables using interaction models.  
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2.4.2. The Effect of Moderator Variables on Budgetary Participation.  
 
An analysis of Shields and Shields’ (1998) inventory of budgetary participation studies 
reveals that a total of 23 moderator variables have been tested in the relationship 
between budgetary participation and a dependent variable (other than budgetary slack). 
A summary of the previous studies researching the most relevant or most important 
moderator variables is presented below. 
 
2.4.2.1. Locus of Control 
 
Brownell (1981) and Brownell (1982b) investigated the influence of subordinate’s 
attitudes (internals vs. externals) in the participation-performance relationship. Given 
that “internals” believe that they can shape the outcome of events by their actions or 
choices, it is argued that the interaction of “internals” will enhance the positive 
relationship between budgetary participation and performance while “externals” will 
negatively impact on the same relationship. Brownell (1981) and Kren (1992b) used a 
lab experiment while Brownell (1982b) gathered survey data. A significant interaction 
was noted in first instance while a marginally significant one was observed for the 
second case. In addition, the “internals” were found to be more satisfied than the 
“externals” when required to participate in the budget setting process (Brownell, 
1982b). Whilst locus of control refers to a personality trait and thus to an individual’s 
attitudes, it is still unclear as to whether people would irremediably fall in one of these 
two categories and if even so, this attitude be exactly similar in all situations (social, 
professional and personal). More specifically, it may be argued that the relative 
specificities of the work environment may interact with influence locus of control. For 
example, the task uncertainty faced by the individual at work may interact with 
personality and attitudes. In short, “...the degree to which individuals accept personal 
responsibility for what happens to them.” (Kren, 1992b, p. 992) may itself be affected 
by the degree of complexity, difficulty and variability exhibited by the task at hand.  
 
2.4.2.2. Organisational Characteristics - Managerial Level, Functional Area and 
Size 
 
Dunk (1992) examined the participation-satisfaction relationship in relation to the 
manager’s hierarchical level, as he believed the inconsistencies noted in the link 
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between budgetary participation and satisfaction may be associated to differences in 
authority across managerial levels. As the manager’s hierarchical level increases, it is 
believed he/she would be more receptive (and hence satisfied) because the budgetary 
participation process allows him/her to exert control over activities. Using a sample of 
26 manufacturing managers and the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire to measure 
satisfaction, a significant regression coefficient is found for the interaction term 
(participation x managerial level). Dunk (1992, p. 215) concludes that such results 
suggest that participation is more effective in enhancing job satisfaction of high-level 
managers than that of low-level managers. In spite of the seemingly positive results 
obtained from this study, there are some strong elements of contention. Firstly, previous 
literature has given much focus on the motivational and the transmission of information 
aspects of budgetary participation. In this perspective, the use of budgetary participation 
as an opportunity to exercise managerial authority may not be a very important rationale 
for participation, since there are a number of instances when managers are required (or 
expected) to exercise their authority. Secondly, the results seem to indicate that 
budgetary participation must be only limited to upper-level management to ensure 
greater satisfaction: in contrast to the main rationale of budgetary participation i.e. the 
commitment of all managerial staff to specific targets/plans. Finally, the use of multiple 
regression analysis (with 2 independent and the interaction term variables) for a sample 
size of less than 30 observations may have generated misleading results.  
 
Merchant (1984) investigated department size effects as well as the extent of functional 
differentiation28 as moderator variables for budget-related behaviour (BRB). The latter 
included a sub-dimension (three factored items) focusing on budgetary participation. 
The argument proposed (1984, p. 293) was that the size and diversity affected a 
manager’s capability to use oral communication and direct supervision in view of the 
increasing number of information flows. Thus, budgetary participation, among other 
BRBs, becomes a more useful control mechanism in larger and more diverse 
departments. An initial finding was that participation is positive correlated to 
departmental size and the department’s extent to functional differentiation. Then, using 
correlation and sample splits, the “fit” between participation and size (and functional 
differentiation) on performance was computed. Results (1984, p. 303-304) reveal the 
                                                
28
 Merchant (1984, p. 295) viewed functional differentiation (within the manufacturing department) in 
terms of the extent to which specific manufacturing areas of responsibility (such as purchasing, control, 
product line redesign, inventory) were clearly attributed to someone in the department. 
  
54
existence of the moderating effect of departmental size and functional differentiation 
(stronger positive associations between participation and performance for larger and 
more differentiated departments). These findings confirm prior interactions that 
Merchant (1981) earlier found between size, budgetary participation and performance.  
 
In a similar vein, Brownell (1985) considered the influence of functional areas 
(marketing vs. R&D departments) on the budgetary participation link to performance. It 
is contended that the each functional area is subject to different environmental 
conditions (1985, p. 502), captured by the two main dimensions: environmental 
complexity and dynamism (adapted from Duncan, 1972), which in turn impacts on task 
uncertainty. However, the environmental scores were not found to be significantly 
different between the two sub-units, except for a higher environmental complexity 
dimension for R&D departments. In this respect, positive effects on management 
performance were noted for the R&D department while this was not the case for the 
marketing function.  
 
In spite of the significant empirical evidence supporting the relevance of the above-
mentioned contextual variables, the rationales used in some of the studies (Merchant 
1984; Brownell, 1985) seem to relate to more fundamental variables of interest. For 
example, department size, extent of departmental functional differentiation or functional 
area differences all point to one more fundamental contextual dimension, namely task 
uncertainty: a key contextual variable to be reviewed in Section 2.6.1 
 
2.4.2.3. Environmental Uncertainty, Market Factors and Environmental Volatility 
 
Evidence on the moderating impact of the “environment” was already implicit (via 
functional areas) in Brownell’s (1985) findings. Merchant (1984) also looked at the 
effect of market factors (measured via Product Life Cycle and Market Position) on the 
participation-performance relationship. It was hypothesised that departments involve 
with mature/declining products and those being in a strong market position (market 
leader) would exhibit higher participation-performance correlations compared to 
emerging/growth-products and weak-market position departments. However, no 
evidence was found of such dichotomy (1984, p. 305). Also, as a follow up of Kren’s 
(1992a) study on the participation-Job Relevant Information (JRI)-performance path 
analysis (refer to Section 2.5.1), environmental volatility was used in the study to 
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examine changes in path relationships. More specifically, it was predicted that as 
volatility increases, stronger relationships should be observed in the path coefficients 
(1992a, p. 513). However, no significant differences were noted on such coefficients, 
when the two sub-samples (split at the median level of volatility) data were computed.      
 
Govindarajan (1986) tested for the interaction of environmental uncertainty in the 
relationship between participation and various dependent variables such as 
performance, motivation and attitude29. The participation construct was based on 
various factored items from the BRB questionnaire, resulting into two main items: 
attention to budgeting and participation in the budget setting process. The study 
obtained 77 responses (84%) from heads of departments, with half from the production 
area. Their immediate supervisors also provided data on the subordinate’s performance 
and level of environmental uncertainty relative to the subordinate’s department.  In 
contrast to previous studies examining the influence of environmental factors, the 
results indicate a positive interaction environmental uncertainty on the participation-
performance (and attitude) relationship (1986, p. 510), thus demonstrating the relevance 
of environmental uncertainty. In addition, the performance measure was more reliable 
as superiors were asked to rate their subordinate’s performance. However, the fact that 
superiors were also asked to rate the department’s environmental uncertainty levels may 
raise some construct validity issues, especially in light of Tymon et al’s (1998, p. 42) 
comments on PEU being a strategic (i.e. top management level) construct rather than a 
middle management one. In addition, the prominence of the 
production/operations/R&D functional areas (61% of respondents) could have 
influenced the level of uncertainty.  Nevertheless, Govindarajan’s (1986) results are 
more persuasive and supportive of the influence of environmental uncertainty and other 
related factors.  
 
2.4.2.4. Product Standardisation and Process Automation 
 
Merchant (1984, p. 294) argued that the level of production technology impacts on the 
budget participation-performance relationship. This is related to the task uncertainty 
aspect, whereby a routine and repetitive production process will imply easier 
coordination via formal control mechanisms such as participative budgeting. In contrast, 
                                                
29
 Govindarajan’s (1986) findings on budgetary slack will be reviewed in Section 2.4.5.2.  
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a custom-made production and less process automation may call for more informal 
methods of control, such direct supervision (1984, p. 292). However, no significant 
interaction was found for the production technology variable. Whilst Merchant (1984) 
subsumed process automation and standardisation within production technology, 
Brownell and Merchant (1990) re-examined the individual interactions of these two 
contextual variables on budgetary participation. In contrast to Merchant’s (1984) 
“interaction” arguments, Brownell and Merchant (1990, p. 389) assert that the 
budgetary participation-performance relation will be accentuated when product 
standardisation is low. The argument was that participation offers opportunities for 
exchange of experience and knowledge to assist in resolving uncertainties in less 
standardised production. Based on a participation measure similar to BRB sub-
dimension (refer to Merchant, 1984), a significant interaction between low product 
standardisation and high participation leading to higher performance was observed. 
Whilst it is not denied that “….pooling the experience and knowledge ......offers the 
potential to assist in resolving uncertainties” (1990, p. 389), this does not necessarily 
mean that positive outcomes will be generated (e.g. impacted on performance) by this 
process – since a standard budgetary process is not construed as an “open forum” to 
resolve other internal issues.  
 
In this respect and in spite of the positive results obtained, it appears that earlier 
arguments/hypothesis by Merchant (1984), who invoked task uncertainty influences to 
justify the influence of product standardisation, may have more credence than those of 
Brownell and Merchant (1990). In addition, the existence of a process automation 
interaction was questioned, in view of the competing arguments as to the direction 
(sign) of such interaction. Firstly, automated controls could reduce the role of budgetary 
controls (1990, p. 389) and thus negate the contribution of budgetary participation to 
departmental performance. Secondly, the existence of higher levels of process 
automation would be linked to higher flexibility and more choices in matters such as 
work scheduling. Consequently, the manager has more scope for a meaningful 
participation in setting manufacturing budgets. But the results eventually showed no 
significant interaction for process automation (1990, p. 393). As in the case of product 
standardisation, Brownell and Merchant (1990) may have made use of unsubstantiated 
linkages between automation to participation (e.g. flexibility to more choices in matters 
or automated controls leads to less budgetary ones) that are more suggestive (if at all 
valid) of antecedent relationships rather than a moderating one. In addition, the setting 
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up of automated controls in the context of process automation was viewed as sign of 
“phasing out” for budgetary controls within the same department. In conclusion, the 
existence and direction of the influence of process automation and product 
standardisation on the participation-performance relationship has yet to be confirmed, 
and indirect (or intervening) effects may have to be investigated. 
 
2.4.2.5. Motivation and Attitude 
 
Mia (1988) notes that motivation (to work) and managerial attitude (towards their job 
and company) were traditionally used as outcome variables in budgetary participation 
studies (1988, p. 466), but some conflicting results (e.g. from Ivancevich, 1979) have 
led the author to believe that motivation and attitude should not be modelled as such. 
Also, given that previous findings (Brownell and McInnes, 1986) did not confirm the 
intervening influence of motivation in budgetary participation-performance model, Mia 
(1988) proposes an interaction model for attitude and motivation i.e. instead of the 
traditional idea that participation leads to motivation and attitude, the level of 
motivation and attitude exhibited by subordinates is expected to drive the participation-
performance relationship. This argument is based on Festinger’s (1957) theory of 
cognitive dissonance, which implies that “...employees who have a more favourable 
(high) attitude or motivation develop a cognitive dissonance or psychological 
uneasiness if their performance is low (below expected level) and to reduce this 
dissonance, they attempt to improve their performance” (Mia, 1988, p. 467). Since 
budgetary participation is a control mechanism that is supposed to assist in improving 
performance, managers displaying high attitude and motivation will accentuate the 
participation-performance link whereas those with low attitude and motivation will 
impact negatively on the participation-performance relationship. The results indicate 
significant coefficients for both participation-motivation and participation-attitude 
interaction variables. In addition, the analysis of partial derivatives for both equations 
(1988, p. 471) indicates non-monotonic effects. Also, the researchers had access to the 
superior’s evaluations of subordinate performance instead of self-rated scores.      
 
This study sheds some light in view of previous results gathered from the traditional 
motivation/attitude linkages discussed in the precedent section (Section 2.4.1). Given 
the wide-ranging impact of motivation and attitude in participative budgeting, their 
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combined effect on alternative dependent variables such as slack (or dysfunctional 
behaviours, in general) could be of interest. 
 
2.4.2.6. Budget Favorability and Agreement on Evaluation Criteria 
 
In contrast to Mia’s (1987) argument that managerial attitude should be a moderator 
variable, Magner et al. (1995) investigated the effects of budgetary participation on two 
related attitude-oriented dependent variables, namely trust in supervisor and 
organisational commitment. The contextual variable of interest was budget favorability 
i.e. the subordinate’s “...perception about the fairness of the procedures (budgetary 
participation process) by which the outcomes (budget/targets) were established” (1995, 
p. 612). This interaction between outcomes and procedures was predicted by the 
referent cognitions theory (RCT), whereby resentment can be expected if the 
subordinate believes that a more favourable budget could have been set if the 
procedures had been fairer (Magner et al., 1995). Indeed, it is acknowledged that 
budgetary participation mechanism does have an inherent “unfairness” given that the 
process (and outcome) is eventually moderated or censored by a superior. Based on a 
sample of 53 managers, the interaction variables were found to be significant in relation 
to both attitudes towards the supervisor (trust) and the company (organisational 
commitment). In effect, managers who have received unfavourable budgets have less 
negative attitudes when they have participated in the budget compared to those who 
have not participated (1995, p. 616). This study focuses on the psychological aspects of 
a control procedure, namely the extent of budgetary participation. One possible issue 
could be the diversity of the respondents. If one considers Dunk’s (1992, 210) argument 
that exercise of authority and control over budgets are likely to be higher as the 
managerial level increases, than if the sample is predominantly made up of higher-level 
management respondents30, higher budget favorability and positive attitudes would have 
been noted even if participation was low.         
 
A second attitude-oriented contextual variable is extent of agreement on evaluation 
criteria between subordinates and superiors. Dunk (1990) also justifies this study on the 
grounds of the conflicting directions in the associations between participative budgeting 
and performance. Rooted within the agency perspective, Dunk (1990) viewed 
                                                
30
 This is not specified in the research paper.  
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participation as the sharing of local information with the superiors and considers that 
the “....value of participative budgeting emanates from the transmission of information 
that takes place” (1990, p. 172). Indeed, subordinates would in effect be made aware of 
the superior’s evaluation criteria and agreement on those criteria would allow the 
subordinate to focus on specific targets/activities, while neglecting others. The author 
links such activities to slack building and assert that performance would be accordingly 
affected by such interaction. Hence, Dunk (1990, p. 173) hypothesises that a higher 
(lower) degree of participation and a higher (lower) extent of agreement on evaluation 
criteria between subordinates and superiors will cause lower performance. Lack of 
congruence between the two independent variables will ensure higher performance. 
Whilst the findings confirm a statistically significant and negative interaction 
coefficient, the study appears fraught with issues. Firstly, the power of the regression 
(R2 = 41%) is unusually high for interval-level data and could be related to the sample 
size (n=26). Also, as earlier mentioned in a review of contextual variables (Section 
2.1.5), the agreement on evaluation criteria was measured using Hopwood’s (1972) 
traditional RAPM construct; a purpose for which the original RAPM measure may not 
have been adequate. In addition, the argument that more slack means less performance 
(i.e. a direct relationship) remains debatable (Dunk and Nouri, p. 74, 1998) since there 
is sizeable part of the slack literature that believes in the beneficial effects of slack31. In 
fact, slack perhaps could have been a more relevant dependent variable in this study.         
 
Furthermore, in the context of agency theory, it would have been perhaps more relevant 
to consider the level of information asymmetry between subordinates/superiors and its 
interaction with participative budgeting. Dunk (1995) eventually considered this and 
found a significant interaction for information asymmetry. In conclusion, budget 
favorability appears to be a promising and theoretically sound variable but needs to be 
further validated in view of the possible bias in the sample. In contrast, Dunk’s (1990) 
statistically significant coefficients for the interaction of the agreement on evaluation 
criteria may not be enough to avoid more fundamental criticisms relating to the 
construct measurement and theoretical underpinnings of his research.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
31
 For example, refer to Merchant and Manzoni (1989), Merchant (1989), and Van der Stede (2000). 
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2.4.2.7. National Culture 
 
 
Further to Hoftstede’s (1980) findings on cultural dimensions, there has been some 
investigation into the influence of cultural attributes in the effectiveness of participative 
budgeting. Harrison (1992, p. 3) argues that two of these four cultural dimensions32, 
namely power distance (the extent to which society accepts inequalities and does not 
challenge hierarchies i.e. high PD) and individualism (the relationship between an 
individual and his/her fellow individuals in society), are of direct relevance to budgetary 
participation. For example, Hwang (1989) found that participation did not affect 
motivation in high power distance countries (Singapore) compared to low power 
distance countries (Australia). A subordinate’s participation in target/budget setting is 
deemed to be a “culturally awkward” practice in high PD countries and thus would not 
have any bearing on motivation. Insofar as individualism is concerned, participative 
budgeting would be more effective in a low individualism setting (e.g. China) because 
the participation process implies an attempt at collective agreement whereas 
participation in a high individualism society (e.g. USA) would only reveal 
irreconcilable differences between the various people involved in the process 
(subordinates and superiors). Chow et al. (1999) confirmed this prediction. 
 
O’Connor (1995) used national culture dimensions (as a proxy) and arguments to 
investigate the influence of organisational culture on budgetary participation usefulness. 
A high power distance country was selected (Singapore) and the selected dependent 
variables were role ambiguity and superior/subordinate relationship. The foreign-owned 
subsidiaries were compared to local ones, and the former were expected to display 
lower power distance (O’Connor, 1995, p. 387). Thus, 
“...for organisations with a high (low) power distance culture, it is expected 
that budget participation will result in increased (decreased) role ambiguity 
and decreased (increased) trust and respect for the superior.” (1995, p. 388) 
 
Based on a sample of 125 managers, the study found mixed results for participation-
ambiguity relationship. The author also used two different measures of participation 
(Milani, 1975 and Hofstede, 1968) to obtain some cross-validation (1995, p. 389) but 
the interaction term was not found to be significant for Milani’s instrument. It was also 
                                                
32
 The other two dimensions are uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. 
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barely significant (p=0.10, Table 5, p. 393) for Hofstede’s measure of participation 
(negative sign, as expected). In addition, no significant interaction was observed for the 
‘participation-extent of superior/subordinate relationship’ model.     
 
The impact of national culture on the effectiveness of budgetary participation has been 
partly demonstrated (Harrison, 1992; Chow et al, 1999) and organisational culture 
needs however to be further researched in view of the mixed results obtained so far. 
Also, Hoftstede’s national culture dimensions assume that countries are “made up” of 
homogeneous societies and are not subject to external ‘foreign culture influences”. As 
suggested by Lau and Buckland (2000, p. 37), the effect of diversity (such as ethnic 
background or religion) within national culture has not been widely considered, in spite 
of the growing relevance of such diversity in various countries. Finally, the notion of 
‘culture’ (as measured by Hoftstede) has been recently challenged (e.g. Baskerville, 
2003) 
 
2.4.2.8. Job Difficulty 
 
In a previous section of the participative budgeting review (Section 2.4.2.2.), it was 
argued that the moderating variable being used (e.g. functional area) was in fact related 
to a more fundamental and relevant one, namely task uncertainty. Mia (1989) partly 
explores the possible relevance of task uncertainty by using the term “job difficulty”, 
which is a sub-dimension of task uncertainty33. He contends that a job is difficult 
because of its complexity, heterogeneity, unpredictability or because of its changing 
operational technology (Mia, 1989, p. 348). In a high job difficulty situation, a high 
level of budgetary participation will provide opportunities for exchange of information 
and such interaction would be expected to generate better performance and higher 
motivation. On the other hand, a mismatch between job difficulty and participation is 
predicted to result into lower outcome for the above-mentioned dependent variables.     
 
The study used performance information provided by the direct superiors of 62 
respondents (76 for participation-motivation model). The interaction term was 
significant and positive (non-monotonic) for the participative-performance model whilst 
this was not the case for motivation. Surprisingly, motivation is not related to budgetary 
                                                
33
 The sub-dimension is more commonly referred as “task difficulty” but the construct measurement is 
exactly the same i.e. a seven-item instrument from Van de Ven and Delbecq (1974).   
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participation (correlation matrix did indicate weak and non-significant coefficient) 
while previous studies had shown better relationships with this dependent variable 
rather than with performance. Insofar as the contextual variable is concerned, it is worth 
noting that Lau et al (1995) did argue for, and demonstrated, the primacy of task (or 
job) difficulty over task uncertainty. However, the relevance of task uncertainty in 
participation-dysfunctional behaviour relationship remains to be investigated.  
 
2.4.2.9. Concluding Remarks 
 
Research into the contextual adequacy of budgetary participation remains the most 
popular area of the budgetary participation studies. A review of the most important 
contingency variables has been presented. While there are strong evidence and 
arguments as to the influence of attitude, motivation, job difficulty, budget favorability, 
and national culture, there are still mixed results for environmental uncertainty (or other 
market-related variable). Also, despite showing some statistically significant 
interactions, some contingency variables such as locus of control, functional area, size, 
agreement on evaluation criteria could in fact be affected by antecedent variables (e.g. 
task uncertainty) driving the interaction. In addition, the related theoretical linkages 
were less clear and thus open to interpretation. 
 
2.4.3. Budgetary Participation Modelled as a Moderator Variable. 
 
Brownell (1983a, 1983b) and Dunk (1993b) investigate the potential positive effects of 
budgetary participation in controlling the “negative” consequences attributed to 
organisational practices and job-related tension. In all three studies, the authors refer to 
the benefits of budgetary participation as ways to gain subordinate’s acceptance of 
targets (Brownell, 1983a, p. 460), to encourage trust between subordinates and 
superiors (Brownell, 1983b, p. 309) and to reduce stress in the job environment (Dunk, 
1993b, p. 578).   
 
In the case of Brownell (1983a), it was hypothesised that management by exception 
(MBE)34 had a negative impact on motivation since the superiors will typically sanction 
                                                
34
 In Brownell’s (1983a) study, MBE is viewed as a system of control that allows the manager to be 
spared the task of reviewing performance when things are going well, so as to devote his attention only to 
those areas which really require his managerial attention (1983a, p. 456).  
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negative variances but there would not be equal considerations for “correct” 
performance or positive variances. Therefore, based on previous findings relating to the 
positive interaction of budgetary participation on performance evaluative style, the 
contingency hypothesis predicted that budgetary participation would mitigate the effects 
of MBE on motivation (1983a, p. 460). However, very little and insignificant direct 
MBE-motivation relationship was found. Similar findings were observed for the 
participation-MBE interaction. The author (1983a, p. 469) attributes these poor results 
to the measuring of motivation and the absence of more important control sub-systems 
in the model which could be interacting with MBE. It can be however argued that the 
(early) concept of MBE is closely associated to Simon’s (1995; 2000) concept of the 
diagnostic use control systems and that the ‘more important control sub-systems’ 
mentioned in Brownell’s paper could be examples of interactive and/or use, of controls 
which are predicted to complement the diagnostic use of controls in the organization – 
as part of the dynamic tension between these two categories of controls (e.g. Simons, 
1995; Henri, 2006).   
 
Brownell (1983b) investigated the effect of leadership style (consideration and initiation 
of structure35) on performance. Previous literature had highlighted the direct effect of 
the “leadership consideration” dimension on satisfaction (Boyles, 1968) but also the 
interacting effects in the relationship between the other leadership dimension (initiation 
of structure) and satisfaction (Dessler, 1973). However, Brownell (1983b) proposed that 
budgetary participation, being a more “democratic” exercise, will not “fit” with a high 
initiation structure and with a low consideration leadership style. Several noteworthy 
results arose from the various ANOVA tables. Firstly, considerate leadership behaviour 
was associated to higher subordinate satisfaction, irrespective of budgetary 
participation, while the relationship to performance was only significant in instances of 
high budgetary participation. Secondly, lower initiating structure also caused higher 
satisfaction but this did not occur in a high budgetary participation situations. Brownell 
(1983b, p. 317) concluded that structure might become redundant in circumstances 
where subordinates are highly involved and influential in budget formulation.  
 
Finally, Dunk (1993b) examined the effects of job-related tension (JRT) on managerial 
performance, based on previous arguments by Hirst (1981). Dunk (1993b, p. 578) 
                                                
35
 The definitions of leadership style and its dimensions are presented in Appendix 2.1. 
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contended that budgetary participation allowed subordinate managers to feel or exercise 
more control. In addition, the author expected that participation led to more clarification 
in the path-goal requirements through an information exchange between superiors and 
subordinates (1993b, p. 578). Hence, it was hypothesised that, in high participation 
situations, the negative relationship between JRT and performance would be 
significantly lower. In contrast to other MCS studies, Dunk (1993b) assumed a 
curvilinear relationship between JRT and performance but the coefficient for the 
quadratic variable was not significant. In conclusion, the moderating influence of 
budgetary participation in the cases of MBE and JRT was not empirically demonstrated.  
 
2.4.4. Budgetary Slack as a Consequence of Budgetary Participation 
 
According to Dunk and Nouri (1998, p. 73), “..slack may be defined as the intentional 
underestimation of revenues and productive capabilities and/or overestimation of costs 
and resources required to complete a budgeted task”. It is noted that the slack 
phenomenon can also been viewed within an agency paradigm, which predicts the 
agent’s potential to shirk and “..assumed to be guided by his/her own self-interest” 
(Merchant, 1985a, p. 202).  
  
Within the MCS literature, there has been more interest in the impact of budgetary 
participation on slack and how this in influenced by contingent factors. Lowe and Shaw 
(1968) contend that managers build in slack if they perceive that formal 
rewards/sanctions are linked to budget attainment; a reaction aimed at protection their 
own interests and which Lowe and Shaw (1968) consider to be economically rational 
(cited in Dunk and Nouri, 1998, p. 74). In a similar vein, Onsi (1973, p. 535-536) 
asserts that slack is not necessarily undesirable, implying some contingency interactions 
such as the impact of “good” business conditions. On the other hand, Schiff and Lewin 
(1970) are less conditional in their understanding of slack. To them, budgetary 
participation inherently leads to the building of slack whilst other researchers (such as 
Young, 1985 and Lukka, 1988) argue that participation merely increases the 
opportunity, rather than the extent, of slack. In addition, Lukka (1988) is credited with 
the formulation of a theoretical framework of budgetary biasing. This term encompasses 
two slack dimensions, namely budgetary slack (as defined earlier) and upward bias, 
which is the deliberate overstatement of an expected performance in the budget (1988, 
p. 283). More recently, the debate seems to be increasingly polarized on whether 
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budgetary slack is dysfunctional or function in relation to the overall (or long-term) 
effectiveness of the organization (e.g. Davila and Wouters, 2005)  
 
Consistent with the format applied previous review sections, the evidence on 
performance-budgetary slack relationships will be considered in two parts; one 
considering research focusing on direct relationships between participation and slack 
while a second section will look at the impact of moderating (contextual) variables36.   
 
2.4.4.1. Budgetary Participation-Budgetary Slack: Direct Relationships  
 
Onsi (1973) used factor analysis to identify several behavioural variables affecting 
budgetary slack. Amongst other results, he found a strong positive correlation between 
an “authoritarian top management budgetary control system” and slack attitude whereas 
participation was negatively related to “less need to create slack” (1973, p. 546). Onsi 
(1973) interpreted the latter findings as an indication of better communication between 
hierarchical levels and less pressure on the subordinate to create slack. Whilst 
Cammann (1976) confirmed the slack-reducing characteristic of budgetary participation 
across functional areas, Collins (1978) was unable to duplicate Onsi’s results (cited in 
Govindarajan, 1986, p. 500). Merchant (1985a, p. 207) obtained results consistent with 
Onsi (1973) and Cammann (1976) whereas Young (1985) found a positive relationship 
between participation and slack.  
 
In the backdrop of such inconsistent findings, Merchant (1985a, p. 209) raised one 
major limitation in the measuring of the concept of slack. Since slack can be, in 
abstract, viewed as “unethical”, respondents to the slack question may have been 
influenced by the social desirability bias and hence, may have minimised 
acknowledgement of slack in response to ethically oriented attitudes. In addition, Lal et 
al. (1996) argued that Merchant’s (1985) study may have suffered from non-random 
sampling and replicated his hypotheses using random samples. Nevertheless, the 
budgetary participation-slack relationship was still found to be negative and significant 
(1996, p. 490).      
                                                
36
 Slack has been operationalised as either extent of slack (organisational-level variable) or propensity to 
create slack (individual or attitude-based variable). Whilst they are important differences between these 
two constructs, such distinctions will not be considered at this stage of the review and the term “slack” 
would refer to both instances. The nuances involved will be addressed in Section 2.8, when reviewing the 
different dependent variables used in contingency-based research.  
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The evidence seems to indicate strong support for a direct and negative relationship 
between budgetary participation and slack. However, authors such as Galbraith (1974) 
and Govindarajan (1986) believe that such relationship may be dependent upon 
contextual factors such as task and environmental uncertainty. Furthermore, it is 
without doubt that there are still strong theoretical reservations (Cyert and March, 1963 
and Hopwood, 1976), which assert that slack has more negative implications than 
positive ones.    
 
2.4.4.2. Budgetary Participation-Budgetary Slack: Contingency Relationships 
 
Galbraith’s (1973, 1974) asserts that organisations respond to uncertainty by increasing 
the resources available, rather than managing existing resources efficiently. For 
Galbraith (1973, 1974) and Govindarajan (1986), these extra resources are slack 
resources that act as a “buffer” and reduce information processing needs. However, 
such practice will eventually impact negatively on performance standards. Galbraith 
(1973, 1974) considered budgetary participation as means to handle the subordinate’s 
information-processing needs and thus, in times of high (low) uncertainty, a high (low) 
participation level will ensure sufficient information availability and lesser potential for 
slack. In other words, the mismatch between participation and uncertainty would create 
more slack. Govindarajan (1986) investigated this hypothesis, using perceived 
environmental uncertainty (PEU) as the contextual variable, and found a significant 
negative interaction term. However, with regards to Tymon’s et al. (1998) comments on 
PEU and the respondent’s hierarchical level (middle managers), it is contended that 
PEU may not be the relevant contextual variable of interest. In fact, Galbraith’s 
information-processing framework refers to task uncertainty rather than environmental 
uncertainty in general (1973, p. 25-26). Dunk and Nouri (1998, p. 80) present 
arguments on the interactive effect of task uncertainty on the participation to slack 
relationship. More specifically, the authors consider the interactive effects of the two 
sub-dimensions of task uncertainty, namely task difficulty and task variability, but their 
interpretation of Galbraith’s early arguments is different from that of Govindarajan’s 
(1986). Dunk and Nouri (1998, p. 79) contend that since a low (high) task difficulty 
would mean (lack of) clearly understood procedures and practices, i.e. high (low) task 
knowledge, there would be little (extensive) room for slack. However, the same 
interaction is not expected for task variability, since it is viewed as not having an impact 
on the needed slack resources. Dunk and Nouri (1998) conclude by formulating 
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theoretical propositions to model task difficulty and variability as moderating variables 
for the participation-slack relationship. These propositions will be adapted to this study 
and further elaborated in the Chapter 4. More recently, Davila and Wouters (2005) 
examine the counter-proposition that slack is in fact useful to the management in certain 
conditions. Based on a case study of four logistic sites of a manufacturing company and 
using both qualitative and quantitative data, the authors (2005, p. 606) conclude that the 
company’s budgetary process encourages budgetary slack when the company expects 
the processes to be under demanding conditions (i.e. high task or environmental 
uncertainty). This ‘encouragement’ is embedded in the budgeting assumptions used to 
calculate costs, thereby allowing managers to focus on other short-term demands/issues 
(e.g. refer also to Van der Stede, 2000). It was argued that budgetary slack appears to be 
intentionally designed in such a way to influence the allocation of organizational 
attention.  The authors also assert that the process of slack creation appears to be more 
elaborate and more subtle that the mere acceptance of high budget costs. This recent 
evidence is partly consistent with  earlier discussions and predictions made by Argyris 
(1990). In this paper, Argyris (1990) reviews his original discussion on dysfunctional 
behaviours, labelling them as ‘organizational and individual defensive routines’ (1990, 
p. 506). According to him, these are activated by the managers when they are facing 
potential or actual embarrassment.    
 
Dunk (1993b) examined the interactive effects of budget emphasis and information 
asymmetry on participation-slack link. Based on Lowe and Shaw’s (1968) expectation 
that slack is conditional upon subordinate’s perception that budget performance will be 
linked to their performance evaluation, Dunk (1993b) hypothesised that a higher budget 
emphasis coupled with high budgetary participation will create more slack. In addition, 
the degree information asymmetry between subordinates and superiors is viewed as a 
further moderating variable. Hence, a multiple interaction between three variables is 
being investigated. Based on a sample of 72 respondents, the study surprisingly reported 
a negative coefficient for the three-variable interaction term, meaning that “...slack is 
low when participation, information asymmetry and budget emphasis are all high” 
(1993a, p. 405-406). Hartmann and Moers (1999, p. 304) noted that the use of three-
way interactions have led to interpretation and complexity issues, especially in the 
absence of a clear theoretical background supporting such relationships. According to 
the authors (1999, p. 305), such issues are present in Dunk’s (1993b) paper.  
Furthermore, as acknowledged by Dunk (1993b) and consistent with Merchant’s (1985) 
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previous remarks, responses to the slack construct may have been influenced by 
respondent’s own ethical attitudes.   
 
In conclusion, there is limited evidence on the interaction effects of contextual variables 
in participation-slack studies. Dunk and Nouri (1998) provide an extensive list of such 
variables based on various theories such as attribution theory, cognitive theory and 
motivation theory. Some of the variables that have yet to be considered are task 
uncertainty, organisational culture, truth-inducing path schemes, role ambiguity and 
need for achievement.  
 
2.4.4.3. Participation-Slack: Concluding Remarks 
 
There is some evidence as to the existence of a negative relationship between budgetary 
participation and slack. On the other hand, the use of contingency arguments has 
revealed possible instances of positive relationships but there has not been sufficient 
investigation into this possibility. In particular, the influence of task uncertainty appears 
of significant interest in considering the impact of MCS on dysfunctional behaviour. In 
parallel however, there is an increasing voice in the literature that considers the 
consequence of slack to be universally beneficial to the organization. Recent case 
evidence suggests that supervising managers  and organizations do allow slack to occur 
but only in specific circumstances (as a result of uncertainty or for directing 
organizational attention, as in the case of Davila and Wouters, 2005).  
        
2.4.5. Budgetary Participation Studies: Concluding Remarks 
 
Except for instances where budgetary participation acted as a moderator variable for 
budget emphasis, this section has presented a review of studies examining the 
consequences of budgetary participation. Several contextual variables have been found 
to be very relevant in influencing the relationship between budgetary participation and 
an outcome variable. It is also worth noting that the “budgetary participation” construct 
has been measured almost consistently in survey research (i.e. based on Milani’s (1975) 
6-item instrument)37 thus preventing construct differences to impact on results - a 
situation which is very different to most of the other constructs being reviewed.    
 
                                                
37
 In other instances, three dimensions of budget-related behaviour (BRB) were used to operationalise 
participative budgeting (e.g. Merchant, 1981 and 1984). 
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As mentioned by Shields and Shields (1998), and in spite of some inconsistencies noted 
in the reviewed literature, there is probably more scope at this stage to explore the 
antecedents of budgetary participation, particularly those relating to the concept of 
uncertainty. This study endeavours to include budgetary participation as one control 
mechanism of interest and to consider in more detail its consequences. In other words, it 
will consider the proposition that participation (as a control system) may induce several 
forms and types of dysfunctional behaviour. Furthermore, the influence of uncertainty 
as a contextual variable remains to be fully investigated.   
 
2.5. Reliance on Accounting Performance Measures (RAPM) 
 
RAPM is another key area of management accounting research, which seeks to 
investigate the effects of - and the factors influencing - the use of accounting data 
(namely budgets) for evaluating managerial performance. More formally, Harrison 
(1993, p. 319) considers RAPM to be: 
“.....the extent to which superiors rely on, and emphasize those performance 
criteria which are quantified in accounting and financial terms, and which are 
pre-specified as budget targets” 
 
There is no doubt as to the value of such research in an environment dominated by the 
need for more competitiveness and the need for organisations to pinpoint or identify 
drivers of (non) performance. The traditional role of accounting data in performance 
evaluation i.e. as an “independent and fair” scorecard system is constantly challenged. 
For example, the concept of Balanced Scorecard  (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) explicitly 
condemns the exclusive use of accounting measures for evaluating a firm’s or a 
manager’s performance. In addition, there is a close link between this research area and 
that of budgetary participation. In fact, whilst Hopwood (1972) is viewed as the seminal 
work in the RAPM area (Otley and Pollanen, 2000, p. 483), Briers and Hirst (1990) and 
Hartmann (2000) consider that Argyris (1952) did already discuss and hypothesise on 
the likely effects (functional and dysfunctional) of RAPM. Argyris (1952) subsumed the 
RAPM construct within his research on supervisory styles and “..the propensity of 
supervisors to emphasize the need to meet the budget (budget emphasis)” (cited in 
Briers and Hirst, 1990, p. 234).  
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Argyris (1952; 1953) remains a research of particular importance to the current study 
since he lengthily debated on the dysfunctional consequences of budget emphasis on the 
concerned managers. For example, his comment that operational managers could not 
properly communicate their explanations - for their budget (non) performance - to the 
controllers, hence creating tension and reduced managerial effectiveness, remains even 
now a case in point. Furthermore, Argyris’ (1952) finding that dysfunctional behaviour 
could indeed be provoked by the use of controls (cited from Hartmann, 2000, p. 452) is 
of crucial interest. His later contribution (Argyris, 1990) is however less categorical 
about the ‘negative’ consequences of ‘dysfunctional behaviours’. He considers the latter 
to be organizational and/or individual defensive routines that arise from potential threat 
or embarassement. In response, players engage into these routine to bypass the causes 
of the threat. Argyris (199) thus essentially argues that such routines are not so 
‘dysfunctional’ since they indirectly communicate the managers’ concerns, realisms and 
uncertainties to their superiors (1990, p. 505 and p. 507), particularly when these 
routines have become embedded (accepted and taken for granted) within the 
organization - hence the term ‘organizational’ routine.  Bearing these arguments in 
mind, one can now consider in more detail the findings/conclusions of Hopwood (1972, 
1973) and Otley (1978); two studies which are widely viewed as the formal starting 
points of RAPM-based studies. 
 
2.5.1. Hopwood (1972, 1973) and Otley (1978) 
 
Whilst there have been some prior and focused investigations on supervisory style after 
Argyris (1952) (e.g. Hofstede, 1968; Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Schiff and Lewin, 1968), 
Hopwood (1972) was the first to formally consider the technical and inherent 
inadequacies of accounting performance measures, namely as an incomplete reflection 
of managerial performance, the inclusion of non-controllable aspects of performance in 
the evaluation, the difficulties in mapping the economic aspects of performance, 
combined with an over-dependence on short-term- and outcome-based evaluation. As 
summarised by Hartmann (2000, p. 455), the main objective of Hopwood’s study was to 
find out whether these inherent technical inadequacies of accounting measures caused 
dysfunctional behaviours or whether it was the supervisor’s approach at using these 
accounting measures that impacted negatively on the subordinate’s attitudes and 
behaviour.  
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In this context, Hopwood (1972) identified three supervisory/management styles, 
namely the Budget Constrained (BC), the Profit Conscious (PC) and the Non-
Accounting (NA) style and based on prior observations from Argyris (1952), he 
hypothesised some relationships between the style adopted by the supervisor and the 
respective subordinate’s level of JRT (job-related tension) and/or other dysfunctional 
consequences. In particular, Hopwood (1972, 1973) found greater JRT and 
dysfunctional behaviours amongst managers who were supervised by BC superiors 
compared to other subordinates having PC or NA supervisors. In addition, he also found 
a significant moderating effect for budgetary participation in situations involving only 
BC supervisors.  
 
Otley (1978) sought to replicate Hopwood’s (1972, 1973) study but inevitably included 
some new elements in his research. For example, he devised a 5-point scale for 
measuring supervisory style (rather than using the 3 discrete categories). In addition, 
Otley (1978) carried out the study amongst independent profit centre managers 
(compared to cost centre managers for Hopwood) on the grounds that the use of 
budgetary control systems were better suited for such units and that the effects on 
supervisory style would be best understood. Finally, Otley (1978) argued for a link 
between supervisory style and budgetary performance. He notably found a positive 
relationship for supervisory style and budgetary performance but no significant 
relationship was observed between supervisory style and JRT. He sought to explain the 
conflicting results using the contingency approach. According to Otley and Pollanen 
(2000, p. 483) and Hartmann and Moers (1999, p. 292), this apparent conflict stimulated 
a stream of work, involving primarily the introduction of a series of contingent variables 
to explain differences in managerial behaviour. These studies and the resulting reviews 
(Briers and Hirst, 199038; Hartmann, 2000) are now considered in chronological order. 
 
2.5.2 Pre-1990 RAPM Studies  
2.5.2.1. The RAPM to Tension/”Dysfunctional Behaviour”/Stress Links 
 
Informed by the Hopwood-Otley divergences, Hirst (1981) examined theoretically the 
budget emphasis-dysfunctional behaviour link, with task uncertainty and job-related 
tension respectively as moderator and dependent variable. The author convincingly 
                                                
38
 Briers and Hirst (1990) provide a tabulated account of 18 studies involving budget emphasis and its 
link to other dependent, moderator or intervening variables.  
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argues that the extent to which managers may engage in dysfunctional behaviour further 
to the different use of accounting measures will vary as task uncertainty changes (Hirst, 
1981, p. 776-780). He also predicts a higher level of job-related tension and more social 
withdrawal when budget emphasis and task uncertainty are at their extremes (low and 
high).  
 
In a later study, Hirst (1983) empirically tests his arguments and predictions. He 
considers job-related tension (JRT) and social withdrawal as surrogates for 
dysfunctional behaviour (1983, p. 597) and initially hypothesises a curvilinear 
relationship. Based on the responses from 111 managers, Hirst (1983) however finds a 
linear relationship between RAPM and the JRT dependent variable. An analysis of the 
relationships reveals a positive link between RAPM and JRT in a high task uncertainty 
situation whereas the relationship is negative in a low uncertainty situation, but with no 
significant results for the social withdrawal variable. Also, Hirst’s (1983) results for the 
JRT dependent variable are not consistent with some of Otley’s (1978) findings. Whilst 
Hirst (1983) acknowledges that the sample selection was a non-random one and that the 
task uncertainty variable sub-scales were poorly related, one non-stated weakness 
remains the measurement of dysfunctional behaviour via JRT. Later in this thesis, it will 
be put forward that dysfunctional behaviour may involves actions (and/or reactions) 
whilst JRT merely implies a state of mind, which may (or not) lead to dysfunctional 
behaviour.   
 
Imoisili (1985) also examined the impact of task uncertainty (role stress was the 
intervening variable) on the RAPM-dysfunctional behaviour link. As reported by Briers 
and Hirst (1990, p. 242), the results were not significant due to the absence of low 
budget emphasis respondents/companies in the study to enable meaningful 
comparisons. A further study by Imoisili (1989) where task uncertainty and task 
interdependence were considered vis-à-vis RAPM and job stress also yielded non-
significant results. Bottger and Hirst (1988) investigated the moderating impact of 
budgetary participation in instances of high budget emphasis and indeed concluded that 
job stress would be reduced in cases of high budget emphasis but no such beneficial 
influence could be observed in a low budget emphasis situation.  
 
The role of budget-based performance measures in encouraging dysfunctional 
behaviour was also considered in the context of zero-based budgeting practices (ZBB), 
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by Hayes and Cron (1988). According to them, the introduction of ZBB practices leads 
to an increase in openness of the adopting department to external factors, and as a result 
this leads to rise in the level of task uncertainty (1988, p. 147). Drawing upon Hirst’s 
(1981) model, they argue that the use of internal accounting measures is (or becomes) 
increasingly inappropriate in the sense that they fail to formally recognize the 
environment faced by, or the demands placed upon, the manager by other units. As a 
result, tensions will increase in subordinate-superior relationships and the manager will 
seek relief by engaging in dysfunctional behaviour (Hirst, 1981, p. 777). Although 
Hayes and Cron (1988) only provide anecdotal evidence and illustrations relating to 
ZBB practices, they provide a convincing argumentation as to the dysfunctional 
consequences of the combined effects of accounting-based performance measures and a 
high level of task uncertainty.  
 
One specific outcome variable, which could be subsumed within the dysfunctional 
behaviour heading, is budgetary slack. There have been two early studies (Schiff and 
Lewin, 1968; Lowe and Shaw, 1968) that have considered the budget emphasis-
budgetary slack link, using interviews/case study methods. Both studies document a 
higher level of budgetary slack in high budget-emphasis situations. Onsi (1973) and 
Merchant (1983) observed similar results as part of an empirical study based on 
structured interviews and questionnaire surveys, whilst Merchant (1985c) found only 
partial empirical evidence of such links. In addition, Hofstede (1968) surveyed the 
budgetary process in six manufacturing companies using interviews and empirical 
analysis. Budget emphasis was one of the three dimensions of supervisory style39 and he 
observed dysfunctional consequences (in terms of absenteeism and interpersonal 
conflicts) as a result of a higher budget emphasis.  
 
From the above-mentioned studies, one can conclude there is a prima-facie evidence of 
a positive relationship between RAPM and dysfunctional behaviour, although the main 
area of contention remains whether the previous studies actually measured 
dysfunctional behaviour or another un-related variable (principally JRT) and whether 
task uncertainty plays any role in this relationship. It is clearly a valid argument to 
hypothesise that JRT or tension can lead to dysfunctional behaviour. For example, the 
notion of invalid data reporting (IDR) from earlier studies (e.g. Hopwood, 1973; Otley, 
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 The other two being frequency of contacts regarding budget results and extent of focus on negative 
results (cited from Briers and Hirst, 1990, p. 236)  
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1978; Hayes and Cron, 1988) has not been picked up in more contemporary studies40 
and the focus had gradually moved to budgetary slack (considered here as a specific 
sub-element of dysfunctional behaviour) and more positively-oriented outcome 
variables (such as managerial performance or job satisfaction). The latter approach is 
possibly related to the rise of Otley’s (1978) contingency “fit” paradigm which started 
to dominate RAPM studies in the early 1980s. Finally, the significant impact of task 
uncertainty is noted, although the initial task uncertainty measurements included 
environmental uncertainty as well (for example, Hirst, 1983 but not Imoisili, 1989).  
 
However, in parallel, the above does not preclude the implication that budget emphasis 
or RAPM) does have a functional (beneficial) use for the organization. The initial 
evidence that focuses on the RAPM-Performance relationship is presented in the next 
section but more contemporary studies that re-examine and present alternative findings 
(on the positive impact of RAPM) are discussed afterwards.    
 
2.5.2.2 The Contingency-led RAPM-Performance Studies (Pre-1990) 
 
Consistent with Otley’s (1980) “minimum necessary contingency framework” and as 
explained by Fisher (1995, p. 32), “…the contingent control literature is based on the 
premise that a correct match between contingent factors and a firm’s control package 
will result in desired outcomes (i.e. higher performance)”, various RAPM studies have 
explored the link between budget emphasis and performance. 
 
Merchant (1981) researched on RAPM, budgetary participation and departmental 
performance amongst 170 managers (19 firms). Whilst he could not detect any 
significant link between budget-emphasis and departmental performance for the whole 
sample, he found positive (negative) effects for large (small) firms, therefore suggestive 
of a relationship contingent upon size. This was later confirmed by a follow-on study 
(Merchant, 1984).  
 
Brownell (1982a) used budgetary participation as a moderator variable for a sample of 
48 managers. He proposed that a high RAPM level would lead to better performance 
(job satisfaction and job performance) only if the managers were participating in the 
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 One notable exception to this situation is Merchant (1990). This study - reviewed in a later section - 
investigated a dependent variable known as “accrual manipulation”. 
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budget.  The results did confirm this hypothesis for the performance variable but not for 
job satisfaction. However, a later study by Brownell and Hirst (1986) claimed that the 
above-mentioned results are more likely to hold only in cases where task uncertainty is 
low (Brownell and Hirst, 1986, p. 242). They conclude that in a low task uncertainty 
situation, the appropriate matching of budget emphasis – budget participation (i.e. 
high/high or low/low) generates lower JRT compared to a non-matching situation (i.e. 
high/low or low/high). As expected, such differences do not hold in a high task 
uncertainty situation.  
 
The inability to secure a statistically significant budget emphasis-performance link, as 
moderated by budgetary participation, was viewed as perplexing (Brownell and Hirst, 
1986, p. 249). Hirst (1987) sought to evaluate it further but was still unable to support 
Brownell’s (1982a) original expectations. In fact, a later study by Dunk (1989) found 
significant opposite results i.e. high (low) budgetary participation together with high 
(low) budgetary emphasis reduces performance (cited from Briers and Hirst, 1990, p. 
242). Hence, after a first decade of contingency research, the findings from RAPM-
performance studies as moderated by budgetary participation remained equivocal.  
 
A second and very commonly used contingent variable in management control studies 
is environmental uncertainty (EU). Govindarajan (1984) sought to test for the validity 
of EU on the premise that RAPM would be more (less) suitable for low (high) 
environmental uncertainty conditions.  Based on a survey of 58 business unit managers, 
the analysis showed a negative correlation between environmental uncertainty and 
RAPM, with higher negative correlations for more effective business units. On the other 
hand, Merchant (1984) did not find any evidence to support the hypothesis that RAPM 
was more appropriate for companies having products later in their life cycle or products 
with higher market share. However, later studies by Brownell (1985 and 1987), who 
also investigated EU as a moderator for RAPM-job performance links, found conclusive 
evidence that a lower budget emphasis would be beneficial on performance and 
satisfaction in high EU situations.  
 
The strategic orientations selected by the companies have been also of interest to 
RAPM researchers. In a way, the use of strategy variables can be viewed as a logical 
step from the analysis of EU variables. According to Govindarajan and Gupta (1985), 
RAPM would be less appropriate for businesses following a build strategy than for 
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those adopting a harvest strategy41. In fact, RAPM appeared to be equally effective for 
both strategies for a sample of 20 profit centres, although a long-term based 
performance criterion was found to be positively correlated to performance in firms 
adopting a build strategy (Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985, p. 63). However, Gupta 
(1987) confirmed that Govindarajan and Gupta’s (1985) initial hypothesis. 
Govindarajan (1988) also investigated the budget emphasis relevance using a different 
typology, i.e. ‘low-cost’ versus ‘differentiation’ strategies. Based on a sample of 75 
managers from 24 large companies, Govindarajan (1988) found that objective measures 
(RAPM) were used by ‘low-cost’ companies. Simons (1987a), using a different 
typology (defenders vs. prospectors42) and a sample of 76 managers, found similar 
evidence of RAPM being more important for defenders than for prospectors.  The 
general conclusion from these initial studies involving RAPM and strategy is one of 
consistent findings – as mentioned by Langfield-Smith (1997, p. 218) – whereby 
performance measures based on objective accounting measures tend to be aligned more 
with companies having adopted a defender / low cost / build type of strategy. Although 
the studies have used different typologies, there are some clear common denominators 
in these strategic orientations (cost control, reaping the benefits and cash flow of current 
markets, etc). This alignment may also indicate to some extent that accounting and 
control systems have been considered in the strategy implementation process and 
adapted accordingly, although the timing of such implementation or changes have never 
been implied or researched by the various studies. 
 
Task uncertainty is another contingent variable which has been researched in RAPM 
studies. Although there has not be strictly a significant number of studies involving task 
uncertainty in the 1980s, other contingent variables have been used to proxy for some of 
the elements of the task uncertainty construct, such as functional differentiation (e.g. 
Brownell, 1985; Hirst and Yetton, 1984) and production technology (e.g. Merchant, 
1984). For example, Merchant (1984) found that to some extent, RAPM was more 
appropriate for routine and repetitive technology departments or companies. Hirst and 
Yetton (1984) demonstrated some stronger relationship between role ambiguity and 
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 A build strategy involves improving a market share and competitive position, even though this may 
decrease short-term earnings or cash flow. A harvest strategy would imply favouring the latter aspects 
rather than increasing market share (Langfield-Smith, 1997, p. 212).  
42
 Defenders operate in a relatively stable product area, offer more limited products than competitors, and 
compete through cost leadership, quality and service. They engage in little product/market development. 
Prospectors, on the other hand, compete through new products and market development. Product lines 
change over time and this type of firm is constantly seeking new market opportunities (Simons, 1987a, p. 
359)  
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budget emphasis for production jobs compared to non-production duties. On the other 
hand, Brownell (1985) examined the differences between marketing and R&D 
managers. Although he had expected that RAPM would be more appropriate for 
marketing managers (and as supported by interviews, Brownell, 1985, p. 510), the 
interaction term coefficient was not statistically significant. The relatively lower 
number of responses from R&D managers compared to the marketing managers could 
have influenced the results.  
 
Again, the impact of task uncertainty was not significant in the study by Imoisili (1989), 
which was expected to moderate RAPM to various outcome variables i.e. job stress, 
performance and attitudes to budget. In trying to reconcile his findings to those of Otley 
and Hopwood, he suggested two possible explanations (1989, p. 332-333), namely the 
financial condition of the targeted companies/organisations (already raised by Otley, 
1978) and reward uncertainties. Indeed, for a company facing financial difficulties, the 
reliance on accounting measures for performance evaluation is expected to decrease as 
managers would be evaluated by multiple criteria (and/more flexible ones; Imoisili, 
1989, p. 332). The second plausible explanation would be that subordinate managers 
lack information and have uncertainties on how their supervisors are assessing their 
performance. In fact, Imoisili (1989, p. 333) did correlate the managers’ perception of 
their evaluation criteria (21 items) and the actual criteria used by the supervisors, and 
found little correlation between 11 of the items. Nonetheless, task uncertainty remains 
to be confirmed as a valid RAPM-based contingent variable. 
 
Essentially, the pre-1990 RAPM studies had started as a result of “seemingly 
conflicting” results (Hopwood, 1972 vs. Otley, 1978) on the impact of accounting 
measures on performance evaluation. Whilst some studies (for example, Hirst, 1981;  
1983; Imoisili, 1989) made specific reference and/or sought to link their research to the 
Hopwood/Otley “debate”, a separate strand of studies has developed independently and 
has focused on potential contingent variables such as environmental uncertainty, 
strategy, budgetary participation, and task uncertainty. As stated by Briers and Hirst 
(1990, p. 253), this research focus has perhaps encouraged more empirical and 
statistically led-analysis at the expense of theory development.  
 
In addition, the use of job performance as a dependent variable for RAPM is put into 
question. Brownell (1982) pointed out that budget emphasis may be in fact a function of 
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job performance (cited in Briers and Hirst, 1990, p. 254). Hence, this is indirect support 
for this study’s proposed focus on dysfunctional behaviour as a more relevant 
dependent variable. However, the key element suggested by Briers and Hirst (1990, p. 
256) is the need to understand the process by which supervisory styles affect behaviour 
and the process by which the supervisory styles emerge. 
 
2.5.3. Post 1990 RAPM studies  
 
As already indicated in the previous section, a second strand of RAPM studies has 
focused on researching new potential significant contingent variables and using 
increasingly more sophisticated statistical techniques. Over the recent period, there has 
been a consistent stream of empirical papers, with no less than four review papers on 
RAPM (all published in 200043). These reviews have sought to examine the body of 
evidence from different perspectives in a bid to develop a long sought RAPM theory 
and to seek generalisations from the last 20 years of research. The relevant findings and 
issues are now presented: 
 
2.5.3.1. Post 1990s RAPM Studies  
 
The starting point of Hartmann’s review paper relates to statements claiming that 
RAPM studies have reached an organised critical mass of empirical work (Brownell and 
Dunk, 1991). On the other hand, authors such as Briers and Hirst (1990) and, to some 
extent Chapman (1997), are more critical of such a claim. Hartmann (2000) then 
reviews 15 RAPM studies published in or after 1990 to consider whether there is 
evidence of such an organized critical mass and to suggest developments to RAPM 
theory.  
 
Firstly, on the issue of direct links between RAPM and some forms of dysfunctional 
behaviour, Hughes and Kwon (1990) and Lal et al. (1996) have found positive 
relationships between RAPM and budgetary slack, therefore confirming earlier results. 
Furthermore, there were further studies who considered this linkage in combination 
with one or more contingent variables (which will be elaborated subsequently) but the 
dependent variables used have been either budgetary slack or job-related tension (JRT).  
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 Hartmann (2000), Otley and Pollanen (2000), Otley and Fakiolas (2000), Vagneur and Peiperl (2000) 
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The first update on the impact of contingent variables relates to environmental 
uncertainty (EU). Although the initial general conclusion drawn out that RAPM was 
less effective in high EU situations, there was some partial evidence of high EU-high 
RAPM links from a cross-sectional study of 81 managers (Ezzamel, 1990). On the other 
hand, in a study involving 215 managers in 18 companies, Ross (1995) did not find a 
significant impact for EU on the RAPM-JRT link. The absence of consistent results 
could be related to the different measures of environmental uncertainty, which 
sometimes included some elements of task uncertainty44. In a review of the use of the 
perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) construct in accounting research, Tymon et 
al. (1998, p. 27) convincingly argue that task uncertainty is a very different concept 
from that of environmental uncertainty. They also consider PEU to be a strategic 
construct (1998, p. 28) and a measure of top management’s perceptions at the level of 
uncertainty regarding the external environment. Hence, any attempt at measuring EU 
from a middle or lower management level may be inappropriate and invalid.  
 
As for the use of strategy as a contingent variable, two further studies are considered, 
namely Merchant (1990) and Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998). In a study using 
“long range orientation” and “discouragement of new ideas” as dependent variables and 
a sample of 54 profit centre managers, Merchant (1990) did not find support for the 
hypothesis that RAPM was more appropriate for growth rather than maintain/harvest 
strategies. Although their study was not included in the Hartmann (2000) review, 
Chenhall and Langfield Smith (1998, p. 263) investigated RAPM as one of the 
components of “traditional accounting techniques” under particular strategic priorities 
(using Porter’s Model, 1980). Using cluster analysis to classify 78 organisations in their 
respective strategic priorities, Chenhall and Langfield Smith (1998, p. 256) found that 
all traditional accounting techniques (inclusive of RAPM) were deemed beneficial for 
almost all companies (whether they were applying a low cost or differentiation strategy) 
although the authors had expected such techniques to be beneficial only for companies 
adopting low price strategies. Hence, despite some earlier consistent findings, Hartmann 
(2000) and Langfield-Smith (1997) thus acknowledge that the more recent results are 
not conclusive and much remains to be done as to the nature and effectiveness of 
performance evaluation systems under different strategies.  
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 All RAPM studies involving EU have measured EU using Govindarajan’s (1984) items - which were 
themselves adapted from Khandwalla (1972).  
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Williams et al. (1990), in a study of 201 managers from 22 firms, investigated the 
impact of pooled vs. reciprocal task interdependence45 for a host of budget-related 
variables (including budget emphasis) and their links to departmental performance. In 
effect, the impact of low (i.e. pooled interdependence) vs. high (i.e. reciprocal 
interdependence) uncertainty was again considered but there were no significant 
differences in the budget emphasis-performance relationship under these two 
conditions. A similar study (not reviewed in Hartmann, 2000), by Kaplan and Mackey 
(1992), looked at the influence of the adopted production process on the use of 
accounting measures. Instead of using the pooled vs. reciprocal dichotomy, the authors 
categorised production processes as either “job shop” or “flow shop”, and interpreted 
them as being respectively low task and high task uncertainty situations (1992, p. 117). 
Although this study did not strictly apply the contingency fit method (no outcome 
variable such as performance or satisfaction), the findings from a sample of 47 firms 
(plant managers and plant controllers) showed that “organizations using a flow 
manufacturing process exhibited a significantly greater tendency to rely on accounting 
numbers for evaluation purposes” (1992, p. 119). Dunk (1992) also considered the 
relevance of manufacturing process automation in moderating the link between reliance 
on budgetary control (budget emphasis) and departmental performance. He found 
similar results to Kaplan and Mackey (1992) in that as manufacturing processes become 
more automated (hence, lower task uncertainty), the reliance of accounting measures 
would be more beneficial to the organization when assessing departmental performance. 
However, Dunk’s (1992) findings are based on a relatively low usable sample size (24) 
and are thus open to criticisms.   
 
Finally, Abernethy and Brownell (1997) also examined the task characteristics within a 
sample of 127 research and development (R&D) managers and found partial support for 
the hypothesis that RAPM was more appropriate in cases of lower task analyzability 
and fewer exceptions. The results presented above clearly show an increased interest 
and relevance of task characteristics in RAPM studies. However, task characteristics 
and to a lesser extent, RAPM have not been measured consistently and this resulted in 
conflicting or non significant results. Nevertheless, task characteristics, and more 
specifically task uncertainty, remain an important contingent variable in RAPM and this 
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 As explained by Williams (1990, p. 223), “the prime function of departments featuring pooled 
interdependence is that, while they share common resources with other departments, little work flows 
amongst departments……”. On the other hand reciprocal interdependence implies a “mutual exchange of 
inputs and outputs amongst the various organizational components” (1990, p. 224) 
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is in fact viewed as the starting point for RAPM theoretical developments, as 
convincingly argued by Hartmann (2000, p. 470-471).  
 
One other set of factors in the RAPM literature relates to the relationships between the 
supervisor and the supervisee. Incidentally, the term “Reliance on Accounting for 
Performance Measurement” (RAPM) is measured by the supervisee’s perception of the 
supervisors’ reliance on accounting measures for his/her performance evaluation 
purposes. Hence, this would mean that this extensive area of research is significantly 
based on the supervisees’ perceptions and the state of the (perceived or otherwise) 
relationship between the supervisor and supervisee would certainly be of utmost 
relevance. In this respect, Ross (1994) investigates the influence of trust in a RAPM-
JRT study. The author (1994, p. 630) argues that any system of performance evaluation 
is bound to cause increased levels of stress, anxiety and job-related tension, and 
suggests that trust could be an important factor in reducing such negative effects. Based 
on a sample of 215 managers, Ross (1994, p. 633) found that in situations of high levels 
of trust, JRT is lower when budget-constrained or profit-conscious evaluation styles are 
used. On the other hand, in cases of low levels of trust, changes in performance 
evaluation style will not decrease JRT.  
 
In a similar vein, Merchant (1990) sought to link the leadership styles and RAPM. 
Although early studies by Hopwood seemed to argue that RAPM is appropriate for 
more considerate and less initiating structure leaders, Merchant (1990) did not find 
empirical support for this hypothesis. So far, there have not been any more studies that 
have tried to clarify the effect of leadership style in RAPM effectiveness. However, 
there has been some interest on the impact of the supervisors’ own performance 
evaluation method on his/her evaluation of subordinates. Poe and Strawser (1991) refer 
to the concept of “contagion effect”46 and operationalised it as a contingent variable. 
But in a study of 77 managers from 25 firms, the authors did not find a strong contagion 
effect i.e. the managers did not use the same evaluative styles as the one they perceived 
to be used by their own superiors. However, in a later study by Barret et al (1992) and 
involving 72 marketing managers, the contagion effect was found to be very strong and 
significant. As mentioned earlier, the use and effectiveness of RAPM is intuitively 
                                                
46
 “The contagion effect posits that as a manager recognizes the evaluative style employed by his 
superiors, he/she will adopt the same or at least a compatible evaluative style in evaluating his 
subordinates” (Poe and Strawser, 1991, p. 171). 
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linked to the degree of relationship existing between the appraiser and the appraisee. 
The above studies have sought to examine the relevance (and existence) of this 
relationship via several contingent variables but their relevance remain to be confirmed.  
 
A final, but yet unclassifiable contingent variable that has been increasingly 
investigated in the RAPM literature is national culture.  As in other areas of accounting 
research47, the national culture variable has emerged to explain differences and 
similarities in the application and usefulness of management accounting practices in 
“non-western” countries (Harrison, 1992; Harrison and Mckinnon, 1999). It is worth 
noting that a very significant majority of the “mainstream” empirical studies in RAPM 
were based on data collected in Australia (e.g. Brownell and Dunk, 1991; Brownell and 
Hirst, 1986; Ross, 1994, 1995), United States (e.g. Hopwood, 1972; Govindarajan, 
1984), Canada (e.g. Kaplan and Mackey, 1992; Williams et al, 1990), and United 
Kingdom (e.g. Otley, 1978; Dunk, 1992). Nevertheless, differences and similarities in 
findings from these various studies were rarely explained by cultural differences but 
rather by other contextual factors.  
 
There are various reasons for this interest in national culture but one may argue that the 
increasing importance and influence of multinational companies in non-western 
countries and the development of a research- and empirically-friendly measurement of 
national culture (namely Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions and scores) have been 
(and are still) important motivators. However, the findings have never been consistently 
conclusive and cultural scores do change over time. For example, in a study of 
Singaporean and Australian functional managers, Lau et al. (1997, p. 189) did not find 
any significant coefficient for cultural variables (individualism and power distance) or 
interaction terms involving a cultural variable. In contrast to the review of national 
culture in budgetary participation studies (Section 2.4.2.7), the impact of national 
culture on RAPM appropriateness is less evident (Hartmann, 2000, p. 463) and this 
seems to indicate a higher level of generalization of RAPM practices (interacting with 
some typical variables such as task difficulty, task uncertainty, budgetary participation) 
irrespective of the different cultural contexts. However, there could be more critical 
explanations of such results.  
                                                
47
 For example, refer to Chanchani and MacGregor (1999). 
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Firstly, the RAPM studies have focused on only two cultural dimensions (power 
distance and individualism) and as mentioned by Lau et al. (1997, p. 192), dimensions 
such as uncertainty avoidance (and even Masculinity vs. Feminity) or Confucian 
dynamism could be more relevant to RAPM. Secondly, one may altogether question the 
use of the Hoftstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions and scores to explain for national 
differences (or similarities) in management accounting practices. It could be argued that 
national differences do exist but these may not be apparent when using Hoftstede’s 
scores. Indeed, a recent review article by Baskerville (2003) challenges the use of 
cultural dimensions and the fact that they seem to be related to various national data 
indices such as GNP, economic growth, population size and density, levels of 
education, social mobility etc (2003, p. 9).  
 
One final category of RAPM studies involves research where RAPM was clearly 
hypothesised as a contingent variable rather than being an independent variable. Dunk 
(1990, 1993a) are examples of such research. Dunk (1990) considered the interactive 
effect of budgetary participation and budget emphasis on managerial performance. 
Based on a sample of 26 managers in northern United Kingdom, Dunk (1990, p. 176) 
concludes that performance is lower when participation is high (low) and budget 
emphasis is high (low). A later study (Dunk, 1993a) investigated budget emphasis and 
information asymmetry on the relation between budgetary participation and slack. This 
research is notable in that it included an agency theory-related variable in the 
management control contingency literature. Using the responses from 79 Australian 
managers48, Dunk (1993a, p. 406) found that slack was lowest (highest) when all 
independent variables were high (low). This was contrary to expectations, prompting 
the author to acknowledge possible measurement issues for two newly-measured 
variables, namely slack and information asymmetry. Oddly enough, there have not been 
subsequent attempts at investigating the impact of information asymmetry in RAPM, 
especially when one considers the results reported by Dunk (1993a).   
 
2.5.4. RAPM: A Further Review and Evaluation of Findings  
 
In contrast to Briers and Hirst’s (1990) earlier criticisms that RAPM studies do not give 
enough attention to replication and confirmation, it is noted that the post-1990 studies 
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 A further 40 managers responded to a second survey, aimed at ensuring the reliability of the 
instruments for budgetary slack and information asymmetry (Dunk, 1993, p. 404).  
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have sought to be generally more coherent in their approaches and selection of 
contingent variables. Nevertheless, as mentioned by Hartmann (2000, p. 465), there is a 
relatively large number of hypotheses not supported and replication studies failed in 
some instances in confirming earlier results. There was still a “duplicative” use of 
contingent variables, principally for task uncertainty which was measured in various 
forms (e.g. level of process automation in Dunk, 1992 or task interdependence in 
Williams et al., 1990). In addition, “newer” variables were considered such as trust and 
national culture and there were an increasing number of studies applying multiple 
interactions models (more than two-way interactions).  
 
In acknowledging Hartmann’s (2000) comments on the lack of successful replications, 
Otley and Pollanen (2000) attempted to re-test some key hypothesis of five often quoted 
studies, namely Brownell (1982), Brownell and Hirst (1986), Dunk (1989), Brownell 
and Dunk (1991) and Harrison (1992) in one single context i.e. managers and 
administrators of Canadian universities. The results of these replications and the 
original results are tabulated in Appendix 2.4. Clearly, the levels of explanatory power 
(as measured by R2) were different and the significance and sign of the interaction terms 
were at odds, except for Brownell and Dunk (1991). According to Otley and Pollanen 
(2000, p. 494), this level of contradictory results is not so surprising given that there has 
generally a preference for new measures and different samples rather than strict 
replication. Hence, even if the surveyed studies had similar hypotheses (and variables) 
being tested (refer to Appendix 2.4), the variables were measured differently and the 
respondents were from very different backgrounds prompting Otley and Pollanen 
(2000, p. 494) to state that “to expect consistency over such a diverse range of 
managers over a 20 year period is clearly optimistic”. Despite that Otley and Pollanen 
(2000) review a relatively limited number of RAPM studies, they nevertheless drive 
home a very important point: the inherent nature of RAPM (and other MCS) studies and 
the mainstream contingency paradigm seems to preclude any chance of a coherent body 
of knowledge and understanding or at the very least, there needs to be stricter 
replication, especially in terms of variable measurement, to reach higher standards of 
consistency.  
 
As stated above, the definition and measurement of variables, specifically RAPM, has 
been identified by Hartmann (2000, p. 466) as an important issue. Surprisingly, Briers 
and Hirst (1990) did not pinpoint this particular problem although there were already 
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different versions of RAPM measures being used49. Otley and Fakiolas (2000) and 
Vagneur and Peiperl (2000) sought to explain these different measures and their 
implications for future RAPM research, and this is detailed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.3).  
 
Hartmann (2000, p. 466) argued that this variety of RAPM measurement has not only 
methodological implications but also theoretical ones as the researchers are implicitly 
reviewing the definition of this control mechanism, presumably in response to their 
particular research objectives and context (i.e. country, category of respondents, 
hypothesis and contingent variable being tested etc50). Clearly the differences in 
understanding and applying RAPM as a variable of interest have been more important 
than compared to “stricter” MCS constructs such as budgetary participation and 
standard operating procedures. Hartmann (2000, p. 466) provides some examples of 
such differences in understanding and application, namely 
(a) RAPM represents targets expressed in accounting numbers (quantitative and 
financial target) – e.g. refer to Harrison, 1993 
(b) RAPM represents rigid, formal and objective measures of performance (e.g. refer to 
Chapman, 1997)  
(c) RAPM refers to the use of budgets, hence the term budget emphasis, (e.g. Fisher, 
1995). 
 
Otley and Fakiolas (2000, p. 507) concurred with the above-mentioned definition and 
measurement issues, and suggested a more thorough development of RAPM measures 
adapted to the organizations under study. However, a more critical and elusive problem 
remains the development of a RAPM theory.  
 
2.5.5. Developing a RAPM Theory and Areas of Investigation 
 
One issue which is raised by both Briers and Hirst (1990) and Hartmann (2000) is the 
absence of a strong theoretical underpinning for RAPM. For example, Briers and Hirst 
(1990, p. 256) state: 
“In summary, recent theoretical developments in supervisory literature have 
centred on the introduction of several moderator and antecedent variables. 
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 Hartmann (2000, p. 466) reports as many as three different RAPM measures as early as from 1980. 
This was most probably associated with the increasing adopting of more sophisticated statistical and 
factor analysis techniques and the need to contextualise the questions to the target audience.  
50
 Otley and Fakiolas (2000, p. 506) report that earlier studies tended to choose between the Hopwood 
and Otley variants depending upon whether they were to be used in a cost or profit centre environment.   
  
86
These developments add breath to the literature…..[but]….the depth of 
understanding has progressed little since the early studies” 
 
Ten years later, Hartmann (2000, p. 467) offers a more nuanced explanation in that 
RAPM studies have typically depended on one theoretical strand, namely role theory. 
According to him, the emphasis on role theory has led to a greater interest on the 
negative effects of RAPM, principally using JRT as a dependent variable. Nevertheless, 
it must be pointed that a significant number of studies both consider JRT and some 
positively oriented outcome variable (e.g. job satisfaction, managerial performance), 
with some measure of success for both categories of outcome variables. However, 
Hartmann (2000, p. 468) argues that a link between RAPM and a positive outcome 
variable is theoretically unsound, when one considers role theory and the difficulties in 
linking empirically job attitudes (e.g. JRT) to managerial performance.  
 
The above-mentioned issue is further compounded by the widespread use of the 
contingency paradigm in RAPM studies. Hartmann (2000) contends that the 
contingency paradigm has turned into a “pragmatic motive” to study the relationship 
between RAPM and any contextual variable: a criticism which was already made by 
Chapman (1997) in the wider management accounting context.  
 
This leads to Hartmann’s (2000) theoretical proposals in using uncertainty as a central 
concept in the RAPM contingency framework, based on Chapman’s (1997) earlier 
suggestions and using Galbraith’s (1973, 1977) notion of uncertainty. The previous 
section has already presented the various RAPM studies that have investigated the 
influence of uncertainty, although there have been very different ways of 
operationalizing uncertainty i.e. from a measure of uncertainty including both 
environmental and task uncertainty (e.g. Govindarajan, 1984), then a focus on task 
uncertainty (from an internal perspective), such as Brownell and Hirst (1986) and 
Imoisili (1989), and on variables which were closely associated to task uncertainty, i.e. 
functional differentiation (Brownell, 1985) and manufacturing process automation 
(Dunk, 1992). Finally a more contemporary approach has been to further dissect task 
uncertainty into two sub-components referred to as task variability and task difficulty51 
on the grounds that they “…are two independent dimensions, each with differing 
theoretical consequences” (Brownell and Dunk, 1991, p. 694) and that quite low 
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 Whitley et al. (1983) refer to “number of exceptions” and “analyzability” to mean task variability and 
task difficulty. These terms have been used interchangeably in more recent studies.  
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correlations have been observed between these two dimensions. Task difficulty has 
been of particular interest in subsequent studies, such as Lau et al. (1995, 1997) and Lau 
and Buckland (2000). However, the results have yet to provide a clear answer as to 
whether task uncertainty (and its sub-dimensions) has a negative or positive effect on 
RAPM. This is referred to by Hartmann (2000, p. 472) as the “uncertainty paradox”. In 
an attempt to resolve this so-called paradox, Hartmann (2000, p. 473-476), proposed 
areas of investigation involving RAPM and uncertainty namely: 
 
(a) The different roles of RAPM and the impact of uncertainty in the change in roles. 
This was already picked up by Simons (1995) in terms of how controls (including 
RAPM) are being used in either a “diagnostic” or “interactive” mode. Abernethy 
and Brownell (1999) is one study which investigated the style of budget use 
(interactive or diagnostic mode) in influencing the link between strategic change 
and performance. This has provided the motivation for further investigating the 
diagnostic vs. interactive dichotomy in this study, but within a mediating model. 
This has also be en the subject of recent studies (e.g. Henri, 2006).  
 
(b) Applying theories other than role theory, especially in cases where RAPM is linked 
to positive outcome variables, such as goal theory (Kren and Liao, 1988, p. 289) or 
equity theory (Landy, 1989). However, given that the current study will focus on 
negative consequences of control systems/mechanisms, role theory will remain the 
primary foundation for investigating RAPM.  
 
(c) More detailed research on the so-called “contagion effect”, in conditions of 
uncertainty. Although it was mentioned earlier than the superior’s own performance 
evaluation criteria may be an important variable, this study will not focus on this 
particular issue. 
 
(d) More detailed research on the different definitions and types of uncertainty 
(environmental and task) that can influence RAPM. In line with earlier comments 
made by Tymon et al (1998) and given that this study will focus on functional 
managers, it would be more appropriate to focus on task uncertainty and its two 
resulting sub-dimensions (task difficulty and task variability). In fact, Hartmann 
(2005) later found that environmental uncertainty and task uncertainty have opposite 
effects on managers’ opinion about the appropriateness of accounting performance 
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measures, and thereby concluded that these findings provide an explanation of the 
mixed findings in the RAPM-uncertainty literature (2005, p. 258).   
 
2.5.5.1 The ‘Positive-influences’ of RAPM and Budget-Based Measures 
 
In parallel to the research direction taken above, it has to be acknowledged that a 
number of recent studies have addressed the RAPM theory debate from an alternative 
perspective namely that the use of budget emphasis can have positive consequences. 
For instance, Marginson and Ogden (2005) argue that the path-goal theory would 
predict that managers who do not have self-evident paths and clear cut goals will 
welcome accounting based controls such as budgets for the structure and certainty they 
provide (2005, p. 436). The key aspect on which the authors and other studies rely on is 
the level of ambiguity that managers may be facing in their activities. They refer to a 
study by Storey et al. (1997) which found that managers accepted the tight budgetary 
targets because the latter reflected a strong image of certainty. As a result of Storey et 
al.’s (1997) findings, Marginson and Ogden (2005) implied that there was little 
evidence of dysfunctional behaviour emerging from a context dominated by a high level 
of RAPM. Based on their own qualitative and quantitative study in a number of 
business units of a major UK corporation, Marginson and Ogden (2005) observe that 
those managers experiencing high levels of role ambiguity are more likely to commit to 
meeting the budget targets as opposed to those with low levels of role ambiguity. In 
addition, the results indicate that the ‘strength’ of the role ambiguity variable is such 
that it can override traditional explanatory variables such as leadership style (2005, p. 
450). The authors thus see the budgeting targets as a coping mechanism for managers, 
particularly those who are experiencing role ambiguity. They suggest that the mere 
visibility of budgetary performance is sufficient to ensure commitment, even without 
necessarily relying on formal incentives (2005, p. 451).   
 
The ‘influence’ of ambiguity is also investigated in Hartmann (2005), where he 
considers the tolerance for ambiguity variable (TFA) and its impact on managers’ 
perceptions of accounting performance measures (APM). He asserts that individuals 
with low levels of TFA would have a greater preference for accounting performance 
measures. Furthermore, the relationship between task uncertainty and the 
appropriateness of performance measures was expected to be more strongly negative for 
managers experiencing a low TFA as opposed to those managers with a high TFA. 
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Based on valid responses from 196 managers, Hartmann (2005) did not find a direct 
effect of the TFA variable on the appropriateness of APM but he observes a moderating 
effect for TFA on the relationship between the uncertainty variables (task and 
environmental) and the appropriateness of APM (2005, p. 258).   
 
Overall, the two studies highlight the possibility that RAPM / budget emphasis does 
have positive effects, particularly in terms of reducing ambiguity and increasing 
commitment. Empirically speaking, the findings of Marginson and Ogden (2005) and 
Hartmann (2005) on the links between ambiguity and RAPM (as a coping mechanism) 
are not totally consistent but this may well be due to their different measures and 
methodologies. However, whilst there is a clear motivation and interest for managers 
with high role ambiguity (or with low TFA) to seek solace from more defined budget-
based measures there is more difficulty in appreciating whether managers with low role 
ambiguity (or high TFA) will demand less budget-based measures. Nevertheless, the 
authors strongly make the case that RAPM and other budget-based measures can have 
positive consequences.  In particular, Marginson and Ogden (2005) seem to suggest that 
the intrinsic features of budgets (structured and certain) may lead to positive 
consequences       
 
2.5.7. RAPM: Concluding Remarks 
 
This section has extensively considered the various strands of RAPM research. In 
contrast to a more “settled” body of knowledge and evidence for standard operating 
procedures and budgetary participation, there are clearly more controversial reviews 
and criticisms for RAPM studies. As stated by Otley (1999) and Hartmann (2000, p. 
477), this may be related to the potential contributions these may have in the 
performance measurement and evaluation areas (e.g. balanced scorecards). The multiple 
and diverging influences ‘uncertainty’ (e.g. Hartmann, 2005) remain of interest. This 
study will thus focus on RAPM, dysfunctional behaviour and selected contingent 
variables, partially in light of the areas of future research proposed by Hartmann (2000), 
as detailed above and in attempt to seek more consistent and theory-driven findings. 
The role and implications of ‘uncertainty’ need to be further considered, as a means to 
address the paradox previously identified by Hartmann (2000) and by his recent 
findings (Hartmann, 2005). Furthermore, Henri’s (2006) study on the interactive and 
diagnostic use of performance management systems highlights the emerging research 
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interest in the manner in which control systems (RAPM) are operated by senior 
managers. Thus, on more general terms, the implications and effects of using 
accounting numbers for performance evaluation remain of critical importance as they 
feed into reward/appraisal mechanisms being used in companies and at different levels 
of management.  
 
2.6. The Relevance of Task Uncertainty and Superiors’ Use of Controls 
 
Further to this extensive review of SOP, BP and RAPM studies, the case will be made 
for the selection of existing contingent variables, namely task uncertainty and the 
superiors’ use of controls (interactive vs. diagnostic). Apart from the fact that these 
have never been considered in a MCS-dysfunctional behaviour study and given that the 
superiors’ use of controls has been scantly considered, it will be also argued that the 
selection of these contingent variables will contribute towards developing a more 
theoretically-driven approach to MCS studies.   
 
2.6.1. Task Uncertainty 
 
Chapman (1997) and Hartmann (2000; 2005) are the main proponents of considering 
uncertainty as a key concept in developing contingency research in management 
accounting. As detailed earlier in this chapter, Chapman (1997) develops his arguments 
from Galbraith’s (1973) earlier notion of uncertainty, namely the existence of an 
information gap (cf. Chapman, 1997, p. 200) in relation to a particular task and a 
particular organisation. He further classified uncertainty in terms of “uncertainty over 
the consequences of action” and “uncertainty over the objectives for action”52. 
Chapman (1997, p. 202) further states that when uncertainty increases, the process of 
quantification in the more rapidly changing situation will be harder and despite more 
efforts being expected from the managers, the end results are less perfect. Hence, the 
uncertainty element is amenable to change significantly the perspective that managers 
may have on control systems.  
 
Although Hartmann’s (2000) review paper and arguments relate primarily to RAPM, 
these can be undoubtedly linked to other control systems/mechanisms. After reviewing 
                                                
52
 This was the basis for Hopwood’s (1980) definitions of the roles of accounting in an organization, 
namely answer machines, ammunition machines, learning machines and rationalisation machines.  
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the various RAPM studies that have focused on the impact of some uncertainty or 
uncertainty-related variables, Hartmann (2000, p. 471) states: 
“In RAPM hypotheses, uncertainty is typically predicted to affect 
subordinates’ perceptions of such factors as the controllability, completeness 
and relevance of RAPM……Uncertainty causes predictions to be difficult and 
thus hinders budgetary targets” 
 
Clearly, these comments can be equally applicable to the other control 
systems/mechanisms in this study (SOP and BP). As mentioned later by Hartmann 
(2000), the controllability aspect of any control system is a central element of any 
responsibility accounting system. The rules of this management tool are clear – more 
authority and power translates in broader responsibility for action or inactions. Hence, 
the level of uncertainty (whether perceived, internal or external) are bound to affect 
system, hence leading to dysfunctional consequences.  
 
However, the past empirical results (particularly for RAPM and BP) involving 
uncertainty have not been consistent i.e. uncertainty has been observed to have positive 
and negative impacts on the control systems. Hartmann (2000, p. 472-473) has sought 
to explain this uncertainty paradox, which is rooted in the controllability principle and 
the implications of being in charge of a responsibility centre. Hence, whilst the 
responsibility accounting concept states that a manager is not to be made responsible for 
uncontrollable variances (especially occurring in a high uncertainty situation), most 
organisations still abide by this system despite its limited usefulness in an uncertain and 
complex environment. This leads Hartmann (2000) to believe that the conflicting results 
may be due to the apparent limited practical applicability of MCS, despite these having 
some strong theoretical (at least logical) usefulness. In consequence, he suggests 
various areas of improvement and one involves understanding the appropriateness of 
RAPM in different kinds of uncertainty. In particular, and as a starting point, the author 
suggests that advances can made by giving theoretical meanings to differences between 
environmental uncertainty (EU) and task uncertainty (TU). Hartmann (2005) 
subsequently finds opposite effects of uncertainty on the appropriateness of accounting 
performance measures (APM), in that environmental uncertainty is positive related to 
APM whilst task uncertainty is negative related to APM (2005, p. 255).   
 
In his review of contextual variables and MCS, Chenhall (2003, p. 137-141) implicitly 
differentiates between environmental and task uncertainty, whilst this had not been the 
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case for Hartmann (2000). He subsumes EU within “the external environment” and he 
considers that uncertainty “..defines situations in which probabilities cannot be 
attached and even the elements of the environment may not be predictable” (2003, p. 
137). Hence, Chenhall (2003) resolutely links EU as part of the external environment53 
(markets, suppliers, competition) and concurs with Tymon’s et al (1998) view that EU 
is a top management perception. On the other hand, Chenhall (2003, p. 139) categorises 
task uncertainty within the generic contingency concept of technology54 along with 
other aspects, namely complexity and interdependence. More precisely, the production 
process and the types of products (services) offered are viewed as important factors. For 
example, if the company primarily55 produces non-standard and differentiated (custom-
made) products, then this will translate into lower task analysability and a high number 
of exceptions to be managed within and across departments. On the other hand, a 
company engaged primarily in a mass production of undifferentiated products involves 
highly analysable processes and few exceptions, in some way benefiting from a sort of 
“organizational learning curve”56. As stated by Chenhall (2003, p. 139), it is an 
established notion that more formal MCS, such as a higher extent of SOP, less BP and 
higher RAPM would be more appropriate in the second instance but the research 
findings (as presented in earlier sections) have not been conclusive. Incidentally, there 
may be some linkages between EU and TU in the sense that the choice of a dominant 
manufacturing processes is linked to the market demands and the strategy adopted by 
the company. Most organisations do not just opt for a mass-production or custom-made 
production – there may be historical reasons (e.g. patent holder) or they may have 
reacted to market demands. However, the focus of this study will be strictly on the task 
uncertainty aspect.  
 
2.6.2. Superiors’ Use of Controls: Interactive and Diagnostic Use 
 
The selection and development of this contextual variable has stemmed from various 
strands of the MCS literature.  Firstly, at the core of the argument, there is the (limited) 
research on the extent of the relationship between the supervisor and the subordinate 
                                                
53
 Originates from initial research on EU (e.g. Duncan, 1972; Khandwalla, 1972, Burns and Stalker, 
1961) 
54
 Originates from initial research on technology (e.g. Woodward, 1965; Perrow, 1970, Thompson, 1967) 
55
 It would be safe to argue that a significant number of companies do not solely engage in mass-
production or custom-made production but rather a combination of both 
56
 Although these distinctions are easy to grasp from a manufacturing perspective, there is theoretically no 
difference in applying such concepts in a services industry (e.g. banks, insurance and hotels, etc) 
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manager which has so far focused on variables such as leadership style, trust, and 
information asymmetry (e.g. refer to Hartmann, 2000, p. 464). Intuitively, how far 
managers would be reacting (negatively or positively) to specific control systems could 
be dependent on how they perceived their supervisors to be using those controls. Hence, 
rather than focusing on a “vague” variable such as leadership style, it would be the 
supervisor’s style of using the MCS which could be relevant.  
 
This is implicitly linked to Hopwood’s (1980) roles of information and control systems, 
which he linked to the uncertainty factor. As reported by Chapman (1997, p. 202), 
accounting systems can take the role of answer, learning, ammunition or rationalisation 
machine in the face of uncertainty. However, accounting systems remain at core basic 
information tools and it is the user’s perspective and interaction that causes the 
accounting system to be, for example, viewed more as a learning machine rather than an 
answer machine. Chapman’s (1997, 2002) following statement is useful in illustrating 
this argument: 
“Where accounting is taken to provide answers, then the numbers can be held 
to speak for themselves. In a more complex setting however, the 
incompleteness of such numbers would suggest they become subject to 
moderation through other concerns” 
 
Although the central theme of this statement is again focused on uncertainty, Chapman 
(1997) is taking for granted that the reader of the accounting information would become 
“aware” of the need to moderate and look for other concerns, whereas this may be 
dependent on how the superior or manager uses the information in the first place.  
 
Simons (1987b; 1990; 1991; 1994; 1995; 2000) is credited for having first explored this 
issue as part of his studies on strategy and control systems. He focuses on senior 
managers’ use of controls to implement and develop strategy (Langfield-Smith, p. 223, 
1997). Simons contends that the contingency framework linking the type of controls 
and strategic choice is not appropriate. In fact, this relationship is mitigated by the focus 
(or bias) of senior management on specific controls, which Simons describes as 
“interactive controls”. Once such controls are identified, it follows that subordinates 
will develop strategies or plans that would better suit these controls57. Therefore, 
companies pursuing similar strategies would not necessarily be focusing on the same 
                                                
57
 This is to be contrasted with “diagnostic” controls that are used to implement intended strategies. 
(Simons, 1995, p. 63) 
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category of controls due to senior managers’ “personal” choices of “interactive” and 
“diagnostic” controls. Such personal attitudes or perceptions are not uncommon in most 
organisations and underlying factors for particular choices of controls may be due to, 
but not limited to, prior professional and/or academic background, and work experience.  
 
Simons (1990) also carried out a comparative analysis of two companies within the 
same industry but applying different strategic orientations. His main findings are 
described in Table 2.2 below. 
 
 Company A Company B 
Strategy Classification  Defender/Cost Leader/Adaptive Prospector/Differentiator/ 
Entrepreneurial 
Environment 
 
Stable (Markets) & Unstable 
(Technological Change) 
Rapidly Changing Conditions 
Type of Controls Diagnostic Controls for sustaining 
competitive advantage whereas 
Interactive Controls for product or 
technological change 
Budgeting & Planning Systems kept 
in focus (interactive) to continuously 
debate on strategy & action plans. 
Table 2.2: Controls and Strategy (adapted from Simons, 1990) 
 
Simons’ expectations are largely fulfilled since senior managers appear to focus on 
controls that monitor the more uncertain aspects of the environment. In addition, he 
(1991) proposes that senior managers will use multiple control systems interactively 
only during short periods of crisis or when the organisation is in transition (Langfield-
Smith, p. 224, 1997). Simons (1994), to a large extent, validated his propositions by 
observing the behaviour of newly appointed senior managers insofar as the selection of 
controls was concerned.  
 
Simons (1991, 1994) provide extensive discussions on the distinction between 
diagnostic and interactive control systems. For example, whilst he (1994, p. 172) 
considers diagnostic control systems as feedback systems used to monitor 
organizational outcomes and correct deviations from preset standards of performance, 
he views interactive control systems as systems that managers use to regularly and 
personally involve themselves in the decision activities of subordinates. In this respect, 
any diagnostic control systems (e.g. profit plans and budgets, variance reports, project 
monitoring systems) could be made interactive by being more involved in the 
monitoring such as: 
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(1) “ensuring that system is an important and recurring agenda to discuss 
with subordinates” 
(2) “ensuring that system is a regular focus of attention by operating 
managers throughout the organisation” 
(3) Participating in the face-to-face meetings with subordinates. 
(4) Continually challenging and debating data, assumptions and action plans.  
 
For example, a typical variance report usually triggers a diagnostic response from the 
supervisor i.e. not much reaction unless there is negative variance. On a more 
interactive level however, the supervisor could follow up on investigating any variance 
(positive or negative) or whether the absence of a significant variance could be related 
to the validity of budget targets. Hence, this would represent a shift from the 
“management-by-exception” principle to a more “hands-on management” one, insofar 
as the use of MCS is concerned. The longitudinal study by Simons (1994) investigated 
the use of controls in a strategic change situation for ten newly appointed managers and 
found evidence of a more interactive use of these controls (e.g. overcoming 
organizational inertia, communicating the strategic agenda, organising the 
implementation of timetables and targets). A particular aspect of the interactive use of 
controls is of interest and is quoted from Langfield-Smith (1997, p. 223): 
“The choice of interactive controls provides the signal to subordinates about 
which aspects need to be attended to, and when new ideas should be proposed 
and tested. This activates organizational learning and new strategies emerge 
over time through the debate and dialogue that surrounds interactive 
management controls” 
 
Based on his initial studies and propositions, Simons (1995; 2000) integrates the 
interactive/diagnostic conceptualisations in his levers of control (LOC) framework. As 
earlier explained in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, there are four inter-dependent control 
systems (belief systems, boundary systems, diagnostic and interactive) that seek to 
maintain a dynamic tension between creative innovation and predictable goal 
achievement (Henri, 2006, p. 533; Widener, 2007, p. 760). Simons (1995; 2000) 
essentially views boundary systems and diagnostic systems as negative forces which are 
counteracted by the positive forces (belief and interactive systems). 
 
Two points can be inferred from the above. Firstly, the use of interactive style vs. 
diagnostic is thus considered to impact on subordinates’ perceptions in terms of 
usefulness and effectiveness of MCS. Secondly, whilst Langfield-Smith (1997) and by 
extension Simons (1994) associate interactive style with more positive consequences, it 
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is not yet evident that the supervisor’s use of controls in a more interactive way will not 
lead to dysfunctional consequences. Indeed, “provides the signal to subordinates”, 
“debate and dialogue” may have more negative connotations such as “pressure”, 
“stress” and “tension”. Intuitively speaking, when one considers that an interactive use 
of MCS would imply the “personal involvement” of top managers, it may be inevitably 
perceived more as a threatening situation for the managers concerned rather than having 
beneficial influences. For instance, as part of a field study on the introduction and use of 
a new performance measure system in a company, Tuomela (2005, p. 312) finds that the 
interactive use of performance measures may actually be viewed as even more 
threatening by certain individuals, since the interactive discussion of problem areas 
increase the visibility of actions and strengthen accountability to peers. However, it is 
only recently there has been more evidence emerging (whether case-based or 
questionnaire-based) on the general interacts and consequences of an interactive and 
diagnostic use of controls.  
 
Abernethy and Brownell (1999) is one of the first empirical studies to have considered 
the interactive/diagnostic use of controls. More specifically, they examined the “style of 
budget use” (interactive or diagnostic) on the relationship between strategic change and 
performance within the Australian hospital sector. Based on theoretical arguments from 
Chapman (1997) and Simons (1994), the authors hypothesised that the hospital CEO’s 
more interactive use of budget data will improve the relationship between strategic 
change and performance. This hypothesis was supported using responses from 63 
hospitals CEOs. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the construct 
measurement of the “style of budget use”. Abernethy and Brownell (1999, p. 196) 
developed a four item 7-scale instrument which yielded a Cronbach Alpha of 0.59. In 
addition, respondents were given a fairly detailed explanation of the two types of budget 
use and were asked to choose the one that best reflected their style of use (forced 
choice, dichotomous measure). The point-serial correlation between these two measures 
was 0.41 and significant. However, the questions devised by Abernethy and Brownell 
(1999) were narrowly defined and would need to be amended to apply to a wider MCS 
context. 
 
A second study that has applied Simon’s (1991, 1994) interactive vs. diagnostic use of 
controls is Van der Stede (2001). However, in contrast to Abernethy and Brownell’s 
(1999) model, Van der Stede (2001, p. 124) operationalised the supervisor’s interactive 
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vs. diagnostic use of controls as part the micro-attributes of “tight budgetary control”. In 
this respect, he tried to develop a measure of interactive budgeting control out of a list 
of 14 items through a confirmatory factor analysis but only six items managed to 
generate a meaningful common factor (above 0.40). In view of these unsatisfactory 
results, Van der Stede (2001, p. 130) could only generate a variable known as “intensity 
of budget related discussions”.  
 
Bisbe and Otley (2004) examine Simons’ expectations that the interactive use of MCS 
is positively-oriented and it will enhance product innovation. The authors argue that 
Simons’ work is however ambiguous in that it does not explicitly state whether the 
interactive use of MCS will eventually have an intervening (indirect) or moderating 
effect on the relationship between innovation and performance. They focus on several 
control systems, namely on an interactive use of budgets, balanced scorecards, project 
management systems and an overall management control system. They measured each 
control system via four items that are each anchored by a description of a low level of 
interactivity (in fact, equated to a high level of diagnostic use) and a high level of 
interactivity. Only three items merged as one factor and the Cronbach’s alpha showed a 
very good level of reliability (0.77 to 0.79). Based on responses from 40 companies, 
there was no evidence of an intervening effect relating to the interactive use of MCS on 
the relationship between innovation and performance. There was also no correlation 
between the interactive use of MCS and innovation and the authors conclude that the 
linkages suggested by Simons (1995: 2000) may be more complex (and perhaps non-
linear) than initially thought (2004, p. 726). However, the moderating analysis provides 
some evidence that the interactive use of controls has an influence in the relationship 
between innovation and performance, but only for the case of budgets and the overall 
MCS variable. Bisbe and Otley (2004, p. 727-728) suggest that the interactive use of 
controls has this moderating influence by showing direction (providing focus to the 
innovation efforts), integration (facilitating a forum for debate and dialogue) and fine-
tuning (allowing frequent adjustments to strategy implementation). However, they 
acknowledge that they did not consider the tensions and balances among the style of use 
of controls (diagnostic vs. interactive) - although the anchors to the MCS questions 
appear to suggest that a low interactive use was synonymous with a high level of 
diagnostic use.   
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In fact, Henri (2006) explicitly addresses this issue in his study of how performance 
management systems (PMS) contribute to organizational capabilities, which in turn 
would affect performance. He specifically models two PMS variables that are each 
related to a different use of a PMS, namely in an interactive and in a diagnostic use. 
Furthermore, in acknowledgment of the dynamic tension hypothesised by Simons 
(1995: 2000), Henri (2006) models the dynamic tension as a product term of the 
diagnostic and interactive PMS and subsequently argues that this variable has a positive 
effect on the capabilities. Although the author relies on a different approach to the 
variable measurement (related to executive support systems), the items used are very 
similar to the ones used by Abernethy and Brownell (1999) and Bisbe and Otley (2004). 
Crucially however, he measures the use of PMS diagnostically (4 items) and the use of 
PMS interactively (7 items) as two separate variables (2006, p. 551). Using structural 
equation modelling (SEM) and responses from 383 senior managers, he finds clear 
support for the direct negative impact of diagnostic PMS - and direct positive impact of 
interactive PMS - on organizational capabilities (market orientation, entrepreneurship, 
innovativeness, and organizational learning). This can be contrasted to the previous 
studies (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Abernethy and Brownell, 1999) which only found a 
moderating effect of interactivity. There is however little support for the direct 
influence of the ‘dynamic tension’ variable, in that it appears only applicable to firms 
with high environmental uncertainty and with benefits only for organizational learning 
and entrepreneurship. Also, there was no significant relationship between the 
capabilities and financial performance. In considering these results, Henri (2006, p. 
547) is critical of the universal expectation that dynamic tension can bring positive 
impacts. He refers to previous authors (Marginson, 2002; Lewis, 2000) who suggested 
that the negative dynamics to the tension can in fact overpower the positive ones. For 
instance, he mentions the possibility that this tension can trigger change while 
simultaneously activating defensive routines that inhibit change (2006, p. 547). The 
reference to defensive routines (Argyris, 1990) is indeed very topical to this present 
study in that it relates to the dysfunctional consequences of the tension between 
interactive and diagnostic use of controls. Whilst Henri (2006) brings crucial evidence 
on the separate (and competing) role of diagnostic and interactive use of controls, it 
however applies only to PMS and the lack of findings relating to the dynamic tension 
may well be influenced by the way this dynamic tension was actually measured in the 
study (i.e. as a product term). 
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Finally, Widener (2007) conducted an empirical analysis of the levels of control 
framework and considered all four elements of Simon’s (1995: 2000) framework. She 
put forward expectations that each control element will have a positive association with 
organizational learning (benefit) and management attention (cost), which in turn would 
have a beneficial impact on performance. She also formally considers the inter-linkages 
between the four elements of control. She then relied on Henri’s (2006) 
conceptualisation of diagnostic and interactive systems to assess how performance 
management (PM) systems are used in companies. Using structural equation modelling 
(SEM) and responses from 122 chief financial officers, she found that organizational 
learning is enhanced by the emphasis of the diagnostic system. Also, the interactive 
system influences the diagnostic and boundary systems whilst the belief systems 
influences each of the three other systems (2007, p. 781). She thus demonstrates the 
inter-dependencies and complementarities between the various elements of the LOC 
and asserts (2007, p. 782) that an important implication for organizations is that control 
systems must be used both interactively and diagnostically to ensure maximum benefit.   
 
In conclusion, several studies, arguments and findings have been used to demonstrate 
the relevance of this contextual variable in the MCS environment. The arguments and 
issues raised by Chapman (1997) and Simons (1995) and the initial evidence put 
forward by Abernethy and Brownell (1999) and Van der Stede (2001) appears to 
indicate such relevance. At the time of designing and collecting the data, this present 
study did not benefit from the subsequent and important contributions by Bisbe and 
Otley (2004), Henri (2006) and Widener (2007) - which only re-asserts the importance 
and relevance of investigating the effects of the interactive/diagnostic use of controls. 
However, at this point, there were still construct measurement issues for this variable 
and the above earlier attempts have been the starting point for seeking a valid measure 
of the superiors’ interactive vs. diagnostic use of controls. The findings of this study 
will be however considered in light of the more recent research/findings on Simon’s 
LOC and the interactive/diagnostic uses of controls. 
 
2.7. Dependent Variables in MCS Research 
 
After having considered the MCS and contingency variables, this section will review 
the outcome variables that have been used in MCS contingency-based research. These 
are broadly classified as positive (e.g. performance, attitude, satisfaction, motivation) 
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and negative (referred here as dysfunctional behaviours) outcome variables. Although 
there is a notable stream of studies that consider MCS as the outcome variable, these are 
not reviewed in this study58.   
 
2.7.1. Performance and other positive outcome variables 
 
As initially proposed by Otley (1980), the inclusion of an outcome variable in a 
contingency-based study is a critical pre-requisite since the traditional objective has 
been towards finding the correct match between a (or several) contingent variable(s) 
and a firm’s control systems. This “match” or “fit” is evidenced by the outcome 
variable and Otley’s (1980, p. 99) following statement leaves no doubt about that: 
“…In order to progress beyond the mere association of particular 
contingencies and accounting systems, a judgement has to be made about the 
impact of the accounting in aiding organizational performance” 
 
In other words (those of Chenhall, 2003, p. 134), good fit meant enhanced performance 
whilst poor fit implies diminished performance. However, Otley (1980) was prompt to 
acknowledge the conceptual difficulties in defining performance or effectiveness - an 
issue which was earlier raised by Evan (1976) and Steers (1977). Nevertheless, the 
increasing interest in applying the contingency framework and in researching more 
contingent variables appears to have put aside these earlier concerns. More recently, 
Chenhall (2003, p. 132) reviewed the outcome variables of MCS and classified them as 
behavioural (e.g. job satisfaction) and organizational outcomes, such as managerial or 
departmental performance (refer also to Kwok and Sharp, 1998). Whilst he reports that 
these have been used extensively, he raises the common issue that all these measures 
are self-assessed and thus could be highly subjective. On the other hand, the use of 
secondary-data outcome variables (e.g. stock prices returns, profits) has been scantly 
considered, possibly due to the difficulties in building theoretical links between internal 
management processes and externally determined performance data59.  
 
Therefore, a significant number of empirical studies in behavioural management 
accounting research have sought to test the efficacy of their propositions and 
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 For a discussion of theoretical issues involved in using MCS as the dependent variable, refer to 
Chenhall (2003, p. 135) 
59
 Indeed, even the determination of accounting profit is significantly subject to generally accepted 
accounting principles and share prices are determined by market forces and are subject to exogenous 
factors.  
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relationships by examining the impact of contextual or institutional variables on one, or 
several, specific dependent variable(s). The most commonly used ones are job 
performance (e.g. Rebele et al, 1996), job satisfaction (e.g. Pasewark and Strawser, 
1996), organisational effectiveness (e.g. Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1991), and 
managerial performance (Gul et al, 1995). But there has not been any research 
investigating the actual power and extent of the relationships between MCS and positive 
outcome variables. These could have shed some light on the generalisability of such 
variables in MCS studies. In this respect, Table 2.3 provides a summary of findings on 
the contingent model’s explanatory power, based on a non-exhaustive list of 11 MCS 
studies60, particularly for BP and RAPM. From the table, several points can be noted: 
 
(a) Managerial performance is indeed a commonly used positive outcome variable, 
although its actual measurement had changed in several studies to take into account 
the problem of simply averaging the 9 items. However, the reported correlations 
between control system and managerial performance have widely fluctuated and 
have in many cases been non-significant. Even in situations where the supervisors 
were asked to rate their subordinates, the relationship to BP was not significant.  
 
(b) In the two surveyed studies, job satisfaction did generate similar results in relation 
to BP but not for RAPM. 
 
(c) Finally, the use of financial (such as profit data) measures (coupled with a 
subjective evaluation of managerial performance) did not generate any significant 
relationship with BP.  
 
It is worth mentioning that one should undoubtedly expect different degrees of 
relationship between a control system/mechanism and the outcome variable as this 
could be due to some contingent variables. However, the fact that non-significant 
correlations are observed for such direct relationships raises questions as to the 
appropriateness of the above-mentioned outcome variables. In this respect, the negative 
consequences of MCS appear to be of more interest and are reviewed below under the 
heading of “dysfunctional behaviour”.  
 
 
                                                
60
 These studies had reported correlation matrices. 
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Study Control System 
or Mechanism 
Positive outcome 
variable 
Instrument used for outcome 
variable 
Significant 
Correlations (r) 
Govindarajan 
(1986) 
BP Managerial 
Performance 
9 item, from Mahoney et al. 
(1963, 1965) 
0.23 
Govindarajan 
(1988) 
RAPM SBU Effectiveness Modified 8 item (weighted 
average) from Govindarajan 
and Gupta (1985) 
Not  
significant 
(ns) 
Mia 1988 BP Managerial 
Performance 
One 9-scale overall 
performance rating by 
respondent’s supervisor 
Ns 
Mia (1989) BP Managerial 
Performance 
One 9-scale overall 
performance rating by 
respondent’s supervisor 
Ns 
Dunk (1992) BP Job Satisfaction 20 items, from Weiss et al. 
(1967) 
0.44 
Harrison (1992) (a) RAPM 
(b) BP 
Job Satisfaction 20 items, from Weiss et al. 
(1967) 
-0.04 
 0.37 
Shields and Young 
(1993) 
BP Firm-Wide 
Performance 
Combination of Net Income, 
Stock Price , ROI and 
subjective rating 
Ns 
Gul et al (1995) BP Managerial 
Performance 
9 item, from Mahoney et al. 
(1963, 1965) 
Ns 
Lau et al. (1995) (a) RAPM 
(b) BP 
Managerial 
Performance 
9 item, from Mahoney et al. 
(1963, 1965) 
-0.42 
-0.39 
Nouri and Parker 
(1998) 
BP Job Performance Modified 8 item (weighted 
average) from Govindarajan 
and Gupta (1985) 
0.34 
Lau and Buckland 
(2000) 
(a) RAPM 
(b) BP 
Managerial 
Performance 
9 item, from Mahoney et al. 
(1963, 1965) 
0.29 
Ns 
Table 2.3:  Positive Outcome Variables used in BP and/or RAPM Studies 
 
2.7.2. Dysfunctional Behaviour 
2.7.2.1 Defining Dysfunctional Behaviour 
 
A more negatively oriented dependent variable is dysfunctional behaviour, which has its 
origins traced back to Argyris’ (1952) seminal case study-oriented paper. This term 
describe the “..organisational and behavioural effects seen in supervisors induced by 
the use of budgeting” (Hartmann, 2000, p. 452) and refers to the violation of control 
system rules and procedures (Jaworski and Young, 1992, p. 17). In more precise terms, 
dysfunctional behaviour leads to the managers experiencing negative feelings towards 
their superiors, due to their perceptions of non-usefulness and inadequacy of the 
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budgeting process. Despite the implications of having a subjective variable such as 
“negative feelings” in a management accounting research process, Hartmann (2000, p. 
452) contends that dysfunctional behaviour is not just a human tendency61, but a natural 
reaction that can be “rationally” expected in response to controls and processes. The 
extent to which such controls are perceived to impact on performance, evaluation, and 
ultimately rewards, is bound to increase managerial stress and tension, thus leading to 
dysfunctional behaviour. Similarly, Argyris (1990) contended that managers facing 
varying degrees of embarassment or threat may react by activating ‘organizational and 
defensive routines’ (i.e. a different label that refers to dysfunctional behaviour) to 
protect themselves from the perceived outcome. In this respect, Jaworski and Young 
(1992, p. 18) expect dysfunctional behaviour to be translated by “...actions in which a 
subordinate [purposefully] attempts to manipulate elements of an established control 
system for his own purposes”. However, Jaworski and Young (1992) did not explicitly 
study the direct link between control systems and dysfunctional behaviour. They only 
concluded that it was role conflict that led to job tension but they could not find any 
definitive links between role conflict and dysfunctional behaviour. There is also no 
indication that Jaworski and Young’s (1992) conceptualisations and measures of 
dysfunctional behaviour were used in subsequent studies.  
 
More recently, Robbins (1994) uses the term “strange behaviour” and illustrates it with 
the common example of managers embarking on a spending frenzy to exhaust their 
budget before a given date, in order to avoid cutbacks in the next period’s allocation. 
This case in point, however, merely gives credit to Jaworski and Young’s (1992) 
comments on the use of anecdotes when referring to dysfunctional behaviour: 
“..while behavioural theories such as dissonance, goal setting and power 
theories have been used to explain dysfunctional behaviour, it has been 
difficult to draw clear conclusions regarding why such behaviour occurs as 
many of the findings are taken from anecdotes or small sample studies..” 
(1992, p.17).  
 
Ashton (1976) also examined the issue of dysfunctional behaviours as the opposite and 
unintended consequences of the traditional “deviation-counteracting feedback” control 
mechanism. Indeed, a control mechanism can be viewed as a “target-monitor-report-
reaction to achieve target” loop, which obviously aims at eliminating variances and 
ensuring achievement of targets. However, Ashton (1976, p. 289) believes that a 
                                                
61
 i.e. which would then be prone to claims of “irrationality”. 
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“parallel” loop is also at work in organisations and contends that the unintended and 
dysfunctional consequences generated by the control system may be perpetuated and 
amplified, hence resulting into a “deviation-amplifying feedback”. Within the context of 
a budgetary control system and consistent with Argyris’ (1953) comments, Ashton 
(1976) provides some examples of “deviation-amplifying feedback” instances such as 
sub-units (departments) being “self-centred” rather than organisation goals-focused62 (p. 
293) and difficulties in gathering “truthful” information to assign responsibilities for 
unfavourable variances (p. 294). Although Ashton (1976) presents a very convincing 
model for unintended and dysfunctional consequences of control systems, evidence as 
to the extent of such “amplification” or “ripple” effect of such consequences remains to 
be identified, and actually traced back to the control system itself. Interestingly, the later 
writings by Argyris (1990) and Simons (1995: 2000) seem to suggest that the ‘ripple’ 
effects of controls systems identified by Ashton (1976) may actually become acceptable 
(and taken for granted) by the organization and be an indicator of the so-called dynamic 
tension expected from the interaction of different uses/types of control systems.   
 
To improve one’s understanding of dysfunctional practices within an organisation, a 
more practical examination of specific forms of dysfunctional behaviours is required. 
  
2.7.2.2 Forms of Dysfunctional Behaviour 
 
There are various forms of dysfunctional behaviours that can occur in an organization 
but with common and underlying objectives: to use the rules and procedures to one’s 
advantage63 or with a view to avoid a potential threat to one’s position / standing in the 
organizations. Hirst (1983, p. 596) considers dysfunctional behaviour to be translated in 
rigid bureaucratic behaviours, strategic behaviours, resistance and invalid data 
reporting64. A more thorough description of the forms of dysfunctional behaviour, as 
reviewed by Birnberg et al. (1983), can be listed as follows: 
 
(a) Smoothing – The subordinate utilises the information system to his/her benefit by 
altering the pre-planned free flow of data without altering the actual activities of the 
organization (Ronen and Sadan, 1981). The most common example would be the 
                                                
62
 Hence creating conflicts between organisational sub-units. 
63
 Or to one’s perceived advantage, as pointed out by Jaworski and Young (1992, p.18). 
64
 Hirst also considered “social withdrawal” to be a form of resistance and hence, a form of dysfunctional 
behaviour (1983, p. 597). 
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booking of sales/expenses achieved/incurred in the current period to subsequent 
periods. 
 
(b) Biasing and Focusing – The manager has flexibility over the various indicators or 
types of information he/she can report. Biasing would imply selecting the one(s) suiting 
best the circumstances and more favourable to the manager. Such situations usually 
exist when managers are being required to provide estimates of future events65 
(Birnberg et al., 1983, p. 121). This is very much related to the idea of focusing, since 
the attention of superiors is being diverted to specific, and more positive, elements of a 
system. More precisely, Birnberg et al. (1983, p. 121) note that focusing occurs when 
certain aspects are either enhanced (highlighted) or degraded (hidden). A further 
dimension of focusing would be to validate a certain course of action (e.g. a capital 
investment decision; Bower, 1970), using “hard” facts and figures, to hide an actual and 
more subjective justification. 
 
(c) Filtering - According to Read (1962), filtering occurs when information is withheld 
because the subordinate thinks that this could be used by his/her superior to hinder the 
subordinate’s personal goals (e.g. career progression). This was later confirmed by 
O’Reilly and Roberts’ (1974) study. Birnberg et al. (1983) also classify the delaying of 
reports, over-presentation (to cause information overload) or over-aggregation as a form 
of filtering. Another example documented by Hayes and Cron (1988) was the impact of 
the introduction of zero-based budgeting (ZBB) practices on dysfunctional behaviours. 
The authors contended that the implementation of the ZBB would lead to an increase in 
task uncertainty and unless organizations adjusted their measures of performance to 
reflect the openness of ZBB, then one could expect a higher level of dysfunctional – 
principally in the form of invalid data reporting.  
 
(d) Illegal Acts or Falsification – Such dysfunctional behaviours may include forgery 
of documents and reports i.e. existing information is intentionally altered to satisfy 
required norms and variances. Examples of studies that have documented such practices 
are Mars (1982), Vaughn (1983) and Simon and Eitzen (1986). 
 
                                                
65
 For example, refer to Lowe and Shaw’s (1968) behaviour of area sales managers when required to 
submit sales forecasts. 
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Jaworski and Young (1992, p. 19) categorise the above-mentioned practices as 
“strategic information manipulations” whereby the control system, and not the process 
itself, is being influenced66. On the other hand, a second category of dysfunctional 
practices, namely “gaming performance indicators”, has perhaps more fundamental 
implications for the organization than those caused by strategic information 
manipulations. Indeed, gaming involves the selection of actions and processes with a 
view to generating favourable reports and feedback for the subordinate. This behaviour 
would not be dysfunctional if the manager had expected such practices and enacted 
rules/procedures to maximise his/her own (and the organisation’s) benefits from the 
subordinates’ actions. Hence, 
“..gaming of a performance measure is said to exist when the subordinate 
knowingly selects his activities so as to achieve a more favourable measure on 
the surrogate used by the superior for evaluation at the expense of selecting an 
alternative course of action that would result in a more desirable level of 
performance as far as the superior’s true goal is concerned.” (Birnberg et al., 
1983, p. 123).   
 
In a similar vein, Jaworski and Young (1992) view gaming as a “resistance” action by 
subordinates since “…the control system measures performance only on a limited 
number of the subordinate’s required tasks, or measures performance on the wrong 
tasks” (1992, p. 19). It follows that gaming has more direct economic consequences for 
an organisation. For example, maintenance costs are not incurred to influence 
profitability ratios, sales volume is pushed up without due regards to the credit policies, 
or to the fostering of long-term customer relations or to company reputation. There is 
also a short-term orientation aspect behind such gaming practices. Merchant (1990) 
coined the above as “management myopia” when he investigated the Japan-U.S. 
cultural divergence on the dysfunctional effects of controls for profit centre managers. 
He also related the myopic behaviour to “…a concomitant discouragement of new 
ideas, particularly for the expenditures that promise long term or less certain payoffs.” 
(1990, p. 301).  In addition, Narayanan (1985) devised a model to show that managers 
possessing private information regarding their decisions have incentives to make 
decisions yielding short-term profits but which are not in the stockholders’ best 
interests.    
 
                                                
66
 As an analogy, actions involving filtering, biasing and smoothing are quite similar to the creative 
accounting or earnings management practices adopted by directors to influence the published financial 
performance and position of a reporting entity. 
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Overall, several but separate elements of dysfunctional behaviour such as 
smoothing/falsifying (Flamholtz, 1979), data manipulation and short-term orientation 
(Merchant, 1990; Chow et al, 1996), invalid data reporting Hayes and Cron (1988), and 
budgetary slack (Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Onsi, 1973) have been studied and there is 
some evidence of their existence and relationships to certain control systems 
(particularly budget-based). However, it is believed that the occurrence of dysfunctional 
behaviours has not been considered systematically. This may have been the result of 
difficulties in identifying and operationalising dysfunctional behaviour, namely its 
dependence on different proxies (tension, stress) or in the use of ‘micro’ 
conceptualisations for measuring dysfunctional behaviour. 
 
2.7.2.3 Operationalising Dysfunctional Behaviour 
 
These two broad categories of dysfunctional behaviours (strategic manipulations and 
gaming) identified above may not necessarily contain all the types of dysfunctional 
behaviours67. Nor do these practices actually operate in isolation of one another68. 
Managers may thus be engaged into gaming and strategic manipulation at different 
levels of combination. Therefore, a methodological problem has been to determine how 
to operationalise the concept of dysfunctional behaviour. Indeed, Hirst (1983, p. 603) 
and Merchant (1990, p. 298) note the difficulties in obtaining honest responses, given 
the sensitive and “illicit” nature of dysfunctional behaviour. In this respect, Hirst (1983) 
used surrogate measures such as tension and social withdrawal (viewed in terms of 
subordinate-superior relations) to capture dysfunctional behaviour but eventually 
suggests the use of case study approaches for future research.  
 
On the other hand, Merchant (1990), Jaworski and Young (1992) and Chow et al. 
(1996) used various constructs to measure dysfunctional behaviour. Appendix 2.5 
provides a summary of the various questions used by these earlier studies and their 
respective Cronbach-Alpha statistics. From these constructs, it is noted that:  
 
(a) The measure used by Jaworski and Young (1992) do overlap between the different 
categories and types of dysfunctional behaviour in contrast to the measures used by 
                                                
67
 The issue of budgetary slack will be considered separately in the next section. 
68
 Birnberg et al. (1983, p. 120) broadly term these practices as “..methods of distorting the information 
system”. 
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Merchant (1990) and Chow et al. (1996) i.e. the latter studies attempt to distinguish 
between strategic information manipulations (manipulation of performance 
measures) and gaming (short-term orientation). 
 
(b)  Despite earlier arguments to avoid direct “sensitive” measurements (e.g. Hirst, 
1983 and Otley, 1978), the questions relating to data manipulation (in Merchant, 
1990) were unambiguous and may result in non-responses69.  
 
(c) Direct questions involving specific and detailed dysfunctional practices (e.g. 
shifting funds between accounts to avoid budget overruns) may elicit respondents to 
provide ethically motivated attitudes rather than generating a measure the incidence 
(or extent) of dysfunctional behaviour. 
 
In light of the above, it is noted that a valid measure of dysfunctional behaviour is not 
an easy task and to date, Jaworski and Young’s (1992) questions have yet to be 
replicated and validated. Even if their questions do not attempt to distinguish strategic 
data manipulations from gaming practices, they have appeared less inclined to generate 
ethically motivated answers. Furthermore, a ‘seemingly’ dysfunctional practice, namely 
the creation of budgetary slack by a subordinate, has been extensively researched and 
measured but has been consistently argued as not being “dysfunctional” (Merchant and 
Manzoni, 1989; Merchant, 1989; Davila and Wouters, 2005). The following section 
considers this view whilst the present study proposes to improve Jaworski and Young’s 
(1992) measures from previous findings on the validity of budgetary slack-oriented 
questions.  
 
2.7.2.4 The Case of Budgetary Slack 
 
As mentioned above, budgetary slack (the choosing of a more achievable sales or 
expenses forecast) has been kept separate from the list of possible dysfunctional 
behaviours. In fact, there has been significantly more research into budgetary slack70 
with an emphasis on understanding the role of managerial participation in the budgeting 
                                                
69
 For example, a direct question by Merchant (1990) on falsifying data caused negative reactions among 
managers during a pilot test. Instead of looking for indirect measures or other proxies, the researcher 
removed the item from the final questionnaire (p. 303, 1990). 
70
 Lukka (1988) also proposed the concept of “budgetary bias” which is made up of budgetary slack and 
“upward-bias” (the exaggeration of forecast performance).  
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process71. Lowe and Shaw (1968) argued that first, managers built slack into their 
budgets as a means of protecting their personal interests, and second, that it was a 
rational economic behaviour for them do so. In this respect, slack can be viewed as 
provoked and rational - i.e. a form of dysfunctional behaviour - which cuts across both 
categories of dysfunctional behaviour (information manipulation and gaming). This 
issue was raised by Jaworski and Young (1992) but slack was finally not included on 
the grounds that a superior can encourage “..slack building behaviour by subordinates 
to increase budget commitment and to reduce incentives to engage in potentially 
dysfunctional practices [other than slack] to meet the budget” (1992, p. 19). Therefore, 
budgetary slack would act as a moderating variable and consequently reduce other 
dysfunctional behaviours. However, this argument remains to be theoretically 
established and empirically tested, despite Van der Stede’s (2000) findings of a negative 
relationship between slack and short-term orientation. Indeed, this study focused on 
only two forms of dysfunctional behaviour so that “…some spillover effects with other 
forms of dysfunctional behaviour (e.g. earnings management) may have remained 
undetected” (Van der Stede, 2000, p. 620).  
 
As in the case of other dysfunctional behaviours, the extent of budgetary slack in an 
organization is also a difficult construct to measure. Kwok and Sharp (1998, p. 144) 
note that in this situation, researchers often resort to the self-reported measure of 
propensity to create slack, which is assumed to an adequate proxy for budgetary slack at 
the organizational level. The most common measure was developed by Onsi (1973) and 
coined in terms of general attitudes on budget and slack72. However, as pointed out by 
Kwok and Sharp (1998, p. 147), the four-item statements were measured on a 5-point 
scale anchored by “always” and “never”. The latter would suggest an attempt to directly 
gather the “extent” of budgetary slack within the organization rather seeking 
“agreement or disagreement” to an attitude-oriented question. Indeed, the statements are 
general in nature and seek only opinions, which would then “approximated” to the 
actual extent of dysfunctional behaviour in the organization. Such reasoning is clearly 
aimed at obtaining more “truthful” responses, although this is not mentioned in Onsi’s 
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 For example, refer to Merchant (1985a), Lukka (1988), Young (1985), Dunk (1993a) and Dunk and 
Nouri (1998).  
72
 Onsi’s (1973) slack attitudes and slack manipulation statements are provided in Appendix 5. 
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(1973) study73. In addition, the term “propensity to create slack” used by subsequent 
studies (Merchant, 1985a; Govindarajan, 1986; Nouri, 1994; Lal et al, 1996; Nouri and 
Parker, 199674) to describe Onsi’s (1973) instrument appears more pertinent, given that 
these statements could in fact measure the respondent’s potential for dysfunctional 
behaviours.   
 
In contrast, Dunk (1993a, p. 402) devised another instrument to measure managers’ 
perceptions of the level of slack in their budgets. The items are reproduced in Appendix 
5 and aim at extracting a more “specific” measure of slack via the use of first person 
(i.e. “I have to..” or “..my area of…”) sentences, in comparison to the general 
statements developed by Onsi (1973). Thus, Dunk’s (1993a) questions appear to be 
more appropriate to proxy organizational slack, despite the fact that they are more 
direct75 in nature and may result in non-responses. However, the other alternative would 
be more “general” questions, which may capture ethically oriented attitudes. 
 
In this respect, the Jaworski and Young’s (1992) instrument is considered to be the most 
appropriate, as amended by the context of the current study (different management 
control systems) and by the inclusion of some of Dunk’s (1993) budgetary slack items, 
to capture the managers’ perceptions of the extent of dysfunctional behaviours in their 
departments. 
 
2.7.2.5. Dysfunctional Behaviour: Concluding Remarks 
 
In spite of a long standing and regular attention given to some of the negative 
consequences of MCS (i.e. JRT, stress, budgetary slack, data manipulation, shorter-term 
orientation), there has been very little focus and research on managers’ dysfunctional 
behaviour as a more general concept and its potential sub-components i.e. information 
manipulations and gaming.  In essence, the phenomenon has been studied on a 
piecemeal and ad hoc basis. For instance, the elements of dysfunctional behaviour 
discussed in Birnberg et al. (1983) have not been evaluated empirically. Jaworski and 
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 Furthermore, the slack manipulation item “With some skill, a manager can make his unit performance 
just as he wants” is also worthy of interest in the context of developing a measure of dysfunctional 
behaviour. 
74
 All these studies used Onsi’s (1973) four-item instrument with the “strongly agree” to “strongly 
disagree” anchor points.  
75
 And perhaps less threatening than the Merchant’s (1990) items relating to the manipulation of 
performance measures.  
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Young’s (1992) model also does not specifically argue and test for the direct effects of 
control systems on dysfunctional behaviour and merely alludes to the possibility of such 
occurrences. At the same time however, there is an emerging voice in the literature that 
questions whether dysfunctional behaviour is actually ‘dysfunctional’ organizationally 
(and individually) and whether organizations can ultimately ‘benefit’ from such 
behaviour in letting managers ‘get away’ with some practices. In particular, it is the in 
the budgetary slack area that the related evidence and arguments have been the most 
persisting (Lukka, 1988; Lillis, 2002; Davila and Wouters, 2005) but similar discussions 
have also recently become topical in the RAPM literature (Hartmann, 2005;  Marginson 
and Ogden, 2005).  
 
The study of managers’ behaviours in response to control systems is thus intended to be 
one of the key contributions of this study. As discussed in the previous sections, the 
measurement of ‘dysfunctional behaviour’ has posed problems and issues to previous 
researchers and this may have curtailed further empirical work in this domain. There 
has been also little interest in the effects of contextual factors that might enhance or 
diminish the effects of dysfunctional behaviour further to the set up of control systems. 
As mentioned in the first chapter, another key contribution would be to improve the 
analysis techniques and methods. These are now reviewed.  
 
2.8. Contingency-based MCS Studies: Research Methods and Analysis Issues 
 
In the recent years, there has been closer attention into the research and statistical 
methods used in MCS studies, specifically in relation to the contingency “fit” 
hypotheses. Several papers, which will be later reviewed in this section, are direct 
testimony to this increasing interest e.g. Hartmann and Moers (1999, 2003), Gerdin and 
Greve (2004) and these authors have illustrated their arguments using the RAPM and 
budgetary participation studies. Although there have been earlier references and 
comments on the various research methods used (e.g. Briers and Hirst, 1990; Langfield 
Smith, 1997; Chapman, 1997), these have been usually considered to be less important 
compared to more “theoretical” or “conceptual” issues in the MCS literature. These 
research methods issues are categorised into three main headings, namely data 
collection methods/sample selection, variable measurement and construct 
reliability/validity, and statistical analysis of “fit”.  
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2.8.1. Data Collection Methods: Implications for MCS Studies 
2.8.1.1. Using Mailed Questionnaires 
 
As mentioned by Briers and Hirst (1990, p. 256), the early MCS studies tended to be 
more case study oriented. For example, the seminar work by Argyris (1952) involved 
the use of qualitative data, such as observations and interviews, to study the budgeting 
practices in four US organisations (cf. Macintosh, 1994, p. 212). However, the use of 
closed-ended (principally Likert-based) mailed questionnaire surveys76 to elicit views, 
perceptions, attitudes and opinions quickly became the most pro-eminent research 
method in MCS studies. Almost in parallel, and presumably in response to a greater 
need for external validity in a statistical analysis process, there was a gradual shift from 
one or few-companies study to cross-sectional studies involving a relatively large 
number of firms and/or respondents. This gradual shift started with Hopwood (1972) 
and Otley (1978), who used questionnaires in one single company77 studies.  This may 
have prompted Chapman (1997, pp. 189) to state that contingency studies have come to 
be seen as large scale, cross-sectional questionnaire-based research, which examines the 
interaction of a limited number of variables. However, he does acknowledge that the 
use of questionnaires were preferred in view of the different research approach selected 
i.e. earlier studies were exploratory in nature and identified dominant contingencies 
from the observation of MCS in a particular organisation whilst the more recent 
explanatory approach involved the study of MCS, using a set of pre-conceived 
hypotheses (1997, p. 190). In her review of MCS and strategy studies, Langfield-Smith 
(1997) is also less critical of the survey instrument.  
 
The use of mailed survey methods is not unique to management accounting and control 
research. For example, Ghauri (1995, p. 59) reported that surveys and questionnaires are 
the most popular data collection method in business studies.  Hence, there are clearly 
very diverging views as to the use of questionnaires and one may argue that this is 
related to the availability of, and/or accessibility to, secondary data. For example, most 
financial accounting studies do rely on publicly available annual reports whilst finance-
oriented research can rely on databases of financial and econometric data, both 
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 One important note: although one may carry out a close-ended questionnaire survey through interviews 
(face to face or phone), the mail based is more anonymous and avoids prevents rater bias. Of course, on 
the other hand, the absence of control on who is exactly responding to the mail survey is one notable 
downside aspect.  
77
 However, Otley (1978) also used face-to-face interviews in his study.  
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generally available thanks to a regulatory requirement. However, by definition, the 
majority of management accounting research involves access to internal company 
information and practices. These are not publicly available. Also, access to company 
premises, staff and documents for case-study or experimental-based data collection is 
no doubt difficult to arrange for and manage. In an increasingly competitive business 
environment, access to internal information is fraught with confidentiality clauses. In 
addition, the company staff may not be too inclined to respond truthfully or accurately 
on a face-to-face basis because of possible repercussions to their career prospects or for 
internal politics. In other words, discarding questionnaire based surveys for 
qualitative/case study-type data collection (such as observations or interviews) may not 
be necessarily an easier or less controversial exercise. In this respect, Ghauri (1995, p. 
91) states: 
“…normally data collection through case studies is considered an easy 
method, but this is a misconception. In fact data, collection through case 
studies is much more demanding than through surveys or 
experiments……..S/he [the researcher] should not only be able to ask relevant 
and probing questions, but should also have the capabilities to listen and 
interpret the answers given……..This is particular important in single case 
studies, as the researcher has no other case with which to compare the 
findings”. 
 
The above may therefore explain the previous scant use of case-study qualitative 
collection in MCS research, particularly within the contingency paradigm. Young 
(1996, cited from Smith, 2003, p. 118) did attribute the decreasing use of questionnaires 
due to “a growing interest in alternative forms of research which can provide richer data 
sources”. However, it is argued that this change in research method in MCS studies may 
be due to the interest into studying alternative theories of MCS, rather than being solely 
due to the issues in using a mailed questionnaire survey.  For example, there has been a 
notable interest in institutional theory in management accounting research (e.g. refer to 
Scapens, 1994; Carruthers, 1995; Baxter and Chua, 2003; Chenhall, 2003). However, 
the nature of the theory (the study of institutional forces in the management control 
process) is such that the dominant method of data collection has been through 
observations, interviews, analysis of company internal management reports, and related 
qualitative data collection techniques78. Within the contingency-based research 
however, qualitative data collection has generally remained to be an exception (e.g. 
Archer and Otley, 1991; Knight and Wilmott, 1993; Simons, 1994; Simons 1990; 
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 Examples of such recent management accounting and control-related studies are Burns and Scapens 
(2000), Walker and Johnson (1999), Abernethy and Chua (1996) and Amat et al. (1994).  
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Marginson 2002). Nevertheless, there is no denying that these particular studies do 
generate valuable findings (Langfield-Smith, 1997, p. 224). 
 
In addition, a study of more recent MCS contingency-based published research (i.e. 
after Young’s 1996 study of 1985-1994 studies, see Appendix 2.6)79 revealed that 13 
out of the 15 selected studies have used close-ended mailed questionnaires for data 
collection purposes. Only one study actually used qualitative data collection methods. It 
is also noteworthy that one of these studies (Davila, 2000) had used interviews and 
other qualitative data collection methods to either develop their measures for the 
questionnaire80. However, the key conclusion is that recent MCS research does not 
appear to be significantly departing from the use of questionnaires as a data collection 
method, as was earlier predicted by Young (1996) or more recently by Van der Stede et 
al. (2005). Although it is clear that the questionnaire survey has notable limitations, its 
practicality and feasibility attributes has contributed to its continued use in recent MCS 
studies.  Nonetheless, this leads to a discussion on the pertinent issues of sample 
selection and response rate.  
 
2.8.1.2. Sample Selection and Response Rate 
 
Most MCS researchers aspire to some level of generalisation of their results and one 
important element in moving towards generalisation is the sample selection and the 
response rate. Young (1996) reported an average of 207 as target population and an 
average of 146 respondents in a review of questionnaire-based studies. He advised (cf. 
Smith 2003, p. 119) the use of more random sampling (rather than convenience 
sampling) and follow-up procedures to achieve larger sample sizes, hence leading to an 
improvement in the statistical significance of the results.  
 
However, MCS research is plagued by the lack of reliable publicly available 
information on companies’ internal management and thus a clear definition of what 
constitutes a population is sketchy at best.  Researchers sometimes rely on business and 
                                                
79
 This is by no means a comprehensive survey as it only focused on two key publications namely 
Accounting, Organizations and Society (AOS) and Accounting and Business Research (ABR) – Refer to 
Appendix 2.6 for the detailed list.  
80
 This is not to be confused with pilot testing where one seeks to confirm the validity of existing 
measures or items.  
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trade directories (e.g. Kompass) or government public databases81 to identify a target 
population but these sources do rarely include all companies or organizations. In 
addition, the companies’ size (e.g. employee numbers, turnover or asset values) can be 
used to limit the population to companies that have a defined management structure 
(e.g. functional managers, business unit managers etc). But even though these now can 
be reliably obtained, there is still the problem of ensuring sufficient response from 
managers. For example, it may be company policy not to respond to any questionnaire 
surveys (e.g. Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998, p. 249) or simply 
managers/companies do not perceive any benefit in answering to surveys82. However, a 
review of the studies listed in Appendix 2.6 does show a relatively satisfactory response 
rate for most studies that have reported the use of a random sampling method (cross 
sectional) - ranging between 47% to 56% - although some studies have had low 
(absolute terms) numbers of respondents (e.g. Abernethy and Lillis, 1995).  
 
In view of the perceived difficulties in seeking a suitable response rate from cross-
sectional samples, several researchers have preferred to sacrifice a higher level of 
generalisation for a higher response rate by using convenience sampling or by focusing 
on key industries/sectors. Hence, these are less cross-sectional in nature or are outright 
focused on one large group of companies. In this respect, the company’s cooperation is 
usually sought prior to the mailing of questionnaires and the company can provide a 
cover letter to encourage participation. However, and based on the review of past 
studies in Appendix 2.6, the success rate of convenience sampling is less consistent than 
expected. Gul et al (1995) only achieved a 22% rate (37 responses) using a convenience 
sampling but nevertheless carried out a full moderated regression analysis (4 variables). 
O’Connor (1995) and Chow et al. (1999) respectively achieved 44% and 41%, despite 
using a convenience sampling method. Others, such as Shields (2000) and Tsui (2001) 
have been more successful with response rates in excess of 70%. This seems to indicate 
that convenience sampling or company-backed surveys may not automatically 
guarantee good response rates.  
 
In conclusion, there are clearly contradicting views on the type of sampling strategy to 
pursue. In the particular context that the data collected will be used in relatively 
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 Usually, information for individual companies obtained from official census or other government-led 
data collection exercises cannot be legally released to third parties. 
82
 Particularly, this may be attributed to the fact that MCS target respondents are often non-accounting 
related managers and may find such research to be of little relevance to their work.  
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complex statistical models, Chenhall (2003, p. 156) states “….It is noteworthy that to 
gain acceptable statistical power in more complex models large sample sizes are 
required. Thus, the relatively small samples in some contingency-based studies limit the 
statistical power of the results”. On the other hand, Birnberg et al. (1990, p. 42) 
worthily reminds that the “external validity depends on the effectiveness of the sampling 
strategy for achieving a random or representative sample, and the developed 
constructs”. Hence, whilst the former author appears to make the case for researchers to 
maximise as far as possible sample sizes, the latter one stresses on the need to seek 
external validity through random sampling. Indeed, Birnberg et al. (1990, p. 47) state: 
“Perhaps the greatest strength of a survey, on the many dimensions discussed, 
is the ability to randomly sample a large percentage of a population and to 
obtain measurements on many variables. Often, though, low response rates 
from a large population can cause survey researchers to seek convenient 
target populations (e.g. within a single firm) from which they hope to obtain a 
higher response rate. When this strategy is employed, any sampling advantage 
over other methods is reduced.” (emphasis added) 
 
In light of the above, and given that this current study will use statistical methods of 
analysis on a cross-sectional basis, it would thus be preferable to seek external validity 
through random sampling. However, the next step would be to consider construct 
reliability and validity since it is a necessary condition to make valid inferences to other 
populations.  
 
2.8.2. Variable Measurement and Construct Validity/Reliability. 
 
As stated by Kwok and Sharp (1998, p. 137), a key methodological concern in 
behavioural accounting research is good construct measurement. This is particularly 
critical in the case of mailed questionnaire surveys because the researcher is not in 
direct contact with the respondent and cannot directly intervene to avoid interpretation 
problems. In addition, because of the difficulty in measuring abstract and complex 
concepts such as managerial performance or budgetary participation, there is generally a 
reliance on multiple item scales (i.e. more than one question to measure the construct) 
which would then converge to one unobservable variable. Thus, one hopes to “corner” a 
reliable estimate of the respondent’s true attitude, opinion or expectation with the use of 
multiple-item questions, generally through the use of Likert-scales. The collected 
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responses are then coded and subjected to reliability and validity tests83. Whilst the 
former seeks to confirm the degree to which the measures are free from errors and 
therefore yield consistent results, the latter attempts to identify the extent to which a 
scale operationalizes the construct it is intended to represent (Kwok and Sharp, 1998, p. 
142). 
 
Insofar as MCS studies are concerned, there has been varying levels of success in 
achieving satisfactory construct reliability and validity. For example, the six-item 
budgetary participation scale (Milani, 1975) has almost been consistently used for the 
last 25 years and this had even led Chenhall (2003, p. 131) to question whether such 
measures should not be “updated” in light of new developments in management 
accounting84. Nevertheless, the “stable” use of the Milani (1975) scale contributes to a 
higher degree of comparison amongst studies. Another example of a “stable” construct  
used in MCS studies is the Mahoney et al’s (1963) and Mahoney’s (1965) nine-item 
measure of “managerial performance”85.  
 
On the other hand, the Reliance on Accounting Performance (RAPM) construct is more 
controversial as reviewed in Vagneur and Peiperl (2000) and Otley and Fakiolas (2000), 
who investigated the numerous and different measures used to operationalize RAPM. 
For example, some studies apply a strict “version” of the construct i.e. extent of the 
supervisor’s reliance on accounting measures for performance evaluation purposes as 
(of course, as perceived by the supervisee and as measured by the Hopwood, 1972 
method86 relative to other measures) whilst others associate RAPM with bonus 
determination (e.g. Govindarajan, 1985, cf. Otley and Fakiolas, 2000, p. 505) or with 
extent of use of accounting information (e.g. Brownell, 1985).  
 
In summary, if one should consider the above-mentioned constructs as extremes within 
the spectrum of MCS-related measures (from a very “stable” to an “unstable” 
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 In addition to these two issues of reliability and validity, the issue of scale dimensionality is one 
important aspect of construct measurement. It is usually assumed that the questions used are meant to 
measure one particular (and hypothesized) construct (uni-dimensional) and not several ones (multi-
dimensional).  
84
 An earlier comment, by Shields and Shields (1998, p. 66), had also raised the problem that the Milani 
(1975) scale could be consisting of two orthogonal dimensions.  
85
 Although almost all studies have used the nine-item construct, there have been some summation 
variants from the usual simple average (e.g. Tsui, 2001) to the weighted average calculation. (e.g. 
Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Nouri and Parker, 1998) 
86
 Categorical variable i.e. the RAPM could either be a Budget-Constrained, a Profit-Conscious or a Non-
Accounting style.  
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construct), most of the MCS-related constructs (whether they measure control 
systems/mechanisms, contingent variables or outcome variables) are regularly reviewed 
or amended for the following reasons: 
(a) Construct reliability and validity tests – researchers exclude particular items of a 
previously used construct in response to reliability and validity tests carried on the 
data (e.g. Van der Stede, 2001; Dunk, 1993a) 
 
(b) Context and category of respondents – the initial items were meant for respondents 
in a particular country (e.g. United States) or for particular levels of management 
(e.g. business unit managers). In this respect, the wording of a particular item is 
amended or a whole item altogether is removed due to possible ambiguity or 
irrelevance in this new context. (e.g. Chow et al., 1999; Shields et al., 2000) 
 
(c) Multi-dimensionality – In the course of the data analysis, researchers may note that 
the uni-dimensional assumption for a specific construct may be inappropriate e.g. 
the task uncertainty construct, which has been broken into two dimensions – task 
difficulty and task variability (Brownell and Dunk, 1991)  
 
The Cronbach alpha is a popular reliability test (Kwok and Sharp, 1998, p. 157). As 
suggested by Nunnally (1978), a Cronbach alpha score exceeding 0.60 is deemed 
satisfactory, in terms of construct reliability. Insofar as construct validity is concerned, 
the earlier tests are generically known as exploratory factor analysis or more precisely 
principal components analysis (PCA)87. These tests attempt to assess validity by 
reducing a large set of correlated variables to a smaller set of hypothetical 
characteristics, traits, or factors that underlie the correlations (Kwok and Sharp, 1998, p. 
143). Again, as per Nunnally (1978), a cut-off point of above 0.50 is proposed for factor 
loadings. However, these are not reported consistently in all studies. In fact, there is no 
clear information on the exact method of factor analysis used.  For example, studies 
such as Brownell (1982), Whitley et al. (1983), Simons (1987a), Mia (1989), Brownell 
and Merchant (1990), Kren and Kerr (1993), O’Connor (1995), Nouri and Parker 
(1998), Van der Stede (2000), Lau and Buckland (2000) and Otley and Pollanen (2000) 
merely report that a “factor analysis” was done without indicating whether this was 
PCA or other procedures (e.g. maximum likelihood, alpha factoring, image factoring 
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 Ittner and Larcker (2001, p. 396) 
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and principal axis factoring)88.  Also, a number of other recent or usually cited studies 
do not report any factor analysis method or results e.g. Imoisili (1989), Brownell and 
Dunk (1991), Lau et. al, (1995, 1997), and Tsui (2001). 
 
The rotation procedures are also prone to criticism. As stated by Newsom (2003), 
rotation is a way of maximising high loadings and minimising low loadings and the two 
basic types of rotation are orthogonal and oblique. The author (2003, p. 4) suggests the 
oblique procedure since it has, in contrast with the orthogonal method, the more 
realistic assumption that the factors are correlated with one another.  Again, there are 
not many MCS studies who report on the rotation method, let alone the fact the loadings 
are calculated on a rotated or un-rotated basis. For example, out of the 11 studies 
surveyed and mentioned above, only 5 stated their method of rotation and only two 
(Brownell and Merchant, 1990 and Whitley et al, 1983) have used the conceptually 
correct “oblique rotation” procedure.   
 
More recently, there has been interest into seemingly more robust validity tests, such as 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). In contrast to EFA, CFA tests for the ability of a 
pre-defined factor model to fit an observed set of data (DeCoster, 2003, p. 5) and it 
represents the actual testing of hypotheses about structures underlying responses to 
individual items on an instrument (Froman, 2001, p. 8). Hence, within the context of 
construct validity, CFA will test the measurement model i.e. the validity of all the latent 
(i.e. unobserved) constructs, which will then be used in testing the hypothesised 
relationships between the validated constructs (i.e. the causal model). Kwok and Sharp 
(1998, p. 159) consider that CFA is theory-driven whereas EFA is nothing more than a 
“fishing expedition”. CFA is strongly related to the Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM) and is tested via statistical techniques such as LISREL. In fact, the measurement 
model in LISREL may be considered equivalent to CFA (Kwok and Sharp, 1998).  
 
Jaworski and Young (1992, p. 27) was one the first MCS studies which used the 
LISREL and the authors do provide some detailed advantages in using LISREL, namely 
the fact that it (a) accounts for measurement errors and, (b) allows for simultaneous 
estimates and structural parameters. This therefore provides diagnostic statistics for the 
model as a whole. Van der Stede (2001) specifically used CFA to seek a valid measure 
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 Davila (2000) is an exception: he reports the use of both principal factor analysis and maximum 
likelihood factor analysis.  
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of “tight budgetary control”. Finally, Poznanski and Bline (1997) and Shields et al. 
(2000) respectively applied PRELIS and LISREL to estimate the measurement model. 
However, there is one caveat. LISREL and other similar techniques rely on large 
sample size i.e. generally more than 200 or relative to number of items in the model. 
Jaworski and Young (1992), Poznanski and Bline (1997), Shields and al. (2000) did 
have relatively large sample (more than 250) but this was not the case for Van der Stede 
(2000, 2001 – 153 observations). In the latter cases, the author applied some small 
sample-related techniques to maintain the minimum ratio of observations to parameters 
i.e. 5:1 (Van der Stede, 2000, p. 618 and 2001, p. 130).   
 
In conclusion, and in light of the weaknesses of the usual MCS measurements validity 
tests, it appears conceptually compelling to adopt a stronger validity test, namely CFA. 
But, it also true that very few MCS studies have actually used CFA and LISREL – 
perhaps in relation to the small sample size associated to MCS studies. In contrast, the 
Cronbach alpha reliability test has been consistently used and does not seem to be 
challenged. Once the constructs can be concluded to be reliable and valid, then the next 
step is to assess the relationships between the variables. 
 
2.8.3. Statistical Analysis of “Fit” 
2.8.3.1 Defining and Classifying “Fit” 
 
Duncan and Moores (1989, p. 90) consider that one central concept of contingent 
propositions is fit i.e. the matching of an organisation’s characteristics or mechanisms to 
its contingencies. And Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) defined three different conceptual 
approaches to fit, namely selection, interaction and systems. These approaches are 
summarised in Table 2.4. Early MCS studies were usually selection fits. Fisher (1995) 
categorised such studies as Level 1 studies, where one contingent factor is correlated 
with one control mechanism. As stated by Fisher (1995, p. 34), this approach examines 
whether the presence of a contingent factor is related to a control system/mechanism. 
However, no attempt was made to evaluate the effect of this correlation on an outcome 
variable. Examples of such studies are Merchant (1981) and Macintosh and Daft (1987).  
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Fit Definitions/Implications Related statistical test(s) or 
procedure(s) used.  
Selection Fit is assumed to exist when there is congruence 
between contingent variable and control 
system/mechanism 
• Correlation Analysis 
• Significance of Regression 
coefficients 
Interaction Fit is tested by the effect of a bivariate interaction of a 
contingent variable and a control system/mechanism 
on a dependent variable, such as performance 
Moderated Regression Analysis 
- Significance of the interaction 
term(s) coefficient 
Systems This involves a more holistic concept of fit where 
multiple contingencies, several control systems are 
simultaneously modelled on several outcome variables 
Profile Deviation Analysis 
Euclidian distance 
Cluster Analysis 
Table 2.4: Conceptual and Analysis Approaches to Fit  
Adapted from Drazin and Van de Van (1985) and Duncan and Moores (1989) 
 
On the other hand, interaction models are used where the nature or strength of a 
relationship between MCS and an outcome criterion will depend on the influence of 
particular aspects of context (Chenhall, 2003, p. 155). Hartmann and Moers (1999, p. 
293) contend that interaction fit is the dominant conceptualization of contingency fit in 
budgetary research. This is also clearly apparent in light of the reviews done in earlier 
sections on RAPM and Budgetary participation.  
 
More recently, Gerdin and Greve (2004) sought to reclassify the different forms of 
contingency fits in the particular context of strategy-MAS/MCS research. However, 
their hierarchical classification has also relevance for the broader MCS area and hence, 
it is presented in this section. According to Gerdin and Greve (2004, p. 304), a first 
distinction is between a Cartesian and a configuration approach. Whilst a Cartesian 
approach assumes that a fit between a contingent variable and a control system is along 
a continuum that allows for regular and small movements, a configuration approach 
assumes that there are only few and discrete points at which fit exists. As stated by 
Gerdin and Greve (2004, p. 305), Cartesian research is characterized by reductionism 
while configurational research takes a holistic view, and these can respectively be 
associated to the interaction and systems model, as defined by Drazin and Van de Ven 
(1985).  
 
The next sub-classification within Cartesian and configuration forms of fit is 
congruence and contingency approaches. The congruence assumption is similar to the 
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Drazin and Van de Ven’s (1985) selection fit category since the research task explores 
the nature of the context-structure without examining whether they affect performance 
(Gerdin and Greve, 2004, p. 305). On the other hand, a contingency approach will 
consider the effect on some outcome variable. A second sub-classification in the 
Cartesian subset and within the congruence and contingency approaches is the use of 
moderation and mediation models. These can best be explained using the diagrams 
below: 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Mediation and Moderation Models 
(based on Gerdin and Greve, 2004; Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985)  
 
There are crucial and different assumptions been made if one applies the moderation or 
the mediation model. For example, for the mediation model (Fig. 2.1A), it is assumed 
that the contextual variable is correlated to the MCS and outcome variable whereas this 
is not the case for a moderation model (Fig. 2.1B). Clearly, the selection of a 
moderation or mediation model will be based on theoretical arguments and hypotheses 
made thereon. And within a particular research context or situation, the moderation and 
mediation models are competing ones.  
 
The final sub-classification refers to the analysis of relationships within studies that 
adopt a Cartesian and moderation approaches. The existence of a moderating 
relationship (whether in a congruence or contingency perspective) for a specific group 
of variables (e.g. one control mechanism, one contingent variable and one outcome 
variable in the case of a contingency approach89) can be analysed in terms of strength or 
form.  Gerdin and Greve (2004, p. 310) argue that this distinction is crucial not only in 
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 In the case of a congruence example, there could be one control mechanism and contingent variable 
interacting to cause a second control mechanism – the latter hypothesised here as a dependent variable).  
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terms of the use of appropriate statistical methods but also in terms of theoretical 
meaning. Given that these distinctions will be highly relevant in the following sections 
these are considered in detail below. 
 
2.8.3.2. Moderation Models - Strength vs. Form Relationships 
 
As stated in Hartmann and Moers (1999, p. 310), strength interaction exists when the 
empirical results indicate that the relationship between a control system and its outcome 
variable is stronger (i.e. better predicted) when the contingent variable (e.g. task 
uncertainty) is low rather than when it is high. The technique used is sub-group 
correlation analysis where the correlation coefficients for the MCS-outcome variable 
relationship are compared between two groups i.e. the low task uncertainty and high 
task uncertainty group. Brownell (1983b) and Merchant (1984) are typical illustrations 
of MCS studies that focused on strength relationships. For example, Brownell (1983b, 
p. 317) dichotomized leadership style (split at mean values for its two sub-dimensions – 
consideration and structure) to observe the relationship between participation and 
performance or job satisfaction. One result of interest was that the correlation between 
participation and performance was negative (-0.56) in situations of low consideration 
but positive (0.55) in situations of high consideration. In the case of Merchant (1984, p. 
303), two sub-dimensions of budgeting characteristics (sub-labelled as participation) 
were positively correlated with performance for large departments (spilt at median size) 
but there was no significant correlation in the case of small departments. Hence, as 
stated by Gerdin and Greve (2004, p. 311), the “strength” relationship indicates the 
predictive ability of the independent variable on the dependent variable over different 
levels of contingencies90. When there are significant differences in value of those 
correlations, the hypothesis of fit is supported.     
 
On the other hand, form interaction implies investigating whether the slope of the 
dependent variable on the independent variable differs as a function of the moderator. 
According to Jaccard et al. (1990, p. 15), form interaction poses an altogether different 
question (compared to strength interaction) because the slope is not only influenced by 
the correlation between the dependent variable and the independent variable, but also by 
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 Also, Jaccard et al. (1990, p. 66) state that in the case of correlation coefficients, the question of interest 
is whether the two groups differ in the proportion of variance in Y that can be predicted from (or 
accounted by) X, assuming a linear model.  
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the standard deviations of the variables. Similarly, Gerdin and Greve (2004, p. 311) 
state that when researchers argues on the impact of a control system on an outcome 
variable, they are implicitly referring to a form interaction. In this approach, the 
multiple regression analysis is the principal statistical technique used to test the 
existence of a form interaction, generally modelled as the equation 2.1 below: 
 
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X1 x X2 + ε    [Equation 2.1] 
Where: Y = outcome variable (e.g. performance, dysfunctional behaviour) 
           X1  = independent variable (e.g. RAPM, SOP, BP) 
 X2 = contextual variable (e.g. task uncertainty, locus of control) 
X1 x X2 = interaction term, representing the moderating effect of X2 on the relationship between 
Y and X1. 
 β0 , β1 , β2, β3 = respective coefficients 
 and ε = error term 
 
The terminology used to describe this model is sometimes referred to as “Interaction 
effects in multiple regressions” (Jaccard et al., 1990, p. 7) or Moderated Regression 
Analysis (MRA, Hartmann and Moers, 1999, 2003).  The main expectation in testing 
the above model would be to generate a significant coefficient for β3. For example, Mia 
(1988) used the MRA to study the separate impact of two contingent variables - 
managerial attitude and motivation – on the relationship between participation and 
performance. In both cases, the interaction term’s coefficient was significant, thus 
meaning that the extent to which changes in participation lead to changes in 
performance differed as the contingent variable (attitude or motivation) fluctuated i.e. 
the slope of the participation-performance line is changing in response to different 
levels of the contingent variable. Finally, it is also possible to test the existence of a 
significant moderating effect by running two separate regressions – one with X1 and X2  
only and a second one with the interaction term – and looking for statistically different 
R2 (as suggested by Cohen and Cohen, 1983). Both Hartmann and Moers (1999) and 
Gerdin and Greve (2003) have also raised the issue that results/interpretations from 
strength and form interactions are sometimes thought to be comparable or used 
interchangeably. As MRA remains an important statistical technique to test interaction, 
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the remaining MRA issues presented by Hartmann and Moers (1999, 2003) are 
reviewed in the next section91.   
 
2.8.3.3. Issues in using Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) 
 
Hartmann and Moers (1999) review the application and interpretation of MRA in 28 
contingency-based MCS studies, involving RAPM and budgetary participation. Apart 
from the issue of form vs. strength, four other issues are considered by the authors, 
namely formulation of hypotheses & effect size, lower-order effects, multiple and 
higher-order interactions, and (non-) monotonicity. 
 
Hartmann and Moers (1999, p. 298) have identified a number of cases where the 
conclusions did not match with the original hypothesis and statistical test used. They 
refer to the example of Govindarajan (1984) who concluded having found a significant 
moderating effect of environmental uncertainty whilst using a sub-group correlation 
analysis of low and high effectiveness respondents, instead of using a low and high 
environmental uncertainty sub-groups. In another case, Merchant (1984) formulated a 
form interaction hypothesis but then used sub-group correlation analysis, hence testing 
merely for a strength relationship. This would indicate that there is a need to ensure 
consistency between hypotheses, statistical test of fit and resulting conclusion. In 
addition, the wording of such conclusion is of importance as one cannot jump to a 
particular finding based on the MRA. For example, Hartmann and Moers (1999, 2003) 
highlight the effect size issue i.e. a significant coefficient of the interaction term only 
contains information about changes in the relation between variables, and does not 
contain information about the optimal value of the dependent variable. Nevertheless, 
previous studies (e.g. Mia, 1989; Dunk, 1993; Brownell and Dunk, 1991, Lau et al, 
1995) implicitly linked a significant interaction to a combination of variables generating 
a maximum value for the dependent variable, using the Johnson-Neyman technique. 
However, Hartmann and Moers (1999, p. 307) argued that this technique mixes main 
effects and moderating effects, and are therefore of little value in measuring specifically 
the interaction effect.  
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 Some of these issues have been also identified by Gerdin and Greve (2004). However, their arguments 
were only based on an analysis of MCS-Strategy research. Since the current study will focus on other 
unrelated contingent variables, their detailed findings and issues are not reviewed.   
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A second and often mentioned issue is the interpretation of the lower order or main 
effects i.e. the coefficients of the independent variables (e.g. β1 and β2 in equation [2.1]). 
Southwood (1978, p. 1168) argues that these coefficients have no theoretical meaning in 
an interaction model and other authors (such as Wright, 1976; Smith and Sasaki, 1979) 
had suggested that a multiplicative term undermines the interpretability of these 
regression coefficients and that these coefficients may even reverse themselves in sign 
or relative magnitude when a product term is added. However, Jaccard et al. (1990, p. 
26) contend that regression coefficients are subject to meaningful interpretations. 
Hartmann and Moers (1999, p. 300) did find several authors who wrongly interpreted 
the main effects (e.g. Brownell, 1982; Chenhall 1986; Mia, 1989) and who decided not 
to interpret them at all on the grounds that they are not interpretable (e.g. Lau et al, 
1995; Brownell, 1985; Dunk, 1990, 1992, 1993b). As per Hartmann and Moers (1999, 
2003, p. 806) and Jaccard et al. (1990, p. 26), it is now clear that the coefficients of the 
main effects can be interpreted provided that the variables are ratio-scaled or that the 
interval-scaled variables have been centered). More importantly however, one must 
have made an a priori formulation of hypothesis on the main effects coefficients based 
on sound theoretical arguments. In the absence of such formulations, the issue of 
interpreting or not the main effects becomes a moot point.  
 
The third problem relates to the use of MRA to model the simultaneous impact of two 
or more contingent variables, resulting for example in three-way interaction models 
(e.g. Imoisili, 1989; Brownell and Dunk, 1991; Harrison, 1993; Lau and Buckland, 
2000). According to Jaccard et al. (1990, p. 40), the interaction model can be readily 
extended to cases involving four or more variables. However, given the significant 
number of variables now modelled as independent variables (e.g. a model involving one 
control system and two contingent variables would mean a total of 7 independent 
variables), there is a temptation to remove seemingly non-significant variables in an 
attempt to improve the degrees of freedom and thus increasing the power of the 
statistical test. However, Cohen and Cohen (1983, p. 348) and Jaccard (1990, p. 41) 
advise that such models should include all two way interactions in accordance with 
statistical principles. Nevertheless, Cohen and Cohen (1983, p. 306) raises some doubts 
as to the ability of researchers in interpreting the results of three-way or even four-way 
interaction models. In addition, and as forcefully suggested by Jaccard (1990, p. 41) and 
Hartmann and Moers (1999, 2003), the focus should be on the theoretical arguments 
and hypothesis in justifying a more complex interaction model. From the review of past 
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studies done by Hartmann and Moers (1999), it is clear that the absence of clear 
hypothesis and arguments for a multiple-way interaction model has contributed to its 
lack of interpretation. In this respect, and with due regards to the principle of parsimony 
and in the absence of a clear theoretical arguments, it would be best to apply a Cartesian 
approach and investigate the effects of contingent variables separately.  
  
One final substantive issue relates to monotonic and non-monotonic interactions. A 
statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term merely states the existence of 
an effect. However, Gul et al. (1995, p. 111) state that it is necessary step in all 
contingency-based fits to find out whether the relationship between the control system 
and the outcome variable is assumed to be the same at all levels of the contingent 
variable (monotonic) or not (non-monotonic).  This is done by calculating the partial 
derivative of Y over X1 over the entire range of X2. If the partial derivative is both 
positive and negative (same direction – negative or positive), then the relationship is 
non-monotonic (monotonic). However, Hartmann and Moers’ (1999) review showed 
that a significant number of studies did not explicitly test for (non-) monotonicity. It is 
worth noting that MCS-based contingency theory does not dictate any particular 
expectations in terms of whether interactions will be monotonic or not but the 
formulation of hypothesis will certainly indicate the expected type of interaction.  For 
example, the following examples of H1 hypotheses are quoted below: 
 
Example 1: “The higher the perceived job difficulty, the more positive is the 
relationship between the participation in budgeting and motivation” (Mia, 1989, p. 
349) 
Example 2: “High levels of budgetary participation will be associated with a negative 
relationship between MAS and managerial performance for Chinese Managers but will 
be associated with a positive relationship for Western Managers” (Tsui, 2001, p. 131) 
 
Insofar as the first hypothesis is concerned, it is clear that the hypothesised relationship 
is assumed to be monotonic (over the entire range of job difficulty) whereas the second 
hypothesis assumes a non-monotonic interaction (culture is the contingent variable). 
However, Tsui (2001) has presented theoretical arguments in support of such a non-
monotonic interaction. Hartmann and Moers (1999, p. 307) suggest the use of sub-
group regressions to detect monotonicity but the crux of the issue was that a minority of 
the surveyed research reported at all on this important distinction.  
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In conclusion, Hartmann and Moers’ (1999, 2003) review can be considered to be a 
thought-provoking one (Dunk, 2003, p. 793) in terms of questioning particularly the 
application and interpretation of relatively complex statistical models i.e. MRA. The 
fact that there have been several and regular criticisms regarding the inconsistencies in 
contingency-based MCS studies (specifically BP and RAPM) results (e.g. Briers and 
Hirst, 1990; Chapman, 1997; Shields and Shields, 1998; Hartmann, 2000; Chenhall, 
2003) could be related to the issues raised by Hartmann and Moers (1999, 2003). More 
importantly, the authors may have been successful in reminding current MCS 
researchers in terms of the assumptions, use and interpretation of MRA. 
 
2.8.4. MCS Research Methods and Analysis: Concluding Remarks 
 
This section has sought to review the critical research method issues pertaining to the 
study of management control systems within a contingency paradigm. The strong 
empirical focus that has always characterised MCS studies does not appear to be fading 
away, despite various calls for, and more recent attempts at, qualitative-based research. 
At the core of this focus seems to be an implicit and explicit interest and need to 
generalise research findings. In addition, the questionnaire survey continues to be the 
main data collection although there have been more notable attempts at using qualitative 
methods for construct design and/or confirming empirical results. Finally, variable 
measurement and data analysis techniques have been under recent scrutiny and criticism 
in light of the various RAPM and BP reviews. There are clear improvements to be made 
insofar as these aspects are concerned and they will be considered in the current study.  
 
2.9. Analysis of Lessons Learned and Research Opportunities 
 
In his review of MCS literature and contingency theory, Chenhall (2003, p. 160-161) 
concludes that there is a considerable body of literature which has provided a basis for 
generalized propositions between MCS elements and context, not withstanding the 
various identified theoretical and methodological imperfections and limitations. At the 
forefront on this analysis is the argument that contingency theory remains a basic and 
strong framework of analysis. Although there is scope to integrate other theories, as 
proposed by Chenhall himself (2003, p. 157-159) and Covaleski et al. (2003), the fact is 
there are still unanswered questions and these are not simply about a new contingent 
  
129
variable to be added to the already extensive of other contextual factors.  Hence, this 
study will focus on the following six identified and so far unanswered questions: 
 
(a) Dysfunctional consequences of MCS – Whilst there have been numerous studies on 
the negative consequences of MCS inspired by authors such as Argyris (1952), 
Hopwood (1972) and Hirst (1981; 1983), the evidence can be described as 
piecemeal, in terms of the types and control systems of dysfunctional behaviours 
studied - with perhaps a rather disproportional empirical attention to budgetary 
slack. The present study thus seeks to re-assert the relevance of two key general (but 
important) types of dysfunctional behaviour namely information manipulation and 
gaming. It is important to point out the use of the term “negative consequences” vs. 
“positive consequences” is not to be interpreted as an assumed inverse relationship 
between say, managerial performance, and Jaworski and Young’s (1992) measure of 
dysfunctional behaviour. The argument is that dysfunctional behaviour is a different 
dimension of the MCS phenomena and needs to be investigated in its own right, 
precisely because some authors argue that it can have unexpected benefits for the 
organization and individuals (Argyris, 1990; Van der Stede, 2000).  So far, this 
dimension has been researched on a narrow basis (e.g. slack, short term orientation 
etc) and for specific control systems. Finally, whilst there had been some interest in 
a broader concept of dysfunctional behaviour from an intervening model perspective 
(i.e. Jaworski and Young, 1992) and in terms of its relationships with uncertainty 
(Hirst, 1981; 1983), there has not been any recent study looking at its relationship 
with formal control systems and other contingent variables.  
 
(b) Standard Operating Procedures – Although Fisher (1995, p. 26) considered SOPs to 
be only a general control mechanism and not a formal control system, it is not 
disputed that SOPs are important components of any organization in regulating and 
controlling managers’ and employees’ behaviour. In addition, despite having a 
predominant non-financial focus, SOP is an important control sub-system at the 
management and operational level. The increasing use of technology-based standard 
procedures and the adoption of quality-driven standards (e.g. ISO 9001) have 
undoubtedly impacted on the extent and use of SOPs by managers. In this respect, 
the MCS literature has barely considered the impact of SOP within a contingency 
paradigm.  
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(c) Uncertainty – Chapman (1997) and Hartmann (2000; 2005) have both made strong 
theoretical arguments on the link between MCS and uncertainty, based on 
Galbraith’s (1973) information deficit perspective. In addition, task uncertainty has 
been previously singled out as key moderating variable of interest in the study of 
dysfunctional behaviour (Hirst, 1981, 1983; Hayes and Cron, 1988) This study will 
contribute towards developing more empirical evidence on the “uncertainty 
primacy” within the MCS contingency paradigm. In conformity with Chenhall’s 
(2003, p. 156) concern with the level of analysis in contingency-based research, task 
uncertainty will be the selected dimension to match with the level of respondents i.e. 
functional managers.  
 
(d) Superior’s Use of Controls – The interactive vs. diagnostic superior’s use of 
controls distinction is one of the key findings of Simons’ (1991, 1994) case study-
based research, which was then integrated in Simon’s (1995; 2000) levers of control 
framework. However, at the time of this study, there have not yet been many 
attempts at testing whether this concept can be generalised to a cross-sectional 
sample and in relation to the traditionally researched control sub-systems (e.g. 
RAPM and BP). In addition, attempts at measuring the construct for quantitative-
based studies (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999 and Van der Stede, 2001) have not 
been very successful, although more recently published works appear to provide 
more confirmatory evidence (Widener, 2007; Henri, 2006; Bisbe and Otley, 2004). 
Nonetheless, an attempt will be made at devising a “better” construct and 
investigating its interaction effects with major control sub-systems.  
 
(e) Research Methods Improvements – The last section of this chapter has undeniably 
raised questions (Hartmann and Moers, 1999, 2003; Gerdin and Greve, 2004) on the 
use and interpretation of various statistical techniques in MCS research, specifically 
in the context of construct validity and interpretation of results. This study will first 
focus on an intervening model which will be tested through the path analysis 
technique for the above-mentioned contextual variables.  The MRA will then be 
used for the latter part of the study.  
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2.10. Chapter 2: Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has extensively presented and reviewed the theoretical and empirical 
literature pertaining to the contingency paradigm and management control systems. 
This has allowed a clear identification of the research gaps that exist in terms of basic 
relationships between MCS sub-systems and outcome variables, in terms of key 
contingent variables to be considered. Firstly, theoretical-led suggestions from Chenhall 
(2003) and Hartmann (2000; 2005) focus on the need to integrate theories within the 
contingency paradigm and to examine the ‘uncertainty paradox’. The overall 
dysfunctional implications of MCS have received less attention and the objective of 
many studies has concentrated on the budgetary slack phenomenon. Finally, there is a 
clear need to improve the method and statistics to ensure a rigorous analysis of 
interaction models. However, and before coming to the formulation of detailed 
hypotheses for this particular study, one additional variable is being proposed. Insofar 
as its theoretical roots partly lies with institutional theory and the broader interpretive 
perspective, it would be important to first review the implications of, and evidence 
from, these schools of thought.   
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Chapter 3 
Institutional Perspectives and Legitimacy 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to introduce the fundamentals of institutional theory and how they 
relate generally to the accounting domain and more specifically to the management 
control system phenomenon. The case will be then made for integrating an institutional 
theory-based variable in this study, closed associated to legitimacy.  
 
3.1 Institutional Theory 
 
This theory seeks to explain organisational behaviour, in terms of its activities, structure 
and relationship with organizational actors, and the factors that generate action (or 
inaction) in an organization. In the context of analysing future directions in 
management control systems (MCS) research, Bhimani (1999, p. 425) asserts that this 
approach: 
“…emphasises the ways in which action is structured and order made possible 
by shared systems of rules that condition the inclinations and capacities of 
individuals and influence the diffusion of organisational operating 
procedures.” 
 
Institutionalism is in sharp contrast to the technical and rational thinking that underlies 
contingency-based relationships between management accounting systems and 
contingency variables (such as environment, technology, structure). In fact, Robey and 
Boudreau (1999, p. 177) assert that institutional theory has historically explained why 
organisational structures and values endure, even in the face of strong reasons and 
elaborate programs to change them whereas contingency theory assumes a diversity of 
practices in response to a host of internal and external variables. However, institutional 
theory has experienced various developments and refinements in the past five decades 
from old institutionalism92 to new institutionalism, and regards institutions as not being: 
“……the product of deliberate design and the outcome of purposive action, but 
rather in terms of the persistence of practices in both their taken-for-granted 
quality and their reproduction in structures that are partially self-sustaining.” 
(Zucker, 1987). 
                                                
92
 This focused on the impact of values, norms and attitudes (Selznick, 1957, p. 17) and its political nature 
(Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, p. 12) 
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The above statement may not necessarily imply resistance to change but rather relates to 
the issue as to why many organizational forms and procedures exist without obvious 
technical or economic value (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). More precisely, researchers, 
such as Tolbert and Zucker (1983), have shown that technical or functional criteria (i.e. 
such as the traditional contingent variables) may be important determinants of the early 
adoption of an innovation but such criteria eventually became weak predictors over 
time. Institutional theorists have also recognised that organizations may vary in the 
degree to which they conform to changes in their external environment (Young et al, 
2000). In addition, Staw and Epstein (2000, p. 524) note that: 
“Although most institutional theorists have argued that late adopters use 
legitimacy rather than technical rationality as the basis for their actions, most 
of the evidence to that effect has been indirect, providing more support for the 
absence of technical or economic determinants of adoption than for 
institutional processes”. 
 
In this respect, early qualitative and descriptive studies93 illustrated how organizations 
structure themselves not so much to execute their tasks more efficiently but to gain 
legitimacy or cultural support (Staw and Epstein, 2000). In a similar vein, Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) contend that to achieve and sustain this legitimacy, organizations tend to 
conform to institutional models while resisting attempts at reform, even when 
organisational efficiency is threatened. According to Hinings and Greenwood (1988, p. 
56), organizations operate within an institutionally defined perspective of efficiency and 
effectiveness. This legitimacy/performance paradox is illustrated by Meyer and 
Zucker’s (1989) study of numerous industries that have continuously performed below 
the market rates of return but which are still persisting and operating.  
 
3.2. Institutional Isomorphism: Definitions and Evidence 
 
Based on the initial precepts of institutional theory, new and existing organizations 
adopt emergent, socially defined elements and legitimated practices in efforts to become 
increasingly similar to their institutional environments (Dacin, 1997). In this respect, 
isomorphism refers to the change process that organizations experience towards these 
institutional norms via mimetic, coercive and normative means94. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983, p. 149) view isomorphism as a “..constraining process that forces one unit in a 
population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
                                                
93
 For example, Selznick (1949) and Zald and Denton (1963).  
94
 Discussed in the next section. 
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conditions...”. They also identify two types of isomorphism, namely competitive and 
institutional. Competitive isomorphism involves pressures towards similarity resulting 
from market competition whereas institutional isomorphism focuses on the 
organisation’s competition for political and institutional legitimacy. (Mizruchi and Fein, 
1999) 
 
An institutional isomorphistic view, whereby this legitimacy quest will ensure that 
organizations pursuing the same objectives will look and act alike, is also shared by 
Beliveau et al. (1994) and Galbraith (1973). Finally, King et al. (1994) take a more 
dynamic perspective as to the nature of isomorphism:  
“….we note that institutions must themselves be seen as fluid entities, as 
networks or organizations in action, that are being shaped by individuals, 
groups, organizations, and interest groups just as surely as they shape those 
entities.” (1994, p. 160). 
 
In such a framework, Bhimani (1999, p. 426) contends that the structuring of 
management control systems cannot arise purely from purposive actions or conscious 
design, but rather may be viewed as reflective of wider social elements whilst being 
deeply embedded in them.   
 
Turning to empirical research, Staw and Epstein (2000, p. 525) provide evidence that 
institutional theory has usually involved the influence of social networks on executives 
in organizations. In particular, organisational practices and forms have been found to 
migrate between organizations that are linked in social networks, such that executives 
have the opportunity to share information and perspectives95. Other evidence of 
institutional theory effects is found in an investigation of the incremental gain in 
legitimacy or support to the organization further to the adoption of environmental rules 
and procedures. In a cross-sectional study of Minnesota banks, Deephouse (1996) 
showed that conformity to industry standards96 was significantly associated to banks’ 
legitimacy. This study measured banks’ legitimacy by ratings made by regulatory 
agencies and press reports, although the levels of legitimacy conferred by these two 
bodies were not equal97.   
                                                
95
 Refer, for example, to Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; Palmer et al, 1993 and Haunschild and Miner, 
1997).   
96
 More specifically, bank asset allocation strategies were the key strategy variables used to measure 
conformity (Deephouse, 1996, p. 1029).  
97
 The correlations between the measures of regulatory endorsement and public endorsement were lower 
than 0.34 (1996, p. 1033). 
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Similarly, Westphal et al. (1997) demonstrated that isomorphic behaviour by U.S. 
hospitals, via adoption of Total Quality Management (TQM) techniques, led to 
increases in legitimacy, as evidenced by higher ratings of national accreditation 
agencies. In a subsequent study, Staw and Epstein (2000) studied 100 U.S. corporations 
and hypothesised an institutional relationship between the adoption of popular 
management techniques98 and corporate reputation. A strong causal relationship was 
found between popular management techniques and reputation whereas no significant 
effect was found on corporate performance99. Their conclusion is a confirmation of the 
institutional assumption that firms do not necessarily choose the best or most efficient 
techniques but, instead, seek external legitimacy by adopting widely accepted and 
approved practices. 
 
Although the above descriptions seem to consider the organization as a “monolith” 
which is subject to institutional pressures, it has to be noted that eventually individuals 
are the real actors of the same institutional process. Peters and Pierre (1998, p. 565) 
explain that,  
“The behaviour of individuals in politics is based in part on individual 
volition, but is also deeply influenced by the values of structures within which 
the individuals are ‘embedded’…Individuals and their values are altered by 
the institutions within which they are embedded and with which they come into 
contact”.      
 
3.2.1 Isomorphic Mechanisms. 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified three different mechanisms or means through 
which institutional isomorphism operates, namely coercive, mimetic and normative 
isomorphism. First, coercive isomorphism originates from formal and informal 
pressures exerted on an entity by other organizations upon which it is dependent and by 
cultural expectations of the society within which the entity operates. For example, the 
laws and regulations require a common behaviour from companies in general but also in 
specific, more regulated, industries or areas of activity (e.g. water and electricity 
utilities).  
 
A further illustration would be related to the strict and worker-oriented labour 
regulation in some countries that restricts companies’ ability to establish performance-
                                                
98
 Namely Total Quality, Self-Managed Teams and Employee Empowerment (2000, p. 531).  
99
 Measured using financial measures i.e. Return on Assets, Return on Equity and Return on Sales 
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related pay and rewards, thus preventing the establishment of objective 
productivity/reward systems in these organizations. However, as stated by DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983), coercive isomorphism is not only caused by legislation. A holding 
company may enforce the adoption of an accounting policy, an organization structure 
and/or a management accounting system on its subsidiaries. Similar instances may exist 
in the case of a franchisee/franchiser arrangement. Irrespective of the source of these 
pressures, the common denominator of coercive isomorphism is that the organization 
has little choice but to conform and behave in a required way, lest there be substantial 
formal and informal sanctions (e.g. legal fines, loss of business, or cancellation of 
franchise).    
 
Secondly, organisational change can arise from mimetic isomorphism. This may be 
more gradual than coercive isomorphism as Haverman (1993) expects that 
organizations change over time to become more similar to other organizations in their 
environments. This is usually in response to uncertainties in the environment100 and/or 
to seek legitimacy/support:  
“…they [organizations] model themselves after other organizations within 
their industry that appear to be most successful in conforming to prevailing 
norms and expectations (Alexander and Fennell, 1986). Specifically, strong 
competitive pressures create uncertainty because of the need for organizations 
to anticipate and react to the strategic initiatives of their competitors 
(Alexander, 1991).” 
 
This argument is reminiscent of the contingency/MCS paradigm but only in context, not 
in perspective. In contrast to a contingency proposition, a company’s’ behaviour will 
not be dependent on its perceived environmental uncertainty but on the behaviour of 
other organizations in the same industry. However, mimetic isomorphism may not 
necessarily be limited to specific industries. For example, the recent and significant 
number of global corporate mergers, which are occurring across industries and 
countries, may be due to mimetic isomorphism on any of the following grounds (i) 
increasing competition (hence, increasing uncertainty), (ii) the belief that “bigger is 
always better” (myth) and (iii) the expectation that the new structure will be viewed as 
more efficient (legitimacy). A more pragmatic argument to support mimetic 
isomorphism would be that organizations do not need to seek and spend on new 
solutions, but rather imitate actions of other organizations (Haverman, 1993).  
                                                
100
 Arising from poorly understood technologies, ambiguous goals and other uncertainties. (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). 
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Similar mimetic-based arguments and findings have been argued and reported by 
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989), Fligstein (1991)101 and Young et al. (2000)102. 
Kaplan (1984) also reported the mimetic behaviour of organizations when he applied 
internal accounting practices that were originally developed in the 1930s for firms 
manufacturing stable products with a direct labour content. In their study of 
management practices, Staw and Epstein (2000, p. 542) interpret mimetic behaviours as 
“fashion cycles” that are originally adopted or considered because of their perceived 
benefits, but contend that the effect of social approval or legitimacy enhances the 
contagion effects (mimetic isomorphism).  
 
Finally, normative isomorphism arises from pressure on organisational actors 
(individuals), via their membership and collective responsibilities to a profession. 
Hence, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that professional bodies are also subject to 
the same coercive and mimetic isomorphism as any other organization, although 
normative pressures are formally less compelling by nature than the coercive ones. The 
professionalisation of specific occupations or activities (as later explained in Section 
3.4) creates much similarity in practices and mindsets of these members, and is 
observable across industries. Grandlund and Lukka (1998, p. 163) note that the recent 
trends of professionalisation in management accounting have, for instance, included the 
promotion of the ideas of cost management and non-financial measures. 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify two sources of professionalisation, namely 
university education and professional networks. Whilst the former impounds formal 
structures and processes, the latter moulds perceptions about professional behaviour 
(Grandlund and Lukka, 1998, p. 164). Thus, 
“Such mechanisms create a pool of almost interchangeable individuals who 
occupy similar positions across a range of organizations and possess a 
similarity of orientation and disposition that may override variations in 
tradition and control…” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 152) 
 
Grandlund and Lukka (1998) illustrate this normative process by referring to the change 
of orientation of management accountants in Finland, “..moving from the inner 
processes to the outside environment of firms and being realised in an intensified 
                                                
101
 The diffusion of diversification strategies.  
102
 The study was based on a survey of hospitals’ evaluation process for CEOs (business oriented vs. 
charity oriented) in response to increased competition in the industry.  
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cooperation between accountants and sales people in a partly decentralised management 
accounting function” (1998, p. 164).   
 
3.3. Institutional Theory: Issues 
  
Two important issues raised in the literature about the efficacy of institutional theory 
are: (i) positivistic orientation of the theory and (ii), the distinctions between the 
dimensions of isomorphic behaviour. First, the institutional argument has been 
extensively researched and empirical tests have been supportive in confirming the 
existence of isomorphic behaviour. This research adopts a positivistic paradigm that 
attaches due importance to social linkages between an organization, its actors and the 
environment. For example, it is expected that a management control system within an 
organization would be dependent upon coercive, mimetic and normative pressures 
rather than being solely contingent upon technical structures and seemingly 
“independent” factors (such as level of technology, competition, organization structure 
and strategy).  
 
However, Bowring (2000, p. 268), while analysing the development of the theory over 
the past 50 years103, argues that the confinement of institutional theory within the 
positivistic paradigm may have limited the insights that could have been generated from 
this body of work. The consequences of such a narrow view have been the notion of 
passivity and fatalism (Agger, 1991; Rowan, 1982), which appeared to characterise all 
institutional-related research in the last 20 years or so. The organization is usually 
viewed as being totally dependent on pressures from the law, competitors, clients, 
professions, etc, whereas it would be safe to argue that organizations (in terms of their 
practices, procedures, performance and experiences) can also place pressure on, and 
bring changes to, the environment. In this respect, Bowring (2000, p. 269) advocates an 
interaction perspective rather than a reaction one with the environment, especially in 
light of the currently fast changing institutional environment faced by corporations 
nowadays. In conclusion, the institutionalisation process described would perhaps be 
better described to the commonly known physical process of osmosis, which denotes a 
                                                
103
 Early proponents of the institutional approach were Selznick (1949), Schutz (1962) and Berger and 
Luckmann (1967).  
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“..process of interchange or absorption or a process of diffusion104” of practices between 
organizations and their environment, to achieve conformity and legitimacy. 
 
Within this context of passivity, Kondra and Hinings (1998) argue that there has been 
an “over-institutionalized” conception of isomorphism, thus neglecting the very basic 
fact that variation and diversity of practices do exist at the outset105.  Thus, research into 
the transformation and change of institutional norms has yet to be explained by 
institutional theory (Kondra and Hinings, 1998, p.750). In fact, the authors propose in 
their study a typology of organizations based an intuitive relationship between 
institutional fit106 and performance. The second issue relates to the elaborate distinctions 
between coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. These distinctions may be 
purely theoretical and even DiMaggio and Powell (1983) conceded that their separate 
effects towards institutional isomorphism may be difficult to distinguish empirically. 
Mizruchi and Fein (1999), having thoroughly examined related empirical research over 
the period 1984-1995, noted a disproportionate focus107 on mimetic isomorphism at the 
expense of coercive and normative isomorphism to explain organisational behaviour, 
despite strong arguments to support all three of them (e.g. Fligstein, 1985: Galaskiewicz 
and Wasserman, 1989).  
 
In addition, even if their respective effects can be validly and reliably measured, this 
will not preclude these different mechanisms from being negated or enhanced by each 
other. For example, based on the previous illustration of global corporate mergers 
(mimetic isomorphism), there has been concomitant stronger oversight of such mergers 
by governments and trans-national bodies (e.g. European Union) suggestive of a 
possible coercive mechanism moderating a mimetic one.  On the other hand, normative 
isomorphism, which may involve the adoption and pressurisation of specific 
management accounting practices amongst professionals, could accelerate the setting up 
of related procedures, structures and systems throughout the companies, hence being 
symptomatic of “quicker” mimetic isomorphism. 
 
                                                
104
 Macquarie’s Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1990, p. 669) 
105
 Ledford et al. (1989) and Buckho (1994) previously mentioned such caveat. 
106
 Defined as “..the degree of compliance by an organization within the organizational form of 
structures, routines and systems prescribed by institutional norms” (1998, p. 750). 
107
 60% of studies have to be found to be focusing on mimetic isomorphism (1999, p. 666). 
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In conclusion, institutional theory provides an additional and relevant perspective 
within the contingency paradigm for a study of the use of management control systems 
in organizations.  
 
3.4. Myths and Rituals 
 
A concept that is also very much related to this interpretive framework is the influence 
of myths and rituals, whereby certain practices and policies within organizations are 
enforced without rationale and presented in non-questionable fashion, even if these 
practices or policies may not be the most efficient or the most adapted way to run the 
organization. For example, a common myth is that private sector organizations are run 
more efficiently and effectively than government departments or state-run entities, 
hence spurring frequent and wholesale calls for more “privatised” structures and 
practices in such organizations.  
 
March and Olsen (1989 and 1995) are credited as being the proponents of such “norms 
and rules” and this strand of institutional theory is referred to as the normative 
institutional theory. The authors argue that actions are determined by a “logic of 
appropriateness” that is shaped by institutional values, in contrast with the “logic of 
consequentiality” characteristic of rational choices and behaviour (cf. from Peters and 
Pierre, 1998, p. 568)   
 
It is also viewed that the professionalisation108 of various occupations and functions 
within organizations reinforces the influence of myth and rituals on practices, policies 
and structures. Therefore, a “qualified” accountant is deemed to be competent and 
effective, not because he/she has actually demonstrated it, but because this occupation 
has been screened by “…social rules of licensing, certifying and schooling” (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977, p. 344).  Previous accounting researchers have highlighted the role and 
processes of to be mere rituals (e.g. Gambling, 1987).   
 
 
 
                                                
108
 As defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), “the collective struggle of members of an occupation to 
define the conditions and methods of their work, to control the production of producers and to establish a 
cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy. 
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3.5. Legitimacy and Legitimation  
 
Legitimacy and legitimation is central to the new institutional framework, an “anchor-
point concept” as termed by Deephouse (1996, p. 1033). Scott (1991, p. 169) asserts 
that legitimacy has been largely viewed as related to societal evaluations of 
organizational goals. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
argued that organizations conform to institutional rules and requirements not necessarily 
for reasons of efficiency but rather for increasing their legitimacy, resources and hence 
their survival. Indeed, “…even among market driven organizations, productive 
efficiency may have relatively little to do with survival” (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, 
p. 187).  
 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996, p. 1022-1023) set out the characteristics of new 
institutionalism with an “..emphasis on legitimacy, the embedded-ness of organisational 
fields, and the centrality of classification, routines, scripts, and schema”. Indeed, there 
needs to be a rationale for any organisational practice, structure or form. As argued by 
Robey and Budreau (1999, p. 177), organizations acquire institutional properties by 
drawing from abstract ideals (rationale) in a society, such as competition, progress or 
efficiency.  
 
Hence, if the stated objective for adopting or retaining a procedure or structure is to 
achieve one or more of the previously mentioned ideals, then legitimacy is achieved i.e. 
a certain degree of “cultural support” (Scott, 1991, p. 170) for the organization has 
occurred. In other words, the “institutional” environment both supports and produces 
normative pressures on an organization to perform in a legitimate fashion (Zucker, 
1987). For example, the so-called “organisational culture”109 would encompass all those 
practices and structures that have “stood the test of time”110 and which are expected to 
result in better performance or efficiency. Obviously, the organisational actors are 
directly affected by these institutional rules. As an illustration to this, Tolbert (1985) 
studied the formal structure of a sample of law firms and found formal mechanisms 
aimed at ensuring the socialisation of new members, with a view to maintaining 
homogeneity of members’ backgrounds and experiences.  
                                                
109
 This term refers to the shared beliefs and attitudes about the appropriate assignment and execution of 
organisational tasks that are reflected in patterns of behaviour (Tolbert, 1985).  
110
 A practice that is deemed to have “stood the test of time” may be considered to be a legitimated one. 
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Ruef and Scott (1998) examine in detail the concept of organizational legitimacy. 
According to the authors (1998, p. 3), organizational legitimacy is determined by those 
observers of the organization who assess its conformity to a specific standard or model. 
Whilst the focus of the literature seems to be more on external constituencies (e.g. 
government, professional associations), there are also internal participants (e.g. workers, 
managers) who also make legitimacy evaluations that can “…affect their own levels of 
involvement and motivation” (Elsbach, 1994). In addition, and interestingly for this 
current study, Ruef and Scott (1998) do question the “location” of the legitimisation 
processes in the organization i.e. at what level or unit. They identify three units/levels, 
namely (a) entire organizational population, (b) individual organizations, and (c) 
subunits and specialized aspects or organizations (1998, p. 3).  One may therefore 
expect heads of functional units in an organization to be part of the legitimation process.  
 
3.6. Accounting and Institutionalism 
 
Despite the frequent mention of the accountancy profession and its activities as an 
illustration of a source of normative isomorphism in organizations (e.g. DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983, p. 147), theoretical and empirical research into the institutional aspects of 
accounting, inclusive of management control systems, has been slow to develop but is 
becoming increasingly predominant (Baxter and Chua, 2003; Luft and Shields, 2003). 
In the early 1980s, authors such as Meyer (1983), Cooper (1981, 1983), and Hopper and 
Powell (1985) already questioned the technical (i.e. contingent) primacy of management 
accounting research and argue for,  
“..a symbolic domain that is created by accounting fictions, a domain that is 
important for creating the type of legitimate and seemingly coherent entities 
that are demanded by the agencies of the modern world” (cf. Hopwood, 1983, 
p. 289) 
 
Indeed, both authors suggest (cf. from Hopwood, 1983, p. 295) the need for going 
beyond the rational domain and to consider broader social and ideological factors that 
are implicated in the accounting processes. The links between general accounting 
practice - as a symbolic representation of rationality - and legitimacy have been 
diversely addressed and/or mentioned in the literature, such as Feldman and March 
(1981), Burchell et al. (1980), Richardson, (1987), Gambling (1977). Hence, the 
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use/existence of internal accounting/financial practices in organizations is seen to have 
legitimacy-seeking properties, in: 
“…creating a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”. (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) 
 
Furthermore, Suchman (1995) seeks to clarify the meanings of legitimacy and suggest 
three types of organizational legitimacy, namely (a) pragmatic legitimacy, which rests 
on the self-interested calculations of an organization’s most immediate audiences, often 
involving a critical resource (financial) dependence between the organization and 
audience, (b) moral legitimacy, which rests not on judgements about whether a given 
activity (e.g. financial planning) benefits the evaluator, but rather on judgements about 
whether the activity is “the right thing to do” whilst focusing on the existence of 
‘sound’ practices as evidence of doing ‘good’ , and (c) cognitive legitimacy, which goes 
beyond evaluation and self-interest, and involves an affirmative backing, or a mere 
acceptance, of the organization based on some taken-for-granted cultural account (1995, 
p. 578-582).   
 
The use of institutional theory was more formally introduced in a study of health care 
organizations (Covaleski et al, 1993). The research investigated the implementation of 
case-mix accounting systems based on diagnostic-related groups (DRG), as means to 
control hospital costs. The authors contend (1993, p. 66) that DRGs and case-mix 
accounting systems will be treated as ceremonial systems for creating and affirming 
orders to satisfy external funding agencies. Based on an analysis of the origins and 
influences of the case-mix accounting systems and DRG in the hospital industry, 
Covaleski et al. (1993, p. 76) conclude that one can more accurately characterize the 
above-mentioned practices as social in nature, as a mechanism to express and 
demonstrate a conformity with institutionalised rules and expectations.  
 
Scapens (1994) provided some initial thoughts on how the institutional framework 
could apply to management accounting. He considered (1994, p. 315) that accounting 
provides some of the routines which both maintain organizational coherence and give 
external legitimacy rather than providing a basis for rational economic choice. Although 
the focus of his discussion is on external legitimacy, one may argue that an internal 
legitimacy could also exist vis-à-vis the internal players within the organization (e.g. 
employees and managers).  
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Carruthers (1995) attempted to examine the links between accounting and new 
institutionalism. He reviewed the arguments and implications that accounting practices 
are rationalised elements (1995, p. 315) that are incorporated to help maintain 
appearances rather than implemented as a result of a technical and rational process. 
However, quoting from Meyer and Rowan (1991), Carruthers (1995, p. 316) does 
acknowledge one important element: the existence of rationalized structures is 
dependent on the level of uncertainty surrounding outputs, technologies and criteria. 
Hence, in a situation of easily measurable outputs, well defined production technologies 
and unambiguous success criteria, technical efficiency will matter. This statement is 
highly reminiscent of the contingency paradigm discussed in the previous chapter. In a 
separate analysis, Carruthers (1995) also considers the extent to which observers and 
players are convinced by rational appearances or are aware of the decoupling between 
the structures (accounting control) and the decisions relating to them. He refers to 
O’Barr and Conley’s (1992) study which argued that “experts see ambiguity where 
others see precision” (cf. Carruthers, 1995, p. 319). Hence, non-specialists (such as 
marketing or production managers) are more likely to be believing that MCS comprise 
of a rational and neutral set of operating procedures, budgetary participation 
mechanisms and performance evaluation criteria. On the other hand, Fligstein (1991) 
argues that “non-accounting” managers, after having spent time and experience in the 
organization, tend to adopt a more financial outlook on the organization’s performance 
over the course of their careers whilst financial experts (accountants) are the ones most 
wedded to rational appearances (in Carruthers, 1995, p. 319). Although both view 
points seem to rely heavily on anecdotal evidence, the statements do reinforce the 
argument that managers may have very diverse perceptions (from rational to 
institutional) of the management control systems. Specifically, the degree of 
legitimation that managers may perceive to be “operating” on the accounting and 
control systems could become a relevant variable.  Carruthers (1995) concluded by 
stating that the extent of investigation on accounting as a rationalised myth had not been 
significant but over the last ten years or so, there has been a growing interest within the 
management accounting area to explore the institutional influence on a theoretical and 
empirical level. Some of the relevant research (post 1995) is now reviewed below. 
 
Firth (1996) applied some the institutional mechanisms and concepts to explain the use 
of particular management accounting practices. He investigated the adoption of a list of 
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managerial accounting practices and procedures (e.g. costing, overhead allocation, 
budget, variance, investment appraisal) by Chinese entities and their foreign partners, 
usually operating through a joint-venture enterprise. Firth (1996) hypothesised that an 
isomorphic and mimetic process would occur whereby Chinese enterprises having joint-
ventures with foreign companies would have made changes to adapt to “capitalist-style” 
management accounting practices. Compared to a sample of other Chinese enterprises 
which were not involved in any foreign partnerships, the author did find significant 
evidence of adoption and convergence in the use of management accounting practices 
by the first category of Chinese enterprises.  
 
Abernethy and Chua (1996) investigated the changes to the MCS in response to 
strategic decisions but considered the effects and implications from an institutional 
theory viewpoint. Based on an extensive qualitative study of a large public teaching 
hospital in Australia, they identified the various forms of isomorphism at play over the 
“various stages of the life” of the organization which eventually played a part in re-
shaping the governance and management of the hospital. New “professional 
management” practices were legitimised, including the new costing accountability and 
control systems.  
 
Hoque and Alam (1999) presented the influence of Total Quality Management (TQM) 
adoption on an organization’s management accounting systems (MAS). Based on a 
qualitative study of a New Zealand company, they observed that there were strong 
pressures for the organization to adopt TQM and thus to increase external legitimacy, 
and gain acceptance from government bodies, professional associations and quality 
standards authorities. They also found that the MAS was eventually adapted to reflect 
the new TQM focus (1999, p. 206).  
 
Whilst the previous articles demonstrate the increasing interest in institutional theory in 
management accounting and control research, there have also been proposals to 
integrate the institutional within the mainstream contingency paradigm. Chenhall (2003, 
p. 160) argues that whilst the institutional paradigm have different theoretical and 
philosophical bases, some researchers have used contingency-based ideas to develop 
convergence between these approaches. He adds (2003, p. 160): 
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“A contingency-based approach attempts to map variables and demonstrate 
potential relationships between these variables, which may include power and 
politics, and indicate potential links with outcomes”.  
 
Covaleski et al. (2003) also consider the theoretical aspects when reviewing budgeting 
research. They identify three theoretical perspectives applicable to budgeting research, 
namely economics, psychology and sociology. According to them (2003, p. 7), the two 
main streams of research within the sociology perspective are the contingency and 
institutional theories. The authors highlight one important assumption that distinguishes 
between the two theories, and which is specifically relevant to this study. They state 
(2003, p. 30): 
“An important assumption of contingency theory is that these employees are 
not strategic in intentionally violating organization policies and goals. In 
contrast, political models of organizations such as institutional theory assumed 
that these ‘bounded rational’ employees are likely to engage in strategic (self-
interested) behaviour. Institutional theory also assumes that this strategic 
behaviour often takes the form of attaching meaning to the budgeting process 
beyond the formal role of coordination and control that it has been given in the 
contingency theory approach” 
 
This appears to be an important point to this study given the closeness between 
“intentionally violating organizational policies and goals”, “strategic behaviour” and 
what has been coined as “dysfunctional behaviour”. At the same time, it does give 
credence to the argument that a manager adopting “an institutional” viewpoint may be 
more amenable to consider forms of dysfunctional behaviour as acceptable. On the 
other hand, as reported in Covaleski et al. (2003), an opposite reaction can be 
interpreted from Czarniawska’s (1997) suggestion on the role of budgeting: 
“….institutional theory depicts budgeting as having a critical role in the 
expression of symbolic preference in a bargaining process rather than a 
formal structural control mechanism in a decision-making process, as a means 
of conversation rather than a means of control, and as an expression of values 
rather than an instrument for action” (in Covaleski et al., 2003, p. 32).  
 
If managers do have an “institutional” rationale when confronted with the MCS (such as 
the budgetary process), then they may conclude that MCS mechanisms and outputs are 
ultimately not relevant in the organisation’s assessment of their functional performance. 
In such a context, the managers’ willingness to engage in dysfunctional behaviour may 
be less than in the case of a manager having a more “rational” outlook to the MCS.  
Hence, the influence of “institutional theory” on the link between MCS and an outcome 
variable (be it managerial performance or dysfunctional behaviour) may be enhancing 
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or decreasing the relationship. In attempting to build more specific links to the context 
of management control systems, one now needs to bring the discussion to a particular 
concept within the institutional framework i.e. the influence of legitimacy or 
legitimation on actors when they interact with the management control system.  
 
3.7. Accounting and Legitimation 
 
One of the early and specific discussions on accounting and legitimation was by 
Richardson (1987). He argued that there are different perspectives of legitimation when 
linked to accounting. For examples, he (1987, p. 341) refers to Cooper’s (1981) view 
that accounting sustains and legitimises the current social, economic and political 
arrangements, whilst there is Tinker et al.’s (1982) characterization of accounting as an 
ideology and Tiessen and Waterhouse’s (1983) view that accounting has a 
constitutional role in organizations. The three main perspectives are more formally 
known as “structural-functionalist”, “social constructionist” and “hegemonic”. 
Richardson (1987, p. 342) contends that the process of legitimation can be generally 
seen as an attempt to establish a semiotic relation between action and values. The above 
stated perspectives on legitimation are however different in terms of how they map the 
link between action and values and how these latter terms are defined.  
 
More importantly, Richardson (1987, p. 343) goes on to define the conditions for the 
process of legitimation: 
“The legitimation for action is necessary for that action to occur where: an 
actor is seen to have a choice in the actions he or she may take; the resource 
requirements or consequences of action for others are non trivial; other 
actors’ participation cannot be coerced; and, their consent is necessary for the 
actor to undertake his or her planned action or avoid penalties for past 
actions. These conditions would seem to be met in the relationship between 
managers and subordinates and between organizations and the institutional 
environment” 
 
In applying these conditions in the context of this study, one can argue for the existence 
of an influence (the legitimation for action) on how managers would perceive the effect 
of MCS on the extent to which they would engage in dysfunctional behaviour.  
 
A second author that often refers to accounting and control systems within discussions 
on legitimation is Brunsson (1990).  In this paper, he formally considered the issue 
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within the broader realm of organizational decision making (making choices) and 
viewed accounting as an important source of information for decision makers (i.e. the 
choosers).   He argued that organizational decisions and certain practices can be viewed 
as legitimating devices. For example, organizations can be advised to continue 
emphasizing budgeting procedures, even if these have not produced the right choices, if 
responsibility and legitimacy are more important (1990, p. 58). However his examples 
and observations were mostly based in government departments, parliaments and 
councils processes, thereby limiting its scope to commercial organizations where 
decisions would not normally be their main “outputs”.   
 
One observation that could be extended from this line of thinking would be that 
managers and decision-makers in organizations may not have identical perceptions of 
whether the decisions (or even actions) were merely legitimating devices or in part 
based on rational comparison of alternatives. Hence, the influence of the legitimation 
process would be dependent on the extent to which actors perceive this process to be in 
operation i.e. Are managers aware of the disconnection between decisions and actions? 
It is the manager’s recognition of the legitimation process (in part or completely) that 
again could be of interest in the link between management control systems and 
managers’ extent of dysfunctional behaviour?  
 
3.8. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered the tenets and implications of institutional theory first in a 
broader organizational context and second, in the context of management accounting. 
There is a growing and relatively recent consensus for the ‘unlocking’ of institutional 
arguments when considering the role of management accounting within an organization 
(e.g. Scapens, 1994; Carruthers, 1995; Chenhall, 2003; Covaleski et al. 2003). Also, 
some of their work have been influenced and led by the theoretical and empirical 
developments within the organizational change literature, and how it relates in turn to 
accounting changes and particularly the impact of “institutional” factors and theories 
that drive changes in management accounting practices and management control 
systems (e.g. Covaleski et al. 1996; Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Nor-Aziah and 
Scapens, 2007; Dambrin et al., 2007). Although some authors (Scapens, 1994 and 
Carruthers, 1995) appeared to place institutional theory at one extreme of the spectrum - 
in comparison with the mainstream management accounting theories (e.g. contingency, 
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agency) - the more recent discussion and arguments do seem to favour an integrative 
approach or at the very least the inclusion of institutional  and interpretive variables 
within the mainstream paradigms.  
 
Furthermore, whilst “institutional theory” provides a set of basic and general 
explanations of an organization’s behaviour, one needs more specific concepts and 
constructs to enable a more focused and empirically valid research. Concepts such as 
isomorphism or legitimacy are important ones as they represent critical aspects of the 
theory and as already noted in some empirical research, appropriate proxies were 
devised to assess the existence and extent of these aspects (e.g. Ruef and Scott, 1998; 
Deephouse, 1996). Legitimacy and legitimation are clearly key concepts that have 
attracted attention. Although it has been mostly viewed from an organizational unit 
viewpoint, and therefore are at a somehow abstract level, there is scope to consider the 
effects of legitimacy and the legitimation process at subunit level. The fact that most 
organizations have retained the functional nature of subunits (e.g. marketing, 
operations, sales, R&D etc) also allows an investigation of the impact of legitimacy on 
MCS by comparing these different functions. 
 
Hence, the recent literature appears to validate the possibility of integrating an 
institutional variable (namely the legitimating nature of controls) within a contingency 
paradigm. The arguments and detailed hypothesis in that respect will be presented in the 
next chapter along with the original contingency variables.   
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Chapter 4  
Hypothesis Development and Empirical Schema  
4.0 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present the formal hypotheses relating to the relationships 
between MCS, dysfunctional behaviour and the contextual variables identified from the 
literature. It thus addresses the three research questions and objectives formulated in 
Chapter 1 (Section 1.5 and 1.6) of this thesis by considering separately the direct, 
intervening and moderating effects arising from the use of MCS in companies. In a bid 
to capture different aspects of management control systems, the sub-control systems of 
standard operation procedures (SOP), budgetary participation (BP) and reliance on 
accounting performance measure have been selected to “reflect” the typical MCS of a 
private sector organization. 
 
More specifically, this chapter will first argue for the various linkages between the 
extent/nature of the above-mentioned three sub-control systems and the extent of 
dysfunctional behaviour by middle level managers. It is argued that such relationship is 
moderated by contextual factors specific to the work functions and environment in 
which the middle managers and their superiors operate. The design of each of the 
above-mentioned sub-control systems will be proposed as an independent variable of 
interest, which is expected to impact on the managers’ two types of dysfunctional 
behaviour, namely information manipulation and gaming. The indirect (or intervening) 
and moderating effects involving a contextual variable with each sub-control system 
will then be considered. As elaborated in Chapter 2 (Section 2.8.3 and Figure 2.1), 
contingency-based studies have involved various forms of fit and models. In this study, 
two types of models are considered: one known as a mediating (or intervening) model 
based on direct/indirect relationships and the second one known as a moderating model, 
based on the interaction effects of two variables (an independent and a moderating 
variable) on the outcome variable. In both cases, however, appropriate hypotheses on 
simple direct effects have to be formulated. These will be elaborated in the following 
sections.  
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4.1 Direct Effects: MCS to Dysfunctional Behaviour 
4.1.1 SOP to Dysfunctional Behaviour Hypothesis 
 
As stated earlier, SOPs enact a number of rules that regulate the capacity or ability of 
managers to act in a flexible way. The evidence on their consequences remains scant, as 
previous research has focused on situational variables only such as task characteristics, 
departmental interdependence and national culture e.g. Rockness and Shields (1984), 
Macintosh and Daft (1987), and Chow et al. (1999). Chow et al. (1996) did find some 
evidence that control systems (including procedural controls) enhanced dysfunctional 
behaviours (short term emphasis and manipulation of measures) in two countries (US 
and Japan) but it does not strictly report on the individual impact of the procedural 
controls. Fisher (1995, p. 40) notes that a procedural system enhances control over 
tasks it supports by reducing the discretion of the person(s) performing the task. SOPs 
typically provide for a paper trail, authorisation limits and compulsory counterchecks 
that enhance the visibility and transparency of activities carried out, or 
actions/decisions taken, by functional/middle-level managers.  
 
While dysfunctional practices entail “getting around” or by-passing formal rules and 
regulations of the organization, it is argued that SOPs are a device - at the middle 
managers operating level - that creates sufficient precision and speed of action by 
administrative management to block (or at least restrict) dysfunctional practices at that 
level. In addition, if one relies on Simons’ (1995; 2000) conceptualisations, one can 
view SOPs as an example of a boundary system that communicates the actions that 
employees should avoid, whilst allowing them to innovate and achieve with certain pre-
defined areas (Widener, 2007, p. 760).   Hence, the higher the precision in applying 
controls on operating tasks, the lower is likely to be the operating managers’ extent of 
dysfunctional practices, resulting in the following directional hypothesis: 
H1: There is an inverse relationship between the level of standard operating 
procedures and the managers’ extent of dysfunctional behaviour (gaming).  
 
A caveat to the above hypothesis however needs to be acknowledged and this can be 
associated to initial observations by Hirst (1983) in that he expected a non-linear 
(curvilinear) relationship between his measure of DB (tension) and the control system 
(RAPM). This was modelled by adding a quadratic term (1983, p. 599) to the 
regression equation. In other words, there is a general expectation that gaming can be 
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minimised up to a point which is deemed ‘acceptable’ by managers. Past this level of 
SOPs, there may be little benefit to additional procedures, possibly resulting in the ‘re-
activation of defensive routines’ in response to a perceived threat - as put forward by 
Argyris (1990). At the same time though, Hirst (1983) did not find empirical evidence 
in support of this curvilinear relationship in the case of RAPM (1983, p. 602). 
  
As will be further explained in Chapter 5 - the extent and existence of SOPs will be 
related to the following activities (adapted from Chow et al., 1999), (i) purchase of 
capital equipment, (ii) hiring and firing of personnel, (iii) sourcing of inputs (raw 
materials, consumables), (iv) operating procedures and schedules and (v) making 
tradeoffs within your unit’s current period budget. However, SOPs applying to these 
activities will be expected to be aimed at restricting the dysfunctional behaviours 
relating to the setting of boundaries on actions and activities (i.e. gaming). On the other 
hand, and given the nature of SOPs, there are fewer possibilities of information 
manipulations arising from the SOPs. Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H2: There is no significant relationship between the level of standard operating 
procedures and the managers’ extent of dysfunctional behaviour (information 
manipulation).  
 
4.1.2. BP - Dysfunctional Behaviour Hypothesis 
 
There is an ongoing debate regarding the positive and negative consequences of 
budgets in organizations. On one hand, initial studies have found direct and positive 
links between participation and motivation or performance (Searfoss, 1976; Kenis, 
1979; Merchant, 1981; Brownell, 1982a; Brownell and McInnes, 1986; Mia, 1987; 
Nouri and Parker, 1998). However, others empirical studies report on the absence of  
relationships between BP and performance/motivation (Shields and Young, 1993; 
Kren, 1990; Steers, 1979). On the other hand, and spurred by the agency paradigm 
(Merchant, 1985a) and previous case study evidence (Argyris, 1952; 1953), one major 
area of research in budgeting practices has focused on the link between the extent of the 
subordinate’s participation in drafting budgets and budgetary slack i.e. formulating a 
budget that makes it easier to attain by understating revenues or overstating costs (e.g. 
Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Onsi, 1973; Govindarajan, 1986; Dunk, 1995). Lukka (1988, p. 
283) extended the concept of slack to that of ‘budgetary bias’, which then included the 
element of upward bias i.e. the deliberate overstatement of expected performance in the 
budget. He further contended that a higher degree of participation provided the 
 153
opportunity to create bias, hence diminishing the superior’s power in controlling the 
subordinate (1988, p. 287) and which was documented in a later case study by Walker 
and Johnson (1999). 
 
Based on a review of empirical studies, Dunk and Nouri (1998, p. 74) concluded that 
participation appears to be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for slack creation 
and that the relation between participation and slack may not be a simple and direct 
one. Indeed, there were also contrary arguments that participation may in fact reduce 
slack (Onsi, 1973; Camman, 1976; Collins, 1978; Merchant, 1985c) and that slack is 
altogether not necessarily dysfunctional (Merchant and Manzoni, 1989; Jaworski and 
Young, 1992; Davila and Wouters, 2005). The debate remains divided as Lal et al. 
(1996) challenged Merchant’s (1985c) use of non-random sampling and found evidence 
of higher slack as a result of BP. However, evidence beyond the narrow concept of 
slack is limited and it is argued that the BP practices may enhance a general behaviour 
of information manipulation and gaming amongst managers i.e. evidence that 
budgetary participation may provide a broader impetus for managers to consider the 
various forms of dysfunctional behaviour remains scant. Since Lukka’s (1988) concept 
of budgetary bias is the most relevant to the notion of dysfunctional behaviour, this 
study will rely on Lukka’s argument that budgetary participation enhances the prospect 
of dysfunctional behaviour.  Hence, it will be hypothesised that the degree of budgetary 
participation by middle managers will increase their level of dysfunctional behaviour. 
In addition, budgetary participation can also essentially be viewed as an information 
sharing process from the subordinate manager to his/her supervisor (Birnberg et al., 
1983). When subordinates have an information advantage, they can misrepresent the 
information to negotiate easier targets, thereby denying valuable information to 
supervisors and by extension, the opportunity to achieve maximum efficiency in 
activities (Davila and Wouters, 2005, p. 590). There is thus an unavoidable efficiency 
loss (Kirby et al., 1991) and slack can be also detrimental since it isolates the 
subordinate manager from the motivational properties of budgets (Bourgeois, 1981). As 
a result,    
H3: There is a significant and positive relationship between the level of budgetary 
participation and the managers’ extent of dysfunctional behaviour (information 
manipulation). 
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Whilst the focus of past studies has been on the information/communicative and 
motivational aspects of budgetary participation and procedures, there has been less 
emphasis on the operational implications of the budgetary process subsequent to the 
participation stage. A certain level of budgetary participation could imply that the 
subordinate has internalised and committed to the plan and has had a reasonable level 
of influence in the sales or expenses target (or any other standard) (e.g. Mia, 1987; 
Murray, 1990). On the other hand, whilst it is acknowledged that a set budget target can 
reduce ambiguity amongst managers (Marginson and Ogden, 2005), an imposed budget 
(i.e. any low level of participation) or target can also put pressure on the manager to 
keep to the budget or to appear to keep to the budget (Hopwood, 1980; Merchant and 
Manzoni, 1989). For example, the manager may engage in the selective use of funds 
just to keep within the budget, even if it means curtailing key tasks or activities. In 
essence, the role one associates to budgetary participation can be diversely interpreted 
according to the theoretical perspectives. For instance, Kren (1997) argues that these 
interpretations reflect a debate between behavioural-oriented and agency-oriented 
theories on how management’s behaviour can best be controlled. However, as 
mentioned earlier, there is little published evidence on the “follow-on” impact of 
budgetary participation on actual activities or actions (Shields and Shields, 1998) but it 
has been recently argued that the level of participation may signal to the manager that 
he/she has the opportunity to operate his/her activities without much oversight due to 
his/her access to private information. Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated.  
H4: There is a significant and positive relationship between the level of budgetary 
participation and the managers’ extent of dysfunctional behaviour (gaming). 
 
4.1.3. RAPM to Dysfunctional Behaviour Relationship 
 
Research on the performance evaluation style of managers has been extensive, with 
Hopwood (1972) being credited with the first empirical study on the role of accounting 
data in managerial performance evaluation. Hopwood (1973, p. 88) further contended 
that a high budget emphasis (budget constrained style) would result in fiddling, short-
time horizons, distrust, rivalry and parochial attitudes; a proposition that was not 
supported by Otley’s (1978) replicating study, hence partly setting off the debate on the 
contingency framework to explain such inconsistent findings. Hirst (1983) does find 
evidence of a positive relationship between tension and RAPM and suggests that more 
research must consider other forms of dysfunctional behaviour (1983, p. 603). Van der 
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Stede (2000, p. 610) reports that the empirical evidence regarding the alleged 
dysfunctional consequences of a rigid budgetary control style remains equivocal, in 
spite of the extensive research on the impact of budget emphasis. For example, Dunk 
(1993a) and Merchant (1985c) found that budget slack was low when the budget 
emphasis was high. One explanation put forward to support such results is that the 
intended consequences of a RAPM system is to reduce dysfunctional behaviour, so that 
such relationship is already embodied and existent at the time of observation i.e. when 
administering the questionnaire.  
 
Vagneur and Peiperl (2000) examine the different measures/constructs used for budget 
emphasis as a potential reason for the absence of convergence in post-Hopwood 
empirical testing. Indeed they have observed substantial evolution in the measures and 
scales used to operationalise performance evaluative style (2000, p. 523). Despite the 
existence of significant correlations between the different measures, there is evidence 
of divergence between the recently modified variables with the ones originally devised 
by Brownell (1982a), Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978), hence providing partial 
explanation for inconsistent and non-comparable findings.   
 
Based on the idea that dysfunctional behaviours might re-emerge in some other form 
and hence explain both positive and negative relationships, Van der Stede (2000) 
investigated the impact of budgetary control111 on slack and in turn the influence of 
slack on short term managerial orientation. Using structural equation modelling (SEM), 
Van der Stede (2000) found a negative impact of the control style on slack and negative 
relationships between slack and managerial short-term orientation. Thus, the findings 
are suggestive of an indirect relationship between budgetary control style and 
managerial short-term orientation through budget slack (2000, p. 619) and of 
dysfunctional behaviour re-emerging in another, but less constrained, form. Van der 
Stede (2000, p. 619) concludes that these findings, to some extent, support the 
argument that both behaviours cannot be simultaneously dysfunctional. However, in 
considering the recent use of Simons’ (1995; 2000) conceptualisations in the MCS 
literature (e.g, Widener, 2007), one can also view that the reliance on accounting 
performance measures as a primarily diagnostic system that are predicted to have 
‘negative’ consequences. In addition, one can consider that RAPM aims at controlling 
                                                
111
 The impact of two independent variables, namely strategy and past financial performance, on the 
control style was also investigated. 
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behaviour (the process) by focusing on outcomes. It is hence contended that the 
mismatch between the inherent role of the sub-control system and its (perceived) actual 
use generates avenues for manipulation and gaming practices. Hence, in light of some 
of the control attributes (Fisher, 1995) of RAPM, namely its short-term orientation and 
its outcome (rather than process), it is hypothesised that: 
H5: There is a significant positive relationship between the level of budget emphasis 
(RAPM) and the manager’s dysfunctional behaviour (information manipulation). 
 
In view of the short-term orientation in relying on accounting measures for 
performance evaluation, subordinate managers may - apart from biasing or filtering the 
information – decide to take decisions or actions in light of what impact the decision 
would have on the final outcome. Hence, “cutting corners” on aspects such as customer 
satisfaction, product quality, and staff welfare could be encouraged as long as these 
would not have an impact on short-term financial-led measures of performance. 
H6: There is a significant positive relationship between the level of budget emphasis 
(RAPM) and the manager’s dysfunctional behaviour (gaming). 
 
4.2 Direct Effects: Contextual Variables to MCS 
4.2.1 Contextual Variables to SOP 
 
Standard Operating Procedures provide detailed rules of conduct to assist functional 
managers in taking their decisions and ensuring proper behaviour. Macintosh and Daft 
(1987, p. 51) state that SOPs generally include prescriptions for how managers should 
handle operational situations that arise. However, it can be argued that the extent of 
their use is dependent on key contextual factors. Two contextual factors of particular 
relevance at the operational level of the functional manager are task uncertainty and 
superiors’ use of controls. 
 
Although perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) has been extensively used in the 
management control literature as a moderating variable, Tymon et al (1998, p. 42) 
recommend that PEU be operationalised only as a strategic construct i.e. PEU 
measurement should represent top managers’ perceptions of the level of uncertainty 
affecting the organization. In light of the above, task uncertainty becomes the relevant 
variable for middle level managers. Task uncertainty has been defined by Galbraith 
(1973) as the difference between the amount of information required to perform a task 
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and the amount of information already processed. In a high task uncertainty situation, 
SOPs can hardly capture or account for all possible situations and thus procedures may 
become ineffective or inapplicable in regulating behaviour. As stated by Galbraith 
(1973, p. 4), 
“If the task is well understood prior to performing it, much of the activity 
can be pre-planned. If it is not understood, then during the actual execution 
of the task, more knowledge is acquired which leads to changes in resource 
allocations, schedules and priorities.” 
 
This was made apparent in Macintosh and Daft (1987) who considered the association 
between department interdependence and SOP, and found a negative link. Although 
departmental interdependence relates purely to the level of interdependence across 
departments (pooled, sequential or reciprocal), Bouwens and Abernethy (2000, p. 224) 
do contend that the latter level of interdependence might be more expected in firms 
manufacturing tailored-only products. In turn, this characteristic is very much linked to 
one aspect of task uncertainty, in that departments involved in tailor-made activities (as 
opposed to mass produced ones) can be expected to display a higher level of task 
uncertainty. However, the task uncertainty construct involves more than just the 
carrying out of tailor-made or mass-produced activities i.e. the managers’ perceptions 
of the information needs to carry out his/her departmental tasks.  Finally, Chenhall 
(2003, p. 141) predicts that at higher levels of task uncertainty, the more informal the 
controls need to be rather than using formal bureaucratic controls such as SOPs. Hence, 
the following hypothesis is generated: 
H7: There is a significant negative relationship between the level of task uncertainty 
and the level of detailed standard operating procedures. i.e. A high (low) level of task 
uncertainty will lead to a low (high) level of detailed SOP.  
 
The diagnostic vs. interactive use of controls system was first documented and 
theorized by Simons (1987b, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1995, 2000). He argued that senior 
managers developed specific attention to a defined set of controls. He first described 
“interactive controls” as those that senior management chose to monitor personally (cf. 
Langfield-Smith, 1997; Abernethy and Brownell 1999, p. 191) and ‘interact’ with. 
Such distinctions can also be associated to an earlier study by Burchell et al. (1980), 
who considered accounting outputs to be either used as an ‘answer machine’ 
(diagnostic) or as a ‘dialogue, learning and idea creation machine’ (interactive). 
Furthermore, the choice of interactive controls provides the signal to subordinates about 
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which aspects need to be attended to. The nature of standard operating procedures 
makes it less of interest to an “interactive” style of management superiors as there is 
little interaction available from the outputs or mechanisms of standard operating 
procedures. On the other hand, a diagnostic approach to a control system implies that 
the superior is more willing to use standard operating procedures and will react mostly 
to exception reports or variations from norms/quotas. Typically, the task of monitoring 
standard operating procedures is delegated to a staff specialist (Langfield-Smith, 1997, 
p. 223) and eventually reported to the superior on an infrequent or exceptions basis. 
Informed by the recent research on the LOC framework (Widener, 2007), an alternative 
perspective to support this hypothesis relates to the predicted interactions between 
boundary systems and the diagnostic use of controls. Indeed, SOPs could be also seen 
as an example of a boundary system. Widener (2007, p. 762) posited that a higher 
reliance on the latter system would also mean a higher reliance on the diagnostic 
system in order to maintain the necessary balance for the control structure.  In this 
respect, there is a logical link between a diagnostic (less interactive) style and more 
standard operating procedures, resulting in the following hypothesis:  
H8: There is a significant negative relationship between the superiors’  interactive 
style of using controls and the level of detailed standard operating procedures i.e. 
The more interactive (diagnostic) the superior’s use of controls, the lower (higher) 
the level of SOP.  
 
4.2.2. Contextual Variables to BP 
 
Shields and Shields (1998, p. 52) contended that very few studies considered the 
antecedent (as opposed to moderating) effects of uncertainty on BP despite the 
theoretical predictions from economics, psychology and sociology as to the role of 
uncertainty in the participative budgeting process. One such study (Merchant, 1984) 
found that the automation of processes and technologies would place greater emphasis 
on formal budgeting. According to Merchant (1984, p. 300), managers responsible for 
more highly automated departments have greater requirements to explain variances and 
to react to expected budget overruns.  However, he did not find a link between high 
product standardization and an increased use of budget. These two elements - which 
embody to a large extent the concept of task uncertainty – did not therefore yield 
consistent results. On the other hand, building on the information gathering and sharing 
perspective of the budgetary process, one may argue that a more uncertain task would 
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cause a higher level of participation and input from the subordinate manager. Indeed, 
within the theoretical bases of economics and psychology, participative budgeting is 
modelled as being used by the superior to obtain information on the subordinate’s task 
and task environment (Shields and Shields, 1998, p. 58). In addition, Brownell and 
McInnes (1986) argued that participation provides information to managers to clarify 
the relation between formal rewards and budget goals, which becomes an increasing 
priority in times of higher task uncertainty, and in the interest of motivating 
subordinates (Shields and Shields, 1998, p. 65). As such, and as recently contended by 
Chenhall (2003, p. 141), a higher level of participation is expected in situations of high 
task uncertainty. Therefore,  
H9: There is a significant positive relationship between the level of task uncertainty 
and the level of budgetary participation i.e. A high (low) level of task uncertainty will 
lead to a high (low) level of budgetary participation. 
  
Budgetary participation can be a useful tool for a superior in motivating the 
subordinate, to gather information on the subordinate’s operations for eventual 
improvement, and to better coordinate action between sub-units (Shields and Shields, 
1998). As already observed in some companies, the budget participation exercise can 
also appear to be delegated to a staff specialist (Langfield-Smith, 1997, p. 223) i.e. the 
management accountant and eventually reported to the superior on an exceptions basis. 
However, there are generally more interactive elements within the proposal, 
negotiation, and meeting stages of the budgetary process. For instance, Bisbe and Otley 
(2004) recently asserted that an interactive use of control systems (including budgets) 
provides the opportunity for top management to get personally involved in the 
processes and outputs of the control systems. This interactive use motivates information 
gathering, face-to-face dialogue and debate (2004, p. 711). In the words of Simons 
(1991) himself, interactive managers “….. of these businesses spend a great deal of 
time debating and adjusting profit plans during the year. Top managers are continually 
revising and discussing profit commitments with subordinates…” (1991, p. 55). Hence,  
 
H10: There is a significant positive relationship between the superiors’ interactive 
style of using controls and the level of budgetary participation. i.e. the more 
interactive (diagnostic) the superior’s use of controls, the higher (lower) the level of 
budgetary participation.  
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4.2.3. Contextual Variables to RAPM 
 
Hartmann (2000) reviewed the evidence on the contingent relationship between RAPM 
and dysfunctional behaviour. Initially, environmental uncertainty can be seen to impact 
on a performance appraisal system that seeks to rely primarily on (historical) 
accounting figures. However, evidence remains mixed at best (Hartmann, 2000, p. 
463). In his subsequent development of the link between RAPM and uncertainty, 
Hartmann (2000, p. 471) refers to Galbraith’s (1977, p. 36) statement that 
“…uncertainty is the core concept upon which organizational design frameworks are 
based”. Yet, empirical evidence has shown support for hypotheses of both positive and 
negative effects for environment uncertainty, resulting in what Hartmann terms “the 
uncertainty paradox” (2000, p. 472). In fact, he finds empirical support for the opposing 
effects of environmental (positive) and task (negative) uncertainty on the 
appropriateness of RAPM (Hartmann, 2005). In a bid to capture a more meaningful 
measure of “uncertainty” relevant to middle-level managers, task uncertainty is thus 
proposed as an antecedent variable. The arguments relating to its relevance have been 
already covered in chapter 2 (Section 2.6.1). In spite of the previous findings on the 
uncertainty paradox, one is compelled to argue that a high level of task uncertainty 
would not match with a system of evaluation based on accounting or budget 
performance and this is confirmed by Chenhall (2003). The main argument relates to 
the inappropriate focus of RAPM on outcomes as opposed to being associated to the 
level of complexity inherent in high task uncertainty situations. In such situations, and 
although managers may understand the performance targets that need to be achieved, 
they will find these difficult and risky to operationalize whilst also perceiving these to 
be an unfair measure of the performance in their activities (Hartmann, 2005, p. 245; 
Locke and Latham, 1990). Hence,  
H11: There is a significant negative relationship between the level of task uncertainty 
and the level of RAPM i.e. a high task uncertainty would lead to a low reliance on 
accounting performance measures.  
 
The diagnostic vs. interactive use of controls system will again be proposed as a 
variable of interest. The expectation would be that a superior following a diagnostic 
style of using controls would tend to focus on outcome-based and financially-based 
measures to assess the actual performance and achievement of specified goals (Bisbe 
and Otley, 2004; Simons, 1995). On the other hand, an interactive style would involve 
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the use of multiple measures of performance (including non-financial ones). In 
addition, within the management accounting systems (MAS) literature, a distinction is 
made between the narrow (historical and accounting-based measures) and broad 
(future-oriented and multiple measures of performance) scope MAS and a recent study 
by Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2007) found that there is a positive relationship between 
the broad scope information and the interactive use of management information (2007, 
p. 742 and 746).  In this respect, one can formulate the following hypothesis: 
H12: There is a significant negative relationship between the level of superiors’ 
interactive style of using controls and the extent of RAPM i.e. a high interactive style 
would lead to a low reliance on accounting performance measures.  
 
4.3. Direct Effects: Contextual Variables to Dysfunctional Behaviour 
A number of studies have considered the direct effects of control systems on the extent 
of dysfunctional behaviours in the presence of contingent variables. Notably, many of 
them have sought to ascertain the influence of task or environmental uncertainty in 
enhancing or dampening the extent of dysfunctional behaviour arising from control 
systems (e.g. Hirst, 1981, 1983; Hayes and Cron, 1988; Ross, 1995).  In particular, 
Hirst (1983) models and finds evidence supporting the hypothesis that task uncertainty 
acts as a relevant variable in moderating the relationships between RAPM and tension, 
sparking a debate on the contingency effects of uncertainty (Ross, 1995; Hartmann, 
2000). Specifically, there is an expectation that incentives to engage in dysfunctional 
behaviour are minimised when managers possessing a low degree of task uncertainty 
are evaluated using internal accounting measures. For units possessing high degrees of 
uncertainty, incentives to engage in dysfunctional behaviour are minimised when non-
accounting measures are employed in the managers’ evaluation. However, there is 
comparatively little evidence on the direct links between uncertainty and dysfunctional 
behaviour.  According to Hartmann (2005, p. 244), task uncertainty is the uncertainty 
caused by the complexity and diversity of tasks performed by the manager. As opposed 
to environmental uncertainty, task uncertainty is an inherent job characteristic that 
relates to managerial work processes and as such, higher levels of task uncertainty will 
cause managerial response uncertainty, causing confusion and ambiguity.  
Independently of the state of control systems in the organization, task uncertainty can 
be sufficient enough to trigger the organizational and individual defensive routines with 
a view to pre-empt any potential or embarassement, more as a result of being concerned 
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and realistic (Argyris, 1990, p. 505). One may thus argue that in unstable and uncertain 
situations, managers may be more willing to engage in dysfunctional practices as 
precautionary move.  
H13a: There is a significant positive relationship between task uncertainty and the 
individual element of dysfunctional behaviour: information manipulation.  
H13b: There is a significant positive relationship between task uncertainty and the 
individual element of dysfunctional behaviour: gaming.  
 
Insofar as the diagnostic vs. interactive use of controls is concerned, Simons (1995) 
asserts that these styles of use of controls have diametrically opposite influences on 
subordinate managers, and as such labelled them as ‘negative’ forces and ‘positive’ 
respectively.  Indeed, the recent studies using these conceptualisations (e.g. Marginson, 
2002; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Henri, 2006; Widener, 2007; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 
2007) generally highlight the ‘beneficial’ implications of the interactive mode for 
improving communication, information sharing, debate and discussions between the 
various levels of management, thereby enhancing organizational learning and 
innovation whilst developing new opportunities/ideas. On the other hand, the diagnostic 
use of controls implies a more ‘simplistic’ approach which emphasizes the constraining 
of behaviour, the feedback on past performance and the lack of ongoing attention from 
senior managers. According to Henri (2006, p. 533), a diagnostic style represents a 
negative force for two reasons. On the one hand, it focuses on mistakes and negative 
variances. On the other hand, the sign that is derived when outputs and goals are 
compared is reversed in the feedback signal to adjust the process. It is thus argued that 
such use of control systems by senior managers can increase tension and stress, thereby 
encouraging dysfunctional practices. The fact that a diagnostic use of controls is an 
intermittent one and is done on an exception basis may provide managers with the 
flexibility and freedom to engage in such practices. As a result,  
H14a: There is a significant negative relationship between the superior’s interactive 
style of using controls and the individual element of dysfunctional behaviour: 
information manipulation.  
H14b: There is a significant negative relationship between the superior’s interactive 
style of using controls and the individual elements of dysfunctional behaviour: 
gaming.  
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4.4. Indirect Effects: Intervening Model (Model 1).  
 
The preceding hypotheses considered the direct effects of task uncertainty, superiors’ 
interactive use of controls, the three control sub-systems and the two forms of 
dysfunctional behaviour. Within the contingency paradigm, the focus of the study is set 
on the effects of MCS sub-systems in organizations, subject to contextual factors.  
MCS sub-systems are seen as (part) consequences of the context (environment) as 
typified by task uncertainty and superiors’ interactive use of controls and in turn 
dysfunctional behaviours are viewed as consequences of existing control systems. As 
opposed to a number of contingency studies that have relied on a moderating model, 
Model 1 in this study relies on an intervening model, as described previously in 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.8.3) and by Gerdin and Greve (2004). One of the central 
assumptions within an intervening model is to argue that the antecedent variables will 
be significantly directly related to the dependent variables i.e. dysfunctional behaviour 
but these relationships can be mitigated in the presence of the intervening variable i.e. 
the control system. In other words, one is able to empirically assess the relevance of the 
control system towards dysfunctional behaviour in the presence of a contextual 
variable. This will be made consistent with Baron and Kenny’s (1986) conditions for 
assessing a significant indirect effect.  
 
SOPs, BP and RAPM have been, to varying extents, previously researched variables in 
the context of whether they can lead to dysfunctional behaviour. However, their 
implications for organizations have been less considered when modelled along with 
antecedent variables of interest. For example, the role of task uncertainty has been 
given a renewed role in light of the recent literature, particularly in the RAPM area 
(Hartmann, 2000; 2005). It was initially put forward by Hirst (1981), who was 
investigating the different results from Otley (1978) and Hopwood (1972) on the 
relationship between APM and job-related tension. However, different and conflicting 
results on the role of uncertainty have persisted (e.g. Ross, 1995; Hartmann, 2000; 
2005) and this could possibly be influenced by the previous reliance on moderating 
models. The use of alternative models was also highlighted by Shields and Shields’ 
(1998) review of the BP literature (1998, p. 64), as way to better appreciate the primacy 
of BP as an ‘organizational’ information sharing tool or an ‘individual’ 
motivation/attitude mechanism. In addition, there is little empirical understanding on 
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the antecedents of SOPs. As a result, this study puts forward the following intervening-
model-led hypotheses relating to the influence of task uncertainty: 
H15a: Standard Operating Procedures have a significant intervening effect on the 
relationship between task uncertainty and dysfunctional behaviour. 
H15b: Budgetary Participation has a significant intervening effect on the 
relationship between task uncertainty and dysfunctional behaviour. 
H15c: Reliance on Accounting Performance Measure has a significant intervening 
effect on the relationship between task uncertainty and dysfunctional behaviour. 
 
In the case of the style of use of controls, Bisbe and Otley (2004) highlighted the 
ambiguity on the actual influence of this variable on the organization. Indeed, they 
claimed that Simons’ (1995; 2000) writings are unclear as to whether the interactive 
use of MCS can be considered to be a mediating or moderating variable. It was 
eventually the latter model that prevailed and this was consistent with earlier findings 
by Abernethy and Brownell (1999). Although this present study focuses on 
dysfunctional behaviour as a consequence of management control systems, it also seeks 
to explore the influence of Simons’ conceptualisation in this relationship. The more 
recently published empirical studies have shown the emerging relevance of the 
interactive/diagnostic dichotomy influencing the use of MCS in organization but there 
has not been any attempt at modelling it in relation to dysfunctional behaviour. As a 
result, this prompts the following hypotheses: 
H16a: Standard Operating Procedures have a significant intervening effect on the 
relationship between superiors’ use of controls and dysfunctional behaviour.  
H16b: Budgetary Participation has a significant intervening effect on the 
relationship between superiors’ use of controls and dysfunctional behaviour.  
 H16b: Reliance on Accounting Performance Measure has a significant intervening 
effect on the relationship between superiors’ use of controls and dysfunctional 
behaviour.  
 
In schema form, the intervening model can be expressed below in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
In line with the assumptions of Baron and Kenny (1986) and as put forward in Bisbe 
and Otley’s (2004, p. 713-714) study, the direct relationships between the contextual 
variables and dysfunctional behaviour are hypothesised to be relatively small in 
proportion to the (larger) indirect relationships that will emerge via the control systems.  
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Figure 4.1:  Model 1a:  Intervening Effect of MCS (Task Uncertainty) 
 
                    
 
       
     
     
           
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2:  Model 1b:  Intervening Effect of MCS (Superiors’ use of controls) 
 
4.5. Institutional Theory-led Effects: The Moderating Model (Model 2) 
 
This section considers a second model of interest in the linkages between the 
extent/nature of three control sub-systems and the extent of dysfunctional behaviour by 
middle level managers. It is argued that such a relationship is moderated by the impact 
of institutional-led pressures, as perceived by internal organizational actors. In 
particular, Carruthers (1995, p. 314) asserts that new institutionalism has become a 
recent paradigm to understand the way various accounting processes actually operate in 
organizations and as perceived by the people affected by these processes. This new 
institutionalism is to a large extent focused on legitimacy and legitimation as a way to 
justify organizational practice and structure (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Selznick, 
1996; Suchman, 1995; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Zucker, 1983; Richardson, 1987).  
 
To date, the institutional perspective within the management control systems (MCS) 
literature has yet to be empirically tested and remains, to a large extent, dependent on 
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case based evidence. The case study orientation of some institutional-based 
management accounting studies (e.g. Perez and Robson, 1999; Abernethy and Chua, 
1996) infers the need for a grounded context (i.e. a specific industry in a defined time 
span). But there are also expectations of more generalized institutional pressures (as 
explained below) that affect the organizational design and MCS of corporations and the 
meanings and understanding of those MCS, as perceived by the different actors in the 
organization.  
 
In the context of increasing globalisation, Grandlund and Lukka (1998) identified the 
drivers of worldwide convergence for management accounting practices and classified 
them as economic, coercive, normative and mimetic pressures.  In particular, normative 
pressures to adopt management accounting and control practices originate from the 
increasing professionalisation of management accountants (Grandlund and Lukka, 
1998, p. 163), who have promoted the use of practices such as standard operating 
procedures, budgetary participation, and reliance on accounting performance measures. 
This is perhaps more a reflection of their training and education rather than an actual 
need of these practices for the organization. In a similar vein, Kaplan (1984) describes 
the ‘institutionalization’ of accounting practices, arguing that many current internal 
accounting practices were developed in the 1930s due to external reporting 
requirements for firms manufacturing stable products with a higher labour content – 
which bears little resemblance to the current environment, within both manufacturing 
and services set ups. Hence, the use of these legitimated ‘elements’ (i.e. control 
systems) as a result from such pressures is argued to direct attention away from task 
performance (Zucker, 1987). More recently, Jang (2005, p. 301) also asserted that 
accounting - as a practice - has become a powerful mode of thought and code of 
conduct in the modern world, closely associated with a natural extension of rational 
management. 
 
One relevant finding from past institutional and accounting/control case study research 
is the issue of ‘decoupling’, whereby organizations tend to avoid dysfunction by 
decoupling their external image systems from their internal operating processes 
(Meyer, 1983, p. 237). On one hand, organizations seek to maintain ceremonial 
conformity to formal structures (MCS) to maintain legitimacy but on the other hand, 
organizations ‘buffer’ their actual activities by in-building ‘gaps’ (decoupling) between 
the external and internal uses of the control systems (e.g. Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
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1983, 1988; Covaleski et al., 1993; Berry et al., 1985)   Thus, managers may collude to 
maintain legitimate external appearances (participation in budgeting) but are still 
involved in conflict, dysfunctional behaviour and budgetary bias.  
 
As such, these above-mentioned issues will be subsumed and applied in this study, as 
part of the “legitimating nature of controls” variable, as perceived at the level of 
functional managers. The is associated to the concept of ‘organizational legitimacy’, 
whereby organizations engage in practices to meet societal expectations, fulfilling 
symbolic purposes rather than task related requirements (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983), 
has taken a gradual but solid base in management accounting research (Baxter and 
Chua, 2003, p. 100). As reported in Covaleski et al. (2003, p.31) in a review of 
budgeting research (also, Oliver, 1991), organizations differ in their propensities to 
conform to external environmental pressures and in the degree to which they are able to 
comply with external social demands. This can also extend to sub-unit managers in 
response to broader organizational demands. Indeed, there is a general view from those 
authors analysing the implications of institutional theory and legitimacy, which 
inherently presents the organization as a ‘monolithic’ entity and staff seeking to 
legitimise its existence vis-à-vis external parties (media, regulator, shareholders and 
lenders). However, different functional actors may have different views and perceptions 
about the implications/effects of a legitimacy-seeking behaviour at their organizational 
level - particularly when these are drawn from a non-accounting background (e.g. 
marketing, production/operations, human resource etc) whilst the financial-oriented 
‘experts’ are the ones most wedded to maintaining rational appearances (Fligstein, 
1991, Carruthers, 1995). For instance, Richardson (1987, p. 346) also raised the 
argument that the process of legitimacy may be a piecemeal one, depending on the 
level within the organization at which the action occurs. It is thus contended that the 
managers’ perceptions of the organization’s ‘seeking’ of legitimacy in the use of MCS 
can influence the extent to which he/she will engage in dysfunctional behaviour.   
 
It would be however be relevant to highlight one important caveat to the development 
of the subsequent hypotheses. In adopting a moderating model to studying the 
legitimating effects and perceptions relating to the dysfunctional consequence of 
control systems, it is implicitly being assumed that the existing controls have not 
themselves being established as a result of these legitimating perceptions. The fact that 
the study focuses on non-accounting managers may possibly contribute to the 
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possibility that such perceptions on the legitimating nature of controls are being indeed 
independent of the type and use of controls established in companies – which 
themselves could have been adopted as a means to improve the legitimacy of the 
organization. Hence, it would be difficult to assert that the perceptions on the 
legitimating nature of controls are totally independent and un-related to the existence 
and features of the control systems being in place.  
 
4.5.1. The Legitimating Nature of Controls and SOP 
 
Meyer and Rowan (1991) argue that organizations frequently establish a variety of 
rational procedures, processes and rules, but the reasons for doing so are not for more 
efficient organizational decisions or for better outcomes. In fact, rationalised elements 
are incorporated because they maintain appearances (Carruthers, 1995, p. 315) and help 
confer legitimacy upon the organization. Indeed, Carruthers (1995, p. 323) states that 
organizations 
“…emulated and reproduced the procedures, rules and structures that enjoyed 
external legitimacy. Formal structure came from the state, from professions, 
or from other “successful” organizations”. 
 
The view can also be taken that SOPs are tools that enhance the role of bureaucracy 
within the organizations and provide legitimacy to those who are responsible for the 
compliance of bureaucratic rules and procedures. Their actions are usually typified by 
the common argument that compliance with the bureaucratic process is more important 
than a prompt and efficient operating outcome from the same process. In this respect, 
this study focuses on the influence of institutional pressures from a departmental 
perspective rather than looking at these pressures from an organizational one. The 
reason for such focus is to enable a more direct contextual orientation for respondents 
so as to establish a meaningful fit between an institutional theory-based variable, in 
influencing the relationship between control systems and the extent of dysfunctional 
behaviour at the respondents’ operating level. This is consistent with Ruef and Scott’s 
(1998) analysis on the operation of the legitimation process which may be investigated 
on several levels, the relevant one here being “…subunits and specialized aspects of 
organizations” (1998, p. 3). 
 
As explained in Chapter 3 (Section 3.5), the legitimacy attached to a particular process 
(such as the various MCS mechanisms) can be perceived differently by an internal 
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actor such as the functional manager. From a functional manager’s (such as Marketing 
or Production) perspective, SOPs relating to his/her department are rules that have been 
enacted as a result of legitimacy pressures and not principally for a rational value-
maximising reason. The extent of SOPs therefore directly reduces the effective power 
and influence of a middle level manager within the latter’s own department. The 
direction of this effect of institutional pressures will depend on how managers perceive 
the appropriateness of prevailing SOPs in their department.  
H17: The greater the legitimating nature of controls is perceived amongst middle 
managers to SOP controls, the stronger the relationship between the level of detailed 
SOPs and dysfunctional behaviour (gaming)   
 
In the absence of a hypothesised relationship between SOP and information 
manipulation (refer to H2), the legitimating variable is not hypothesised to have any 
impact on this link. Hence: 
H18: The legitimating nature of controls as perceived amongst middle managers to 
SOP controls will not have a significant moderating effect on the relationship 
between the level of detailed SOPs and dysfunctional behaviour.  
 
4.5.2. The Legitimating Nature of Controls and BP 
 
In his various writings, Brunsson (1993; 1990; 1989, p. 116-122) frequently singles out 
the budgetary system as a single process that creates or reasserts formal hierarchical 
patterns of responsibility within organizations. This is consistent with earlier comments 
of Cyert and March (1963) who defined budgets as both the substance and result of 
political bargaining processes that are useful for legitimising and maintaining systems 
of power and control within organizations (cf. from Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988, p. 1; 
also in Czarniawska-Joerges and Jacobsson, 1989). In this respect, the extent of 
budgetary participation by subordinates/middle level managers is viewed as a political 
and negotiating exercise, to “..support the positions of the various constituents of 
budgeting in their confrontation” (Wildavsky, 1979).  
 
Based on the above arguments, Perez and Robson (1999) described the budget setting 
process in a company and the institutional processes that led to constant budget 
revisions and conflicts within the organization, in a bid to achieve a target acceptable to 
the head office. From the analysis of the budget process over a three-year period, Perez 
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and Robson (1999, p. 404) observed that the involvement of subordinates was viewed 
purely as a legitimating device. They also noted (1999, p. 404) that: 
“The new ‘participation’ in budget setting had the legitimacy both of the 
new discourse or ideology of ‘empowerment’ in organizations (as practiced 
by the corporation’s competitors in Japan) and the claim to superior 
‘internalization’ of budget targets by those to whom the budget is meant to 
apply”  
 
In addition, the case study depicted how the head office was imposing “budget 
participation” for all subsequent budget revisions and not arbitrarily finalising one 
budget target for the company in the early stages of the budget review. This may be 
related to a “democratic gesture” (Perez and Robson, 1999, p. 398), which is implicit in 
the budgetary participation exercise but which was in fact purely ceremonial. Indeed, as 
earlier quoted from Perez and Robson (1999, p. 404), budgetary participation in the 
organization may be originating from mimetic isomorphism (e.g. adhering to 
competitors’ practices) and coercive isomorphism (e.g. required by the parent 
company). If middle managers perceive that the practice of budgetary participation in 
their organization is merely a product of institutional-led pressures, then the extent to 
which they engage in dysfunctional behaviours, particularly budgetary bias, may be 
increased because they believe the budget setting process purely meets an appearance 
of legitimacy and is not used primarily for seeking views from functional managers. 
This sense of lack of purpose to the process is likely to incite dysfunctional behaviours 
during the process. Therefore,  
H19: The greater the legitimating nature of controls perceived amongst middle 
managers to BP, the stronger the relationship between the level of budgetary 
participation and dysfunctional behaviour (information manipulation).    
 
In addition, it is argued that managerial perceptions as to the legitimating nature of 
controls will have similar influences on gaming practices.  
H20: The greater the legitimating nature of controls perceived amongst middle 
managers to BP, the stronger the relationship between the level of budgetary 
participation and dysfunctional behaviour (gaming)   
 
4.5.3. The Legitimating Nature of Controls and RAPM 
 
Similarly, the extent of the relationship between RAPM and managerial dysfunctional 
behaviours can again be influenced by institutional pressures. Consistent with the 
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institutional-led arguments mentioned in the case of budgetary participation, a RAPM 
policy aims at rationalising and legitimising the process of responsibility, 
accountability and performance assessment of unit managers in the organization, based 
on a widely-acceptable ‘objective’ measure of performance (accounting numbers). 
Indeed, Meyer and Rowan (1991, p. 51) mention that techniques for measuring, 
monitoring and controlling organizational performance are integrated within the 
organization’s formal structure to confer legitimacy upon these organizations (cf. 
Carruthers, 1995, p.315).  
 
Vagneur and Peiperl (2000, p. 523) observe that most Anglo-American companies used 
budget-centred performance measurement as a central feature of their management 
control systems, thus justifying the need for further research in understanding the 
consequences of RAPM. However, the exact reasons for explaining such convergence 
of practices are not provided by the authors but in light of the earlier arguments of 
Granlund and Lukka (1998), such phenomenon could be the result of institutional 
pressures supporting internal short term financial measures of performance as a way to 
reflect the short-term profit targets expected of company directors towards satisfying 
shareholders and the stock market. In light of the contemporary developments in non-
accounting measures for performance evaluation, the continuous convergence towards 
RAPM remains troubling but can be explained by the need for companies to adopt a 
“long-standing” practice, even if its usefulness in internal performance evaluation 
appears to be put into question. Hence, one can hypothesise that perceptions on the 
legitimating nature of controls will enhance the links between reliance on accounting 
performance measures and both forms of dysfunctional behaviour: 
H21: The greater the legitimating nature of controls perceived amongst middle 
managers to RAPM, the stronger the relationship between the level of RAPM and 
dysfunctional behaviour (information manipulation).    
H22: The greater the legitimating nature of controls perceived amongst middle 
managers to RAPM, the stronger the relationship between the level of RAPM and 
dysfunctional behaviour (gaming).    
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In conclusion, the Model 2 schema can be summarised in Figure 4.3.  
 
 
   
   e 
 
 
      
 
 
Figure 4.3:  Model 2 - Moderating Effect of the legitimating nature of controls 
perceptions on MCS to Dysfunctional Behaviors.  
 
4.6. Chapter 4: Concluding Remarks 
 
The aim of this chapter was to present the arguments for a series of hypotheses to 
reflect the research questions and objectives initially set out in Chapter 1. A number of 
specific research gaps and issues were identified in Chapters 2 and 3, that broadly 
pointed to the need for further evidence on the implications and consequences of three 
‘typical’ MCS sub-systems, particularly in relation to (i) contingency theory-based 
research and the modelling/relevance of the two selected contingency variables, namely 
task uncertainty and superior’s use of controls, (ii) the ‘nature’ of dysfunctional 
behaviour, particularly its broader conceptualisation and its association to practices 
such as gaming and information manipulation, and (iii) the emergence of more 
interpretive perspective on the role and nature of controls in organizations, in particular 
originating from institutional theory.  
 
In this respect, hypotheses have been put forward to test and/or assess the validity of 
these arguments/issues. These are summarised in Table 4.1 overleaf. The direct effects 
– set out in  hypotheses H1 to H14b -, describe the predicted relationships between 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Budgetary Participation (RAPM), Reliance on 
Accounting Performance Measures (RAPM), Task Uncertainty (TU) and Superior’s use 
of Controls (INT), Dysfunctional Behaviour: Information Manipulation (DBIN) and 
Dysfunctional Behaviour: Gaming (DBGA).  
 MCS: 
SOP 
BP 
RAPM 
 
Dysfunctional 
Behaviour : 
 
(a) Information 
Manipulation 
 
(b) Gaming 
Legitimating Nature of Controls 
 173
Table 4.1: Summary of Hypotheses for the Study 
 
The intervening effects summarised in hypotheses H15a to H16c predict that each of 
the control sub-systems has a significant intervening role when considering the 
influence of one contingency factor. A final set of hypotheses (H17 to H22) considers 
the moderating effect of a new variable (Legitimating Nature of Controls, as perceived 
by the managers (LNC) variable on the various links between MCS sub-systems and 
dysfunctional behaviours. In addition to the four issues identified at the start of this 
section, the literature review chapters have also revealed a number of methodological 
Hypothesis Relationship Direction of Relationship 
(if applicable) 
Direct Effects: 
 
H1 SOP to DBGA Negative 
H2 SOP to DBIN  No relationship 
H3 BP to DBIN Positive 
H4 BP to DBGA Positive 
H5 RAPM to DBIN Positive 
H6 RAPM to DBGA Positive 
H7 TU to SOP Negative 
H8 INT to SOP Negative  
H9 TU to BP Positive 
H10 INT to BP Positive 
H11 TU to RAPM Negative 
H12 INT to RAPM Negative 
H13a TU to DBIN Positive 
H13b TU to DBGA Positive 
H14a INT to DBIN Negative 
H14b INT to DBGA Negative 
Indirect Effects - Intervening Model 1: 
 
H15a TU-SOP-DB Significant Intervening 
H15b TU-BP-DB Significant Intervening 
H15c TU-RAPM-DB Significant Intervening 
H16a INT-SOP-DB Significant Intervening 
H16b INT-BP-DB Significant Intervening 
H16c INT-RAPM-DB Significant Intervening 
Legitimating Nature of Controls Effects - Moderating Model 2: 
 
H17 LNC moderates SOP to DBGA Positive (enhancing) 
H18 LNC moderates SOP to DBIN Not significant 
H19 LNC moderates BP to DBIN Positive (enhancing 
H20 LNC moderates BP to DBGA Positive (enhancing) 
H21 LNC moderates RAPM to 
DBIN 
Positive (enhancing) 
H22  LNC moderates RAPM to 
DBGA 
Positive (enhancing) 
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and analytical weaknesses, relating to the design/use of questionnaires and Likert-
scales to collect responses and the use of regressions and related techniques to analyse 
the resulting data. These will be addressed and documented where applicable in the 
subsequent chapters.     
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Chapter 5 
Sample Selection, Questionnaire Design and Variable Measurement  
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter will elaborate on the data collection procedures and variable measurement 
adopted in line with the objectives and hypotheses of the study. Where applicable, it 
draws from the previous arguments and findings in the literature as well as addresses 
methodological issues identified in Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
5.1. Sample Selection 
 
The study will focus on responses from functional managers in manufacturing 
companies, with particular emphasis on production/operations and sales/marketing 
managers. Australia is known to have established manufacturing sectors, involved in a 
fairly diverse set of activities and products. Whilst there may be a valid interest in the 
MCS of service companies as well, the majority of previous contingency MCS studies 
have studied functional departments in manufacturing companies (e.g. Govindarajan 
and Gupta, 1985; Simons; 1987a; Kren and Kerr, 1993; Dunk, 1993a, 1993b; 
O’Connor, 1995; Tsui, 2001) and one can expect some differences112 in results inherent 
to service organisations. Hence, in an attempt to ensure some level of comparability 
with previous studies, service organizations (including public sector entities) are not 
considered in this study.  
 
The target companies were identified and compiled using the Kompass Directory 
(Australia). This provides details of the company’s activity, registered and plant 
addresses, number of employees, and even, in a majority of cases, the names of the 
CEOs and functional managers. Given that the study depended on a reasonably 
representative, and sufficient, number of respondents, the following selection 
procedures were applied: 
 
                                                
112
 For example, refer to Modell (1996) for a review of management accounting studies in service 
organisations.  
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(a) Using the Kompass classification, the list of manufacturing companies were 
identified from the activity codes 20 to 49, each code (e.g. 20, 21, 35….etc) 
representing a generic manufacturing activity.  
(b) Since the study relied on companies having a clearly defined organisational 
structure and the existence of a management accounting control system, size 
(in terms of more than 200 employees) was then used to narrow the list of 
manufacturing companies. 
(c) Using the list of companies generated from (a) and (b), the Kompass record for 
each company was scrutinised and only those providing the actual names of 
their sales/marketing and/or production/operations managers were selected. It 
was felt that a request for questionnaire reply had much higher chances of 
being entertained if it was addressed to the appropriate manager by name113 
rather than an impersonal “The Marketing Manager”. It has to be pointed out 
that a minority of those companies (about 10%) listed in the Kompass 
Directory did not provide at all the names of their managers.  
 
The above procedures resulted in a list of 359 manufacturing companies and 568 
identified managers classified into 301 “Commercial or Marketing or Sales” Managers 
and 267 “Operations or Technical or Manufacturing or Production” Managers. The 
activity classification and number of selected companies per activity and employee 
range are detailed in Appendix 5.1.  
 
5.2. Questionnaire Design and Variable Measurement 
 
Smith (2003, p. 117) criticises the survey method as being the “poor man’s experiment” 
because of its inability to assign subjects randomly to treatments, and their consequent 
inability to rule out rival hypotheses. Briers and Hirst (1990, p. 257) were also of the 
view that use of questionnaires in a cross-sectional studies oversimplifies the 
phenomena (also stated by Chapman, 1997) under investigation and calls for use more 
longitudinal studies to focus on the process of MCS. In his review of mail survey 
studies in management accounting research over the period 1985-1994, Young (1996) 
reported on a list of issues relating to the use of mail questionnaires such as the low 
target populations, the low number of respondents, absence of information on the use of 
follow-up procedures, lack of analysis of non-responses, and no proper use of sampling 
                                                
113
 In some cases, contact names and details were also sought from company websites.  
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procedures. Based on his analysis of journal articles, Young (1996, p. 55) reports on the 
decline in the use mail survey methods over the stated period and a growing interest in 
alternative forms of research methods i.e. principally fieldwork and experiments. 
Nevertheless, and despite the previously used negative tones, Young (1996, p. 67) 
proposes seven “improvement opportunities” for survey-based research.  
 
As also discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.8.1), the mailed questionnaire survey remains 
a widely used and a practical method of data collection for MCS studies. In this respect, 
however, it is important to design a questionnaire that addresses all issues of ambiguity 
and interpretation. For example, the questionnaire was reviewed from an Australian 
viewpoint to ensure consistency of understanding114. The various items and measures 
used for the variables are now presented115: 
 
5.2.1. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 
 
Although the earlier studies by Rockness and Shields (1984) and Macintosh and Daft 
(1987) did examine the effects of SOP as a management control system, the 
measurement and items were very different. Rockness and Shields (1984, p. 172) used 
only one likert-scale item termed “rules and procedures” whereas Macintosh and Daft 
(1987, p. 53) focused on physical counts (number of books and pages) to measure the 
extent of SOP. However, the more recent “Structuring of Activities” variable, as used 
in Chow et al (1999), was made up of 8 sub-items relating to the extent to which 
procedures and manuals existed for a list of management activities.  
 
Figure 5.1 is a reproduction of the SOP items (labelled Question 1) to be used in this 
study. There were two notable amendments made to the Chow et al (1999) instrument 
and these are detailed below: 
 
 
 
 
                                                
114
 The language differences are considered to be at a minimum since the official language for all 
government and business activities in Australia is English.  
115
 All data validity and reliability tests will be reported in Chapter 6.  
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Firstly, Chow et al. (1999, p. 458) had two separate sets of questions for the same sub-
items, namely a question on the extent of standardized procedures and a second 
question of the extent of written manuals which specify how to perform. Given the high 
Cronbach alpha obtained for this variable (0.93) in Chow et al. (1999), there is a strong 
possibility that both sets of questions have been interpreted as being exactly the same 
and indeed, one can reasonably expect that standardised procedures are indeed written 
ones (whether it is hard copies or soft copies e.g. via an intranet system). Hence, the 
two questions have been collapsed into one main question.  
 
Secondly, three sub-items, namely (a) development of new outputs, (f) pricing of new 
outputs and (g) distribution of new outputs, may not be necessarily applicable to all the 
functional managers and targeted companies. To ensure a consistent understanding of 
SOP cross-sectionally, only the five items that are of direct relevance to all functional 
managers have been used in this study.   
 
 
We are interested in the management controls which derive from your company’s 
standard operating procedures i.e. rules, policies, regulations, manuals, and checklists.  
 
(1) Please rate, by circling a number from 1 to 5, the extent to which your company has 
standardised and documented procedures (such as written manuals or online procedures) for the 
following classes of activities (Circle “0” if not applicable): 
 
 Very 
Low 
Low Moderate Substantial High Not 
Applicable 
(a) Purchase of Capital Equipment 1 2 3 4 5 0 
(b) Hiring and Firing of Personnel 1 2 3 4 5 0 
(c) Procurement of Inputs (Raw 
Materials, Consumables or Other 
Regular Expenses) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
(d) Operating Procedures, Time Plans 
and Schedules 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
(e) Making tradeoffs within the line 
items of your department’s 
current period budget 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
Figure 5.1: Standard Operating Procedures Items 
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5.2.2. Budgetary Participation (BP) 
 
Despite Chenhall’s (2003, p. 131) criticisms that some MCS-based measures (such as 
budgetary participation) need to be updated to take into account new developments in 
management accounting, there is no recent evidence to suggest that the Milani (1975) 
score is becoming increasingly non-contemporary116.  
Hence, Questions 2 to 7 are based on Milani’s (1975) original items and these are 
reproduced in Figure 5.2. These have been slightly amended to reflect the context of 
functional departments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
116
 For example, Lau and Buckland (2000) and Tsui (2001) report Cronbach Alpha’s exceeding 0.75 for 
the BP measure.  
We are interested in the extent to which you participate in the setting of budget targets for your  
department.  
Please respond to each of the following questions by circling a number from 1 to 5.  
(Circle “0” if not applicable) 
 
(2) What is the extent of your involvement in the budget setting process for your 
department?  
1 
Very Low 
Involvement 
2 
Low 
Involvement 
3 
Moderate 
Involvement 
4 
Substantial 
Involvement 
 
5 
High 
Involvement 
0 
Not applicable 
(3) Which best describes the reasoning provided by your supervisor, when budget 
revisions concerning your department are made?  
1 
Not 
convincing 
2 
Slightly 
Convincing 
3 
Moderately 
Convincing 
4 
Substantially 
Convincing 
5 
Highly 
Convincing 
0 
Not 
Applicable 
(4) How often do you voluntarily state your opinions and/or suggestions concerning  
the budget to your supervisor? 
1 
Never 
2 
Rarely 
3 
Sometimes 
4 
Quite Often 
5 
Very 
Frequently 
0 
Not 
Applicable 
(5) How much influence do you feel that you have on the final budget figures? 
1 
Very Low 
Influence 
2 
Low 
Influence 
3 
Moderate 
Influence 
4 
Substantial 
Influence 
5 
High 
Influence 
0 
Not 
Applicable 
(6) How important is your participation to securing an appropriate budget 
       for your department? 
1 
Very Low 
Importance 
2 
Low 
Importance 
3 
Moderate 
Importance 
4 
Substantial 
Importance 
5 
High 
Importanc
e 
0 
Not Applicable 
(7) How often does your supervisor seek your opinions and/or suggestions  
       when setting the budget? 
1 
Never 
2 
Rarely 
3 
Sometimes 
4 
Quite Often 
5 
Very 
Frequently 
0 
Not 
Applicable 
Figure 5.2:  Budgetary Participation Items 
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5.2.3. Reliance on Accounting Performance Measure (RAPM) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.4), there have been various measures and items 
used to operationalize RAPM. Whilst Lau and Buckland (2000, p. 45) argued for the 
Brownell (1985) rating approach rather than the ranking approach and calculated 
RAPM as the summation of the two key items (“Meeting the budget” and “My concern 
with costs”), Vagneur and Peiperl (2000, p. 523) indicate some loss of correlation 
power (although still significant) with the ratings-based measures in comparison to the 
rankings-based approach, particularly in the case of Brownell’s (1985) method. Otley 
and Fakiolas (2000) analysed the different questions and items used in the various 
RAPM instruments and tried to explain the origins of the differences between the four 
groups of studies. On the other hand, Vagneur and Peiperl (2000) identified five types 
of RAPM measurement (labelled A-E) and empirically tested each of these measures 
via correlation matrices and in relation to various outcome variables.   
 
The five RAPM measures range from the original categorical variable (Hopwood, 
1972, 1973), the ordinal variable (Otley, 1978), the binary variable (Brownell, 1982), 
the summed/continuous ratings (Brownell, 1985) and the algebraic/continuous ratings 
(Harrison, 1992)117. The last two measures have been used more extensively as from 
the mid 1980s. Based on questionnaire responses from 68 business unit managers in 
UK and using firstly a correlation matrix, Vagneur and Peiperl (2000, p. 521) showed 
that all the six measures of evaluative style were positively and significantly correlated. 
However, the degree of relationship between the original Hopwood (1972, 1973) 
measure and those of Brownell (1985) and Harrison (1992) were relatively quite lower 
than the relationship between Hopwood’s (1972, 1973) measure and those of Otley 
(1978) and Brownell (1982). These differences do shed at least a partial light on the 
extent of inconsistent results in RAPM studies. In addition, the relationships (although 
significant) between RAPM metrics and performance variables (ranging from stock 
market abnormal returns through to self-rated performance metrics) were not consistent 
and essentially worsened as the original RAPM construct was being modified (Vagneur 
and Peiperl, 2000, p. 523). 
 
                                                
117
 Vagneur and Peiperl (2000, p. 518) also investigated a variant of the algebraic/continuous rating. 
Hence, their empirical analysis refers to six different RAPM calculations.   
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In addition, Otley and Pollanen (2000, p. 503) criticise the use of the absolute scores (as 
done in the case of Brownell, 1985; Lau and Buckland, 2000) since the measure of 
reliance on accounting measures must be relative to reliance on other non-accounting 
measures. In this respect, Harrison’s (1992, 1993) ratio of accounting vs. non-
accounting is more logical and appealing. Hence, this approach will be used in this 
study. Eight questions/items were taken from Otley (1978) (used also in Brownell, 
1985, 1987) and are disclosed in Figure 5.3 below. However, non-accounting items (h) 
and (j) were added in consideration of the rising interest and focus that organisations 
attach to customer satisfaction and teamwork118.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.4. Dysfunctional Behaviour 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.7.2), there has been little empirical research on the 
extent of managers’ dysfunctional behaviour, as conceptualised by Jaworski and Young 
                                                
118
 On the other hand, Brownell and Hirst (1986) and Harrison (1992, 1993)  had two additional items, 
labelled as “How well I cooperate with workers at my level in the organisation” and “How well I 
cooperate with individuals outside the firm (e.g. suppliers, customers)”.  
This section seeks your views as to how your supervisor evaluates your performance. 
  
(8) How much importance does your supervisor attach to each of the following criteria in 
evaluating your performance?  
 Very 
Low 
Low Moderate Substantial High Not 
Applicable 
(a) The effort I put into my job 1 2 3 4 5 0 
(b) My concern with quality 1 2 3 4 5 0 
(c) My contribution to company 
profits 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
(d) The relationships I have 
established with fellow staff 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
(e) How efficiently I run my unit 1 2 3 4 5 0 
(f) How well I get on with my 
supervisor(s) 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
(g) How well I meet the budget 1 2 3 4 5 0 
(h) Customer service ratings 1 2 3 4 5 0 
(i) My attitude toward my work 1 2 3 4 5 0 
(j) How well I develop a team 1 2 3 4 5 0 
 
Figure 5.3: Reliance on Accounting Performance Measures Items 
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(1992). The latter’s five item scale attempted to provide an overall picture of 
dysfunctional behaviour and the scale achieved a satisfactory reliability level 
(Cronbach alpha - 0.72). On the other hand, the confirmatory factor analysis identified 
a validity problem due to the presence of another instrument – peer dysfunctional 
behaviour – but this is not expected to occur in this study as the objective is not to 
assess the impact of peer-influenced dysfunctional behaviour. In contrast, a more recent 
study by Van der Stede (2000) attempted to measure other sub-dimensions of 
dysfunctional behaviour, namely slack and short term orientation. However, his 
measures appeared too constrained to consider for the three sub-control systems. In 
consideration of the clear distinction between the information manipulation element 
(made up of aspects relating to biasing, filtering, and smoothing) and the gaming 
element, these two sub-concepts of dysfunctional behaviour have been operationalised 
in the questions.  
 
Hence, inspired primarily from Jaworski and Young’s (1992) initial attempts, the seven 
items listed in Figure 5.4 (Questions 11a to 11g) were used to measure managerial 
dysfunctional behaviour. Items (a) to (c) were aimed at eliciting responses on gaming 
whilst items (d) to (g) seek to gather views on information manipulation. As Merchant 
(1990) noted some (understandable) reluctance in answering such questions, the 
following modifications were made in a bid to elicit more honest and unbiased 
responses, or simply to ensure that managers would actually respond to such questions 
without being necessarily influenced by ethical considerations: 
(a) Instead of using the active tense (i.e. “I tend to ignore……”), all questions used 
the passive tense or referred to managers in general. This would ensure that 
respondents did not take the questions personally, thereby preventing possible 
non-responses or biased ones.   
 
(b) The questions were scaled using the “forced choice” (even) scale rather the 
usual odd-scale. Although these have been rarely used in previous MCS studies, 
there is no conceptual issue arising from the use of even scale, especially in 
cases when one can expect respondents to pick the neutral position because 
they are reluctant to answer (Frary, 1996).  
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(c) The original item “Even if my productivity is inconsistent, I still try to make it 
appear consistent” (Jaworski and Young, 1992) was removed because it was 
not necessarily relevant to the sample of respondents and it was ambiguous.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following statements relate to your attitudes towards management control systems in your 
department.  
(11) Please indicate the extent of your agreement with each statement by circling a number from 1 
to 6. (Circle “0” if not applicable) 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
N/A 
(a) Certain job-related 
activities can be safely 
ignored when they are not 
monitored by a supervisor. 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
0 
(b) In certain cases, tasks 
can be subtly adjusted to 
align departmental 
performance with 
organizational goals.  
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
0 
(c) Management control 
systems do not cause 
managers to be particularly 
concerned with improving 
efficiency in their area of 
responsibility.  
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
0 
(d) Managers tend to 
emphasise data that reflects 
favourably upon them when 
presenting information to 
upper level management 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
0 
(e) Managers tend to avoid 
being the bearer of bad 
news when presenting 
information to upper level 
management 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
0 
(f) Most managers will 
place high importance on 
their department’s success 
in getting a generous 
budget. 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
0 
(g) Managers choose to 
present information that 
makes their own 
performance look better. 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
0 
Figure 5.4: Dysfunctional Behaviour Items (Gaming & Information Manipulation) 
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(d) The above-mentioned item was replaced by a more subtle and yet general one, 
namely item 11(g).  
 
(e) Item 11(c) was based on one of the items used in the budgetary slack literature 
(For example, refer to Van der Stede, 2000, p. 615) but reference was made to 
management control systems in general rather than budget targets.  
 
(f) Item 11(f) aims at investigating the respondent’s opinion in assessing 
performance only from the point of view of “winning” a generous budget.  
 
(g) Finally, no specific reference was made to “dysfunctional behaviour” in the 
questionnaire as it was clearly a “loaded” term and would have influenced the 
responses. Instead, the sub-heading for items 11(a) to 11(g) was referred to as 
“Attitudes to Control Practices”.  
 
5.2.5. Task Uncertainty 
 
Task uncertainty is a relatively stable and frequent variable of interest in the MCS 
literature. However, there has been more recent interest in the sub-dimensions of task 
uncertainty, namely the task difficulty variable e.g. Brownell and Dunk (1991), Lau et 
al. (1995, 1997) and Lau and Buckland (2000). However, in light of the theoretical 
arguments suggested by Hartmann (2000) and Chapman (1997) and the low Cronbach 
alpha obtained for task difficulty in one study (Lau et al., 1995, p. 367), there are some 
valid justifications in using the broader concept of task uncertainty, especially in the 
context of using dysfunctional behaviour as an outcome variable.  
 
In this respect, Figure 5.5 details the 6 items used to measure task uncertainty, from the 
analysis of Whitley et al.’s (1983, p. 59) factor analysis scores. Based on the highest 
reported scores in Whitley et al. (1983, Table 5, p. 59), Items 9(a), 9(c) and 9(d) have 
been selected from the task analysability sub-dimension whereas Items 9(b), 9(e) and 
9(f) were identified for the task exception sub-dimension. It is noted that there were 10 
original (5 each) identified items from the factor analysis with factor loadings 
exceeding 0.50. All the questions are reverse-coded. 
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However, the wording of some of the excluded items was in fact very repetitive and 
could have led to misunderstandings. There was also one item which referred to 
established procedures and practices and this could create confusion with the questions 
relating to standard operating procedures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approaches to management control may be quite different depending on whether the task is routinely 
carried out, can be well defined or needs to respond to unpredictable factors. This section seeks to 
identify the level of uncertainty you perceive in your day-to-day departmental management activities.  
(9) Please respond to each of the following questions by circling a number from 1 to 5. (Circle 
“0” if not applicable) 
 Very 
Small 
Extent 
Modest 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Considerable 
Extent 
Very 
Large 
Extent 
N/A 
(a) To what extent is there 
a clearly defined body 
of knowledge which 
can guide you in doing 
your work? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
0 
(b) To what extent would 
you think that your 
work is routine? 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
(c) To what extent is there 
a clearly known way to 
do the major types of 
work you normally 
encounter? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
(d) To what extent is there 
an understandable 
sequence of steps that 
can be followed in 
doing your work? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
 
 
Almost 
None 
More 
than a 
few 
Several A lot  Almost 
All 
N/A 
(e) People in the 
department perform 
routinely most of the 
time. 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
(f) Departmental members 
perform repetitive 
activities in doing their 
jobs. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
Figure 5.5: Task Uncertainty Items  
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5.2.6. Superior’s Interactive vs. Diagnostic Use of Controls. 
 
To the best of my knowledge119, there is only one study that seeks to measure the 
interactive use of controls and it was geared towards CEOs rather than functional 
managers (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999). The four items used did factor into one 
dimension with a relatively low Cronbach alpha (0.59 – Abernethy and Brownell, 1999, 
p. 196). In addition, the measure focused solely on interactive characteristics whilst it 
may have been judicious to ask diagnostic-oriented questions as well to confirm the 
perception of the respondents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this respect, and based on Simons (1994, p. 170-171) definitions, the four items used 
(as described in Figure 5.6) aimed at developing a spectrum ranging from interactive to 
diagnostic use. Items (a) and (b) were taken from Abernethy and Brownell’s (1999, p. 
                                                
119
 At the time this research questionnaire was being designed, more recent attempts to measure 
interactive/diagnostic styles - notably by Bisbe and Otley (2004) and Henri (2006) - were not yet 
published. As a result, this present study’s measures could not have benefited from the related 
improvements in construct measurement. Nevertheless, and where applicable, reference to these 
contemporary studies will be made in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 Please indicate the extent of your agreement with each statement by circling a number from 1 to 6. 
(Circle “0” if not applicable) 
(10) Your supervisor(s) often use information provided by various management control 
systems’ reports in the following ways: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree N/A  
(a) As a means of questioning 
and debating the ongoing 
decisions made and actions of 
your department. 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
0 
(b) As a continuous process, 
which demands your regular 
and frequent attention. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
0 
(c) By delegating staff 
specialists (e.g. accounting 
department) to monitor the 
information provided.  
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
0 
(d) By infrequently 
looking at the detailed 
information provided.   
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
0 
Figure 5.6: Superior’s Interactive Use of Controls Items 
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202) instrument and a further two items (c) and (d) were developed from Simon’s 
(1994) definitions’ of diagnostic use of controls. The last two items would then be 
reverse-coded since it is expected that respondents would perceive their managers to 
have either a high (low) degree of interactive use or a low (high) degree of diagnostic 
use. Finally, as in the case of dysfunctional behaviour, forced choice Likert scales were 
used to prevent neutral and ambiguous responses.  
 
5.2.7. The Legitimating Nature of MCS  
 
In the absence of previous studies using Likert-scale questionnaires to gather views on 
institutional theory-led variables, the following questions were developed from the 
theoretical underpinnings of institutional theory and more precisely the legitimacy / 
legitimation concept. Although the latter is the product of external forces, it is argued 
that the level of respondents (middle-level functional managers) could be a mitigating 
factor in gathering valid and appropriate perceptions of an external-led legitimation 
process. This is the key reason for focusing on internal perceptions as to whether 
controls are established for legitimation purposes rather than rational ones. The 
questions are reproduced in Figure 5.7.    
 
As in the case of dysfunctional behaviour, the questions and headings did purposely not 
make reference to terms such as legitimacy. The heading “purpose of control systems” 
and the statements used made specific and separate reference to the individual control 
sub-systems.  
 
It is noted that for each question (No. 12 to 14), the scales and the reference to MCS 
sub-systems were repeated. Whilst not making specific reference to legitimacy, it is 
argued that the statements underlined key elements of internal legitimacy, namely the 
need to conform to control systems whilst this negatively affects performance and 
outcomes (questions 12 and 14), and the fact that control systems merely re-assert 
hierarchies but have little influence on decision making (question 13). Although several 
scales were provided for each control system, the objective was to ensure more precise 
answers to the questions as some organizations might not have one or two of the 
specific control sub-systems. However, the expectation is that all questions would 
factor to provide one variable that would cut across all the control sub-systems 
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5.2.8. Demographics and Bio-Data  
 
Although there were no specific hypotheses generated in relation to demographic data, 
the actual profile of respondents would be still important to analyse the various 
responses. In this context, several questions were sought in relation to:  
 
(a) Personal data – gender, age, length of service in company and functional area of 
responsibility. The last item will allow some confirmation that the questionnaires 
were indeed sent to the targeted respondents.  
 
(b) Company-based data – Information on the actual size (in terms of number of 
employees), and the ownership status of the company i.e. is it a subsidiary, part of a 
multinational group and/whether the company is listed on a stock exchange. 
 
This section collects your views on the purposes of management control systems in your company.  
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with each statement by circling a number from 1 to 6. 
(Circle “0” if not applicable) 
 
(12) An emphasis on the carrying out of the following control functions has compromised the 
achievement of actual outcomes in my department: 
 
(13) The following control functions serve as ways of creating or reasserting formal hierarchical 
patterns of responsibility in the company, but have little influence on actual decision-making in my 
department: 
 
(14) When the following control functions have been prescribed by head office/central management 
policies, my department has faithfully carried them out regardless of their impact on departmental 
output targets: 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
N/A 
(a) Compliance with Standard 
Operating Procedures 
1 2 3 4 5 6 0 
(b) Participation in Budget Setting 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 
(c) Determination of performance 
evaluation criteria to be applied to 
managers 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
0 
Figure 5.7: The Legitimating Nature of Controls Items 
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Finally, an opportunity was given to respondents to provide additional information via 
an optional open-ended question, asking managers to convey their thoughts on any 
aspect in the use of MCS in their companies.  
 
5.3. Questionnaire Validation / Pilot-Testing 
 
All the above-mentioned questions and items were pilot-tested amongst a total of 5 
lecturers/academics of the Curtin University of Technology’s School of Accounting for 
clarity, understandability, ambiguity and face validity (Dillman, 1978). In addition, an 
Australian Management Consultant was contracted to review the questions, particularly 
in light of some of the “difficult” questions such as dysfunctional behaviour and 
interactive/diagnostic use of controls and how these are likely to be interpreted by 
practising managers. Although pilot testing procedures would usually involve managers 
from the identified sample, it was believed that the lecturers and consultant would 
provide a quicker and more focused assessment of the questionnaire’s contents and 
format. Indeed, various issues relating to the wording, ambiguous terminologies and 
sequencing of questions were indeed identified and rectified accordingly.  
 
5.4. Administering the Questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire was administered in Australia to 568 identified functional managers. 
A one-page explanatory letter entitled “A Survey on How Managers Work with Control 
Systems in Manufacturing Companies” was sent along with the bound questionnaire 
and a stamped self-addressed envelope (template letter and questionnaire provided in 
Appendix 5.2) 
 
There were general instructions and comments on the objectives of the study and it was 
stated that all responses will be treated anonymously and confidentially. A first period 
of three weeks was allocated. Consistent with Dillman’s (1978) procedures, an 
incentive was offered to all respondents in terms of participation in a lucky draw and to 
maintain anonymity, the participants will insert their names/addresses or business card 
on a tear-off section of the questionnaire.  
 
Although there were initial and valid responses coming in at the outset, there were also 
a significant number of returned mails due to wrong addresses, companies closed down 
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and/or managers having left their positions. This was surprising considering the use of 
the most updated version of Kompass Australia. There were 65 returned questionnaires 
by the Post Office, hence resulting in a final sample size of 503 potential responses. 
Finally, a reminder letter (along with a copy of questionnaire and stamped return 
envelope) was sent with a further deadline of 3 weeks.  
 
5.5. Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter detailed the questionnaire design and data collection procedures that have 
been implemented for the sample. Whilst some of the selected variables are very well 
established and have been known to generate reliable measures, other variables/items 
have been less studied and have been amended to take into account the theoretical 
literature, past empirical results and the respondent’s context. All the reported items are 
presented after having been pilot-tested. In addition, there were some revisions in the 
potential number of respondents due to wrong addresses, companies having closed, 
and/or managers having left their positions, leaving a final potential number of 503 
Australian managers. Unfortunately, these are unavoidable practical limitations in the 
absence of a complete and updated database of relevant companies.  
 
All the data analysis procedures and techniques will now be addressed and presented in 
Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 6 
Data Analysis and Discussion  
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter will present the findings and analysis in the following sequence (a) Initial 
Analysis i.e. response rates and profile of respondents (b) Data Reliability and Validity 
and Descriptive Statistics for the variables (c) Analysis of Model 1 hypotheses via the 
path analysis technique and (d) Analysis of Model 2 hypotheses via the moderated 
regression analysis.  
 
6.1. Basic Analysis  
6.1.1. Response Rates 
 
In the previous chapter, details were provided as to the identification and potential 
number of respondents from managers. After the first mail shot, this potential number 
of respondents was reduced due to reasons such as invalid addresses and companies 
which had ceased trading. Table 6.1 presents the response rates achieved after the 
additional mail shot (reminder) was sent.   
 
Initial Number of Managers Surveyed 568 
Revised Number of Managers 503 
Valid Responses Received 130 
% Response Rate 25.8% 
Table 6.1: Response Rates for the Study 
 
In relation to previous studies and comments in Chapter 2 (Section 2.8.1.2), the 
response rates are relatively low. This reinforces the point that companies and 
practitioners in general are reluctant to participate in mail surveys, particularly in 
situations where there are no endorsements. Nevertheless, the absolute number of 
responses (130 in total) is sufficient (in comparison to several MCS studies120) for 
carrying out the planned analysis. However, one negative consequence is that the 
LISREL technique appears not to be appropriate (in terms of number of observations 
and number of items/variables), as initially discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.8.3.4). An 
                                                
120
 Refer to Appendix 2.6 and related discussion in Chapter 2 (Section 2.8.1.2). Virtually all the listed 
studies achieved an absolute number of responses between 37 and 159 (one exception being 358). The 
response rates ranged from 22% to 95% for both convenience and random sampling strategies.  
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analysis of returned questionnaires pre- and post-reminder did not indicate any pattern 
or significant differences in the responses.  
 
6.1.2. Profile of Respondents.  
 
An analysis of the profile of the respondents indicates that an overwhelming majority 
(95%) are male. They are primarily aged between 30 and 45 (50%) and more than 45 
(43%). This is reflected in the level of experience where more than half of the 
respondents (52%) have 10 years or more experience in their current position and a 
further 21% have between 6 and 10 years experience. In terms of functional area being 
represented, there was almost an even mix of production/operations (56%) and 
sales/marketing managers (44%).  
 
Insofar as the profile of the surveyed organizations is concerned, 66% of the 
respondents are located in companies having 100 to 500 employees. A further 22% 
come from companies having more than 500 and less than 1,000 employees. Finally, 
12% of the respondents are from companies having more than 1,000 employees. To a 
large extent, this profile reflects the actual breakdown of targeted companies by size 
(refer to Appendix 5.1).  Also, 52% of the respondents stated that their companies are 
subsidiaries and are part of a multinational group. Finally 46% of the respondents 
confirmed their companies are listed on a stock exchange. The stated profile of the 
companies does therefore indicate that the sample includes a substantial number of 
companies facing institutional and regulatory pressures (i.e. stock exchange rules, 
corporate governance, public shareholders) and issues relating to the management of 
multinationals.  
 
In conclusion to this section, the response rate is an acceptable one but remains low, in 
spite of the application of methods recommended in the mail survey literature. 
However, there are sufficient responses to carry out the study, and on which to evaluate 
the data reliability and validity.  
 
6.2. Reliability/Validity and Descriptive Statistics 
 
As stated by Kwok and Sharp (1998, p. 137), a key methodological concern in 
behavioural accounting research is good construct measurement. This is particularly 
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critical in the case of mailed questionnaire surveys because the researcher is not in 
direct contact with the respondent and cannot directly intervene to avoid interpretation 
problems. Two of the key procedures in MCS studies to assess construct validity and 
reliability are principal components analysis (PCA) and the Cronbach Alpha test121.  
 
According to Kwok and Sharp (1998) and DeCoster (2003), there are conceptual 
differences between PCA and exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Whilst PCA is viewed 
as a data reduction procedure, EFA seeks to determine the number of common factors 
influencing a set of measures and the strength of the relationship between each factor 
and each observed measure (DeCoster, 2003, p. 3-4). Furthermore, Newsom (2003) 
argues that although PCA is the default exploratory factor analysis procedure in most 
statistical packages, it is deemed not to be a true EFA procedure because it assumes no 
measurement error. He also argues that PCA can give poor estimates of the population 
loadings in small samples. However, with larger samples, most approaches will have 
similar results (Newsom, 2003; Osborne et al., 2004). But the sample size definition is 
itself an unsettled issue. For example, Froman (2001, p. 17) provides a range from 5 
subjects per item with a minimum of 100 subjects regardless of the number of items, 
through a minimum of 200, up to 3 to 6 subjects per item with a minimum of 250. 
Osborne at al. (2004, p. 10) proposes higher subject to item ratios (more than 20:1) and 
more than one thousand subjects to reduce error rates. This clearly raises an issue in the 
context of this study (and several previous ones – see Section 2.8.1.2) since the usable 
sample sizes are rarely as large as stated. The factor loadings for all the variables 
(except RAPM) are provided in Appendix 6.1 and are deemed at reasonable levels, as 
per Nunnally (1978).  
 
In addition, the presence of common-rater bias was verified using Harman’s (1967) 
single factor test. All the items were simultaneously entered into an exploratory factor 
analysis. Since no single or common factor emerged from the factor analysis, there is 
thus little evidence that the analysis based on the responses will be subject to a common 
rater bias. This is a common technique used in various MCS studies (e.g. Hartmann, 
2005; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007).  
 
 
                                                
121
 Although there are more robust techniques such as Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), the required 
number of observations would generally need to be more than 200 (Van der Stede, 2000, 2001) 
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6.2.1. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 
 
Items (Question 1) Valid 
Responses 
Min. Max Mean S. Dev. 
(a) Purchase of Capital 
Equipment 
128 1 5 4.05 1.118 
(b) Hiring and Firing of 
Personnel 
128 1 5 4.02 0.960 
(c) Procurement of Inputs (Raw 
Materials, Consumables or Other 
Regular Expenses) 
130 2 5 4.02 0.919 
(d) Operating Procedures, Time 
Plans and Schedules 
129 1 5 3.94 0.933 
(e) Making tradeoffs within the 
line items of your department’s 
current period budget 
119 1 5 2.93 1.118 
Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics for Standard Operating Procedures items 
 
Whilst a high level of SOP was noted for items (a) to (d), there was a lower level of 
SOP for item (e). This perhaps denoted some ambiguity and technicality in the 
wording, particularly for managers in non-accounting functions. Nevertheless, all items 
factored into one construct as expected and as a result the variable “Standard Operating 
Procedures” (SOP) was obtained by a simple average of the five items. The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics (standard errors in italics) indicate a normal distribution (i.e. they 
lie between -1 and 1), as show in with the remaining descriptive statistics in the 
following summary panel:  
 
Summary Panel: Standard Operating Procedures 
Mean: 3.833                                                 Standard Deviation: 0.9142 
Minimum: 2.00                                             Maximum: 5.00 
Skewness: -0.573 (0.212)                              Kurtosis: -0.624 (0.422) 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.712 
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6.2.2. Budgetary Participation (BP) 
Items (Questions 2 to 7) Valid 
Responses 
Min. Max Mean S. Dev. 
Extent of your involvement in 
the budget setting process.. 
127 1 5 4.50 0.786 
Which best describes the 
reasoning provided by.…  
117 1 5 3.74 0.822 
How often do you voluntarily 
state your opinions….. 
129 2 5 4.24 0.818 
How much influence do you feel 
that you have…. 
129 1 5 3.95 0.917 
How important is your 
participation to you securing.. 
127 1 5 4.36 0.803 
How often does your supervisor 
seek your …. .. 
123 2 5 4.14 0.843 
Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics for Budgetary Participation items 
 
In the case of budgetary participation items, the mean scores indicate that managers 
perceive they have a fairly high level of involvement and influence in their 
department’s budget setting process. However, the factor analysis generated two 
components. In particular, the third and sixth item (Questions No. 4 and 7) did not 
factor significantly with the others. This is quite surprising considering the long-
standing use and validation of Milani’s (1975) items to estimate the level of budgetary 
participation. Both questions were related to the expression of opinions.  The 
respondents may have believed these to be less influential in their understanding of 
‘participation in the budgeting process’ and which indeed could be simply viewed as 
giving ‘opinions’. In consideration of this, the budgetary participation construct was 
therefore based on the average of the remaining 4 items i.e. Questions 2, 3, 5 and 6.  
The skewness and kurtosis statistics (standard errors in italics) indicate a normal 
distribution (i.e. they lie between -1 and 1), as shown in the following summary panel: 
 
Summary Panel: Budgetary Participation (BP - 4 items only) 
Mean: 4.2199       Standard Deviation: 0.81683 
Minimum: 1.50                      Maximum: 5.00 
Skewness: -0.836 (0.213)             Kurtosis: 0.615 (0.423) 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.759 
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6.2.3. Reliance on Accounting Performance Measures (RAPM) 
 
Items (Question 8) Valid 
Responses 
Min. Max Mean S. Dev. 
(a) The effort I put into my job 129 1 5 4.14 0.836 
(b) My concern with quality 
 
129 1 5 4.08 0.880 
(c) My contribution to company 
profits 
129 1 5 4.39 0.774 
(d) The relationships I have 
established with fellow staff 
129 1 5 3.82 0.964 
(e) How efficiently I run my unit 129 1 5 4.36 0.717 
(f) How well I get on with my 
supervisor(s) 
126 1 5 3.49 0.883 
(g) How well I meet the budget 126 1 5 4.24 0.853 
(h) Customer service ratings 123 
 
1 5 3.89 0.957 
(i) My attitude toward my work 128 1 5 4.22 0.887 
(j) How well I develop a team 
 
129 1 5 4.14 0.864 
Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics for RAPM items 
 
As in the case of Budgetary Participation (BP), reliance on accounting data in the 
performance evaluation criteria applicable to (and as perceived by) subordinate 
managers has been an extensively researched MCS sub-system since Hopwood (1972). 
However, unlike BP, there have been several attempts to measure more “accurately” 
this construct and based on recent comparison studies (e.g. Otley and Fakiolas, 2000; 
Vagneur and Peiperl, 2000), this study adopts the ‘Likert importance scores’ rather than 
the ‘traditional’ ranking approach.    
 
From Table 6.4, one can note a very substantial to high perceived importance attached 
to all dimensions, except for item (f). This is possibly a reflection of the increasing 
emphasis of non-financial measures in organizations. For example, the balanced 
scorecard approach and strategy-led measures such as KPIs (Key Performance 
Indicators) could have been an influential factor in the responses. Based on the 
measurement method in Harrison (1992, 1993) - sum of two accounting scores (items 
(c) and (g)) divided by sum of 8 non-accounting scores multiplied by 4 - the following 
descriptive statistics are provided in the summary panel. Again the skewness and 
kurtosis statistics (standard errors in italics) indicate a normal distribution (i.e. they lie 
between -1 and 1), as shown in the following summary panel: 
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Summary Panel: Reliance on Accounting Performance Measures (RAPM) 
Mean: 1.1052*    Standard Deviation: 0.25534 
Minimum: 0.35                      Maximum: 2.00 
Skewness: 0.125 (0.212)             Kurtosis: 0.958 (0.423) 
* A score of 1 indicates that accounting and non-accounting criteria have equal importance 
 
6.2.4. Dysfunctional Behaviour (DB) 
 
Items (Question 11)  Valid 
Responses 
Min. Max Mean S. Dev. 
(a) Certain job-related activities 
can be safely …. 
130 1 6 3.15 1.463 
(b) In certain cases, tasks can be 
subtly adjusted to align…. 
130 1 6 3.12 1.429 
(c) Management control systems 
do not cause …. 
130 1 6 2.44 1.294 
(d) Managers tend to emphasise 
data that ….. 
129 1 6 4.22 1.312 
(e) Managers tend to avoid being 
the bearer of bad…. 
129 1 6 3.71 1.400 
(f) Most managers will place 
high importance on their…… 
126 1 6 3.78 1.356 
(g) Managers choose to present 
information that ……. 
129 1 6 3.80 1.214 
Table 6.5: Descriptive Statistics for Dysfunctional Behaviour Items 
 
Table 6.5 displays the descriptive statistics for the items used to measure dysfunctional 
behaviour. The first three items were expected to factor into the sub-dimension of 
gaming (DBGA) and the last four items into the second sub-dimension – information 
manipulation (DBIN), and this is confirmed by the factor analysis (oblique rotation). 
The use of a more general set of statements (i.e. focusing on managers and using 
agree/disagree to proxy for extent of behaviours) was justified in the earlier chapters in 
a bid to elicit more reliable and less ethically-motivated responses. The mean scores 
already show some differences on the group of items purported to reflect the two sub-
dimensions of dysfunctional behaviour i.e. a higher agreement (hence extent) is 
apparent for information manipulation items compared to the gaming items. There is a 
low number of non-responses and this is especially encouraging if one considers the 
nature of the questions and the forced choice Likert-scale.  
 
On a closer inspection however, the reliability for DBGA barely reaches an acceptable 
level and there are probably some elements of ambiguity in the statements which could 
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have influenced the scores. On the other hand, the information manipulation dimension 
appears quite robust. For the sake of completeness, the descriptive statistics are also 
provided for the broader construct of ‘dysfunctional behaviour’ in the following 
summary panel. The skewness and kurtosis statistics (standard errors in italics) indicate 
a normal distribution (i.e. they lie between -1 and 1):   
 
Summary Panel: Dysfunctional Behaviour Variables 
Dysfunctional Behaviour – Gaming (DBGA)  
Mean: 2.9687    Standard Deviation: 0.99220 
Minimum: 1.00                     Maximum: 5.33 
Skewness: 0.307 (0.212)            Kurtosis: -0.719 (0.422) 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.607 
 
Dysfunctional Behaviour – Information Manipulation (DBIN) 
Mean: 3.8827    Standard Deviation: 1.09776 
Minimum: 1.00                     Maximum: 6.00 
Skewness: -0.461 (0.212)            Kurtosis: -0.481 (0.422) 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.847 
 
Dysfunctional Behaviour (DB - 7 items combined) 
Mean: 3.5039    Standard Deviation: 0.87272 
Minimum: 1.57   Maximum: 5.29 
Skewness: -0.303 (0.212)  Kurtosis: -0.669 (0.422) 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.779 
 
6.2.5. Task Uncertainty (TU) 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, items (a), (c) and (d) are related to the ‘task 
analysability’ dimension whilst items (b), (e) and (f) seek to capture the ‘task 
exception’ dimension. The responses to all the questions were reverse coded and hence 
the scores in Table 6.6 reflect ‘task uncertainty’ as 1-low and 5-high. Whilst there is 
some consistency in the mean scores for task analysability, there are some marked 
differences in the perceptions of task exception. The factor analysis identified two 
components but not according to the exception/analysability dichotomy. In fact, items 
(a) to (d) factored into one component whilst the two final items (e) and (f) strongly 
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factored in another item. A correlation matrix between the six items also revealed very 
poor correlation coefficients between the first four items and the last two ones.  
 
There is a possibility that the wording and the formatting (i.e. separate headings used) 
of the last two questions may have influenced theses differences. As can be seen from 
Figure 5.5 (Chapter 5), the last two items were headed separately and referred to 
“people in the department” and “departmental members”. This was in contrast to the 
first four items which were addressed specifically to the respondent. Hence, the degree 
of task uncertainty may have been differently perceived. Since the study is seeking 
perceptions from the manager’s point of view, it would be appropriate to use the first 
four items only.  In addition and based on the data, there does not seem to any 
significant difference between the exception and analysability dimensions.  
 
Items (Question 9) reverse 
coded 
Valid 
Responses 
Min. Max Mean S. Dev. 
(a) To what extent is there a 
clearly defined body…..? 
128 1 5 3.05 1.064 
(b) To what extent would you 
think that your work is….? 
129 2 5 3.43 0.788 
(c) To what extent is there a 
clearly known way to….? 
127 1 5 2.91 0.921 
(d) To what extent is there an 
understandable sequence…? 
129 1 5 2.97 0.984 
(e) People in the department 
perform routinely……. 
128 1 5 2.56 0.962 
(f) Departmental members 
perform repetitive activities in 
doing their jobs. 
129 1 5 2.71 1.002 
Table 6.6: Descriptive Statistics for Task Uncertainty Items 
 
As a result, the descriptive statistics for the TU construct are provided in the following 
summary panel. The skewness and kurtosis statistics (standard errors in italics) indicate 
a normal distribution (i.e. they lie between -1 and 1):   
 
Summary Panel: Task Uncertainty (TU) – First 4 items only 
Mean: 3.1141     Standard Deviation: 0.69281 
Minimum: 1.50                      Maximum: 4.50 
Skewness: -0.171 (0.212)             Kurtosis: -0.760 (0.422) 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.710. 
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6.2.6. Superior’s Interactive ‘and’ Diagnostic Use of Controls 
 
Table 6.7 provides the descriptive statistics for the four items used in the study. The 
first two (interactive use) were selected from Abernethy and Brownell’s (1999) study 
and the last two items were developed from the literature and purport to capture the 
diagnostic use of controls. 
 
 Items (Question 10) Valid 
Responses 
Min. Max Mean S. Dev. 
(a) As a means of questioning 
and debating the…... 
124 1 6 4.01 1.358 
(b) As a continuous process, 
which demands your …… 
125 1 6 3.98 1.283 
(c) By delegating staff specialists 
(e.g. accounting)…. 
130 1 6 3.70 1.381 
(d) By infrequently looking at 
the detailed….. 
 
130 1 6 3.16 1.411 
Table 6.7: Descriptive Statistics for Supervisor’s Use of Controls  
 
The mean scores indicated general agreement (particularly the first three items) by the 
respondents that they perceive their supervisors to be using the various control systems 
in both an interactive as well as in a diagnostic mode. This suggests the possibility that 
an ‘interactive to diagnostic’ spectrum is not strictly present in this study. This is in 
contrast to the measurement of ‘interactive budget use’ in Abernethy and Brownell 
(1999) since it ignored the possibility that a ‘high’ response to the items did not 
necessarily mean that the respondents perceived a ‘low’ diagnostic budget use. The 
validation classification statement they used (1999, p. 202) to corroborate with the 
Likert-based questions was very long and ambiguous and although there was a 
significant correlation between the statement and the Likert-items, it should have, 
intuitively, been much higher (0.41, 1999, p. 196). Furthermore, Van der Stede (2001) 
was also unable to empirically validate the interactive vs. diagnostic use of controls.  
 
In a way, the above is reminiscent of the arguments and discussion on the measurement 
of RAPM (use of accounting versus non accounting data for performance evaluation) 
i.e. a simple mean score of the importance of accounting data is not sufficient to reflect 
a ‘reliance’ on accounting performance measures since it is not relative to the mean 
scores for non-accounting data. So, two possible measurement solutions were explored 
at this point and these are detailed in the following summary panel:   
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Option (a) to consider interactive (a & b) and diagnostic (c & d) measures separately 
i.e. and investigate their relationships, OR Option (b) to intuitively apply the same 
measurement method adopted by Harrison (1992, 1993) for RAPM and express the 
level of interactive use of controls as a ratio of the level of diagnostic use, whereby a 
unity score indicate an equal interactive and diagnostic use of controls by the superior.  
 
Summary Panel: Interactive and Diagnostic Use of MCS by Superior 
Option (a) (i) Interactive Use of Controls (INT) 
Mean: 3.9308    Standard Deviation: 1.15764 
Minimum: 1.00                     Maximum: 6.00 
Skewness: -0.605 (0.212)            Kurtosis: -0.469 (0.422) 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.739 
 
(ii) Diagnostic Use of Controls (DIA) 
Mean: 3.4180    Standard Deviation: 1.06071 
Minimum: 1.00                     Maximum: 6.00 
Skewness: -0.108(0.214)            Kurtosis: -0.685 (0.425) 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.224 
 
Option (b) Interactive use of MCS (relative to diagnostic use) (IND) 
Mean: 1.2941*   Standard Deviation: 0.68219 
Minimum: 0.25   Maximum: 6.00 
Skewness: 3.070 (0.214)  Kurtosis: 17.836 (0.425) 
* A score above 1 indicates a higher level of interactive use of MCS relative to its diagnostic 
use.  
 
In the absence of any prior evidence, both measurement options were estimated and 
considered. The factor analysis (oblimin rotation) identified two separate components 
(i.e. item (a) and (b) factoring together – known as INT - as well as (c) and (d) 
separately – known as DIA). Whilst the Cronbach Alpha for INT was quite satisfactory 
(0.739), the score for DIA was quite low (0.224). Also, there is a very high skewness 
and kurtosis for the interactive variable expressed as a ratio of the diagnostic variable 
(INT/DIA). In both options, however, the descriptive statistics do reflect a significantly 
higher interactive use of MCS as perceived by the subordinate manager. In view of the 
low reliability score for DIA and the non-normality of the variable INT/DIA, this study 
 202
will focus on INT, strictly as a measure of the level of interactive use of controls 
(Option (a)(i)). The statistics also appear to bring some support to more recent 
discussions on the interactive and diagnostic styles in the use of controls, highlighted in 
Henri (2006). These will be considered subsequently.  
 
6.2.7. Legitimating Nature of Controls  
 
Of particular interest to the institutional-based model (Model 2), ‘the legitimating 
nature of controls’ (LNC) is an attempt at designing an empirical construct to capture 
the influence of the various institutional processes from a managers’ perspective. The 
functional managers were deemed to be appropriate respondents as they ‘represented’ a 
clearly defined subunit within an organization and as such had some overall 
responsibility for the activities of the subunit. A higher level of agreement with the 
statements will indicate that the managers have perceived a higher level of legitimacy 
within the organization.  
 
Items (Questions 12 to 14) Valid 
Responses 
Min. Max Mean S. Dev. 
An emphasis on the carrying out 
of the following control 
functions…… (a) SOP 
 
 
128 
 
 
1 
 
 
6 
 
 
2.81 
 
 
1.379 
                   (b) BP   126 1 6 2.63 1.331 
                   (c) RAPM    128 1 6 2.90 1.391 
The following control functions 
serve as ways of creating or 
….(a) SOP 
 
 
127 
 
 
1 
 
 
6 
 
 
3.01 
 
 
1.445 
                    (b) BP 126 1 6 2.90 1.377 
                    (c) RAPM  127 1 6 3.06 1.444 
When the following control 
functions have been 
prescribed……(a) SOP 
 
 
125 
 
 
1 
 
 
6 
 
 
3.81 
 
 
1.401 
                    (b) BP 124 1 6 3.80 1.343 
                    (c) RAPM 125 1 6 3.72 1.305 
Table 6.8: Descriptive Statistics for Legitimating Nature of Controls (LNC) items 
 
From Table 6.8, three points can be noted. Firstly, there are similar mean scores for all 
types of MCS thereby suggesting, as expected, a general view and perception on all 
control systems and there is no discernable difference in opinion between SOP, BP and 
RAPM. Secondly, the mean responses to questions 12 and 13 are quite similar and in 
fact tend towards a slight level of disagreement to the statements - whilst bearing in 
mind the relatively large level of standard deviation. In other words, there is a notable 
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perception that conformity to control functions did not compromise the department’s 
achievements nor do they re-assert hierarchical patterns of responsibility. Thirdly, the 
significantly higher level of agreement for Question 14 appears odd in comparison to 
the previous responses and it may be possible that the last question suffered from some 
ambiguity and a loaded term (‘faithfully’). In light of the above points, the LNC 
variable will consist of the six items from Questions 12 and 13 only. The skewness and 
kurtosis statistics (standard errors in italics) indicate a normal distribution (i.e. they lie 
between -1 and 1):, as provided in the following summary panel: 
 
Summary Panel: Legitimating Nature of Controls (LNC) 
Mean: 2.8918    Standard Deviation: 1.07474 
Minimum: 1.00                     Maximum: 6.00 
Skewness: 0.471 (0.212)            Kurtosis: 0.021 (0.422) 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.847. 
 
6.2.8. Differences in Means: Some Comparisons. 
 
At this stage, it would be relevant to identify and assess any significant differences in 
the mean scores of the seven constructed variables, based on previously researched 
‘contingent variables’ such as functional area, company size and mode of ownership.  
 
The variables per functional area were then estimated using the technique of 
independent samples t-test and no significant differences were noted. Whilst there were 
no significant differences noted for size, stock market listing and status (subsidiary or 
not), there was one interesting instance of variability when considering the ownership 
structure of the organization (i.e. is the company a subsidiary and is it part of a 
multinational group?). Respondents operating within a multinational set up showed a 
higher mean score for SOP (4.0134 compared to 3.6191, p = 0.023) and a lower score 
for DBIN (3.7438 compared to 4.1702, p = 0.034). In a limited way, this demonstrates 
the influence of multinational business and foreign ownership/participation on some 
instances of MCS i.e. the use of a more SOP in the case of multinational groups to 
ensure cohesion and the transfer of know-how/skills. The lower DBIN score for 
companies found in multinational groups is also of interest as it could indicate the 
existence of a more restrictive set, or a more consistent use, of controls in this category 
of companies.   
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Nevertheless, and save for the possible influence of multinational ownership as detailed 
above, the extent of the differences arising from the other factors are quite minimal and 
apply to one variable only. There is therefore support in using the whole data set (pre- 
and post-reminder) for further investigating the key hypotheses in Models 1 and 2. On 
the basis of the results obtained, and subject to significant sample sizes, the identified 
differences can then be considered in more detail. 
 
6.2.9. Correlation Matrix 
 
Prior to applying the path analysis and interaction techniques, a bi-variate correlation 
matrix is estimated to draw out any initial evidence of relationships between the 
selected variables of interest. Table 6.9 only shows the significant correlation 
coefficients (in bold, at p<0.01 and p<0.05 level).  
 
The correlation matrix does indicate the existence of significant positive and negative 
coefficients between the MCS variables, the contingent variables and the dysfunctional 
behaviour variables. There is therefore preliminary evidence to investigate the 
relationship models. The first hypotheses (H1 to H14) are purely direct and simpler 
tests of relationships and will thus serve as a basis to explore the intervening and 
moderating models.  
 
 
 SOP BP RAPM DB DBGA DBIN TU INT LNC 
SOP 1.00         
BP .323 1.00        
RAPM -.070 .031 1.00       
DB -.241 -.328 .374 1.00      
DBGA -.331 -.271 .277 .740 1.00     
DBIN -.106 -.282 .343 .890 .359 1.00    
TU -.202 -.235 .036 .203 .180 .174 1.00   
INT .271 .211 .291 .253 .189 .212 -.045 1.00  
LNC -.143 -.132 -.051 .125 .130 .082 -.106 .169 1.00 
Table 6.9:  Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s) 
Bold and underlined coefficients are significant at p<0.01  
Bold only coefficients are significant at p<0.05 
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6.3. Direct Effects (Hypotheses 1 to 14) 
 
Using simple regression analysis, the direct relationships between each aspect of the 
MCS and the various forms of dysfunctional behaviour (H1 to H6) and between each 
aspect of the MCS and the two identified contextual variables (H7 to H12) are 
considered.   
 
6.3.1. Direct Effects: MCS to Dysfunctional Behaviours 
 
The first two hypotheses consider the separate effects of SOP on the two forms of 
dysfunctional behaviour and the summary results for the two regressions are shown in 
Table 6.10: 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (SOP) DBGA (H1) DBIN (H2) 
SOP Standardized Coefficient  
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
-0.331 
(-3.962)** 
-0.106 
(-1.203)ns 
R2 10.9% 1.1% 
F-value  15.697** 1.447 ns 
Table 6.10: Regression Results (SOP - H1 and H2) 
** significant at 1% level or less and ns is not significant 
 
It is sometimes argued – often in anecdotal terms - that prescriptive or “rule-book” 
control mechanisms (i.e. SOPs) tend to stifle managers’ initiatives and curb their ability 
to operate with flexibility. Whilst the usefulness of SOPs in preventing frauds or 
widespread abuse of resources by management (e.g. internal controls) is not put into 
question, the argument had been that managers may engage into gaming activities with 
a view to influence their departmental outcomes and that SOPs could play a role in 
controlling such behaviour (H1). From Table 6.10, the results show a significantly 
negative relationship (β = -0.331) between managers’ extent of gaming and SOPs, 
therefore confirming the original expectations that SOPs are effective in limiting 
gaming practices.  Also, as predicted in H2, the prescriptive nature of SOPs was not 
expected to impact significantly on the managers’ extent of information manipulation. 
In spite of an observed negative coefficient, the latter was not statistically significant 
and the R2 is also very minimal.   
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The second pair of hypotheses was related to the effects of budgetary participation on 
dysfunctional behaviour. Table 6.11 provides the regression statistics for the 
relationships between BP and DBIN and BP and DBGA respectively.  
 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (BP) DBIN (H3) DBGA (H4) 
BP Standardized Coefficient  
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
-0.282 
(-3.327)** 
-0.271 
(-3.184)** 
R2  8.0% 7.3% 
F-value  11.069** 10.141** 
Table 6.11: Regression Results (BP - H3 and H4) 
** significant at 1% level or less 
 
On the basis of past evidence, budgetary participation was perceived to be enhancing 
information manipulation behaviours (H3). However, the results indicate a significant 
but opposite relationship (β=-0.282). This seems to show that budgetary participation 
has positive consequences in an organization in the way of influencing managers’ 
towards lesser manipulation of the information provided. There was already evidence 
of its positive links with performance and motivation but now there is some evidence 
towards its impact in dampening the managers’ extent of dysfunctional behaviour. This 
is in some way reminiscent of the previous debates relating to the positive impacts of 
budgetary participation on slack behaviour. If one considers that the information 
manipulation measure was ‘constructed’ as a general measure of managerial 
dysfunctional behaviour - and not just specifically linked to the budgetary process- 
there is the possible explanation that budgetary participation, as a control mechanism, is 
having a much wider and positive impact on a manager’s overall behaviour and 
intentions towards engaging in dysfunctional activities.   
 
In the case of H4, there was similarly a hypothesized direction in terms of the positive 
relationship between BP and Gaming. However, the significant results appear to add 
weight to the analysis made of the previous paragraph on the ‘favourable’ effects of 
high budgetary participation (β=-0.271). Therefore, as initially explained in the 
hypothesis section, a high level of budgetary participation seems to show an 
internalization of the budget targets and having already influenced to some extent these 
targets, there is less intention and motivation to engage into gaming practices. On the 
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other hand, a low level of participation will be perceived as targets being imposed on 
managers and they may react accordingly in terms of adopting policies or actions 
strictly to meet the budget but with negative consequences on the department’s 
activities and processes.  
 
The final set of hypotheses in this section considers the effects of RAPM on 
dysfunctional behaviour. Table 6.12 displays the relevant results for both dependent 
variables i.e. DBIN and DBGA.  
 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (RAPM) DBIN (H5) DBGA (H6) 
RAPM Standardized Coefficient 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
0.343 
(4.131)** 
0.277 
(3.267)** 
R2 11.8% 7.7% 
F-value 17.064** 10.676** 
Table 6.12:  Regression Results (RAPM - H5 and H6) 
** significant at 1% level or less 
 
The previously observed ‘positive’ effects of BP and SOP do not appear to extend to 
the RAPM control mechanism. The latter, which implied control attributes such as the 
focus on short-term orientation and outcome vs. process basis, were hypothesized to 
encourage dysfunctional behaviours such as information manipulation (H5). The 
evidence from this study indicates a highly significant positive relationship (β=0.343) 
and therefore confirmation of the initial hypothesis. The fact that certain organizations 
continue to rely more on budget-based measures for performance appraisal in contrast 
to other non-accounting measures seems to lead managers into a ‘creative accounting 
mode’ whereby managers would attempt to manipulate numbers or reports to ensure 
adherence to expectations. This finding can be linked to the information asymmetry 
paradigm that negatively influences the flow of reliable information to higher levels of 
management. As in the documented research and cases involving directors’ use of 
discretion to influence their annual report numbers to shareholders (e.g. Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990; Lev., 2003), the existence of an internal information manipulation 
context in a high RAPM environment is bound to create inefficiencies in terms of 
misguided decisions and sub-optimal performance.   
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Insofar as H6 is concerned, it was argued that a higher reliance on RAPM could lead to 
more gaming practices by managers. As in the case of DBIN, RAPM was found to have 
a direct and positive effect on the managers’ extent of gaming (β=0.277). The 
coefficient and model for DBGA is slightly weaker than the DBIN one. To some 
extent, this could be explained by the previous findings, namely the positive 
relationship between RAPM and information manipulation. Indeed, if managers react to 
higher reliance on accounting measures by engaging in information manipulation 
actions, then there is a possible ‘knock-on effect’ of being less inclined to engage in 
gaming practices.  
 
In conclusion to this section, the regression results have highlighted an interesting but 
diverse set of results, namely that individual MCS sub-systems do appear to have 
different degrees of effect (or non effect) on the forms of dysfunctional behaviour. 
Also, some of the results are supportive of the initial hypotheses proposed whilst others 
have produced significant relationships but in the opposite direction to expectations. 
Some the implications of these findings are discussed in Section 6.7.2. The next section 
will now consider the individual direct effects of the selected contextual variables on 
the different MCS and on the final dependent variables (DBIN and DBGA).  
 
6.3.2. Direct Effects – Contextual Variables to MCS and DB 
 
The first two direct effects hypotheses involving the selected contextual variables 
consider the independent variables of task uncertainty (TU) and superior’s interactive 
use of controls (INT) on SOP.  
 
 Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: (SOP) TU (H7) INT (H8) 
Standardized Coefficient for Independent Variable 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
-0.202 
(-2.329)* 
0.271 
(3.190)** 
R2 4.1% 7.4% 
F-value  5.422* 10.176** 
Table 6.13: Regression Results (TU & INT on SOP- H7 and H8) 
*significant at 5% level and ** significant at 1% level or less 
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Table 6.13 presents the regression results for the relationships between TU and SOP as 
well as INT to SOP. As expected, H7 is supported i.e. a low task uncertainty 
environment will lead to a higher reliance on SOP, since SOPs can reliably provide and 
account for most of the situations and procedures faced by managers in the organization 
(β=-0.202). Conversely, one would expect a low level of SOP in a high task uncertainty 
situation since functional managers would then need to operate with more flexibility to 
address changes in the work patterns.  
 
However, a result contrary to expectations emerges on the relationship between 
interactive style in using controls and SOP. It was initially hypothesised (H8) that a 
more coherent fit would exist between a diagnostic style in using controls and SOP. 
However, the measurement of interactive style was put into question and the original 
hypothesis cannot be tested.  
 
The strong positive link here (β=0.271) suggests that an interactive style in using 
controls would lead to a higher use of SOPs. In view of the initial issues observed with 
the measurement of interactive/diagnostic styles, the other measures (IND and DIA) 
were also tested in this relationship but this did not yield any other significant result.  
The monitoring of SOPs in organizations is generally left to staff specialists but the 
results in this study could be influenced by respondents’ profile i.e. functional 
managers.  This issue will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section (Section 
6.7.2) but it appears that this result raises questions on the relevance of the 
interactive/diagnostic dichotomy to all layers of management (top, middle or 
functional).  
 
BP is the next dependent variable of interest for the two selected contextual variables. 
In both hypotheses (H9 and H10), a positive relationship was predicted. Table 6.14 
describes the regression results. In a more task uncertain environment, a greater level of 
involvement by the subordinate in the setting of targets was expected but the results 
showed a significantly negative relationship (β = -0.235). Whilst various authors 
concur on the ‘information gap’ consequences and issues relating to a high task 
uncertainty situation (e.g. Galbraith, 1973; Chapman, 1997), it was already 
acknowledged that empirical results have not been consistent in demonstrating the link 
between TU and control systems. Indeed, one may argue that a higher level of 
subordinate participation in setting targets may not be really helpful in situations of 
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high TU i.e. a higher level of subordinate participation in setting the budget implies the 
knowledge, skill and ability from the subordinate manager to respond to the high TU 
environment. This may not be applicable in all cases. Secondly, as Hartmann (2000) 
alludes to, managers may not feel compelled to participate if they are ‘shielded’ and 
effectively not made responsible for events and actions in a high task uncertainty 
situation (e.g. uncontrollable costs, last minute customized order). In both of these 
cases, the expected positive relationship may not be forthcoming and may to a certain 
extent reverse itself.  
 
 Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: BP TU (H9) INT (H10) 
Standardized Coefficient for Independent Variables 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
-0.235 
(-2.736)** 
0.211 
(2.437)* 
R2 5.5% 4.4% 
F-value (significance) 7.484** 5.940* 
Table 6.14 - Regression Results (TU & INT on BP - H9 and H10) 
*significant at 5% level and ** significant at 1% level or less 
 
For H10, the positive and significant relationship materialised (β = 0.211). This 
demonstrated a relationship between the features of an interactive style in using 
controls by top management and the subordinate’s extent of participation in the budget.  
The results provide confirmation of the expectations formulated in Simons (1994) and 
Abernethy and Brownell (1999) and also new evidence on the actual role of interactive 
style in the MCS area.  
 
Table 6.15 details the regression results for the relationships between the contextual 
variables of TU and INT to RAPM. In both hypotheses (H11 and H12), a negative 
relationship was hypothesised. However, the coefficient for TU was positive and not 
significant whilst the INT regression showed a positive relationship (β = 0.291).  
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 Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: RAPM TU (H11) INT (H12) 
Standardized Coefficient for Independent Variables 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
0.022 
(0.244)ns 
0.291 
(3.437) ** 
R2 0.1% 8.4% 
F-value  0.170 ns 11.810** 
Table 6.15: Regression Results (TU & INT on RAPM - H11 and H12) 
** significant at 1% level or less and ns is not significant 
 
There is a historical and traditional reliance on accounting measures for performance 
evaluation in most private-sector organizations due to their initial presence for financial 
accounting and other regulatory-related purposes, and their dominance as the key 
performance measures for shareholders.  In contrast, and despite their long standing 
‘popularity’ in organizations, budgets and SOPs are not strictly the result of the same 
pressures. Hence, the perceptions in this study on the level of RAPM may well be 
unconnected to the TU variable, as was already noticeable from the correlation matrix. 
The positive link between INT and RAPM (i.e. a higher interactive use of controls is 
related to a higher use of RAPM) could also be interpreted by considering the impact of 
RAPM-based measures on the superior managers themselves. Given the traditional 
focus of accounting measures (as explained above), managers could interpret that an 
interactive style in the use of controls involves inherently a more ‘hands-on’ approach 
to accounting-based measures.  
 
The last four hypotheses (H13a, H13b, H14a and H14b) were hypotheses formulated in 
the context of developing the path model. Given that the different MCS sub-systems are 
viewed as having an intervening effect between the contextual variables and 
dysfunctional behaviour (Model 1) and in view of the assumptions in Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) criteria (explained in the next section), it follows that one should 
expect a significant observed relationship between the contextual variables (TU and 
INT) and DBIN and DBGA. The correlation matrix (Table 6.9) did find significant 
relationships (only at 5%) between the contextual variables and two forms of 
dysfunctional behaviour.  
 
In the case of H13a and H13b, the positive relationships between TU and the two forms 
of dysfunctional behaviour materialized. This thus brings some support on the direct 
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effects - as opposed to the moderating effects - of TU on the extent of dysfunctional 
behaviour. The inherent complexity, ambiguity and confusion caused by task 
uncertainty can thus on itself provide the conditions for dysfunctional behaviours and is 
thus of interest to companies/organizations operating units/departments with relatively 
high uncertainty.   
 
In the case of H14a and H14b however, the coefficients linking INT and the forms of 
dysfunctional behaviour were significant but in the opposite direction. In other words, a 
high level of interactive use of controls leads to a higher extent of dysfunctional 
behaviour. This is very significantly at odds with the recent research that an interactive 
use of controls operates more positively for the subordinate managers. However, it 
needs to be pointed out that the measurement of INT in this study is viewed as being 
independent of the diagnostic style of using controls i.e. higher INT does not 
necessarily mean a lower use of diagnostic controls.  
 
In conclusion to this section, some significant relationships, but not necessarily 
hypothesised in the correct direction, were observed for BP, SOP and RAPM. As 
hypothesised earlier, there were some direct links between the contextual variables and 
the forms of dysfunctional behaviour. This now allows for considering the Model 1 
results, using path analysis.  
 
6.4. Model 1 Results: Using Path Analysis 
6.4.1. Path Analysis  
 
Path analysis is a statistical technique aimed at testing the direct, indirect (or 
intervening) and spurious effects of the situational variables (i.e. TU, INT) on the 
dependent variables (DB) via the management control systems (i.e. SOP, BP and 
RAPM). This technique has been extensively used in management control research 
(such as Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Chong and Chong, 1997; Nouri and Parker, 1998; 
Mia and Clarke, 1999; Bowens and Abernethy, 2000) to assess the significance of 
relationships between dependent and independent variables. This is also referred to as 
the intervening-variable model (Luft and Shields, 2003).  
 
Path analysis is more formally known as a regression-path analysis (Wolfle, 2003) and 
as such it can be viewed as a straightforward extension of the multiple regression 
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technique and its aim is to provide estimates of the magnitude and significance of 
hypothesized causal connections between sets of variances (also refer to Sclove, 2001). 
One useful application of path analysis is to find the best regression model by 
elimination of variables that contribute little to the equation. Based on the use of 
regression and correlation analysis for coefficient estimations (Asher, 1983), the output 
of the path analysis is a series of path coefficients. These are standardized beta 
coefficients found by regressing the outcome variable on the appropriate antecedent 
variable(s).    
 
In this respect, a path diagram is a graphical illustration of the pattern of causal 
relations among a set of variables and therefore in the first instance reflects the 
theoretical model. This model is then put to the test and the path coefficients are then 
analysed to reject or not reject the detailed hypotheses inherent to the theoretical model. 
According to Asher (1983), a general path coefficient is represented by symbol P with 
two subscripts – the first representing the effect and the second subscript representing 
the cause. Figure 6.1 provides a basic example:  
 
 
 
        
 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
Figure 6.1:  Illustration of Individual Path Diagram and Coefficients 
The above path diagram depicts the direct and indirect effects of X1 and X2 on X3.  The 
break-down of the total effect of one variable in the model on another is obtained using 
the computed path coefficients and the correlation coefficients. Hence, the observed 
correlation coefficient (rji) can be decomposed in a path analysis into the (1) Direct 
effects (Pij), (2) the Indirect effects (Pij rji) and (3) the spurious effects. If this is applied 
to the Figure 6.1 illustration, then the decomposition can be show in Table 6.16 below: 
 
 
 
X2 
(e.g.BP) 
X1 
(e.g. TU) 
 
X3 
(e.g. DBIN) 
P21 
P31 
P32 
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Combinations 
of variables 
Observed 
Correlation 
= Direct 
Effects 
+ Indirect 
Effects 
+ Spurious 
Effects 
X1  to X2 r12 = P21     
 
X2  to X3 r23 = P32    P31 r12 
 
X1  to X3 r13 = P31 + P32 r12   
 
Table 6.16 – Illustration of Decomposition of Observed Correlations  
 
After having completed the stage of estimating each of the coefficients, a formal 
criterion is applied to establish the significance of each indirect path (i.e. the 
intervening or mediating effect). The criteria were proposed by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) in conjunction with Sobel (1982, 1986).  Firstly, Baron and Kenny (1986) 
formulated three essential conditions to establish the existence of a mediating 
relationship, namely (1) the independent variable (e.g. TU) and the mediating variable 
(e.g. BP) are significantly related; (2) the mediating variable and dependent variable 
(e.g. DBIN) are significantly related and (3) the relationship between the independent 
variable (e.g. TU) and the dependent variable reduces (e.g. DBIN) and becomes 
insignificant when the mediator is added to the model. In addition, Baron and Kenny 
(1986) argue that a full or perfect mediation occurs when a significant relationship 
between the independent variable and dependent variable is no longer significant after 
controlling for the effects of the intervening variable. On the other hand, a partial 
mediation occurs when the relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable decreases, but remains significant after controlling for the 
intervening variables. In addition, a more recent development has been to assess the 
formal significance of the indirect effect using Sobel’s (1982) test. MacKinnon et al. 
(1995 and 2002) and Preacher and Hayes (2004) argued that this procedure can provide 
a stronger assessment of the mediation. Essentially, the test is in the form of a z-score 
which is calculated by dividing the indirect effect (using unstandardized coefficients) 
by its standard error.  None of the reviewed MCS studies estimate this score, except in 
the case of Nouri and Parker (1998).  
 
Based on the above set of conditions, the path analysis procedure will involve 
calculating the standardized (beta) coefficients when considering each MCS sub-system 
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against the respective contextual variables and each form of dysfunctional behaviour to 
address the specific hypotheses detailed in H15 and H16. Then, Sobel’s z-score will be 
estimated for each path. However, a first overall picture of the relevance of direct and 
indirect effects for all the MCS sub-systems, contextual variables and forms of 
dysfunctional behaviour can be shown by considering all the path coefficients.  
 
6.4.2. Path Analytic Model: Overall Effects  
 
Table 6.17 provides the summary regression results relevant to the estimation of an 
overall set of the direct and indirect relationships. It is noted that the R2 can be quite 
low in some cases but as stated in Joshi and Rai (2000), a low R2 in such an intervening 
model does not undermine the results. 
 
 
For the five multiple regressions run above, the collinearity statistics (Variance 
Inflation Factors - VIF) for each independent variable were close to 1 (0.80 to 1.2) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Path 
Coefficient 
t-value p-value 
(sig.) 
R2 
(F Test) 
DBIN SOP -0.023 -0.267 0.790 24.7% 
(8.124)** 
 BP -0.303 -3.587 0.000 
 RAPM 0.288 3.494 0.001 
 TU 0.097 1.198 0.233 
 INT 0.202 2.346 0.021 
DBGA SOP -0.306 -3.610 0.000 27.4% 
(9.369)** 
 BP -0.217 -2.618 0.010 
 RAPM 0.182 2.251 0.026 
 TU 0.072 0.907 0.366 
 INT 0.268 3.165 0.002 
SOP TU -0.190 -2.264 0.025  11.2% 
(7.816)** 
 INT 0.263 3.136 0.002 
BP TU -0.226 -2.675 0.008 9.5% 
(6.692)** 
 INT 0.200 2.373 0.019 
RAPM TU 0.050 0.584 0.560 8.7% 
(6.045)** 
 INT 0.293 3.450 0.001 
Table 6.17:  Results of Overall Regressions  
** significant at 1% level or less 
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indicating a relatively low level of multi-collinearity (from Gujarati, 2003 and 
Abernethy and Brownell, 1999, p. 197) and not exceeding 10 (Hair et al., 1998). Based 
on the above regression results, an overall path analytic model is graphically shown in 
Figure 6.2. The important aspect that is noted is the absence of any direct significant 
relationships between the task uncertainty variable and the two instances of 
dysfunctional behaviour. The indirect paths are now driving the model and the 
intervening role of MCS sub-systems – RAPM and BP more specifically - is now more 
visible. On the other hand, there are two instances of non-significant paths, namely the 
TU-RAPM path and the SOP to DBIN path. Also, the direct effects of INT on DBIN 
and DBGA remain quite significant and have the potential to outweigh the 
hypothesised intervening effect of MCS sub-systems (for INT). 
 
 
        
 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Overall Path Analytic Model 
(Coefficients bold underlined are significant at 1% whereas those in bold only are significant at 5%) 
 
The hypotheses consider the more specific and individual indirect effects of control-
subsystems in mediating the impact between contextual variables and dysfunctional 
behaviour. This therefore calls for a more in-depth assessment and examination of the 
intervening effects for each contextual variable, control sub-system and dysfunctional 
behaviour variable.  
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6.4.3. Investigating Model 1a (Task Uncertainty only) 
 
The sub-hypotheses in H15 argue that each control sub-system has a significant 
intervening effect on the relationship between task uncertainty and dysfunctional 
behaviours. There are therefore 6 potential individual paths (e.g. TU-SOP-DBIN) to be 
tested i.e. 2 DB variable x 3 control sub-systems for the task uncertainty context, 
although the overall path model already shows that some paths may not be significant 
(e.g. TU-RAPM-DBIN or DBGA). Consistent with the procedures adopted in Bouwens 
and Abernethy (2000), the following regressions equations were estimated (Equation 
6.1 and 6.2): 
 
X2(i) = P21(i) X1 + P2u(i) Su(i)     [Equation  6.1] 
X3(j) = P31(j) X1 + P32(i)(j) X2 + P3v(j) Sv(j)   [Equation 6.2] 
Where: 
X1 = Task Uncertainty (TU) 
X2(i) = MCS sub-systems (i = 1….3) = SOP, BP and RAPM 
X3(j) = Dysfunctional Behaviours (j = 1,2) = DBIN and DBGA 
P21(i), P31(j) and P32(i)(j) = path coefficients for explanatory variables 
P2u(i) and + P3v(j) = path coefficients for unexplained variances 
Su(i) and + Sv(j) = error variables.  
 
Although estimated in a different context, the direct effects coefficients from Equation 
1 (P21(i)) were already calculated in Section 6.3.2 (Contextual variables to MCS). 
Hence, Table 6.18 displays the results for Equation 6.2 and for completeness purposes 
reproduces the results applicable to Equation 6.1.  
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Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient t-value p-value 
(sig) 
R2 
(F-value) 
Equation 6.2 Coefficients and Statistics 
DBIN SOP (P32) -0.074 -0.827 0.410 3.6% 
(2.346)ns 
 TU (P31) 0.160 1.794 0.075 
DBIN BP (P32) -0.255 -2.934 0.004 9.2% 
(6.432**) 
 TU (P31) 0.114 1.316 0.191 
DBIN RAPM (P32) 0.337 4.103 0.000 14.4% 
(10.673)** 
 TU (P31) 0.162 1.974 0.051 
DBGA SOP (P32) -0.307 -3.615 0.000  12.3% 
(8.867)** 
 TU (P31) 0.118 1.387 0.168 
DBGA BP (P32) -0.242 -2.776 0.006 8.8% 
(6.098)** 
 TU (P31) 0.123 1.407 0.162 
DBGA RAPM (P32) 0.271 3.321 0.002 10.6% 
 (7.508)** 
 TU (P31) 0.170 2.021 0.045 
Equation 6.1 Coefficients and Statistics 
SOP TU (P21) -0.202 -2.329 0.021 4.1% 
BP TU (P21) -0.235 -2.736 0.007 5.5% 
RAPM TU (P21) 0.036 0.412 0.681 0.1% 
Table 6.18:  Results of Regressions for Equations 6.1 and 6. 2 (TU) 
** significant at 1% level or less and ns is not significant 
 
Again, for the six multiple regressions run above, the collinearity statistics (Variance 
Inflation Factors - VIF) for each independent variable were close to 1 (0.96 to 1.06) 
indicating a relatively low level of multi-collinearity. Based on the coefficients 
calculated above, the direct and indirect effects in the individual paths (labelled (a) to 
(f) can now be decomposed as follows in Table 6.19. 
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Path Observed 
Correlation 
(Table 6.9) 
= Direct 
Effects 
(Table 
6.18) 
+ Indirect Effects + Spurious 
Effects 
(a) TU-SOP-DBIN 
X1  to X2 -0.202 = -0.202     
X2  to X3 -0.106 = -0.074   + -0.033 
(.166x -.202) 
X1  to X3 0.174 = 0.160 + 0.014 
(-.074x -.202) 
 
 
(b) TU-BP-DBIN        
X1  to X2 -0.235 = -0.235     
X2  to X3 -0.282 = -0.255   + -0.27 
(.114x-.235) 
X1  to X3 0.174 = 0.114 + 0.060 
(-.235x-.255) 
 
 
(c) TU-RAPM-DBIN 
X1  to X2 0.036 = 0.036     
X2  to X3 0.343 = 0.337   + 0.006 
(.162x.036) 
X1  to X3 0.174 = 0.162 + 0.012 
(.036x.337) 
+ 
 
(d) TU-SOP-DBGA 
X1  to X2 -0.202 = -0.202     
X2  to X3 -0.331 = -0.307   + -0.024 
(.118x-.202) 
X1  to X3 0.180 = 0.118 + 0.062 
(-.202x-.307) 
 
 
(e) TU-BP-DBGA 
 
 
   
 
 
X1  to X2 -0.235 = -0.235     
X2  to X3 -0.271 = -0.242   + -0.029 
(.123x-.235) 
X1  to X3 0.180 = 0.123 + 0.057 
(-.235x-.234) 
 
 
(f) TU-RAPM-DBGA 
X1  to X2 0.036 = 0.036     
X2  to X3 0.277 = 0.271   + 0.006 
(.170x.036) 
X1  to X3 0.180 = 0.170 + 0.01 
(0.036x0.271) 
+ 
 
Table 6.19: Decomposition of Observed Correlations (TU) 
 
 
If one applies Baron and Kenny’s (1986) set of three conditions, then it would appear 
that SOP-DBIN and TU-RAPM correlation coefficients were not significantly related 
and therefore, the resulting paths labelled (a), (c) and (f) above are not significant and 
not suggestive of an intervening effect. For the remaining three paths, labelled (b), (d) 
and (e), the first two conditions are met and the indirect effects are underlined in the 
Table 6.19 above. Upon further inspection of the third condition, full mediation is 
apparent in all these three cases since the prior significant correlation between the 
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independent variable (TU) and the dependent variables (DBIN and DBGA) become no 
longer significant (path coefficients not significant) after controlling for the effects of 
the intervening variable (SOP and BP). More specifically, the coefficients (P31) in these 
paths were all non-significant. The individual diagrams (Figures 6.3a, 6.3b and 6.3c) 
are now shown for the significant paths:  
 
 
 
        
 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
Figure 6.3a – The Significant Intervening Effect of BP on TU and DBIN  
 
 
 
        
 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
Figure 6.3b – The Significant Intervening Effect of SOP on TU and DBGA 
 
 
        
 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
Figure 6.3c – The Significant Intervening Effect of BP on TU and DBGA 
(Coefficients bold underlined are significant at 1% whereas those in bold only are significant at 5%) 
 
As mentioned earlier, and whilst Baron and Kenny’s (1986) conditions for full 
mediation have now been met, a formal test of significance must now be used to 
confirm the indirect effects described above. Sobel’s (1982) test is estimated using the 
formula Z = a*b/Square-Root (b2*sa2 + a2*sb2) where a and b are the un-standardized 
path coefficients respectively from Equations 6.1 and 6.2 and Sa and Sb are the 
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corresponding standard errors.  For all the paths described in Figure 6.3, the z-scores 
are significant (p-value equal to or less than 0.05) confirming that the indirect effects 
are significantly different from zero. Hence, hypothesis H15b is fully supported (for 
both forms of dysfunctional behaviour) and hypothesis H15a is partially supported (for 
DBGA only). However, hypothesis H15c is not supported at all.  
 
Although the mediation effects of MCS sub-systems between TU and dysfunctional 
behaviour have not been significant for all paths, results show the dampening effect of 
BP and SOP on dysfunctional behaviours. Indeed, the initial results showed the 
enhancing and direct effects of task uncertainty on both types of managerial 
dysfunctional behaviour. However, in the paths shown above, this direct effect is 
eliminated when BP and SOP are included in the model. This brings more weight to the 
initial results that BP and SOP ‘keep in check’ managerial dysfunctional behaviours in 
organizations. In contrast, this does not seem to be the case for RAPM. No significant 
RAPM path exists between TU and DBIN/DBGA. However, the correlation matrix and 
overall path model does seem to indicate stronger linkages between INT, RAPM and 
DBIN and this will be now examined in the context of the Model 1b results.  
 
6.4.4. Investigating Model 1b (Superior’s Interactive Use of Controls) 
 
The sub-hypotheses in H16 argue that each control sub-system has a significant 
intervening effect on the relationship between superior’s interactive use of controls and 
dysfunctional behaviours. There are again 6 potential individual paths (e.g. INT-SOP-
DBIN) to be tested i.e. 2 DB variable x 3 control sub-systems for the INT context. As 
in the case of Task Uncertainty, the following regression equations (Equations 3 & 4) 
will be estimated and where relevant, the same notation was in Equations 6.1 and 6.2.  
 
X2(i) = P24(i) X4 + P2w(i) Sw(i)    [Equation 6. 3] 
X3(j) = P34(j) X4 + P32(i)(j) X2 + P3z(j) Sz(j)   [Equation  6.4] 
Where: 
X4 = Superior’s Interactive Use of Controls (INT)  
P24(i), P34(j) and P32(i)(j) = path coefficients for explanatory variables 
P2w(i) and + P3z(j) = path coefficients for unexplained variances 
Sw(i) and + Sz(j) = error variables.  
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Again, the direct effects coefficients from Equation 3 (P21(i)) were already estimated in 
Section 6.3.2 (Contextual variables to MCS). Hence, Table 6.20 below displays the 
results for Equations 6.4, and provides the summary results corresponding to Equation 
6.3. As in the previous cases, for the six multiple regressions run below, the collinearity 
statistics (Variance Inflation Factors - VIF) for each independent variable were close to 
1 (0.92 to 1.09) indicating a low level of collinearity between the independent 
variables.  
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient t-value p-value (sig) R2 
F-Value 
Equation 6.4 Coefficients and Statistics 
DBIN SOP (P32) -0.176 -1.985 0.049 7.4% 
(5.040)** 
 INT (P34) 0.259 2.923 0.004 
DBIN BP (P32) -0.342 -4.100 0.000 15.6% 
(11.778)** 
 INT (P34) 0.294 3.402 0.001 
DBIN RAPM (P32) 0.307 3.557 0.001 13.1% 
(9.599)** 
 INT (P34) 0.122 1.415 0.160 
DBGA SOP (P32) -0.412 -4.976 0.000 19.3% 
(15.191)** 
 INT (P34) 0.301 3.632 0.001 
DBGA BP (P32) -0.325 -3.855 0.000 13.7% 
(10.058)** 
 INT (P34) 0.257 3.052 0.003 
DBGA RAPM (P32) 0.243 2.747 0.007 9.0% 
(6.265)** 
 INT (P34) 0.118 1.337 0.184 
Equation 6.3 Coefficients and Statistics 
SOP INT (P24) 0.271 3.190 0.000 7.4% 
(10.176)** 
BP INT (P24) 0.211 2.437 0.016 4.4% 
(5.940)* 
RAPM INT (P24) 0.291 3.437 0.001 8.4% 
(11.810)** 
Table 6.20: Results of Regressions for Equations 3 and 4 (INT) 
*significant at 5% level and ** significant at 1% level or less.  
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The direct and indirect effects in the individual paths for the superior’s interactive use 
of controls can now be decomposed in Table 6.21 below. The individual paths are 
labelled (g) to (l). In all cases, Baron and Kenny’s (1986) first two conditions are met.  
 
Path  Observed 
Correlation 
(Table 6.9) 
= Direct 
Effects 
(Table 
6.20) 
+ Indirect Effects + Spurious 
Effects 
(g) INT-SOP-DBIN 
X4  to X2 0.271 = 0.271     
X2  to X3 -0.106 = -0.176   + 0.070 
(.259x .271) 
X4  to X3 0.212 = 0.259 + -0.047 
(.271x -.176) 
 
 
 
(h) INT-BP-DBIN        
X4  to X2 0.211 = 0.211     
X2  to X3 -0.282 = -0.342   + 0.060 
(.294x.211) 
X4  to X3 0.212 = 0.294 + -0.072 
(-.342*.211) 
 
 
(i) INT-RAPM-DBIN 
X1  to X2 0.291 = 0.291     
X2  to X3 0.343 = 0.307   + 0.036 
(.122x.291) 
X4  to X3 0.212 = 0.122 + 0.090 
(.291x.307) 
+ 
 
(j) INT-SOP-DBGA 
X4  to X2 0.271 = 0.271     
X2  to X3 -0.331 = -0.412   + 0.081 
(.301x.271) 
X4  to X3 0.189 = 0.301 + -0.112 
(.271x-.412) 
 
 
(k) INT-BP-DBGA 
 
 
   
 
 
X4  to X2 0.211 = 0.211     
X2  to X3 -0.271 = -0.325   + 0.054 
(.257x.211) 
X4  to X3 0.189 = 0.257 + -0.068 
(-.325x.211) 
 
 
(l) INT-RAPM-DBGA 
X4  to X2 0.291 = 0.291     
X2  to X3 0.277 = 0.243   + 0.034 
(.118*.291) 
X4  to X3 0.189 = 0.118 + 0.071 
(0.243*0.291) 
+ 
 
Table 6.21: Decomposition of Observed Correlations (INT) 
 
 
However, for path (g), (h), (j) and (k), there is an indication that the coefficients (P34) 
for the contextual variable (INT) vis-à-vis the dependent variables (DBIN or DBGA) 
has increased when the mediator (SOP and BP) variable was added to the model. For a 
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full or partial mediation to occur, the coefficient should have decreased or become non-
significant. This is clear evidence that SOP and BP do not have a significant 
intervening effect between INT and both forms of dysfunctional behaviour. In other 
words, a situation of a high level of interactive use of controls by the superior 
stimulates a higher extent of managerial dysfunctional behaviour and even the inclusion 
of MCS sub-systems such as SOP and BP cannot control for this effect. Hence, 
Hypotheses H16a and H16b are not supported. 
 
On the other hand, the INT coefficients associated with paths labelled (i) and (l) (i.e. 
INT-RAPM-DBIN and INT-RAPM-DBGA) do satisfy Baron and Kenny’s (1986) third 
condition i.e. they do become non-significant after the inclusion of the intervening 
variable (RAPM). This indicates full mediation and again the Sobel (1982) test can now 
be applied to formally assess the significance of the indirect effect of RAPM.  Based on 
the un-standardized coefficients from Equations 6.3 and 6.4 (RAPM being the 
intervening variable), the z-scores for both paths are found to be significant (p-value 
less than 5%). Therefore, Hypothesis H16c is fully supported i.e. for both forms of 
dysfunctional behaviour and the relevant significant paths are show in Figure 6.4a and 
Figure 6.4b: 
 
 
 
        
 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
Figure 6.4a – The Significant Intervening Effect of RAPM on INT and DBIN 
  
 
 
        
 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
Figure 6.4b – The Significant Intervening Effect of RAPM on INT and DBGA 
(Coefficients bold underlined are significant at 1%)  
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In contrast to the previous contextual variable (TU), INT is shown to have stronger 
direct relationships to dysfunctional behaviours even in the presence of the 
hypothesised intervening variables of SOP and BP. In the paths involving SOP and BP, 
the INT coefficients are strongly significant and positive, thereby enhancing the extent 
of managerial dysfunctional behaviour. Secondly, RAPM is the only MCS system that 
is acting as a significant intervening variable between INT and DBIN/DBGA. This 
finding seems to reinforce the evidence on the diametrically opposite impact of RAPM 
as a control sub-system on manager’s extent of dysfunctional behaviour. The 
implications and analysis will be considered in Section 6.7.3. 
  
6.5. Model 2 Results: The Moderating Model  
6.5.1. Assessing the Interaction  
 
The moderating model focuses on the role of institutional theory-led pressures in 
influencing the link between MCS and dysfunctional behaviour. According to Luft and 
Shields (2003, p. 9), the moderator-variable interaction (MVI) model implies that a 
moderator variable (i.e. the legitimating nature of controls) has no influence on the 
dependent variable (i.e. dysfunctional behaviour) in the absence of the independent 
variable (i.e. MCS) as well as no influence on the latter. The ‘influence’ operates solely 
by changing the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable.  
 
As shown extensively in Chapter 2, the use of the MVI model was, and remains to a 
certain extent, the primary causal-model form i.e. a representation of how MCS operate 
in organizations, in relation to other variables of interest such as managerial 
performance, task uncertainty etc. Chenhall (2003, p. 155) refers to the MVI model as 
an interaction variable model and contends that they have been the dominant form of 
modelling in contingency-based research.  
 
Consistent with the explanations in Chapter 2 (Section 2.8.3), this study will make use 
of the moderated regression analysis (MRA) technique to assess the ‘form’ of 
interaction. However, as documented in Gerdin and Greve (2004), a first step can be 
carried out to assess the ‘strength’ of the interaction since there is no reason to expect 
that a form interaction is necessarily the same as a strength interaction (2004, p. 311-
312). Indeed, Gerdin and Greve (2004, p. 311) warn the two forms of fit may, in some 
cases, yield consistent results but there is a no priori reason to think they will generate 
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similar results. Hence, there may be four possibilities occurring in a particular 
interaction study namely, no interaction, or a form but no strength interaction, or a 
strength but no form interaction or finally both a strength and form interaction. This is 
one of the main issues raised by Hartmann and Moers (1999, 2003) in the use and 
interpretation of MRA in MCS research. According to the authors (1999, p. 297-298), 
there are a number of budgetary studies that have wrongly expressed their hypothesis 
and their concurrent conclusions i.e. stating a form hypothesis but testing and 
concluding on a strength hypothesis. It is however noted that the hypotheses made in 
this study were originally expressed in a form interaction. 
 
6.5.2. The Strength of the Moderation 
 
As in the cases of Brownell (1983b) and Merchant (1984) and recommended in Gerdin 
and Greve (2004), a sub-group correlation analysis can be used to evaluate the 
existence of a strength interaction. The correlation between the various MCS sub-
systems and forms of dysfunctional behaviour will be compared for two sub-groups i.e. 
those with higher than average agreement on the legitimating nature of controls 
legitimacy and those with lower than average agreement to the legitimating nature of 
controls122.  
 
                                                
122
 The groups were split at the mean level. Alternatively, as in Merchant (1984), the median can be used 
to separate the high and low groups. This was also done but the differences in the correlation matrices 
were not materially different. 
1. Outcome Variable  Dysfunctional Behaviour (Information Manipulation - DBIN) 
MCS Sub-system: Low LNC High LNC 
SOP -0.015 (0.899) -0.188 (0.161) 
BP -0.315 (0.007) -0.238 (0.075) 
RAPM 0.326 (0.005) 0.362 (0.006) 
2. Outcome Variable Dysfunctional Behaviour (Gaming – DBGA) 
MCS Sub-system: Low LNC High LNC 
SOP -0.297 (0.011) -0.342 (0.009) 
BP -0.366 (0.001) -0.145 (0.282) 
RAPM 0.441 (0.000) 0.144 (0.286) 
Number of cases 73 57 
Table 6.22:  Sub-Group Correlation Matrix  
(Significance in parentheses and italics) 
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Table 6.22 indicates some visible changes in the strength of the relationships in a 
condition of high agreement to the LNC compared to low agreement to the LNC. For 
instance, in the case of DBIN, the negative relationship between BP and DBIN is 
reduced in a high LNC situation. Conversely, the positive relationship between RAPM 
and DBIN is enhanced in a high LNC situation. This gives some credence to the 
arguments developed in the hypothesis development chapter (Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3), 
namely that managers perceiving a high level of LNC within the organization will 
engage in more dysfunctional behaviour in response to the greater use of controls.  
 
This line of argument does not extend to the second form of dysfunctional behaviour 
(DBGA). In a high LNC situation, managers appear to reduce their extent of gaming in 
response to the SOP controls. In the case of BP and RAPM, the correlations between 
these two respective control sub-systems become non-significant in a high LNC 
situation. In a high LNC situation, managers perceive that controls are merely rituals 
and historically reproduced practices that have little impact on their day-to-day 
activities and simply assert the authority of the higher levels of management. In this 
respect, the incentive to engage in dysfunctional behaviours may be increasing but 
solely in respect to information manipulation. Indeed, the extent of gaming behaviours 
in reaction to the SOP control is further reduced in a high LNC situation whilst the 
correlations between SOP, BP and DBGA become non-significant when LNC is high.  
 
However, upon statistical inspection (Fisher’s r to z transformation e.g. refer to 
Preacher, 2002), only one of the above-mentioned differences in correlations is found 
to be significantly different at the 5% level, namely for the RAPM-DBGA relationship. 
In conclusion, the use of sub-group correlation analysis for LNC provides some 
indication of the influence of managerial opinions on the legitimating nature of controls 
in moderating the relationship between MCS and DBIN/DBGA in a very selective way. 
Based on the analysis, LNC is found to have a strength interaction only in one case. 
The next step is now to examine the form of the interaction using the MRA technique.    
 
6.5.3. Form of the Moderation (MRA).  
 
The MRA technique is consistently documented in both the MCS and statistical 
literature (e.g. Hartman and Moers, 1999, 2003; Gerdin and Greve, 2004; Jaccard and 
Turrisi, 2003; Cohen and Cohen, 1983). According to Jaccard and Turrisi (2003, p. 18), 
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the most popular approach involves estimating parameters for two equations: one that 
includes the two independent variables (e.g. the MCS variable and the moderator 
variable – LNC) and one that includes the latter two variables plus a third variable 
known as the product term.  Equation 6.5 and 6.6 are provided and reflect the 
application of the MRA technique (notations changed compared to Model 1). 
 
Y(j) = β1(i)
 
X1 +  β2X2  + e1(ij)    [Equation 6.5] 
          Y(j) =  β3(i) X1 + β4 X2 + β5(ij) X1X2 + e2(ij)  [Equation 6.6] 
Where: 
X1(i) = MCS sub-systems (i = 1….3) = SOP, BP and RAPM 
X2 = Legitimating Nature of Controls (LNC) 
Y(j) = Dysfunctional Behaviours (j = 1,2) = DBIN and DBGA 
β1(i)
 , β2(i) , β3(i) and β4(i) = Coefficients for main explanatory variables 
β5(ij)
 
= Coefficient for interaction term 
e1(ij) and e2(ij) = error variables.  
 
Technically, there are two indicators that can be used to confirm that there is a form 
interaction, namely (i) a statistically significant increase in the explanatory power of 
Equation 6.6 in relation to Equation 6.5 (difference in R2 – hierarchical F test) and (ii) a 
statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term (β5). However, as 
demonstrated in Cohen and Cohen (1983) and confirmed in Jaccard and Turrisi (2003, 
p. 26), the F-statistic for the increase in R2 equals the square of the t-statistic for the 
interaction term (also in Hartmann and Moers, 1999, p. 294). Hence, in practical terms, 
a statistically significant coefficient for β5 would be sufficient to support a form 
interaction hypothesis.  
 
A total of 5 pairs (Equation 6.5 and 6.6) of regressions can now be run to test 
Hypotheses H17 to H22 (except for H18). However, a data issue had to be resolved, 
namely the existence of multi-collinearity in these models. For example, as correctly 
identified and dealt with in Abernethy and Brownell (1999) and explained in Jaccard 
and Turrisi (2003, p. 27), the product term is often highly correlated with one or both of 
the constituent independent variables. This was detected in this study. For example, in 
the SOP to DBGA model, the VIF statistics in Equation 6.5 were quite acceptable 
(1.02) but in Equation 6.6, the inclusion of the product term (SOP x DBGA – which has 
a significant coefficient), the VIF statistics for the independent variables increased to a 
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range of 2.26 to 6.03. Nevertheless, Jaccard and Turrisi (2003, p. 28) as well as 
Hartmann and Moers (1999) downplay the implications of high multi-collinearity in 
interaction models and argue that a more pressing issue would occur if the moderator 
and the independent variable were correlated123.  Yet, as part of their explanations and 
illustrations of MRA techniques, they (2003, p. 29) do adopt strategies to “…avoid 
problems with multi-collinearity”. 
 
In consideration of the above limitation, one of the often applied strategies to reduce 
the VIF statistics is mean centering. As explained in Abernethy and Brownell (1999, p. 
197), centering involves the subtraction of the mean value of the independent 
variables124 (e.g. SOP and LNC) from the original score. The product term would then 
be the multiplication of the centered independent variables.  Apart from reducing the 
multi-collinearity, Jaccard and Turrisi (2003, p. 30) contend that this procedure would 
make the coefficients for the independent variables (i.e.  β3 and β4) easier to interpret. 
The ability to interpret the latter coefficients – known as ‘lower order effects’ in 
Hartmann and Moers (1999, 2003) – has been the subject of controversy in MCS 
research due to apparently conflicting arguments and recommendations that lower order 
effects in a multiple regression that includes a multiplicative term cannot be interpreted 
(from. Southwood, 1978, and cited for example in Gul and Chia, 1994; Lau et al., 
1995). But more recently, Hartmann and Moers (2003, p. 806) have concluded that 
these lower order effects can be interpreted for “….ratio-scaled variables and interval-
scaled variables that are centered”. In light of the above, all the regressions results 
below are based on mean centered independent variables (SOP, BP, RAPM and LNC).  
Consequently, the product terms are also based on the mean centered independent 
variables. 
 
6.5.3.1. Form of the Moderation – Results for DBGA only 
 
Table 6.23 displays the regression results (standardized coefficients and un-
standardized coefficients) in relation to DBGA only. 
 
 
 
                                                
123
 This is not the case in this study as shown in the Correlation Matrix (Table 6.9).  
124
 Centering does not apply to the dependent variable.  
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 Equation 6.5 
Y = DBGA 
Equation 6.6 
Y = DBGA 
X1(1) – SOP  β1 = -0.318**  (-0.346; 0.091) β3 = -0.314** (-0.341; 0.090)  
X2 – LNC  β2 = 0.085ns     (0.078;0.078) β4 = 0.047ns (0.044; 0.079) 
X1 x X2  - β5 =0.171* (0.162; 0.080) 
R2  
F-Test  
11.6% 
8.351** 
14.4% 
7.068** 
  
X1(2) – BP  β1 = -0.254** (-0.309; 0.106) Β3 = -0.305**(-0.371; 0.106) 
X2 – LNC  β2 = 0.071ns  (0.066; 0.081) β 4 = 0.032ns  (0.029; 0.080) 
X1 x X2 - β 5 =0.235** (0.250; 0.091) 
R2  
F-Test 
7.8% 
5.386**  
13% 
6.276** 
 
  
X1(3) – RAPM β1 = 0.285** (1.107; 0.328) β 3 = 0.252** (0.977; 0.333) 
X2 – LNC  β2 = 0.145ns  (0.134;0.078) β 4 = 0.157ns  (0.145; 0.078) 
X1 x X2 - β 5 =0.152ns  (0.417; 0.237) 
R2  
F-Test 
9.8% 
6.892** 
12% 
5.704**  
Table 6.23: MRA Results (DBGA as dependent variable) 
un-standardized coefficients; standard errors shown in parentheses and italics 
** significant at 1% level or less, * significant at 5% level or less, and ns is not significant 
 
In all three cases, the VIF statistics for the independent variables have remained at very 
acceptable levels, ranging from 1.01 to 1.09 - thus indicating that the issue of multi-
collinearity has been appropriately addressed in the context of mean centered ratio-
scaled and interval-scaled variables. As already found in the direct effects section of 
this chapter (Section 6.3.1), all three MCS sub-systems are significantly affecting (at 
the 1% significance level or less, from Equation 6.5) the extent of managerial gaming – 
negatively in the cases of SOP and BP and positively in the case of RAPM. On the 
other hand, there are no significant coefficients for the LNC variable in all the 
regressions equations above. Hence, the managers’ perceptions on the legitimating 
influences in the organizations are not having a direct effect on DB but the interaction 
of LNC and the respective controls are having some influence on the managers’ extent 
of gaming.   
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In particular, the β5 coefficients for the SOP and BP equations are significant at the 5% 
and 1% level respectively. For the SOP equation, the interaction term standardized 
coefficient is significantly positive (0.171, t=2.023, p = 0.045) and the interaction term 
in the BP equation is also positive (0.235, t=2.739, p = 0.007). Whilst this is sufficient 
statistical evidence to point towards a form interaction for SOP and BP vis-à-vis 
DBGA, the nature of the form interaction needs to be further analysed to confirm 
whether the relevant hypothesis is supported. However, insofar as the moderating effect 
of LNC in the relationship between RAPM to DBGA is concerned (H22), the non-
significant interaction term is conclusive enough to state that H22 is not supported125.  
 
For the other two hypotheses involving DBGA (i.e. H17 and H20), the moderating 
effects can now be considered in more detail. As advised in Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) 
and Preacher (2003), one can make use of the un-standardized coefficients and model a 
graphical representation of the moderation (e.g. refer to Govindarajan and Gupta, 
1985). For the first significant moderating model, this is done by calculating the slope 
of the SOP-DBGA’s linear relationship at three different levels of LNC (high, average 
and low). This is usually determined as one standard deviation above and below the 
mean for the high and low equations. Since all the independent variables are centered, 
the means are obviously equal to zero.  
 
Hence, the regression equation for Equation 6.6 (SOP) generated the following un-
standardized form: 
 
Y2 = 2.977 – 0.371 X1(2) + 0.044 X2 + 0.162 X1(2) X2 
 
The above can be simplified by grouping X1 and X2 separately, i.e. 
 
Y2 = (– 0.341 + 0.162 X2) X1(1) + (2.977 + 0.044 X2) 
 
The different equations of X1(1) affecting Y2 (i.e. SOP on DBGA) can now be derived 
under three different levels of LNC. The standard deviation for the centered LNC is 
1.075 and therefore, X2 will take different values, namely low LNC (-1.075), medium 
                                                
125
 Although not hypothesised, a strength interaction was however found to be significant in the previous 
section.  
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LNC (0) and high LNC (1.075). Replacing X2 for these values, the respective equations 
are now as follows: 
 
• Low LNC   Y2  = -0.515 X1(1) + 2.923 
• Medium LNC   Y2  = -0.341 X1(1) + 2.977 
• High LNC   Y2  = -0.167 X1(1) + 3.024 
 
From the above output, it is already noted that the negative slope seems to reduce as the 
level of LNC increases whilst there is little change in the constant terms. The above 
equations can be sketched on the same graph for the same values of X1(1) (SOP). For the 
sake of simplicity, the selected values of SOP (centered) will be the maximum (1.17) 
and minimum values (-1.83) to present the relationship diagrammatically.  
 
 
(3.871)                                                    
 
(3.601) 
 
(3.323) 
 
 
 
 
Low LNC 
Medium LNC 
High LNC 
 
 
 
                       
                               (2.823)   
                               (2.578) 
                                    (2.325) 
-1.83                                                                   0                        1.17               X1(1) = SOP 
Figure 6.5: Moderating Effect of LNC  on SOP and DBGA 
(DBGA scores in parentheses) 
 
Figure 6.5 illustrates clearly the influence of LNC. It can therefore be concluded that 
there is a stronger negative relationship between SOP and DBGA when LNC is low and 
a weaker negative relationship when LNC is high. To complete the analysis of the 
interaction, one must formally consider whether the interaction is monotonic or non-
monotonic i.e. whether the direction (sign) of the relationship between SOP and DBGA 
is the same at all values of the contingent variable (monotonic) or not (non-monotonic). 
Y =DBGA 
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Most researchers recommend and use the partial derivative method (e.g. Schoonhoven, 
1981; Hartmann and Moers, 1999; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Nouri, 1994; Tsui, 
2001) whereby Equation 6 is partially derived with respect to the control variable (X1) 
and the results are graphically inspected over the range of the contingent variable 
(LNC). However, Schoonhoven (1981, p. 376-377) suggests a simpler test where the 
un-standardized coefficients of Equation 6.6 are used to estimate the potential 
‘inflection point’ i.e. the LNC point at which effect of X1 (SOP) on Y (DBGA) will 
change direction.  The following formula is hereby used:    
 
X2 = - β3 / β5     [Equation 6.7] 
Where β3 and β5 are the un-standardized coefficients from Equation 6.6. 
 
If the obtained value from Equation 6.7 lies within the observed range of LNC, then 
there is an actual inflection point and the interaction is viewed as non-monotonic. For 
SOP-DBGA, the value of Equation 6.7 is 2.105 [-(-0.341)/0.162]. Given that the 
variables were centered, the actual LNC score is 2.105 added to its original mean 
(2.8918) and this is 4.9968. As stated in Section 6.2.7 (Table 6.8), the observed values 
of LNC range between 1 and 6 and the output from Equation 6.7 effectively lies within 
the observed range. This confirms that the interaction is non-monotonic.      
 
Hence, whilst SOP does decrease the extent of managerial dysfunctional behaviour 
(gaming) at most of the observed levels of LNC, the dampening effect of SOP on 
gaming is gradually mitigated when levels of agreement to the legitimating nature of 
controls increases. At higher levels of LNC (i.e. beyond the inflection point), the level 
of agreement by managers on the existence of these institutional pressures in their 
organizations will now interact with SOP to increase the extent of gaming behaviours. 
Strictly speaking, the relevant hypothesis (H17) assumed a monotonic interaction and 
an enhancing impact on a positive relationship between SOP and DBGA. However, the 
actual results indicate a more complex significant relationship and these are not in line 
with the hypothesis.  
 
The next identified significant interaction is between BP and DBGA and this is now 
explored in detail using the same approach as in the case of SOP. The regression 
equation for Equation 6.6 (BP) provided the following un-standardized output: 
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Y2 = 3.010 – 0.371 X1(2) + 0.029 X2 + 0.250 X1(2) X2 
 
The above can be simplified by grouping X1 and X2 separately, i.e. 
 
Y2 = (– 0.371 + 0.250 X2) X1(2) + (3.010 + 0.029 X2) 
 
The different equations of X1(2) affecting Y2 (i.e. SOP on DBGA) can now be derived 
under three different levels of LNC. The standard deviation for the centered LNC is 
1.075 and therefore, X2 will take different values, namely low LNC (-1.075), medium 
LNC (0) and high LNC (1.075). Replacing X2 for these values, the respective equations 
are now as follows: 
 
• Low LNC   Y2  = -0.640 X1(2) + 2.979 
• Medium LNC   Y2  = -0.371 X1(2) + 3.010 
• High LNC   Y2  = -0.102 X1(2) + 3.041 
 
As in the case of SOP, the negative slopes in the above equations reduce as the level of 
LNC increases. The above equations can be plotted on the graph for the same values of 
X1(2) (BP). The selected values of BP (centered) will be the maximum (0.78) and 
minimum values (-2.72) to present the relationship diagrammatically.  
 
(4.719)                                                    
 
(4.019) 
 
(3.318) 
 
 
 
 
Low LNC 
Medium LNC 
High LNC 
 
 
 
                       
                               (2.961)   
                               (2.721) 
                                    (2.479) 
-2.72                                                              0                               0.78               X1(2) = BP 
Figure 6.6: Moderating Effect of LNC on BP and DBGA 
(DBGA scores in parentheses) 
Y =DBGA 
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As show in Figure 6.6, and similarly to the case of SOP, LNC moderates the negative 
relationship between BP and DBGA. Again, a higher level of LNC amongst the 
respondents appears to reduce the DB-decreasing effects of BP. The monotonic/non-
monotonic procedure is repeated and the score for Equation 6.7 is 1.484 (-(-
0.371)/0.250). This increases to 4.3758 when added to the mean of the original non-
centered LNC variable, which is within the observed values of LNC. This is 
conclusively a non-monotonic interaction.  Therefore, exactly as in the case of SOP, the 
results can be interpreted as follows. Whilst BP appears to cause a reduction in gaming, 
this relationship is significantly moderated by the perceptions on the institutional 
pressures of controls in the organization. As LNC increases, BP has a lesser negative 
impact on DBGA and eventually at the inflection point (i.e. LNC = 4.3758), the impact 
becomes null (zero at the inflection point) and becomes positive thereafter. Again, 
Hypothesis H20 assumed a positive relationship between BP and DBGA and a 
monotonic interaction (i.e. no change in direction of relationship as LNC changes). 
Therefore, the results do not formally meet H20 but are indicative of a significant non-
monotonic interaction.  The significance of these results will be further analysed in 
Section 6.7.4 but the next step is to repeat the MRA process for the second form of 
dysfunctional behaviour – information manipulation (DBIN)  
 
6.5.3.2. Form of the Moderation – Results for DBIN only 
 
Table 6.24 below displays the regression results (standardized coefficients and un-
standardized coefficients) in relation to DBIN only. The VIF statistics for the centered 
independent variables have again remained at very acceptable levels, ranging from 1.01 
to 1.1. The non-hypothesised model of LNC on SOP to DBIN is not shown and in any 
case, the relevant coefficients were all non-significant.  
 
As seen in the direct effects section of this chapter (Section 6.3.1), BP and RAPM are 
significantly affecting (at the 1% significance level or less, from Equation 6.5) the 
extent of managerial information manipulation – negatively in the case of BP and 
positively in the case of RAPM. As in the case of DBGA, there are no significant 
coefficients for the LNC variable in all the regressions equations above. This is once 
more suggestive that the managers’ perceptions on the institutional influences in the 
organizations do not directly impact on DB.  
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 Equation 6.5 
Y = DBIN 
Equation 6.6 
Y = DBIN 
X1(2) – BP  β1 = -0.278** (-0.374; 0.118) β 3 = -0.294**(-0.394; 0.121) 
X2 – LNC  β2 = 0.017ns  (0.017; 0.089) β 4 = 0.005ns  (0.005; 0.091) 
X1 x X2 - Β 5 =0.071ns (0.083; 0.103) 
R2  
F-Test 
8% 
5.512**  
8.5% 
3.880*  
 
  
X1(3) – RAPM β1 = 0.348** (1.496; 0.357) β 3 = 0.305** (1.310; 0.090) 
X2 – LNC  β2 = 0.099ns  (0.102;0.085) β 4 = 0.121ns  (0.124; 0.084) 
X1 x X2 - Β 5 =0.196*  (0.595; 0.256) 
R2  
F-Test 
12.7% 
9.279** 
16.3% 
8.203** 
Table 6.24: MRA Results (DBIN as dependent variable) 
un-standardized coefficients; standard errors shown in parentheses and italics 
** significant at 1% level or less, * significant at 5% level or less, and ns is not significant 
 
There is also no indication of a significant moderating effect for LNC in the case of BP. 
The R2 changes are very minimal and the β5 coefficient is non-significant. Therefore, 
the significant non-monotonic interaction of LNC found in the model of BP to DBGA 
does not extend to the information manipulation form of dysfunctional behaviour and 
Hypothesis H19 is not supported.  
 
On the other hand, a significant β5 positive coefficient is observed for the interaction 
term RAPM x LNC (standardized β5 = 0.196, t = 2.326, p = 0.022), coupled with an 
increase in the explanatory power of the model (Equation 6.6), which confirms the 
existence of a form interaction. This interaction can be now examined mathematically 
and graphically using the same procedure as in the previous section. The un-
standardized coefficients for regression equation 6.6 (for RAPM) are thus expressed as 
follows: 
Y1 = 3.861 + 1.310 X1(3) + 0.124 X2 + 0.595 X1(3) X2 
This is re-expressed as follows: 
Y1 = (1.310 + 0.595X2) X1(3) + (3.861 + 0.124 X2) 
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The different equations of X1(3) affecting Y1 (i.e. RAPM on DBIN) are now estimated, 
based on three different levels of LNC. Based on the previously used values of LNC, 
the respective equations are now as follows: 
 
• Low LNC   Y1  = 0.670 X1(3) + 3.728 
• Medium LNC   Y1  = 1.310 X1(3) + 3.861 
• High LNC   Y1  = 1.949 X1(3) + 3.994 
 
The equations above indicate that the positive slopes increase as the level of LNC 
increases. The above equations can be plotted on the graph for the same values of X1(3) 
(RAPM). The selected values of RAPM (centered) will be the maximum (0.89) and 
minimum values (-0.76) to present the relationship diagrammatically.  
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Figure 6.7:  Moderating Effect of LNC on RAPM and DBIN 
(DBIN scores in parentheses) 
 
As shown in Figure 6.7, there is a stronger positive relationship between RAPM and 
DBIN as the level of perceived legitimating nature of controls in the organization 
increases. It was initially found that a higher level of RAPM, in isolation, is very 
significantly causing a higher extent of information manipulation. In addition, the 
above indicates an even more positive relationship in situations of high internal 
legitimacy.  
Y =DBIN 
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The monotonic/non-monotonic test is repeated and the score for Equation 6.7 comes to 
-2.2017 (-(1.310)/0.595, from Table 6.23). After accounting for the mean centering 
effect, the score is 0.69 (2.8918 – 2.2017), which is outside the observed values of 
LNC. Pursuant to Schoonhoven (1981), this is confirming that the interaction is a 
monotonic one i.e. there are no changes in the direction of the relationship between 
RAPM and DBIN, which will remain positive at all observed values of LNC. Given 
that all the initial interaction hypotheses in Chapter 4 were expressed in a monotonic 
form, then it can be concluded that the Hypothesis H21 cannot be rejected.  
 
In conclusion to these last two sections, a total of five form moderation models were 
considered. Two were non-significant. A further two had significant coefficients for the 
interaction but displayed a non-monotonic form. Finally, only one of the models 
confirmed the initial hypothesis. The implications of the significant results will be 
reviewed in Section 6.7.4, in light of the initial expectations and past results from the 
literature. Prior to that, a final set of hypothesis are considered. These are related to 
differences in the direct, intervening and moderating models when factors such as 
functional area are considered.  
 
6.6. Summary of Results and Discussion of Findings 
 
The full set of hypotheses has been empirically tested and the implications/contribution 
of the relevant findings can now be considered. These implications will be presented 
under four main headings, namely the (a) the findings on individual variables, (b) the 
direct relationships between MCS, dysfunctional behaviours and the contextual 
variables, (c) the Intervening Models and (d) the Moderating Models. 
 
6.6.1. Findings on Individual Variables 
 
In a bid to address the research questions in this study, an essential pre-requisite was 
the design and/or improvement of three concepts/constructs relevant to management 
control, namely dysfunctional behaviour (information manipulation and gaming), the 
superior’s use of controls (interactive vs. diagnostic) and internal legitimacy.  Finally, 
in the light of the results from this study, some measurement issues also need to be 
noted for the other more ‘mainstream’ MCS variables, namely BP, RAPM and TU.  
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Very early on in the budgeting literature, the organizational and behavioural effects 
caused by the use of controls in organization had been observed and documented (e.g. 
Argyris, 1952, 1953). However, there was a subsequent shift in the interests of 
researchers towards the more ‘positively biased’ consequences of controls (motivation, 
performance, satisfaction), particularly after the development of the contingency 
paradigm and fit in management control (e.g. Otley, 1978).  However, as put forward 
by Ashton (1976), a ‘parallel’ loop may be at work in organizations, where unintended 
and dysfunctional consequences appear to be emerging from the control system’s 
operation. Hirst (1983) used constructs such as stress and tension to approximate 
dysfunctional behaviour but then authors (e.g. Onsi, 1973; Merchant, 1990; Chow et 
al., 1996) sought to empirically measure ‘control-specific’ types of dysfunctional 
behaviour - principally budgetary slack, short term orientation, and manipulation of 
performance measures. On the other hand, Jaworski and Young (1992) was the first 
study to develop and test the broader concept of ‘dysfunctional behaviour’, based on 
previous detailed descriptions (Birnberg et al. 1983). However, whilst the authors 
referred to the gaming and information manipulation forms of DB, they did not seek to 
measure these separately.  
 
Jaworski and Young’s (1992) initial measurement was developed from a five-item 
instrument to a seven item instrument and adapted to the wider context of management 
control systems. The validity and reliability statistics were satisfactory and also 
importantly there was little indication of inconsistent or null responses from the 
managers in spite of forced-choice design.  The descriptive statistics showed a 
significantly higher extent of information manipulation as compared to gaming 
practices and a relatively low level of correlation between these two constructs 
(r=0.359)126. Thus, the respondents appear to discern between these two constructs and 
in fact, seem to be more critical of the gaming practices. The latter are generally 
perceived to have more negative consequences whilst the manipulation of information 
may be viewed as less controversial. Nevertheless, the results have clearly shown two 
main forms of dysfunctional behaviour - previously hypothesised in the literature - that 
can now be identified in the field using the seven item instrument.   
 
                                                
126
 Surprisingly, there is no reported descriptive data on DB in Jaworski and Young (1992) and hence, no 
comparison could be made. 
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The identification and measurement of the superior’s interactive vs. diagnostic style in 
the use of controls were based on Simons’ (1990, 1991) definitions and empirically 
researched in Abernethy and Brownell (1999) and Van der Stede (2001). However, one 
critical difference existed in this study. Rather than surveying the superiors themselves, 
the middle managers were asked about their perceptions on how their superiors used 
controls in their organizations. In contrast to Abernethy and Brownell (1999), the four 
items factored into two constructs, suggesting that interactive and diagnostic styles may 
not actually be the two extremes of a single spectrum (style of use of controls) i.e. less 
interactive does not necessarily mean more diagnostic. However, the reliability of the 
diagnostic scores was very low and this study therefore focused on the level of 
interactive style in the use of controls (high/low). It is also noted that the mean scores 
for interactive use of controls was high in this study (mean = 3.93/6) and similar to 
Abernethy and Brownell’s scores (21.87/28, 1999, p. 196). In spite of some significant 
results obtained in the intervening models, the interactive vs. diagnostic style in the use 
of controls remains an issue. In his case studies, Simons (1994) appears to have found 
and documented a clearly dichotomised concept but the attempts at studying this more 
empirically have not been entirely successful. In light of recent similar findings, further 
analysis will be considered in Chapter 7.   
 
The construct ‘legitimating nature of controls’ (LNC) as perceived by functional 
managers was an attempt to examine the influences of the institutional pressures in 
organizations within the specific realm of management control systems. It is undeniable 
that institutional theory (and other interpretive perspectives) has in the last 20 years or 
so reached prominence in the MACS literature and has been supported by a rich set of 
qualitative research. It was argued that common characteristics of the theory could be 
operationalized and measured empirically. For instance, organizational control systems 
could be viewed as legitimising practices that have little use for managers or the 
organisation and are just reproduced for symbolic purposes and the assertion of 
authority.  The extent to which functional or middle managers would agree with this 
view was hypothesised to be a variable of interest in examining MCS and dysfunctional 
behaviour. Of the three items designed from the literature, only two items factored 
successfully whilst the third one may have affected by a loaded question. Again, as in 
the case of the interactive style in the use of controls, the measured construct was found 
to be relatively significant in the moderating models but this measure now needs to be 
further explored and replicated in other studies to ascertain its reliability and validity.  
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Whilst the above-mentioned variables and measures are relatively new ones and thus 
would benefit from refinement and empirical replication, some of the other variables 
have been extensively used in the MCS literature in various contexts but are still open 
to interpretation.   
 
The first and main example would be budgetary participation (BP), which had been 
almost universally measured using Milani’s (1975) six item construct. In this study 
however, two of the items unequivocally did not factor with the others and as 
mentioned in the relevant section (Section 6.2.2), this may be due to the fact that these 
two questions involved the expression of opinions rather than the degree of influence a 
subordinate manager might have in the budget setting process. The results give 
credence to the earlier discussions in Shields and Shields (1998, p. 66) and Chenhall 
(2003), who both argued that the BP measurement needs to be reviewed and that 
participative budgeting should be decomposed further. Consistent with Chenhall’s 
(2003, p. 131) views, one may also argue that changes in the historical context (e.g. 
management style, increased decentralization and new management accounting 
practices) in business over the last 30 years may have changed the respondents’ 
perceptions on what is a high vs. a low level of subordinate participation in setting 
budget targets. As a numerical illustration, Brownell and Hirst’s (1986) study found a 
mean score of 27.04 (over 42) for BP amongst Australian functional managers whilst 
this study reports a mean score of 4.21 (over 5) for the same variable (using the same 
six item measure) in the same country (about 16 years after the original study). 
Arguably, the sample sizes are different but this can also be interpreted by an increase 
in the level of subordinate participation. Therefore, irrespective of the results obtained 
for the hypothesised models, there appears to be a robust justification to review the 
scope and measurement of budgetary participation.   
 
In contrast to BP, the issue of RAPM measurement had been more recently the subject 
of investigations and reviews e.g. Vagneur and Peiperl (2000), Otley and Fakiolas 
(2000) and Hartmann (2000). The latter author contended (2000, p. 466-467) that the 
significant diversity in the operationalization of RAPM not only posed measurement 
and comparison challenges but also theoretical ones i.e. what exactly is RAPM? These 
issues were specifically taken up in this study and the RAPM measurement was based 
on the reliance on accounting measures relative to the non-accounting ones, as applied 
in Harrison (1992, 1993). Again, this choice was motivated by the documented increase 
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and awareness in companies to the use of non-financial performance measures, 
principally popularised by techniques such as the Balanced Scorecard or Total Quality 
Management (TQM). Indeed, whilst this study reported a higher level of reliance on 
accounting measures for the Australian sample (high RAPM, mean = 1.12), the 
descriptive statistics had shown a fairly wide deviation (from 0.35 to 2.00) and 
Harrison’s (1993) statistics for an almost equal number of Australian managers showed 
a RAPM score of exactly 1.00 with less variability (0.50 to 1.71). In conclusion, the use 
of Harrison’s (1992) measure for this study has provided an opportunity for some valid 
comparisons and more importantly, it is a measure based on the relative rather than the 
absolute use of accounting measures for performance measurement.  
 
Finally, Task Uncertainty (TU) is another example of a ‘popular’ variable in MCS 
research. Chapman (1997), Hartmann (2000) and Chenhall (2003) all consider the 
broad construct of uncertainty to be an important factor in influencing the design and 
effectiveness of controls. Some authors had also investigated the sub-components of 
TU, namely Task Analyzability and Job difficulty (e.g. Mia, 1989) but there has been 
little consistency in the results involving TU and its other sub-components. As in the 
case of the BP construct, the measurement of TU has been used in a fairly consistent 
way (based on Whitley et al., 1983 – combination of task analyzability and task 
exception dimension) and applied in this study. However, the wording of the last two 
items (as reported in Section 6.2.5) may have influenced the reliability of the construct 
and only the first four items factored together with no clear split between analyzability 
and exception.  TU’s measurement and sub-dimensions, as documented in previous 
studies, were not forthcoming in this study and to some extent, this may be due to the 
decision to adapt the format of the last two items during the pilot testing.  
 
In conclusion to this first section, some variables have been successfully adapted and 
applied in this study, thereby providing additional evidence of their reliability and 
validity. On the other hand, results for other variables have not been quite satisfactory, 
prompting the need to not only re-examine the measurement issues but also the 
theoretical ones.   
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6.6.2. Direct Effects (H1 to H14)  
 
The hypotheses H1 to H14 argued for the direct effects between the MCS sub-systems, 
dysfunctional behaviours and the two contextual variables. Table 6.25 displays the 
results for each of the hypotheses and the subsequent sub-sections will consider the 
results in the light of the expectations and any previous literature.  
 
Hypothesis Relationship Direction of 
Relationship (if any) 
Actual Results 
H1 SOP to DBGA Negative Negative 
H2 SOP to DBIN None None 
H3 BP to DBIN Positive Negative 
H4 BP to DBGA Positive Negative 
H5 RAPM to DBIN Positive Positive 
H6 RAPM to DBGA Positive Positive 
H7 TU to SOP Negative Negative 
H8 INT to SOP Negative Positive* 
H9 TU to BP Positive Negative 
H10 INT to BP Positive Positive* 
H11 TU to RAPM Negative None 
H12 INT to RAPM Negative Positive* 
H13a TU to DBIN Positive Positive 
H13b TU to DBGA Positive Positive 
H14a INT to DBIN Negative Positive* 
H14b INT to DBGA Negative Positive* 
Table 6.25: Direct Effects Hypotheses: Summary of Results 
* Hypothesis not comparable to actual results due to re-formulation of INT variable 
 
6.6.2.1 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 
 
To date, SOP remains a little researched aspect within the MCS literature. The previous 
SOP studies (Rockness and Shields, 1984; Macintosh and Daft, 1987; Chow et al., 
1999) did not empirically consider the consequences of SOPs. The extensive use of 
SOPs in organizations was certainly a motivation in researching the implications and as 
hypothesised, a higher use of SOPs would lead to a lower extent of dysfunctional 
gaming practices. However, one possible caveat from this finding is that one cannot 
 244
necessarily view this relationship as a purely linear one between SOPs and gaming. 
Indeed, it may be argued that there is an ‘optimal’ level of SOP beyond which gaming 
will not continue to decrease or even may start to increase as managers actively seek 
loopholes to beat the system, but this remains to be investigated. Insofar as H2 was 
concerned, the nature of SOPs (as least, as measured in this study) meant that these 
would have little impact on information manipulation and although the direction of the 
relationship was negative, the coefficient was non-significant. The above brings 
empirical support for the use of SOPs to reduce the extent of managerial dysfunctional 
behaviour but the impact of SOPs on other outcome variables (such as performance, 
motivation etc) remains to be examined.  
 
6.6.2.2 Budgetary Participation (BP) 
 
Contrary to expectations (H3), BP was found to be negatively related to information 
manipulation. Whilst the review of the budgetary slack (Onsi, 1973; Young, 1985; 
Lukka, 1988; Shields and Shields, 1998) literature pointed towards a negative 
relationship between BP and slack, the stated hypothesis adopted an agency paradigm 
whereby managers would be more encouraged to engage in information manipulation 
behaviours if they were allowed to participate more in the budgeting process.   
 
In consideration of Lukka’s (1988) argument that there were two dimensions of slack 
(slack and upward bias), the comparison might in fact be best made with Lukka’s own 
slack dimension of ‘upward bias’, which was argued to be a more ‘negative’ 
consequence than budgetary slack. Nevertheless, the results seem to give credence that 
subordinate budgetary participation plays a beneficial role in the relationship with 
superior managers and enhances the manager’s motivations and attitudes (Shields and 
Shields, 1998, p. 60). On the other hand, this beneficial impact may be revisited when 
contextual factors are considered.  
 
In the case of H4, the results again confirm a significant negative relationship between 
BP and the managers’ extent of gaming practices. Whilst information manipulation can 
be associated with slack or upward bias, gaming practices are potentially management 
actions and decisions in response to a particular control system. This has been less 
researched and the results could be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, there is a wider set 
of organizational benefits in the use of participative budgeting in general. This supports 
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the theoretical underpinnings used to support BP, namely in the economics area 
(reduction of uncertainty) and the psychology area (value attainment, cognitive effects 
and motivation). In spite of their different focus, both these theoretical bases 
acknowledge the improvement in the relations between superior and the subordinate 
manager, resulting in a ‘higher quality decision’ or ‘information exchange’ (Shields and 
Shields, 1998, p. 59). Hence, the incentive for gaming practice is lowered but the 
impact of contextual variables may alter this relationship.     
 
6.6.2.3. Reliance on Accounting Performance Measures (RAPM) 
 
It is widely viewed that the debate on the dysfunctional consequences of RAPM 
(Hopwood, 1972 vs. Otley, 1978) spurred the development of the contingent arguments 
in MCS research since both researchers could not find consistent results on the impact 
of RAPM (e.g. refer to Hartmann, 2000, p. 453-455). Subsequently other researchers 
also reported on both the direct dysfunctional- enhancing and -reducing effects of 
RAPM (e.g. Merchant, 1985b, 1990; Hughes and Kwon, 1990; Lal et al., 1996, Van der 
Stede, 2001) but again only one study went beyond the budgetary slack variable i.e. 
Merchant (1990) by considering data manipulation and management myopia. Others 
focused solely on proxies of dysfunctional behaviour, such as role ambiguity or job-
related tension (e.g. Hirst, 1981).  
 
In this study, the direct and enhancing effects of RAPM on the two forms of 
dysfunctional behaviours are clearly observed over a cross-sectional sample of 
manufacturing companies and these are supportive of Hypotheses H5 and H6. These 
provide a more generalizable finding, compared to Merchant (1990) who surveyed only 
54 managers in two firms.  
 
This is a significant empirical finding for the RAPM literature in terms of providing a 
clear and consistent result on the dysfunctional effects of RAPM. It does not rely on the 
usual proxies of dysfunctional behaviour and the RAPM measurement was also refined 
to address the use of accounting measures relative to the use of non-accounting 
measures. One explanation for the difference in the managers’ perceptions between 
RAPM and the two previously tested control systems is that managers perceive a more 
direct link from RAPM to their performance appraisal compared to BP and SOP.  
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6.6.2.4 The Direct Effects of Task Uncertainty (TU) on MCS 
 
Hypotheses H7, H9 and H11 considered the effects of TU on SOP, BP and RAPM 
respectively. The literature has traditionally attached much importance to the role of 
uncertainty in the shaping, design and effectiveness of MCS. For example, Chapman 
(1997) and Hartmann (2000) have both developed arguments based on Galbraith’s 
(1973) notion of uncertainty and different versions of the uncertainty variable have 
been used in the empirical studies e.g. perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) and 
Task Uncertainty (TU).    
 
The hypothesised negative effect of TU on SOP was supported i.e. a high (low) TU will 
be related to a lower (higher) use of detailed SOPs. By nature, SOP is a set of formal 
rules on how specific tasks should be addressed.  Rockness and Shields (1984) found 
differences in the use of SOPs by considering only R&D departments whilst Macintosh 
and Daft (1987) found negative links between the extent of SOPs and the extent of 
sequential/reciprocal interdependence. In some way, the results in this study provide a 
broader and more generalisable perspective since it uses the task uncertainty variable, 
rather than using proxies such as interdependence or functional area. In the latter case, 
several studies (e.g. Dunk, 1992; Brownell, 1985; Merchant, 1984) used functional area 
as the variable of interest to proxy for task uncertainty. However, when functional 
differences (marketing vs. production) were considered in this study, there were no 
significant differences in the TU-SOP relationship. Hence, this suggests that the use of 
functional area as a TU proxy may not be advisable.    
 
Insofar as BP was concerned, a positive link was hypothesised between BP and TU. 
However, hypothesis H9 was not supported and a significant negative relationship was 
observed. This questions the relevance of the ‘information gap’ argument as a means to 
predict the use of budgets in a high uncertainty environment and contradicts the 
predictions of Chenhall (2003). In fact, this result gives further credence to Merchant’s 
(1984, p. 300) comments that a low task uncertainty environment (as characterised by 
high process automation) would negate to some extent the need for budgetary 
participation. In his words, managers “…meet less frequently with their superiors 
regarding budget matters, and they feel that they have greater influence over their 
budget plans”. The comparison to Merchant’s results and comments is a limited one 
since Merchant (1984) did not use Milani’s (1975) measure of budgetary participation. 
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Hence, whilst one of Merchant’s (1984) items was positively correlated to level of 
automation (influence on budget plans), the other items (such as involvement in 
budgeting) were not significantly correlated. As mentioned in Section 6.3.2., there are 
other related arguments for the negative relationship. A high TU environment may not 
be mitigated by a higher level of participation from the subordinate manager as the 
‘answers’ may lie elsewhere for the superior managers to find. On the other hand, a low 
TU environment supposes that the subordinate manager may be able to provide the 
necessary input to the planning process.  
 
In the case of H11, a high task uncertainty was predicted to have an inverse relationship 
with RAPM. When Briers and Hirst (1990) and Hartmann (2000) reviewed the 
evidence on the RAPM-TU link, they noted the difficulties in obtaining consistent 
results particularly when TU was hypothesised as a moderator or independent variable. 
Hartmann (2000, p. 465) reported a large number of failed hypotheses and replication 
studies that did not yield similar results and used the term “uncertainty paradox” (2000, 
p. 472) to describe it. In spite of the application of various recommendations (using TU 
for middle managers, RAPM measures refined), no significant relationship was found. 
As mentioned initially in Section 6.3.2, the use of RAPM is such a widespread one 
being enforced in all profit-maximising enterprises and consequently, the effect of TU 
appears negligible in influencing the extent to which superiors are using accounting 
performance measures.  
 
6.6.2.5 The Direct Effects of Superior’s Interactive Use of Controls on MCS  
 
To date, empirical investigations into the influence of the superiors’ style in using of 
controls remain scant. It was intended to be a more specific variable to explore the 
interactions between the superior and subordinate manager in the MCS context, in 
contrast to other variables such as leadership style or trust. There was strong case study 
evidence from Simons (1991, 1994) to back up the finding that senior managers may 
choose to use controls in an interactive vs. diagnostic mode. However, as explained in 
Section 6.2.6, the factor analysis procedure failed to generate one variable from the four 
items which were slightly adapted from Abernethy and Brownell (1999). Consequently, 
it was argued that it may be inappropriate to consider interactive and diagnostic use as 
the two extremes of one spectrum (style of use of controls). Therefore, the focus was 
now aimed at the level of interactive use of controls by the superior manager (labelled 
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INT – high/low). Technically therefore, Hypothesis H8, H10 and H12 cannot be 
accepted in their original formulation but the actual results are still significant and are 
now considered.  
 
A positive relationship was found between INT and SOP, suggesting that a high (low) 
interactive style use of controls is associated to a high (low) use of detailed SOPs. 
Based on Simons’ (1994) original discussions, managers perceived a high INT from 
their superiors when the latter involve themselves in the decisions and activities of their 
subordinates. This positive link seems to suggest that one of the consequences of 
having a high INT superior will be the establishment of further SOP controls, 
presumably in light of the interactions the superior has had with the subordinate 
manager and the SOP controls. This appears consistent with the ‘hands-on 
management’ approach described by Simons (1994) and as mentioned by Langfield-
Smith (1997, p. 223), adopting an interactive style involves the testing of new ideas and 
the activation of organizational learning. 
 
Similarly, a positive relationship was observed between INT and BP. As discussed in 
Shields and Shields (1998, p. 59), the theoretical literature contends that the cause of 
participative budgeting is basically one that is related to uncertainty or a superior-
subordinate information asymmetry. However, the interactive ‘nature’ of the superior 
was seen as an implicit assumption in Shields and Shields’ (1998) description of the 
rationale for participative budgeting. In other words, actions such as information 
sharing or exchange imply the ‘participation’ of the superior as well and INT is in this 
case a reflection of the superior’s participation, from the point of view of the 
subordinate manager. In this respect, this result is consistent with the theoretical 
underpinnings of participative budgeting and suggests that the INT is an important 
factor towards encouraging a higher level of participation in the budgeting process by 
the subordinate.  
 
Finally, a positive link was also observed between INT and RAPM i.e. a high (low) 
interactive superior would be linked to a high (low) use of RAPM. Simons (1991, 
1994) description of the more ‘interactive’ superior manager does not make reference 
to a preferred reliance on accounting based measures. In previous RAPM studies (e.g. 
Hopwood, 1974; Merchant, 1985b, 1990), predictions were made on the relationships 
between the leadership style and RAPM but the initial Hopwood results (RAPM 
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matched with more considerate leaders) were not confirmed. A more relevant study for 
comparison is Barrett et al. (1992) which found that superiors tend to match their 
evaluative style with the style used in their own performance evaluation. This is 
referred to as the contagion effect (Hartmann, 2000, p. 465). Whilst there is probable 
predominance of financial measures in the performance assessment of the superior 
managers, there is no empirical evidence to suggest it in this study. However, this 
appears to be a sensible explanation as to the positive link between INT and RAPM in 
this case.      
 
A final comment on the relationship between INT and control systems must be made. 
The use of the interactive style of management variable was queried at the level of 
functional managers and they were asked the relevant questions in relation to their 
immediate supervisor. In the previous studies (Simons, 1991, 1994; Abernethy and 
Brownell, 1999), the questions had been aimed at chief executive officers (CEOs) 
directly. Although the questions were adapted and pilot tested at the appropriate level, 
there is nevertheless the limitation that this may negatively affect the comparisons to 
the previous studies.   
 
6.6.2.6 Direct Effects of TU and INT on Dysfunctional Behaviours 
 
The last hypotheses for the direct effects (H13a, H13b, H14a and H14b) were 
directional ones and were formulated to test that the critical condition set out by Baron 
and Kenny (1986) for an intervening model is actually satisfied i.e. the relationship 
between the independent variable (e.g. TU) and the dependent variable reduces (e.g. 
DBIN) and becomes insignificant when the mediator (MCS) is added to the model. To 
the same extent that there were significant correlations between TU/INT and 
DBIN/DBGA, all the above-mentioned hypotheses are supported and the initial 
conditions for testing the intervening models were met.  
 
However, it is noted that all the contextual variables were positively related to the two 
forms of dysfunctional behaviour. In other words, a high (low) task uncertainty and a 
low (high) interactive use of controls by the superior appear to cause a high (low) 
extent of dysfunctional behaviours (information manipulation and gaming). As already 
reported in the previous sections and the literature review, uncertainty is viewed as a 
central concept in management accounting and control research, particularly within the 
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contingency paradigm (e.g. Galbraith, 1977; Hartmann, 2000; Chenhall, 2003). This 
study has focused on TU to reduce the ambiguity associated with other uncertainty 
variables but it is observed here that there are some consequences for the managers’ 
behaviour. Hirst (1983) found that task uncertainty played a significant moderating role 
in the relationship between RAPM and JRT but no direct relationship was noted.  
Jaworski and Young (1992) sought to examine the impact of the roles of information 
asymmetry, role conflict and job tension on managers’ dysfunctional behaviour. They 
only found some positive link between job tension and dysfunctional behaviour. In 
addition, Merchant’s (1990) study of data manipulation and management found a high 
incidence of dysfunctional behaviours and admitted that the difficult economic times 
(1990, p. 311) may have influenced the responses. Obviously, the past evidence appears 
quite limited and difficult to compare given the differences in the research designs and 
variables used.   
 
Nevertheless, the results show a significant positive effect that as the task uncertainty 
increases, managers may react by engaging into dysfunctional behaviours. The extent 
to which this may occur depends on the application of the controllability principle 
(Hartmann, 2000, p. 471), whereby managers may be exempted from accountability 
and responsibility in times of high task uncertainty. However, this issue of 
controllability cannot be ascertained in the context of this study.  
 
In contrast to some of the extant TU literature, there is considerably less research on 
INT although this has evolved in the past few years. As noted in Chapter 2, Simons 
(1994), Langfield-Smith (1997) and Abernethy and Brownell (1999) explicitly 
associate an interactive style of using controls as a positive practice, which needs to be 
encouraged in organizations. They build on Burchell’s et al. (1980) notion of dialogue, 
learning and idea creation machine, whereby the MCS sub-systems are used for the 
continual exchange between top management and lower levels of management 
(Abernethy and Brownell, 1999, p. 191). The latter authors do acknowledge (1999, p. 
192) that the interactive style in using controls is not costless because it requires more 
involvement and time from all parties concerned. In turn, this can also result in negative 
pressures on subordinate managers as they seek to address the ‘interactive’ nature of 
the superior managers. On the other hand, a less interactive style of using controls can 
also provide the environment in which managers may be encouraged to manipulate 
information or engage in gaming practices. Therefore, in spite of the observed 
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significant positive relationship between INT and dysfunctional behaviours, there are 
still unanswered questions as to why this would actually happen. Some tentative 
interpretations will be considered in the last chapter. 
 
6.6.3. The Intervening Models (Model 1 Indirect Effects) 
 
Hypothesis Relationship Direction of Relationship 
(if any) 
Actual Results 
Model 1a 
H15a TU-SOP-DB Significant Intervening Significant only for 
DBGA 
H15b TU-BP-DB Significant Intervening Significant for both DBIN 
and DBGA 
H15c TU-RAPM-DB Significant Intervening Not significant  
Model 1b    
H16a INT-SOP-DB Significant Intervening Not significant 
H16b INT-BP-DB Significant Intervening Not significant 
H16c INT-RAPM-DB Significant Intervening Significant for both DBIN 
and DBGA 
Table 6.26: Intervening Effects Hypotheses: Summary of Results 
 
The summary of the intervening hypotheses are shown in Table 6.25. A total of 12 
different paths were tested (6 hypotheses x 2 forms of dysfunctional behaviour) and 
only five were found to be significant, based on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) conditions 
and Sobel’s (1982) statistical test. The models 1a and 1b allowed an examination of the 
role of MCS in encouraging or discouraging the extent of dysfunctional behaviours, in 
the presence of two contextual variables.  
 
In the case of Task Uncertainty (Model 1a), the results firstly showed that TU has a 
negative relationship on the extent of detailed SOPs – high (low) task uncertainty links 
to a low (high) SOP - and in turn SOP was negatively related to gaming practices i.e. a 
high (low) SOP would cause a low (high) extent of gaming. More importantly perhaps, 
the significance of the intervening model implies that the direct enhancing effect of TU 
on DBGA is totally eliminated when SOP is included i.e. the existence of SOP is 
therefore relevant in controlling for the effects of TU but only in cases of low task 
uncertainty.  
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These results contribute to the MCS literature in terms of providing evidence on the 
effects of MCS in the context of task uncertainty. In addition, TU was modelled as 
antecedent variable rather than a moderating variable. To date, there is only one 
previous published study that used the intervening model linking contextual variables, 
control systems and dysfunctional behaviour (Van der Stede, 2000). However it solely 
focused on budgetary control style (a form of budget emphasis/RAPM variable), used 
strategy and past performance as antecedent variables and slack and managerial time 
orientation as forms of dysfunctional behaviour. However, in this study, RAPM was 
not found to be playing a significant role in mediating between TU and DBIN/DBGA. 
 
In contrast to TU, Model1b presents a different picture as to the role of INT. As noted 
before in the direct effects section, there is a very strong impact of INT on RAPM and 
on DBIN/DBGA directly. Full mediation occurs in the INT-RAPM-DB paths, but in 
contrast to SOP and BP, RAPM enhances both forms of dysfunctional behaviour. The 
perceived interactive style of the superiors has caused an increased reliance on 
accounting performance measures which in turn increase the extent of the subordinate 
manager’s dysfunctional behaviour. This brings further evidence on the negative 
consequences of financial- and short-term based targets, which were previously noted 
by authors such as such as Hopwood (1972), Otley (1978), Hirst (1983), Merchant 
(1990), Chow et al. (1996), and Van der Stede (2001).  
 
This study again contributes to the literature by considering the effects of INT in the 
relationship between RAPM and dysfunctional behaviour. In addition, the links 
between INT and DBIN/DBGA via SOP/BP are also of interest. Both SOP and BP 
could not dampen the impact of INT on DBIN/DBGA. This can be interpreted as 
follows: the high interactive behaviour of superior managers is having dysfunctional 
consequences on the behaviour of subordinate managers and the use of SOPs and BP is 
not sufficient in reducing the extent of dysfunctional behaviour.  This is further and 
new evidence on the ‘dangers’ of an ‘over-interactive’ superior manager in the context 
of his/her use of controls such as SOP and BP. This brings a potential link with the 
previous literature on the impact of leadership style on the effectiveness of MCS e.g. 
Brownell (1983b). Hopwood (1972, 1974) did develop arguments on the link between a 
low considerate and high initiating structure superior and the type of control systems. 
When one considers Simons’ (1994) characteristics of an interactive superior, there are 
some similarities between a high interactive superior and a high initiating structure 
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leader. For example, “…ensuring that system is an important agenda to discuss with 
subordinates and… is a regular focus of attention by operating managers…” (Simons, 
1994, p. 172) is testimony of such high initiating structure. On other hand, there are no 
discernable similarities between the interactive superior and the consideration 
dimension of leadership. In summary, the empirical evidence is quite suggestive that an 
interactive style of using controls may not necessarily be yielding positive 
consequences for the organization, at least from the subordinate manager’s point of 
view. At the very least, this finding brings into question the effectiveness of a high 
interactive style of a superior in using the three studied MCS sub-systems. However, it 
needs to be noted that a low interactive style is not necessarily synonymous with a 
diagnostic style as described in Simons (1991, 1994). Finally, it needs to be recognised 
that Dent (1990, p. 20) had been critical of Simons’ early accounts of this managerial 
behaviour and argued that these might be speculative.  
 
6.6.4 The Moderation Model (Model 2 Interaction Effects) 
 
The second model was tasked with re-examining the relationship between the MCS 
sub-systems and the two forms of dysfunctional behaviour in the presence of an 
institutional theory-based influence. The case-based evidence on the state and evolution 
of management accounting and control systems in organizations has become of 
increasing interest (e.g. Berry, 1985; Covaleski et al., 1993; Abernethy and Chua, 
1996). These studies demonstrated that managers and other organizational players are 
to some extent aware of the ritualistic and ceremonial roles of accounting tools and 
techniques and thus see ‘beyond’ the rational aspects and implications of these 
practices.  The ‘legitimating nature of controls’ variable was thus designed to reflect the 
extent to which managers would adhere to these attitudes in relation to their own 
organizational contexts and accordingly react in relation to the existence/influence of 
MCS in their departments. 
 
The focus of Model 2 and the six related hypotheses were towards the existence of 
form (rather than strength) and monotonic interactions. Table 6.27 summarises the 
actual results: 
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Hypothesis Relationship Interaction  Actual Results 
Model 2 
H17 LNC moderates 
SOP to DBGA 
Positive (enhancing) 
and monotonic 
Form interaction supported but 
non-monotonic 
H18 LNC moderates 
SOP to DBIN 
Not significant Not Significant 
H19 LNC moderates 
BP to DBIN 
Positive (enhancing) 
and monotonic 
Not supported 
 
H20 LNC moderates 
BP to DBGA 
Positive (enhancing) 
and monotonic 
Form interaction supported but 
non-monotonic 
H21 LNC moderates 
RAPM to DBIN 
Positive (enhancing) 
and monotonic 
Fully Supported  
 
H22  LNC moderates 
RAPM to DBGA 
Positive (enhancing) 
and monotonic 
Not supported but strength 
interaction found*  
Table 6.27: Interaction Effects Hypotheses: Summary of Results 
* Refer to Section 6.5.2 
   
Although only one hypothesis (H21) is formally supported, there are additional 
significant results that have been generated from the statistical analysis. Firstly, the 
institutional effects measured through LNC are found to have different implications 
depending upon the type of control sub-system and the outcome variables.  For 
example, opinions about the legitimating nature of controls do not appear to moderate 
the negative effect of BP on information manipulation. In other words, the managers’ 
attitudes to the control systems as legitimising and ritualistic instruments do not 
influence the information manipulation-reducing effect of budgetary participation.  
 
However, when it comes to gaming practices, the initial negative relationship between 
BP and DBGA then becomes a positive one at higher levels of LNC. The same 
interaction is observed in the case of SOP as managerial beliefs on the ‘bureaucratic’ 
nature of SOPs are heightened. As stated by Richardson (1987, p. 343), accounting may 
be seen as legitimating device to the extent that it mediates the mapping between action 
and values. In this study, control systems (whether accounting-focused or not) structure 
the relations between two of the main actors in the organization e.g. functional non-
accounting managers and supervising/top managers and focus on the perceptions of the 
functional managers in response to the control systems and the environment in which 
they believe they are operating.  
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The positive enhancing effect of LNC in the RAPM-DBIN relationship is suggestive of 
the stronger implications of LNC for organizations which have a higher reliance on 
accounting measures to assess the performance of their managers. This is compounded 
by the inherent bias that profit-maximizing organizations have for the accounting 
measures i.e. directors are generally assessed on profitability and shareholder value 
added: a clear outcome from the annual report ‘ritual’. However, the absence of a form 
interaction for LNC in the RAPM-DBGA relationship is of some concern as one would 
have expected a similar result as in the case of DBIN. A strength interaction was 
observed in the latter case and this, as stated by Gerdin and Greve (2004, p. 311), does 
not necessarily mean that one should expect a form interaction.   
 
The absence of previous empirical results on the significance of an institutional theory-
led variable in an MCS prevents any further comparisons. However, the results are 
consistent with the case study findings of Perez and Robson (1999) which found 
instances of ritualistic and taken-for-granted behaviours by the various individual 
managers, particularly in the budget process. The case study research observed attempts 
by sub-unit or functional managers (e.g. Perez and Robson, 1999, p. 397-398) to enter 
in a ‘gaming’ process and the need to protect their own department. This confirms the 
possibility of legitimacy being an important concept not only for the organisation 
towards the ‘external’ environment, but also for sub-unit departments.  Nevertheless, 
the evidence at least attests to the existence of managers’ attitudes towards the 
usefulness of control systems in their activities.   
 
6.7. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has presented the results for the study, in terms of the following aspects: 
response rate, profile of respondents, variable validity and reliability, and empirically 
considered the hypotheses formulated for direct, indirect (intervening) and the 
moderating effects. The final chapter will now elaborate on the implications of the 
findings, the limitations of the study and recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
7.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter will present the main contributions and implications for the MCS 
literature, arising from the empirical findings of this study. It has to be acknowledged 
that the present study was carried out and written over a number of years as a part-time 
PhD study. Thus, in parallel to this research study, a number of theoretical and 
empirical developments have occurred, which would have been of relevance to this 
research’s objectives, design, hypotheses and/or findings. Within the key parts of the 
introductory, literature review, and hypotheses development chapters, these recent 
contributions have been incorporated in the text but more importantly, they also form 
an integral part of the overall analysis on the main findings of this study in this chapter. 
Finally, these main findings and associated analysis together with the limitations of the 
study will form the basis for the recommendations for future research. 
 
7.1 Main Contributions to the  Literature 
7.1.1.  Validating information manipulation and gaming measures 
 
The study of management control systems and its dysfunctional consequences is not a 
new endeavour. Many seminal studies on management control systems such as Agyris 
(1952, 1953), Hopwood (1972), Onsi (1973), Otley (1978) and Hirst (1981; 1983) have 
documented and focused on the dysfunctional consequences of control systems - 
particularly those relating to budgetary systems. However, spurred by the various 
conflicting findings and resulting debates, the MCS literature became more narrowly 
focused on the specific dysfunctional consequences of (i) budgetary slack, arising from 
budgetary participation and (ii) job-related tension and stress, arising from RAPM.  A 
separate but smaller set of studies focused on broader budget-based control systems 
(e.g. Merchant, 1990; Chow et al., 1996) and their effects on specific instances of 
dysfunctional behaviour such as data manipulation, short-term orientation and invalid 
data reporting. Although there were some valid results from the latter studies, questions 
arose as to the reliability of the measures (Merchant, 1990). In addition, there was little 
empirical evidence on the broader conceptualisations of dysfunctional behaviour, as 
initially identified in Birnberg et al. (1983), and how far they were related to the 
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operation of control systems. In this respect, Jaworski and Young’s (1992) measures of 
dysfunctional behaviour provided the starting point to design two broader measures of 
dysfunctional behaviour - namely information manipulation and gaming - whilst 
addressing the validity/reliability issues inherent in collecting data on such fairly 
controversial issues. The seven items factored as expected into the two pre-defined 
constructs and there was little indication of inconsistent or non-responses. The 
reliability tests were very satisfactory for both variables. In conclusion, the theoretical 
conceptualisations of information manipulation and gaming appear to have been 
successfully operationalized and thus could be of use to future MCS research, 
particularly in the study of antecedents and consequences of dysfunctional behaviour.     
 
7.1.2. SOPs as a mechanism constraining gaming practices.  
 
From the literature review, it became apparent that questions focusing on the 
antecedents, consequences and generally the role, of SOPs in companies have attracted 
considerably less research attention than other control systems (e.g. BP and RAPM). 
SOPs were often included as a sub-component of control systems (Merchant, 1982; 
Fisher, 1995; Chow et al. 1996) and being regarded as a ‘mechanistic’ system. Indeed, 
early attempts at measuring SOPs adopt a fairly simplistic view by using the number of 
pages etc (e.g. Macintosh and Daft, 1987). At the same time, previous studies have only 
been suggestive of the link between SOP and task uncertainty, by considering variables 
such as ‘knowledge of the transformation process’ (Rockness and Shields, 1984) and 
departmental interdependence (Macintosh and Daft, 1987), as possible antecedents to 
the design/use of SOPs. In addition, the links between SOP and dysfunctional 
behaviour are only alluded to in Chow et al. (1996), in that the set of controls studied 
was acknowledged to be too broad to capture specifically the effects of SOPs on 
dysfunctional behaviour (1996, p. 189). Furthermore, the forms of dysfunctional 
behaviour studied by Chow et al. (1996) were focused on ‘discouragement of new 
ideas’ and manipulation of performance measures’, which were found to be positively 
associated to the level of control tightness (i.e. could be interpreted as a higher level of 
SOPs).  
 
By uncovering, and using a clearly delineated variable for SOPs, the findings (Table 
6.10) from this study provide evidence on how SOPs contribute significantly to the 
reduction of gaming activities by managers. It has already been acknowledged that this 
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could only apply to a defined range of SOPs, and is thus consistent with Hirst’s (1983) 
argument on the possible curvilinear relationship between control systems and 
dysfunctional behaviour. The result that SOPs can have little effect on a manager’s 
extent of information manipulation was hypothesised and this result is not in line with 
Chow et al. (1996)’s previous findings.  However, a strict comparison to this latter 
study may be difficult to sustain given the different measures used - particularly in 
relation to a very broad conceptualisation of SOP controls used in Chow et al. (1996).  
The relevance of TU in the design of SOPs is confirmed as a variable of interest in that 
a low level of TU appears to be appropriately matched to a high level of SOPs, thereby 
reducing the potential for dysfunctional behaviour (Section 6.6.3). This brings new 
evidence on the need to design appropriate levels of SOPs to the perceived level of task 
uncertainty faced by the managers/departments, with a view to constraining gaming 
behaviours. Finally, the effect of an interactive style of using controls was found to be 
positively linked to a higher level of SOP but there was no support for an intervening 
model (Section 6.6.2.5).  
 
In essence, one may argue that the effects of SOPs have generally been taken for 
granted and assumed to operate universally in restricting managerial flexibility and 
action. SOPs exist and persist in many forms and in many organizations and are very 
often the most visible reflection of emerging practices and technologies (e.g. total 
quality management procedures and other quality standards dictated by ISO – 
International Standards Organization). The absence of, or non-compliance with, SOPs 
has also been associated to many instances of fraud and mismanagement. Thus, in a 
‘narrow’ context and understanding, they are the boundary systems (internal controls) 
that maintain the integrity of the organization’s information systems and of its 
resources. For instance, Widener (2007) pointed out that a boundary system is often 
legally required by stock exchange authorities and recently in the US, through the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2007, p. 762). However, in a ‘broader’ context 
and higher level of management, they could also act as a boundary system that 
“…delineates the acceptable domain of strategic activity for organizational 
participants” (Simons, 1995, p. 39). Notwithstanding the fact that Simons’ (1995; 
2000) conceptualisations were devised in the context of strategic implementation 
involving senior/top management level, it remains that his writings do have some 
relevance to middle management level, particularly in relation to the notion that a 
boundary system communicates the actions that employees should avoid (Widener, 
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2007, p. 759). Hence, a boundary system allows employees to innovate and achieve 
within certain pre-defined areas, but it does so in a negative way through the 
constraining of behaviour. Consequently, and in light of the results, one key conclusion 
is that it would be appropriate to label SOPs as an effective constraining mechanism 
(possibly in an almost coercive way) aimed at reducing managerial dysfunctional 
behaviour. In addition, the likely influence of task uncertainty in the design of such 
boundary systems needs to be taken into consideration. One has also to qualify this 
statement in that this boundary system appears appropriate only in dealing with gaming 
(management actions) and not with the information manipulation behaviours. It may be 
possible that other boundary mechanisms (e.g. ethical codes of conduct) have an 
influence on the quality of information being provided by managers.  
 
Furthermore, the additional finding of a positive relationship between the superior’s 
interactive style of using controls and SOPs may appear at odds with the expectations 
of a preference between the diagnostic (i.e. less interactive) use of controls and SOPs. 
However, the changes made to the variable measurement of INT for this study implied 
that a high (low) interactive use of controls could no longer be equated to a low (high) 
diagnostic use of controls (Refer to Section 6.7.1). These are not viewed as the two 
extremes of a spectrum relating to one construct but rather as two different constructs. 
In other words, superiors could be perceived to have both styles of using controls with 
varying effects on the design, and consequences, of control systems. Henri (2006) and 
Widener (2007) appear to give credence to this observation by measuring these 
variables separately whilst others (e.g. Bisbe and Otley, 2004, p. 731) used diagnostic 
and interactive anchors in the measuring of their variable. In this present study, the 
results indicate that the higher the interactive use of controls, the higher the level of 
SOPs in the organization. One possible interpretation may be obtained from Simons 
(1991). Relying on field data from 30 US businesses, he postulated that a highly 
interactive manager can focus intensively on certain control systems in specific 
strategic settings but only for limited periods, or he/she risks information overload, 
superficial analysis, lack of perspective and potential paralysis (1991, p. 59). As such, a 
highly interactive manager can possibly be expected to rely on SOPs in these particular 
times to ‘handle’ the more routine matters, given the relevance of SOPs as a boundary 
system. Furthermore, this finding could be indirectly indicative of the so-called 
dynamic tension that would originate from the use of the different levers of control 
(Simons, 1995; Henri, 2006; Widener, 2007) but there is no evidence to point to the 
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consequences of such tension (e.g. no intervening effect to an outcome variable such as 
dysfunctional behaviour). Finally, it is quite possible that the so-called direct 
relationship between INT and SOPs may in fact be mediated by another variable i.e. 
another control system or a contextual variable. This therefore calls for further research 
into the links between the interactive use of controls and SOPs and/or other boundary 
systems and the consequences of the interaction between these variables.    
 
7.1.3. BP as a mechanism defusing dysfunctional behaviours 
 
In spite of the numerous empirical and theoretical studies over nearly five decades, the 
debate on the usefulness, antecedents and consequences of a budgeting process – 
including the specific practice of budgetary participation - remains of particular interest 
to accounting researchers (e.g. Shields and Shields, 1998; Fisher et al., 2002a; 
Covaleski et al., 2003; Davila and Wouters, 2005; Marginson and Ogden, 2005). This 
continued interest is related to the fact that budgeting is one of the most visible 
accounting tools in everyday life and a central plank of most organizations’ control 
mechanisms (Otley, 1999, p. 370). It operates in various forms and in various 
organizations and whilst most textbooks invariably associate it with ‘good’ 
management and planning of activities, early behavioural evidence suggested that the 
use of budgets (particularly imposed ones) were impacting negatively on managers’ 
behaviour (stress and tension) and on organizational effectiveness (e.g. Argyris, 1952; 
Swieringa and Moncur, 1972; Hopwood, 1976). The bureaucratic and political 
implications of the budgeting process are also well documented (e.g. Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1983; 1988) and are sometimes used as arguments for budgeting practices to 
be radically curtailed/adapted or altogether abolished (e.g. Hope and Fraser, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, these criticisms have been enhanced in light of the predictions from the 
agency perspective (e.g. Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Young, 1985) and the possibility that 
higher levels of BP will lead to higher levels of slack. The reasons for such behaviour 
have been associated to the need by managers to show a better performance (Kren, 
1997), to facilitate shirking (Baiman and Demski, 1980), and to protect against 
uncertainties (Onsi, 1973). Some authors also argue that slack can be actually positive 
in the long term and/or organizationally (Onsi, 1973; Argyris, 1990; Davila and 
Wouters, 2005). However, the findings of this study go beyond this point and the 
‘limited’ notion of slack or whether the latter is reduced or increased by BP. In their 
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review of the BP literature, Shields and Shields (1998) outline the various reasons for 
participative budgeting and its possible antecedents. The reasons relate to vertical 
information sharing, coordination of interdependencies and motivation/attitudes (1998, 
p. 60). Whilst the first two reasons emphasise the narrow functional and cognitive 
aspects (supply of information and managerial coordination) of BP, the last one implies 
there are broader and more complex implications for the manager and the organization 
alike.  
 
Although the various hypotheses on the effects of BP were initially informed by the 
agency perspective, the findings (Table 6.14. and Section 6.6.2.2) are compelling 
enough to review one’s perspective on the implications of participative budgeting. The 
finding that BP both reduces information manipulation and gaming (as broader 
managerial phenomena) could be viewed to be more consistent with the psychological 
theory-based research and the previously mentioned impact on motivation/attitudes. In 
particular, the concept of value attainment (Locke and Latham, 1990) asserts that 
satisfaction and morale can be improved simply because of this process (act) of 
participation that allows a subordinate to experience self-respect and feelings of 
equality arising from the opportunity to express his/her values (Shields and Shields, 
1998, p. 59). Whilst the links between BP and satisfaction/motivation are well 
documented, it is now apparent that the same value attainment concept can as well have 
broader and positive implications on how managers perceive, or actually engage in, any 
form of dysfunctional behaviour. Hence, perhaps in contrast to a limited and negatively-
oriented ‘constraining’ effect that SOPs have on dysfunctional behaviour (gaming), the 
above findings suggests that BP operates more comprehensively and more positively - 
beyond the realm of the traditional budgeting process - in ‘defusing’ instances of 
dysfunctional behaviour (information manipulation and gaming) amongst managers. 
  
However, the above conclusions are made conditional on the presence of contextual 
factors, particularly on the influence of task uncertainty. Again, the relevant hypothesis 
was guided by cognitive-led arguments in that a high level of task uncertainty was 
translated into an increased ‘functional-led’ need for more information to share with 
supervisors and to coordinate interdependencies, hence a higher level of BP (Sections 
6.6.2.4 and 6.6.3). In addition, Shields and Shields (1998, p. 60) also contended that 
when BP existed primarily for motivational reasons (as seems to be the case from the 
interpretation above), then the extent of BP practices will be positively associated with 
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task uncertainty. The authors’ own exploratory study (Shields and Shields, 1998) finds 
empirical support for this proposition (1998, p. 62). However, it is the opposite effect 
which is detected in this study, namely that a high (low) TU leads to low (high) BP. 
This then raises questions as to the motivational value and overall relevance of BP in 
times of high task uncertainty. If managers are confronted with high levels of TU, this 
would imply that there would be little to gain from the budgetary participation exercise, 
possibly in light of the inherent limitations of a ‘static’ budgetary process in responding 
to continuous uncertainties in the manager’s work environment. In turn, this would 
mitigate the ability of BP to retain its overall motivational value, specifically in this 
case in terms of preventing dysfunctional behaviour. This is a significant caveat to the 
initially optimistic and universal consequences of BP. However, this does not preclude 
the possibility that the company and its senior management could depend upon an 
alternate dialogue/debating process that could alleviate the uncertainties arising from 
the task requirements, thereby maintaining managerial motivation.  
 
In view of the recent interest in Simons’ (1995; 2000) LOC framework and the 
interactive/diagnostic conceptualisations, a further finding worthy of mention is the 
relationship between the interactive style of using controls and BP. A positive 
relationship was hypothesised between an interactive (diagnostic) and high (low) BP. 
Due to the changes in variable measurement for INT, the actual results can only bring 
support as to the relationship between a high (low) interactive style of using controls 
and high (low) use of BP (Table 6.14). Indeed, the initial descriptions of a highly 
‘interactive’ manager appeared to show an ideal fit with the budgetary participation 
exercise. For example Simons (1991, p. 55) states: 
“Although financial planning and budget data are used to frame the 
discussion, the debate centres on the effects of competitor actions, the timing 
and success of new product roll outs and withdrawals,…and consideration of 
appropriate responses to new market opportunities and threats”. 
 
In other words, the superior’s higher interactive use of controls is indicative of the  
‘mindset’ of the supervising manager (at least as perceived by the subordinate manager) 
in which the budgetary participation process is being designed, operated and acted 
upon, with the aim of fostering organizational dialogue, debate, and information 
exchange. At the same time however, this result does not preclude the fact that a high 
diagnostic use of controls can also be positively related to a high level of BP. Purely as 
a way to illustrate this possibility, one can consider the correlations reported by Henri 
 263
(2006, p. 541) between the diagnostic and interactive use of performance management 
systems (PMS) and the consequences predicted in Simons (1995; 2000), namely 
innovativeness and organizational learning. Whilst Henri (2006) hypothesised a 
negative relationship between the diagnostic uses of PMS to these variables, the 
correlations indicate a positive and significant association. Therefore, there is a need to 
dwell in more depth on the effects of interactive and diagnostic styles – as well as the 
combination of both styles - on the BP process.   
 
7.1.4. RAPM as a mechanism enhancing dysfunctional behaviours.   
 
Overall, the dysfunctional effects of RAPM were probably the most expected of the 
results, in consideration of the previous findings and expectations (e.g. Hopwood, 
1972; Onsi, 1973; Hirst, 1983; Merchant, 1985c; Merchant, 1990; Hughes and Kwon, 
1990; Lal et al., 1996). Most of these studies have focused on various outcome 
variables such as job-related tension (JRT), accrual/data manipulation, short-term 
thinking, discouragement of new ideas and budgetary slack. This study thus provides 
more recent empirical evidence supporting the claim that a reliance on accounting 
performance measures leads to the ‘broader’ dysfunctional effects of managerial 
gaming and information manipulation (Table 6.12 and Section 6.6.2.3). The fact that 
RAPM privileges outcomes rather than processes also points to the ‘diagnostic 
leanings’ of RAPM and the expectation that this may lead to more negative 
consequences (Simons, 1995: 2000). Informed by the more recent issues relating to the 
measurement and operationalisation of RAPM (Vagneur and Fakiolas, 2000; Otley and 
Fakiolas, 2000; Hartmann, 2000), this study also successfully adapted the relative 
measure of RAPM (accounting as a ratio of non-accounting measures), as initially 
suggested by Harrison (1992; 1993). Hartmann (2000) had previously highlighted the 
problems relating to the use of diverse RAPM measures over time and the hindrance 
this causes to theoretical developments and understandings of RAPM (2000, p. 466).    
 
Whilst the initial arguments by Hopwood (1972) placed the blame on the inherent 
limitations of accounting-based measures (such as budget targets being incomplete, 
lacking precision, outcomes-based and short-term oriented) in potentially causing 
dysfunctional behaviour, the author subsequently asserted that it is more the undue 
reliance on such measures (in specific contexts) which actually causes the 
dysfunctional behaviours. The subsequent operationalisation and long standing use of 
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RAPM (or budget emphasis) in the literature thus reflects this argument and this, in 
many ways, has steered the debate on the relevance (or not) of relying on accounting 
performance measures e.g. the recent use of a new variable known as ‘opinions about 
the appropriateness of accounting performance measures’ by Hartmann (2005) is a case 
in point. However, evidence on whether the ‘intrinsic’ features127 of accounting-based 
performance measures can also cause (dys)functional behaviour has been less of an 
interest - although extant evidence on the dysfunctional behaviour of RAPM has often 
been equated to mean that accounting-based measures are intrinsically ‘bad’. At this 
juncture, this therefore suggests a need to re-orient the research objectives and design in 
seeking to gather more empirical (and contemporary) evidence on the consequences 
(both positive and negative) arising from the intrinsic features of accounting 
performance measures subject to specific contextual variables, rather than focusing 
purely on their actual use or reliance by senior managers.  
  
The next contribution relates to the initially unexpected findings on the links between 
the superiors’ interactive use of controls and RAPM (Table 6.15). Since RAPM 
involved a reliance on short term, outcome-oriented and accounting-based measures, 
there was an expectation that this would suit a more diagnostic (i.e. less interactive) 
style in the use of controls. Again, the actual measurement of INT in this study, and the 
implication that diagnostic and interactive uses of control can prevail independently 
(Widener, 2007; Henri, 2006) in an organization, preclude one from reaching any 
conclusion on the consequences of a (high or low) diagnostic style in the use of 
controls on RAPM.  On the other hand, the empirical results assert that a high 
interactive use of controls is associated to a higher level of RAPM. A possible 
interpretation - similar to the point made earlier on the links between INT and SOPs - is 
that a highly interactive manager depends on the feedback and diagnostic feature of 
RAPM to keep an ‘overall look’ on the activities of the subordinate managers and 
departments. This is consistent with the previous arguments that there are 
complementarities between an interactive style of using controls and the so-called 
diagnostic/feedback features of RAPM, thereby leading to a state of dynamic tension 
                                                
127
 A recent illustration of this interest in the intrinsic - but more positive - features of budgets was put 
forward in Marginson and Ogden (2005). The authors are critical of the literature’s focus on the negative 
aspects of budgets and contend that budget targets convey in themselves a sense of certainty and clarity, 
thus acting as an antidote to role ambiguity (2005, p. 436-437) and enhancing managerial commitment to 
the budget targets (2005, p. 451). Their findings thus bring credence to the significant and inherently 
positive features of budgetary-based measures and targets, whilst acknowledging the influence of 
contextual variables in mitigating or enhancing the effects of these intrinsic features. 
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that will enhance organizational capabilities (Widener, 2007, p. 760; Henri, 2006). 
However, this dynamic tension does not necessarily ‘generate’ positive outcomes. For 
instance, Henri (2006) did not find any support for the dynamic tension variable in his 
study and he suggested that the negative dynamics to the tension can in fact overpower 
the positive ones. Furthermore, he mentions the possibility that this tension can trigger 
change while simultaneously activating defensive routines that inhibit change (2006, p. 
547). The reference to defensive routines (Argyris, 1990) was viewed as very topical to 
the present study in that the results show a significant interaction between INT and 
RAPM in enhancing both forms of dysfunctional behaviour (Chapter 6, Figures 6.4a 
and 6.4b). Furthermore, and building also on Argyris’ (1990) comments, Tuomela 
(2005, p. 312) highlights the threatening characteristic of an interactive use of a 
performance management system, although he considers this would arise when such 
system would be grounded in detailed non-financial information (as opposed to 
financial ones for a diagnostic use). Although this present study was designed and 
conducted prior to Henri (2006) and Tuomela (2005), this finding nevertheless provides 
empirical support – albeit in a rather indirect fashion - to the argument that the dynamic 
tension as well as interactive use of controls can not only lead to positive consequences 
(as initially predicted by Simons) - but also to negative ones.   
 
A final comment relates to the absence of a significant relationship between task 
uncertainty and RAPM (Table 6.15). This can be viewed as a significant departure from 
the long-standing arguments and findings on the relevance of uncertainty (task and 
environmental) in the design or influence of RAPM - particularly in relation to its 
overall effects on the extent of managerial dysfunctional behaviour (e.g. Hirst, 1981; 
1983; Hayes and Cron, 1988; Ross, 1995; Hartmann, 2000; Hartmann, 2005). In 
particular, Hartmann (2000) contends that uncertainty is a central concept in the RAPM 
contingency framework, as conceptualized previously by Galbraith (1973; 1977). 
Hartmann (2005) recently provided empirical results supporting the relevance of both 
environmental and task uncertainty, albeit with opposite effects on RAPM (positive for 
EU and negative for TU) and in the presence of personality characteristics (i.e. 
tolerance for ambiguity). According to him (2005, p. 258), any theory that suggests 
singular relationships between ‘uncertainty’ and budgets or budget-based measures is 
incomplete. To some extent, this may provide an explanation of the lack of direct 
relationships between TU and RAPM. For instance, the effects of TU can be more 
complex than initially hypothesised and may interact more with personality-based 
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variables (such as tolerance for ambiguity, locus of control) in influencing RAPM, as 
suggested by Hartmann (2005) and Chenhall (2003, p. 158). In addition, one may also 
question whether TU needs to be examined in relation to the intrinsic features of 
accounting measures, as discussed in the initial part of this section.  
 
7.1.5. Validating a ‘legitimacy’ variable within a functionalist model  
 
Chenhall (2003, p. 159) argues for the inclusion of more interpretive and/or critical 
elements in such studies, in an attempt to better inform the traditional functionalist 
model - which has dominated in many ways ‘mainstream’ management control 
research. While he suggests that there is still more to ascertain from the wide array of 
functionalist-oriented theories from the economics, psychology and organizational 
literature (e.g. agency, population-ecology), he contends that the contingency-based 
research has not relied on, or applied, the more interpretive and critical theories (2003, 
p. 159). At the same time, these are being increasingly validated by the findings from 
case study research128. Although Chenhall (2003, p. 160) acknowledged the caveat that 
it may be difficult to combine these so-called ‘alternate theories’ with the traditionalist 
functional model, he concludes that many of the insights concerning for example the 
role of institutions within society on the adoption of MCS can be combined readily with 
contingency concepts (2003, p. 160). It is thus in this spirit that one must consider the 
exploratory-oriented findings of this study (Section 6.6.4), particularly in addressing 
the tenets and implications of the institutional perspective and the associated concept of 
the legitimating nature of controls (LNC).  
 
Essentially, institutional theorists contend that organisational environments are 
characterised by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual 
organisations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy (Scott and 
Meyer, 1983, p. 149). The concept of legitimacy has gained popularity and validity on 
its own in management and administrative research (Suchman, 1995; Deephouse, 
1996), namely for example in the study of accounting practice in context (e.g. Burchell 
et al., 1980; Richardson, 1987; Carruthers and Espeland, 1991), in understanding 
voluntary disclosures in company annual reports (e.g. Deegan, 2000; 2002), and in 
examining the reasons for the implementation of corporate governance 
                                                
128
 For example, one can refer to Baxter and Chua (2003) for a more detailed review of the various 
alternative management accounting theories and the associated case evidence. 
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practices/disclosures (e.g. Woodward et al., 1996; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). 
This conformity for the ‘sake’ of legitimacy is typically expected to be achieved 
without consideration of whether such practices are actually effective or beneficial to 
the actors in the organization. As such, the perceptions of the individual actor (e.g. 
manager) are not considered critical to these theoretical strands since it is rather the 
collective behaviour of organizations and of its actors in response to social and 
institutional forces that matters. However, the unit of interest for the behavioural-
inspired and contingency-based MCS research remains the individual manager. As 
such, and apart from the evidence gathered from case studies, there appeared to be very 
little cross-sectional empirical evidence on whether (and the extent to which) 
individually managers perceive control systems to be legitimating devices. In this 
respect, the questionnaire items (Chapter 6, Table 6.8) indicated a reasonable range of 
mean responses, thereby revealing some agreement to the fact that control systems 
serve symbolic and legitimating motives but these are not necessarily viewed as the 
primary motives for control systems as evidenced by the mixed mean responses and 
variability levels. Furthermore, only two of the three items factored satisfactorily, 
which was mostly explained by design issues with the third item. Interestingly 
however, there were weak non-significant correlations between LNC variable and other 
variables measured in this study i.e. control systems, traditional contingency variables 
and the dysfunctional behaviour variables, suggesting there is little evidence of direct 
relationships (and confounding effects) between the surveyed ‘functionalities’ of 
control systems and the legitimating motives put forward. Overall, this partially shows 
that an exploratory-led operationalisation of a legitimacy variable has yielded 
satisfactory results and thus demonstrates that there are opportunities in developing 
questionnaire-based measures, as informed by the theoretical principles, arguments and 
concepts from the institutional and legitimacy perspectives. 
 
Early studies such as Cyert and March (1963) already highlighted the ‘ceremonial’ or 
‘ritualistic’ nature of the budgetary system and considered the budget as “...both the 
substance and result of political bargaining processes that are useful for legitimising 
and maintaining systems of power and control within organisations” (cited in 
Covaleski and Dirsmith, p. 1, 1988). In addition, Perez and Robson (1999) found 
instances of gaming practices in an organization as well as ritualistic and taken-for-
granted behaviours by the various individual managers. In this study, the institutional-
led concept - known as the legitimating nature of controls (LNC) - was found to be a 
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moderator variable in some of the MCS-DB links, thereby providing an empirical 
confirmation of some of the previously mentioned case study observations. Firstly, 
whilst gaming behaviours appeared to be significantly constrained by SOPs, the 
presence of a higher agreement by managers to the fact that controls are merely 
legitimating devices causes the constraining effect of SOPs to be gradually ‘loosened’ 
and eventually reversed (non-monotonic relationship) i.e. a high level SOPs will 
eventually encourage gaming behaviours. This can be interpreted as a significant 
dysfunctional reaction to the increasing use of ‘bureaucratic’ nature of SOPs internally 
by individual managers, as opposed to what the organization ‘expects’ from a higher 
level of SOPs, namely that they are beneficial both in terms of functionality (control 
managers) and legitimacy (conferring social acceptance from actors and participants). 
This interpretation of such managerial behaviour can be also tentatively associated to 
the previously mentioned expectation from the contingency literature (Hirst, 1983, refer 
to Section 7.1.1) that there is possibly a U-shaped (non-linear) relationship between 
control systems and dysfunctional behaviour. To my knowledge, this remains to be 
empirically supported (refer to Section 4.1.1) although the existence of such 
relationship remains intuitively strong i.e. it would be difficult to expect the linear 
relationships to be valid at extreme levels (i.e. very high or near zero levels of SOPs). 
However, in consideration of these moderating results, one may be tempted to conclude 
that the consequences of SOPs on gaming at extreme levels may be best explained by 
how managers perceive these controls to be primarily legitimating devices or not.  
 
The fact that a similar moderating non-monotonic effect was observed for BP and 
gaming (Table 6.27) brings further evidence as to the effects of LNC on the extent of 
managerial dysfunctional behaviour. In contrast to the study of SOPs, there is a number 
of interpretive and institutional-led case studies that have focused, and/or documented, 
on the symbolic, legitimating, political and power implications of the budgeting 
process, and particularly on the notions of a ‘democratic-led’, ‘devolved’ subordinate 
involvement and empowerment (e.g. Cyert and March, 1963; Meyer, 1983; Covaleski 
and Dirsmith, 1983; Covaleski et al. 1985; Brunsson, 1989; Perez and Robson, 1999; 
Moll and Hoque, 2004). The recent case study into the introduction of a budget system 
in a university (Moll and Hoque, 2004) demonstrated the continued relevance of 
legitimacy in terms of the ability of the new budget model to impart a sense of 
efficiency to management operations (2004, p. 26). However, the authors also 
document individual resistance and dysfunctional behaviours from managers (creation 
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of slack budgets, poor performance, negative attitudes towards management), due to 
their perceptions on the symbolic and power-related implications of the budget. Thus, 
this study contributes to the existing case evidence on budgets and legitimacy by 
providing empirical and quantitative-based evidence on how legitimating perceptions 
amongst functional managers can override the ‘rational’ motivational consequences of 
the budgetary participation, particularly on the extent of gaming practices. However, it 
has to be acknowledged that the absence of moderating effects of LNC in the 
relationship between BP and information manipulation behaviours hinders the validity 
of the above as an overall interpretation. Nonetheless, the existence of a (weak) 
strength interaction (Section 6.5.2) i.e. the negative coefficient between BP and DBIN 
is lower at high LNC levels as opposed to low LNC levels, suggests there are 
indications of similar effects for the information manipulation behaviours.  
 
Finally, the contributory effects of LNCs are also (partly) confirmed for the RAPM 
variable. In contrast however, the moderating effect of LNC on the RAPM-DBIN level 
is a monotonic one (Section 6.5.3.2) i.e. managers’ perceptions of the legitimating 
nature of controls have a constant enhancing effect on the existing positive relationship 
between RAPM and information manipulation. The institutional theory-led literature 
has given some specific attention to use of accounting measures in organizations and 
these can be subsumed within the category of accounting practices that are often used 
to convey the appearance of rationality and efficiency (Burchell et al., 1980; Feldman 
and March, 1981; Ansari and Euske, 1987; Carruthers and Espeland, 1991; Jang, 2005; 
Potter, 2005). For instance, as a result of a global demand for an objective and scientific 
accountability model, Jang (2005, p. 298) asserts that accounting practice (including the 
use of accounting measures) - by virtue of their quantification and calculation - has 
gained ‘prestige’ as a result of the perceived ‘objectivity’ of numbers and its ability to 
make activities (and thus actions or management performance) visible in economic 
terms. This last point is reminiscent of Roberts and Scapens’ (1985) comments: 
“Accounting is significant in organizations, not just as a functional specialism 
alongside production, marketing etc, but because it frequently provides the 
common language through which the activities of engineers, salesmen and so 
on are integrated and assessed” (1985, p. 450).  
 
At the same time, this assessment of managerial performance can also be analysed as a 
decision by the senior manager, who must be seen as reaching a decision following the 
use of so-called ‘objective’ information - as a “….representation of competence and 
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reaffirmation of social virtue” (Feldman and March, 1981, p. 177; also in Brunsson, 
1990, p. 58). As such, decision-makers and organizations hope to legitimate their 
decisions via the demand for accounting performance measures, irrespective as to 
whether the reliance or not on such measures is functionally appropriate, adequate 
and/or complete for the subordinate managers and for the organization as a whole. 
Indeed as suggested by Potter (2005, p. 270), how the accounting-based evaluation is 
done is less important than the fact that it is done. The findings relating to LNC and 
RAPM (i.e. monotonic form interaction for information manipulation and a significant 
strength interaction for gaming i.e. refer to Table 6.27 and Section 6.5.2) indicate that 
subordinate managers perceive such reliance on accounting measures to be reflecting 
strongly such legitimating and symbolic motives. At their level, these legitimating and 
symbolic motives are perceived differently in that the subordinate managers appear 
encouraged to engage in dysfunctional behaviours. Therefore, in considering the sum of 
these findings, one can conclude that a manager’s perception on the legitimating nature 
of controls acts in combination with the existing control systems towards intensifying 
the extent of dysfunctional behaviours.  
 
In terms of the wider implications of these findings, there was already an increasing 
voice in the literature supporting the relevance of institutional theory and its principles 
in management accounting and control (e.g. Scapens, 1994; Carruthers, 1995; Bhimani, 
1999; Chenhall, 2003; Potter, 2005) and more recently in the specific context of 
management accounting change (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007; Dambrin et al., 2007). 
As mentioned by Baxter and Chua (2003, p. 100), there has been an explicit movement 
in organisational theory and sociology towards cognitive and cultural explanations of 
institutions, focusing on the meaning and accomplishment of various rules that 
structure behaviour in organisations and society. Hence, rules embodied in control 
systems - such as SOPs, budgetary participation, and the reliance on accounting 
performance measures - are seen as ‘rational myths’ that could confer social legitimacy 
upon organisational participants and their actions (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983; 1988; 
Covaleski et al., 1993; Abernethy and Chua, 1996) but these appear to be differently 
perceived at various intra-organizational levels. From these various writings and as 
evident in the empirical results achieved in this study, it is apparent that 
legitimacy/legitimation arguments on the existence of particular organization structures 
(such control systems) are not viewed as a de facto rejection of the functional (or 
efficiency-led) motives. The legitimation interpretation can obviously be trumpeted as 
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being the more relevant one but crucially, these two explanations could still be seen as 
competing with, and complementing each other. Whilst it can be concluded there is no 
a priori incompatibility in considering the legitimacy argument within the functional-
led contingency model, it is acknowledged that more theoretical-led refinements and 
empirical replications are needed. In particular, the assumption that the existing 
controls have not themselves been established as a result of these legitimating 
perceptions is a notable theoretical and empirical challenge. Whilst the perceptions on 
the legitimating nature of controls were observed as being (directly) independent of, 
and un-related to the existence of the control systems (Table 6.9), there is an inherent 
complexity in the dynamics of how institutional forces operate and a need to examine 
in more detail the implications of such a relationship when developing models/variables 
involving dynamics of isomorphism. 
 
7.2. Limitations of the Study and Resulting Research Opportunities  
 
In the process of meeting the main research questions and objectives, several aspects in 
the study may limit the scope of the findings. In addition, the reliance on more recently 
published research could have addressed some of these limitations. At the same time 
however, many of the issues mentioned can be turned into opportunities for subsequent 
research and/or further refinement.  
 
7.2.1. Questionnaire Response Rate and Statistical Methods  
 
The percentage response rates for the survey questionnaire were not as high as expected 
and this has influenced several intended aspects of the study. The sources of 
information for the manufacturing companies (especially internal management 
structures, names etc) were limited for the Australian sample. Although up-to-date 
databases (such as Kompass Directory) existed for the manufacturing companies, the 
reliability of information was still not fully satisfactory as shown by the number of 
returned questionnaires. In an attempt at improving the generalizability of the findings, 
the above details were deemed necessary to ensure the use of a random cross-sectional 
sample of respondents rather than relying on convenience sampling, the latter being a 
popular practice in management accounting research (Van der Stede et al., 2005, p. 
668).  However, as earlier discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.8.1.2) and again referring 
to the comments by Chenhall (2003) and Birnberg et al. (1990), an inevitable trade off 
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occurs between ensuring a maximum response rate in a convenience sampling strategy 
compared to ensuring the maximum chances for generalizable results in random sample 
strategy. This study has focused on the latter whilst applying the recommended 
protocols relating to pre-testing, follow-up and the use of incentives as previously 
recommended in Dillman (1978) and reinforced by more recent authors (Young, 1996; 
Van der Stede et al., 2005). Nevertheless, in spite of the low percentage response rate, 
the number of valid completed questionnaires was, overall, adequate to meet the 
research objectives.   
 
In light of the above, the initial intention to test the intervening models using the 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) technique had to be reviewed, in consideration of 
the caveats of small sample size (Jaccard and Wan, 1996). In lieu, the ordinary-least 
squares (OLS) regression method was implemented for both the path analysis and 
moderated regression analysis (MRA). However, an alternative and more robust 
strategy could have been the use of partial least squares (PLS). According to Hartmann 
(2006, p. 34 and 2005, p. 254), this technique is similar to covariance based structural 
equation modelling techniques (e.g., LISREL, EQS). PLS is a second generation 
statistical technique that allows testing causal models with multiple independent, 
mediating and dependent variables with multiple indicators or measures per variable. 
PLS resembles ordinary least squares regression with regard to output and can be used 
in a similar way for path and moderating models (Hartmann, 2005). In addition, PLS 
allows smaller sample sizes than covariance-based models and does not rely on the 
many stringent assumptions implicit in the use of OLS. This technique has been 
recently used in other MCS-related research (e.g. Mahama, 2007; Abernethy and 
Bouwens, 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, it is also noted that in addressing this research objective and question, the 
path analysis technique was applied more rigorously, particularly in the light of the 
criticisms of solely depending on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) conditions. In this case, 
the path-analytic procedures set out by Preacher and Hayes (2004) and the use of 
Sobel’s (1982, 1986) test were implemented to assess the statistical significance of the 
indirect effects - an aspect which has been mostly taken for granted (rather than being 
formally tested) in previous path-analysis based MCS studies. It is also believed that 
statistical pitfalls associated with the analysis of moderation or interaction models, as 
extensively documented in Hartmann and Moers (1999, 2003) and Gerdin and Greve 
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(2004), have been addressed in this study. In particular, the identification of strength 
vs. form interactions has not been previously emphasized in most of the MCS research 
that relied on moderation models.  
 
7.2.2. Interactive vs. Diagnostic Style in the Use of Controls 
 
The measurement and conceptualisation of this contextual variable remains open to 
further refinements. This was originally developed from Simons’ (1994) observations 
and later assessed empirically (in the context of budgets only) by Abernethy and 
Brownell (1999). A number of recent empirical and case studies have also relied on this 
concept (Marginson, 2002; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Tuomela, 2005; Naranjo-Gil and 
Hartmann, 2007; Henri, 2006; Widener, 2007). A key initial feature of this variable has 
been the fact that managers can be either interactive at one end of the scale or 
diagnostic at the other extreme, in their intentions towards the use of controls. This was 
explicitly assessed and used by Abernethy and Brownell (1999), although the reliability 
statistics were not very promising (1999, p. 196). However, a very different picture has 
emerged in this study in that the responses for the individual items did not factor 
properly resulting into two variables i.e. an interactive level of use of controls 
(high/low) and a diagnostic one (high/low). Upon further investigation, only the first 
variable was used in this study and found to have relevance in the intervening models. 
Nevertheless, the issue remains as to the exact nature of these two variables and their 
impact on control systems and subordinate managers - a challenging issue initially put 
forward by Van der Stede (2001) and more recently in Tuomela (2005), Henri (2006), 
Widener, (2007) and Bisbe et al. (2007). Informed by the predictive validity 
framework, the latter authors stress (2007, p. 810) the need for a sound conceptual 
specification of research constructs - particularly practice-based constructs - and 
present the example of the interactive use of controls to illustrate their arguments. In 
addition, some of the recent studies have taken an interest in the interactions between 
diagnostic and interactive controls (as initially hypothesised by Simons, 1995; 2000). 
Indeed, the existence of a dynamic tension arising from the interaction of the two styles 
could be more relevant in understanding their effects on managers’ behaviour and 
organizational outcomes (Marginson, 2002; Henri, 2006).  Finally, as will be elaborated 
below, future MCS studies may - as a matter of course - be compelled to examine and 
model the inter-linkages between the different control systems i.e. for example by 
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relying comprehensively on the levers of control (LOC) framework (e.g. Widener, 
2007; Tuomela, 2005).  
 
7.2.3. Traditional vs. ‘Contemporary’ Conceptualisations of Control Systems  
 
The starting point of this discussion relates to the measurement of budgetary 
participation in this study (Section 6.2.2). Although it was only slightly different from 
the original Milani (1975) score and it did not seem to have caused significant 
differences in the overall results, it remains that this once ‘stable’ construct may now be 
increasingly out of tune with the realities of budgeting and planning practices in private 
organizations, as alluded earlier in Chenhall (2003) and Shields and Shields (1998). For 
instance, Chenhall (2003, p. 131) mentions budget controls such as static-flexible 
budgets, non-financial performance measures, activity-based accounting, competitor-
focused accounting, and product development information. This could be initially 
addressed through case studies of participation in setting targets in different types of 
organizations to find new dimensions and then conducting a cross-sectional (random 
sample of companies/managers) validation of the variable. In addition, previous 
discussion on RAPM (Section 7.1.4) has highlighted issues arising from the different 
conceptualisations of the use of accounting performance measures and the need perhaps 
to focus on the more intrinsic features of accounting performance measures. 
Furthermore, as put forward by Chenhall (2003, p. 130) there are a number of ‘new 
contemporary’ management and control practices that have not been fully integrated in 
the extant contingency-based MCS research, namely on aspects such as balanced 
scorecards, target costing, life cycle costing. Hence, whilst this study has focused on 
specific and well-researched control systems and has indeed brought new research 
findings in relation to these control systems, it is also important to recognize there 
could be other control systems/mechanisms operating within these same organizations 
that may have more relevance than these ‘traditional’ controls - in terms of their impact 
on contextual variables and dysfunctional behaviours.   
 
In parallel to the above, there is an increasing acknowledgement (and empirical 
implementation) of the fact that control systems are inter-dependent (Merchant and 
Otley, 2006) and that researchers must approach studies with a holistic perspective of 
control systems (Otley, 1999) rather than considering control systems in isolation from 
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one another129. Recent MCS studies indicate that this latter strategy remains popular, 
possibly as a need to focus on the implications of specific control mechanisms, and 
with particular emphasis on more contemporary systems e.g. Bisbe and Otley (2004) 
study the interactive use of budgets, balance scorecards and project management 
systems without assuming these may have inter-dependencies. Henri (2006) adopts 
Simons’ (1995: 2000) conceptualisations of interactive/diagnostic control and dynamic 
tensions between them but focuses their implications only on performance management 
systems. In contrast, Widener (2007) and Tuomela (2005) adopt the LOC framework 
(belief systems, boundary systems, diagnostic, interactive) holistically and address the 
inter-relationships between the control systems. For instance, and relying on Simons’ 
(1995; 2000) arguments, Widener (2007) hypothesises relationships between the 
emphasis placed on belief systems and the emphasis placed on the other three control 
systems. Overall, she finds (2007, p. 779) empirical support for the inter-relatedness 
and complementarities between the different control systems in improving 
organizational outcomes. Incidentally, this study found little association amongst the 
surveyed control mechanisms, apart from a significant correlation between SOP and BP 
(Table 6.9). However, in the absence of an explanatory framework supporting the inter-
relationships between control systems, such association (and absence thereof) conveys 
little theoretical meaning.  As Widener (2007) demonstrates, the LOC framework could 
be a useful theoretical basis to assess empirically the complementarities between 
control systems. Alternatively, Chenhall (2003, p. 131-132) suggested the use of 
taxonomies of control systems (from mechanistic to organic controls) and how these 
relate to the overall control culture of the organization.    
 
7.2.4. Measurement and Consequences of Managerial Dysfunctional Behaviour 
 
This section relates to the two continuous challenges in researching the ‘practice’ of 
managerial dysfunctional behaviour and the implications of such practices for managers 
and organizations. Previous studies of dysfunctional behaviour, such as Jaworski and 
Young (1992), Van der Stede (2000), Merchant (1985c), refer to the problems of 
eliciting ‘truthful’ responses from managers about the extent to which they might 
‘misbehave’. The use of forced choice questions and other strategies in formulating the 
various items do not appear to have had a negative impact on construct validity and the 
                                                
129
 Incidentally, previous studies (e.g. Dunk, 1990; 1993a; 1993b) have considered the inter-relationships 
between BP and RAPM but as part of a moderating model i.e. BP and RAPM were hypothesised to be 
interacting to achieve organizational outcomes but were not assumed to be directly associated.      
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intended sub-dimensions of DB (information manipulation and gaming) did materialize 
as originally expected. Nevertheless, the risk of ethical-led bias remains quite present 
and potentially can influence findings. Future research involving dysfunctional 
behaviour might best be led by the guidelines on conceptual specification, recently 
advocated in Bisbe et al. (2007). 
 
Equally crucially however, the other challenge concerns the follow-on - and possibly 
positive - consequences of managerial dysfunctional behaviour for the organization, 
which as result, could be encouraged by senior management. The same issue was raised 
within the budgetary slack literature (e.g. Shields and Shields, 1998; Dunk and Perera, 
1997) and on the nature of dysfunctional behaviour itself (Argyris, 1990). As 
mentioned by Jaworski and Young (1992, p. 31), firms may condone violations of the 
control system if there are indications that such violations may actually improve 
performance over the long run. Van der Stede (2000, p. 620) does acknowledge the 
same point but counter-argues that unless actions are taken to reduce dysfunctional 
behaviour in the short term, “….there may never be a long term”. More recently, 
Davila and Wouters (2005, p. 588) presented convincing case evidence on how 
budgetary slack was accepted and used purposefully by the organization as a way to 
facilitate managers’ work, particularly in situations when the latter are confronted with 
uncertainties and multiple goals. The authors report on an almost subtle and elaborate 
system by which the organization was able to direct managerial attention to more 
important aspects by allowing the building of slack.  
 
Throughout the various studies (including this present one) and over time, the 
terminologies used (i.e. slack, short-term orientation, information manipulation, gaming 
and dysfunctional) have inevitably conveyed a negative tone. Davila and Wouters 
(2005, p. 588) highlight this issue and argue that they for example view slack as a 
neutral concept with no pre-determined positive/negative connotations. Argyris’ (1990, 
p. 506) also appears to review his initial perspectives by referring instead to the 
activation of organizational and individual defensive routines adopted by players (and 
thereby implicitly accepted by organizations) to ‘protect themselves’. But there is little 
acknowledgement of how this could be beneficial in the longer term. Whilst recent 
evidence on the ‘good’ consequences of slack has been uncovered, more investigation 
may be needed in formally ascertaining the positive consequences of a wider range of 
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so-called dysfunctional behaviours not only at the individual/managerial level, but also 
for the organization as a whole.  
 
7.3. Key Recommendations for Further Research 
 
The previous sections on the main contributions to the literature and 
limitations/opportunities have already highlighted or alluded to a number of directions 
future MCS research could build on from the key findings of this study. As a result, the 
following six key recommendations for future research are presented: 
 
(a) Research on the elements, and the overall framework, of Simons’ (1995; 2000) 
levers of control (LOC). There are emerging findings from this study and recent 
research (e.g. Tuomela, 2005; Henri, 2006) suggesting that an interactive style of 
controls is not necessarily leading to positive consequences for control systems using 
the LOC framework. In addition, evidence on the benefits of a so-called dynamic 
tension between the ‘negative’ (boundary and diagnostic) and ‘positive’ (beliefs and 
interactive) forces has not been forthcoming (e.g. Henri, 2006). At the same time, a 
more comprehensive adoption of the LOC framework will inherently involve the study 
of inter-relationships between control systems (e.g. Widener, 2007).  
 
(b) In parallel, there is a need to review more critically the concepts and constructs of 
‘traditional’ MCS research such as budgetary participation and RAPM. In the case of 
BP, there is an implication that the budgeting and planning process has remained static 
and that the ‘process’ of participation has not evolved, as a result of new management 
structures, use of technologies (e.g. enterprise resource planning systems) and changes 
in management / organizational ethos.  In the case of RAPM, there would be an interest 
in considering the intrinsic features of accounting-based and budget-measures and the 
consequences these may have on managers and organizations in the presence of key 
contextual variables.  In a similar vein, the notion of ‘uncertainty’ - as it pertains to the 
operation of control systems - may also need to be revisited. Finally, the findings on 
SOPs suggest that further research on other instances of ‘non-financial’ boundary 
systems (or mechanistic controls) - and their inter-relationships between them - is 
germane to one’s understanding of the overall consequences of MCS.    
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(c) Applicability of results in other contexts: The comparison of MCS and its 
consequences in different countries has already been an element with abundant 
literature. It was however argued that the cultural dimensions used (mainly developed 
by Hofstede, 1981) may not be appropriate to formally assess the differences in 
practices in such studies and also in the broader context of accounting research. This 
point was elaborated in Baskerville (2003, p. 10), who suggested the alternative use of 
national characteristics relating to economic performance, socio-political data etc.  In 
this thesis, the extent of the analysis was limited to one country – albeit in one which 
has been frequently ‘used’ in previous MCS studies - and difficulties may arise in 
replicating this research in other contexts, particularly in countries where there may be 
more reluctance to respond to questionnaires or where there are difficulties in assessing 
the list of target companies and managers.  
 
(d) A number of aspects recommended in (a), (b) and (c) above could best be addressed 
through the use of multiple research methods and data sources, rather than relying 
solely on questionnaire surveys or case study research. One possible research strategy 
would be to first carry out case study-based research on a few similar companies 
(similar size and activity) in Australia as well as in other countries, which would allow 
a more in depth analysis and understanding of control systems as they exist in the field. 
This can then inform contingency-based designers in developing better measures. For 
instance, this notion of dynamic tension (e.g. Henri, 2006) appears to be much more 
complex than being simply understood and measured as a product term of an 
interactive and diagnostic use of controls. In addition, the use of more recent statistical 
methods (such as Partial Least Squares) will bring more confidence in the validity of 
the models and hypothesis put forward, particularly in a research context dogged by 
relatively low response rates.  
  
(e) Dysfunctional behaviours: measurement and follow-on Consequences – This thesis 
has provided a fairly robust confirmation of the descriptive (e.g. Birnberg et al., 1983) 
and empirical literature (specifically Jaworski and Young, 1992) in terms of the 
construct ‘extent of managerial dysfunctional behaviour’ and its sub-dimensions of 
‘information manipulation’ and ‘gaming’. However, replication studies can be 
envisaged to confirm the stability of the constructs and eventually there would be an 
interest in surveying a wider sample of managers in manufacturing as well as service 
companies in different contexts. Furthermore, there is the critical question of the 
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follow-on (rather than long-term) consequences of dysfunctional behaviours, as 
mentioned in Jaworski and Young (1992), Van der Stede (2000) and Davila and 
Wouters (2005). Hence, building on the lessons learned from the budgetary slack 
literature, there would be merit in investigating - empirically and/or initially as a case 
study - the consequences of managerial dysfunctional behaviours on other outcome 
variables, such as managerial motivation, job satisfaction, or performance. 
 
(f) Institutional theory-led and other ‘interpretive’-led variables - Part of this study has 
focused on the empirical implications of the institutional perspective in the operation of 
management control systems. There is a criticism and limitation in using empirical 
methods such as a survey questionnaire to measure such aspects. On the other hand, 
case study research can only bring a limited set, albeit in more depth, of evidence as to 
the validity of these ‘interpretive’ variables in organizations. The case study literature 
has already highlighted the existence/relevance of rationalised practices, legitimacy, 
symbols and rituals, and the exercise of power and politics in organizations, when it 
comes to the existence and use of MCS. They are factors and issues that are 
increasingly difficult to ignore within the ‘mainstream’ MCS research in assessing the 
managers’ behaviour in response to control systems. As a potential illustration, 
empirical research on the asserting and exercising of power through accounting/control 
systems could be considered by building on the findings of existing case studies (e.g. 
Collier, 2001; Abernethy and Vagnoni, 2004).  
  
7.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
During the research and write up phase of this thesis, a number of developments in the 
MCS area have occurred. Whilst these have been acknowledged in various parts of this 
thesis, this chapter has particularly sought to situate the relevance of the current study’s 
measures and findings vis-à-vis these more recent studies. Firstly, this study brings to 
the fore the concept of dysfunctional behaviour as a broader set of behaviours involving 
information manipulation and gaming. Relying on early conceptualisations, the relevant 
statistics in this study support its reliability and validity for future research. Secondly, 
the effects of control systems on managerial dysfunctional behaviour have been 
identified and the potential (and different) ‘dynamics’ underlying  such effects have 
been put forward, particularly in light of the recent findings relating to the LOC 
framework and the interactive/diagnostic concepts. For instance, SOPs - as a form of 
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boundary system - have a limited but constraining effect on gaming practices. In 
contrast, the motivational-led properties of participative budgeting have a broader but 
yet defusing effect on the extent of both information manipulation and gaming 
practices, suggestive of the beneficial and comprehensive impact of BP in 
organizations. On the other hand, the reliance on accounting performance measures 
enhances both forms of dysfunctional behaviour and this could be associated to the 
diagnostic feature of the control system, and its expected ‘negative’ consequences for 
managers. Thirdly, the relevance of task uncertainty and the interactive use of controls 
has been partly confirmed but there are also contrary (and non-significant) results 
which have been related to recently published empirical/case findings. Fourthly, there 
are a number of significant results - relating to SOPs, BP and RAPM - supporting the 
claim that the managers’ views on the legitimating nature of controls (LNC) intensify 
the extent of dysfunctional behaviours. In other words, the managers’ attitudes on the 
extent to which controls are more ceremonial, ritualistic and symbolic than functional is 
observed to have a moderating impact on the relationship between control systems and 
dysfunctional behaviour. Whilst not all the relevant hypotheses have been supported, 
the findings are at least indicative of the possible avenues of compatibility between 
legitimacy/institutional arguments and the rational-led contingency model used in MCS 
research.  
 
Finally, a number of limitations have been also highlighted such as the (relatively) low 
response rate, the use of statistical methods, the conceptualisations (and inter-
relationships) of control systems and the consequences of dysfunctional behaviours 
(whether leading to positive or negative outcomes). However, these limitations also 
represent opportunities for further empirical and/or case studies, in a bid to better 
appreciate and recognise the complexities that are currently emerging from the study of 
the existence, interacts, and consequences of management control systems.  
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Appendix 2.1 - List of Contingency Variables Researched in Management Accounting and Control Studies 
 
Contextual 
Variable 
Reference Measurement / Construct 
 
Advanced Management 
Practices (AMP) 
 
Perera et al. (1997) 
Chenhall (1993b) 
 
Note: AMP and AMT are 
combined to form “Customer-
Focused Manufacturing Strategy) 
 
Based on Chenhall (1993b) - A seven-item instrument to assess the extent to which 
an organization has implemented programs involving reduction of waste, quality 
improvement, cycle time improvement etc.  
 
Advanced 
Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT) 
 
 
 
Perera et al. (1997) 
Note: AMP and AMT are combined 
to form “Customer-Focused 
Manufacturing Strategy) 
 
Adapted from Inkson et al (1970) - The instrument measures the degree 
(existence/use) of workflow integration automation as characterised by six 
categories ranging from hand tools to computer control.  
Agreement on 
Evaluation Criteria 
Dunk (1990) Extent of agreement between the supervisor and subordinate on the evaluation 
criteria for assessing the subordinate’s performance. It is measured by using 
Hopwood’s (1972) 8-item instrument on superior’s evaluative style whereby the 
respondents (subordinate) responds twice to these questions: one on their own 
personal view of the importance their superiors place on each criteria and second, 
on their perception of the importance of these criteria. (Dunk, 1990, p. 173, 175). 
 
Attitude  Mia (1988) Milani (1975) defines attitudes in terms of employees’ feelings and predispositions 
towards their job and employer in a budgetary context. Attitude towards the job is 
measured using a 16-item instrument and attitude towards company is measured 
using a 10-item instrument (Mia, 1988, p. 468-469)  
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Authoritarianism 
(Authoritarian Dyad is a 
related concept) 
 
Harrison (1993) 
Chenhall (1986) 
Seiler and Bartlett (1982) 
Searfoss and Monczka (1973) 
 
This is a personality variable and measures the extent to which the superior (or 
subordinate) believes in personal interactions based on power and authority i.e. 
where directives and orders are more accepted than cooperation and trust. 
Authoritarian Dyad relates to the comparison of authoritarianism levels for 
subordinates and superiors combined (high/low), as applied by Chenhall (1986). 
Both concepts are measured California F Scale (Adorno et al., 1950) 
 
Corporate Context Merchant (1981) Defined in terms of size, product diversity and extent of decentralization. 
 
Culture 
 
Chow et al. (1991) 
Harrison (1992) 
Harrison (1993) 
Chow et al. (1999) 
 
National Culture (Individualism) 
National Culture (Power Distance and Individualism) 
National Culture 
National Culture (Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance and 
Masculinity) 
 
Decentralization 
(Organizational 
Structure) 
 
 
 
Gul and Chia (1994) 
Chia (1995) 
Govindarajan (1988) 
Merchant (1981) 
Gul et al. (1995) 
Using the measure of Organizational Structure (Gordon & Narayanan, 1984) to 
classify the degree of decentralisation in decision making in terms of the 
development of new products/services, the hiring and firing of managerial 
personnel, selection of large investments, budget allocations and pricing decisions 
(Gul and Chia, 1994, p. 419) 
Environment Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978) Environment has two aspects: Simple vs. Complex and Static vs. Dynamic, which  
load into one dimension: Predictability  
 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
 
 
Merchant (1990) 
Brownell (1985) 
Brownell (1987) 
Developed by Lorsch & Allen (1973) and also used by Sathe (1982) – 
Environmental Uncertainty is assessed using an environmental rate of change in 
six categories of the profit centre’s environment (Merchant, 1990, p. 304)  
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Environmental Volatility  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kren (1992a) Volatility is defined as change or variability in the organization’s external 
environment. The measures were operationalised by Tosi et al. (1973) and 
confirmed by Snyder & Glueck (1982). The basis of computations were: 
• Accounting variables for measuring market (coefficient of variation of net sales) 
• Technological (coefficient of variation of the sum of research & development 
and capital expenditure divided by total assets) and  
• Income volatility (coefficient of variation of profits before taxes)  
 
Functional 
Differentiation  
 
Mia and Chenhall (1994)  
 
 
Brownell (1985) 
Merchant (1984) 
 
Hirst and Yetton (1984) 
Classifying production and marketing functions as high and medium/low task 
uncertainty based on interviews of selected companies i.e. linking level of task 
uncertainty to functional areas. 
Functional Area (Marketing vs. R&D managers) 
Functional Differentiation (Allocation of responsibilities within the manufacturing 
departments) 
Production vs. Non-Production Jobs (low vs. high job structure) 
 
Goal Congruence 
 
Jaworski and Young (1992) Refers to the degree of adoption of values, goals and objectives of the organization 
as one’s own goals. The scale comprises of two items (Jaworski and Young, 1992, 
p. 26)  
 
Information Asymmetry Dunk (1993a) 
Dunk (1995) 
The extent to which subordinates have more information on their activities than 
what is known by their superiors. Dunk (1993a) developed a six-item (seven point 
scale) to measure the extent of information asymmetry. 
 
Intensity of Market 
Competition 
Khandwalla (1972) 
Mia and Clarke (1999) 
 
Description of the term ‘intensity of market competition’ and managers were then 
asked to rate the level of intensity of competition in their organization’s market.  
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Interactive vs. 
Diagnostic Supervision 
Style 
 
Abernethy and Brownell (1999) Based on Simons’ (1990) classification on the use of controls by managers. Using 
a four-item (seven point scale) instrument, an evaluation was made of the 
manager’s extent of interaction vs. extent of diagnostic behaviour towards a 
specific control system (the budget). 
 
Interdependence (Sub 
Unit) 
 
 
 
 
Hayes (1977) 
Macintosh and Daft (1987) 
Williams et al.  (1990) 
Fisher (1994) 
Bouwens and Abernethy (2000) 
 
The measures were based on those of Van de Ven et al (1976). The questions 
aimed at identifying the type of interdependence: Pooled, Sequential & Reciprocal 
Interdependence between sub-units (departments). Workflow Diagrams were used 
to illustrate the different types of interdependence.  
Williams et al. (1990) used the term “Task Interdependence”.  
 
Job Relevant 
Information 
Kren (1992a) Job Relevant Information (JRI) helps the manager to improve his/her action choice 
through better-informed effort, thus providing the manager with a better 
understanding of decision alternatives and actions to reach objectives (Kren, 
1992a, p. 512). This measure assesses the extent to which managers perceive 
information availability for effective job-related decisions (1992, p. 514). 
 
Leadership Style - 
Supervisory 
Consideration 
 
 
Hopwood (1974) 
Brownell (1983b) 
Merchant (1985b) 
Merchant (1990) 
Otley and Pierce (1995) 
 
Extent of consideration and support that the superior has for the subordinates. It is 
one dimension of leadership style. Consideration is measured by the subordinates’ 
perceptions, using the Leadership Behaviour Description Questionnaire (LBDQ, 
Stogdill, 1963) 
Leadership Style - 
Initiating Structure 
 
 
Hopwood (1974) 
Brownell (1983b) 
Merchant (1985b) 
Otley and Pierce (1995) 
 
The extent to which an individual is likely to define and structure his/her own role 
and those of his subordinates towards goal attainment. (Otley and Pierce, 1995, p. 
406) 
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Locus of Control Brownell (1981) 
Brownell (1982b) 
Mia (1987) 
Frucot and Shearon (1991) 
Kren (1992b) 
Fisher (1996) 
 
A personality variable that lies on a continuum with two extremes: 
(i) Internals – Individuals who believe that the events that occur in their lives are 
largely due to their own actions or efforts. 
(ii) Externals – Individuals who believe that their destinies are controlled by luck 
or chance. (Fisher, 1996, p. 362) 
Managerial Level 
 
 
Dunk (1992) 
 
 
 
Managerial Level refers to the position an individual holds in a hierarchy of 
managerial authority. Respondents were provided with a generic organisation chart 
and asked to indicate their managerial level in the organisation (operationalised 
from Level 1 to Level 4) (Dunk, 1992, p. 209, 212). 
 
Managerial Role  
 
Macintosh and Williams (1992) According to Mintzberg (1973), managers exhibit different behaviours in relation 
to the duties involved in management. These behaviours can be classified in 
managerial roles, namely interpersonal, informational and decisional roles. Aspects 
that were specifically studied within these roles were leader, liaison, monitor, 
spokesman, entrepreneur and resource allocator. The instrument was based on 
Tsui’s (1984) instrument. 
 
Manufacturing 
Flexibility (also referred 
to as Customisation) 
 
Abernethy and Lillis (1995). 
 
 
 
 
Bouwens and Abernethy (2000) 
 
Abernethy and Lillis (1995) developed two questions based on interviews to 
measure manufacturing flexibility: 
• What proportion of your turnover comes from non-standard product lines? 
• Does the manufacturing process provide the flexibility to offer customers 
product variations? 
Adapted Measure from Pugh et al. (1969) - Percentage of products/services in four 
categories of customisation 
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Manufacturing Practices 
(TQM & JIT) 
Sim and Killough (1998) Adapted from Snell and Dean (1992):  
• TQM Instrument: 10 item instrument largely adapted from Snell and Dean 
(1992) to measure the extent of use of specific procedures/actions in an 
organization. 
• JIT Instrument: 10-item instrument  
 
Manufacturing Process 
Automation 
 
Brownell and Merchant (1990) 
Dunk (1992) 
A three-part instrument developed by Inkson et al. (1970): 
• Degree of automation of the most automatic piece of production equipment (six 
point) 
• Degree of automation of the bulk of the production equipment (six point) 
• Degree of automation of finished product quality (3 point) 
 
Market Factors Merchant (1984) Two aspects of market factors: 
• Stage of the Product Life Cycle (emerging, growth, mature, declining) 
• Strength of Market Position 
 
Motivation Mia (1988) 
 
Work motivation was measured using an instrument developed by Lawler and 
Suttle (1973) and based on expectancy paradigm (Mia, 1988, p. 469) 
 
Organisation Structure  
 
Bruns and Waterhouse (1975) 
Gordon and Narayanan (1984) 
 
 
 
Davila (2000) 
Based on Burns & Stalker’s (1961) notion of mechanistic vs organic. 
Construct was measured by 5 questions about degree of centralization, 
formalization of authority, and the degree to which general characteristics of 
bureaucracy existed in the organization (some adapted from Khandwalla, 1972) 
 
Within the context of a R&D function, what are the responsibilities and position of 
the manager and his/her authority over marketing decisions? 
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Organisational 
Characteristics 
Merchant (1984) Two Measures were used: 
• Departmental Size (No. of Full Time Employees) 
• Degree of Functional Differentiation (adapted from Inkson et al, 1970 measures 
of specialization and decentralization) 
 
Organisational 
Commitment 
Nouri and Parker (1998) 
Nouri and Parker (1996) 
Nouri (1994) 
Organisational Commitment is a bond that links the individual to the organisation 
(Mathieu and Zajac, 1990) - Measured using a nine-item scale from Mowday et al 
(1979)  
 
Organisational Size 
 
Merchant (1981) 
Merchant (1984)  
Refer to ‘Organisational Characteristics’ 
 
 
Perceived Peer 
Dysfunctional 
Behaviour 
Jaworski and Young (1992) Defined as the individual’s perceptions that his peers knowingly violate established 
control system rules and procedures. It is measured using a 3-item instrument 
(Jaworski and Young, 1992, p. 26) 
 
Perceived 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gordon and Narayanan (1984) 
Chenhall and Morris (1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Govindarajan (1984) 
Gul (1991) 
 
 
Gordon and Narayanan (1984) adapted the questions from Khandwalla (1972):  7 
questions relating to intensity of bidding for raw materials, competition for 
manpower and price competition, no. of products marketed, stability of 
economic/technological environment, predictability of competitors’ action, 
predictability of preferences/tastes of customers, changes to 
legal/political/economic constraints, and frequency of new scientific discoveries in 
the industry. 
 
Govindarajan (1984) adapted the questions from Miles and Snow (1978) – How 
predictable were the following five components of the organisation’s external 
environment: customers, competitors, regulatory groups and technological 
requirements of the industry.  
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Environmental 
Uncertainty (contd) 
 
 
 
Govindarajan (1986) 
Kren and Kerr (1993), Ross (1995) 
Gul and Chia (1994) 
Chenhall and Morris (1986) 
Ferris (1982) 
Rebele and Michaels (1990) 
Umanath et al. (1993) 
 
 
 
Adapted from instrument developed by Duncan (1972) and Sathe (1974). The 
measurement construct comprises the following items: manufacturing technology, 
competitors’ actions, market demands, product attributes/designs, raw materials 
availability, raw materials prices, government regulation and labour union actions 
(Gul and Chia, 1994, p. 418). (12 items-instrument) 
 
Personality Harrison (1993) 
 
 
 
 
The personality variable was measured using the following sub-dimensions: 
• Authoritarianism:  based on a ten-item instrument (California F Scale) 
• Individualism–Collectivism: based on a 11-item co-worker subscale of the 
INDOL scale (Hui, 1988) 
Product Life Cycle Merchant (1984) 
 
The stage in the product life cycle is considered as one important dimension of 
“market factors” and the discrete stages were: emerging, growth, mature, and 
declining. (Merchant, 1984, p. 295) 
 
Product Standardization 
 
Brownell and Merchant (1990) 
Merchant (1984) 
 
A Product Dimension varying from “one of a kind” to “commodities” (high):  
Converted to –1 and +1 for low and high standardization respectively. 
Production Technology Woodward (1965)  
 
Merchant (1984) 
Different Types of Production Technique (unit production, small batch, large 
batch, mass production and process production) 
Focus on Routine/Non Routine Aspect: 
• Degree of Automation of the Production Process (Inkson et al, 1970) 
• Degree of Product Standardization (adapted from Thompson, 1967) 
 
Project Uncertainty  
 
Davila (2000) 
 
Uncertainty relating to technology and market factors for R&D functions 
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Standard Tightness Shields et al. (2000) 
 
 
Standard tightness is defined as the amount of resources needed to perform at the 
level of a standard minus the amount of resources provided to perform 
 
 
Strategic Priorities Chenhall and Langfield-Smith 
(1998) 
 
Using Porter’s (1980) Framework 
• Low Price (Cost) vs. Differentiation 
 
Strategy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Govindarajan and Gupta (1985)  
Simons (1987a) 
Govindarajan (1988) 
Govindarajan and Fisher (1990) 
Merchant (1990)  
 
Merchant (1985b) 
 
Gupta (1987) 
Davila (2000) 
 
Build, Hold, and Harvest Strategies (Business Unit Strategy) 
Prospectors and Defenders 
Differentiation and Low Cost Strategies 
Differentiation and Low Cost Strategies 
Harvest, maintain/generate cash flow, selective growth and rapid growth (using the 
firm’s own terminology) 
Harvest, maintain/generate cash flow, selective growth and rapid growth (using the 
firm’s own terminology – Profit Centres) 
Build, Hold and Harvest Strategies  
Product Strategy (Low Cost, Time Based and Customer Focused) 
 
Task Difficulty 
(Also Job Difficulty) 
 
 
 
Lau et al. (1995) 
Mia (1987) 
Brownell and Dunk (1991) 
Mia (1989) 
Sub-dimension of Task Uncertainty, which focuses on analysability Seven-item 
instrument based on Van de Ven and Delbecq (1974). Mia (1989) used the term 
“Job Difficulty” but applied the same instrument as task difficulty.  
Task Interdependency 
 
 
 
 
Imoisili (1989) 
 
Task interdependency is defined as the extent to which each participant perceives 
his or her work-related activities to require the joint or cooperative efforts of other 
work groups within than particular organisation. It is measured using a 2-item, 5 
point, scale from Osborne et al. (1980).  
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Task Uncertainty Chong (1996) 
Brownell and Hirst (1986) 
Lau et al. (1995) 
 
 
Imoisili (1989) 
Gresov (1989) 
 
 
Brownell and Dunk (1991) 
Hirst (1983) 
 
Defined as the difference between the amount of information required to perform a 
task and the amount of information already processed (Galbraith, p. 4, 1973). 
Measured as a nine item, 7-point scale, based on the instrument of Withey et al. 
(1983). 
 
Defined as the frequency of change of factors affecting work-unit performance 
(Imoisili, 1989). A five-item, 5-point scale, instrument from Podsakoff et al. 
(1983) was used to measure this variable. 
 
14-item, 7-point scale, composite measure used by Van de Ven and Delbecq 
(1974) and made up of two sub-measures, namely Task Difficulty and Task 
Variability. 
 
Technology Daft and Macintosh (1978)  
 
 
 
Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978) 
Brownell and Merchant (1987) 
Measuring work unit technology (i.e. number of exceptions that arise in conversion 
process and search procedures used when exceptions arise) – based on Perrow 
(1967) 
 
Same as Perrow (1967) but loads into one single dimension: degree of routineness. 
 
Trust 
 
Ross (1994) 
Otley (1978) 
Hopwood (1972) 
A manager’s level of trust for his superior was measured by a four-item 
instrument, developed by Read (1962). 
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No. Study Term 
 
Definitions or Statements Implicitly providing 
Definitions and Scope. 
 
Context or Objective of Study 
1 Hopwood (1972) Accounting 
Systems 
“Accounting Systems are often the most important 
formal sources of information in industrial 
organizations. They are designed to provide all 
levels of management with timely and reasonably 
accurate information to help them make decisions 
which are in agreement with their organization’s 
goals” (1972, p. 156) 
 
• Role of accounting data in performance 
evaluation (Specifically the Budget) 
• Dysfunctional Behaviours as a result of 
Budget Constrained vs. a Profit 
Conscious Style of Performance 
Evaluation  
2 Gordon and Miller 
(1976) 
Accounting 
Information 
Systems (AIS) 
Characteristics of Accounting Information Systems 
• Information Load 
• Centralization of Reporting 
• Cost Allocation Methods (amount and timing) 
• Frequency of Reporting 
• Method of Reporting (statements, raw data, 
charts) 
• Time Element (Ex Ante or Ex Post) 
• Performance Evaluation 
• Measurement of Events (financial vs. non-
financial, external vs. internal data. 
• Valuation Methods (historical cost, market value, 
inflation adjusted).                     (1976, p. 570). 
 
 
 
• Devising a Contingency Framework for 
the Design of Accounting Information 
Systems. 
• Linking ‘archetypes’ of firms to the AIS 
design compatible to each type of firm:   
Adaptive, running blind, and stagnant 
bureaucracy. 
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3 Hopwood (1977) Information & 
Control Systems 
“Many Management Information and Control 
Systems, and particularly responsibility accounting 
systems,…” (1977, p. 197). 
 
 
 
 
• How to Design Information Systems for 
Matrix Organizations. 
• Provides a classification of information 
systems based on two dimensions: (1) 
Project vs. Functional Orientation and 
(2) Decision vs. Control Orientation) 
 
4 Hopwood 
(1978) 
Accounting and 
Information 
Systems 
“….the role that formal information systems, such 
as accounting systems, …” (1978, p. 4) 
 
“…the design of and functioning of accounting 
systems, like other information and control systems, 
are interrelated…” (1978, p. 8) 
• Justification for further research into the 
design of accounting and information 
systems. 
• “…We still have only the barest of 
understanding of the factors which shape 
either the design of information systems 
or the processes through which they, in 
turn, influence the consciousness and 
actions of organizational participants”. 
(1978, p. 10) 
 
5 Otley (1980) Management 
Accounting 
System (MAS) 
 
 
“..is thus viewed as one type of control mechanism 
and will be dependent upon the control needs of an 
organizational sub-unit..” (1980, p. 91) 
 
“It is explicitly recognized that AIS design, MIS 
design, organizational design and the other control 
arrangements of the organization (such as collective 
agreements, personnel selection, promotion and 
reward systems….form a package which can only 
be evaluated as a whole.” (1980, p. 96). 
• Formulating the minimum necessary 
contingency framework. 
• Cites examples of more formalized 
controls in organization, from 
Westerlund & Sjostrand (1979). (list 
annexed, p. 98)  
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6 Tiessen and 
Waterhouse (1983) 
Management 
Accounting 
System 
“MAS serves an important constitutional role 
within organizations…to encourage cooperative 
behaviour on the part of organizational members” 
(1983, p. 252) 
 
“In other organizational settings, MAS information 
may be important for reaching and enforcing 
agreements among organizational members”. 
(1983, p. 252). 
• A review of contingency and agency 
theories in the field of management 
accounting systems 
• Proposing various institutional 
arguments to explain the persistence in 
the practice of certain responsibility 
accounting systems  
 
 
 
7 Gordon and 
Narayanan (1984) 
Management 
Accounting 
Systems 
‘The MAS oriented researchers have been primarily 
concerned with an organization’s information 
system”  
 
“…….information systems are seen as facilitating 
decision making within organizations” (1984, p. 33) 
 
 
 
 
 
• Investigates the relationship among 
environment, structure and information 
systems. However, specific 
characteristics of the information 
systems were selected namely: 
(a) Externally Oriented vs. Internal 
Oriented 
(b) Non Financial vs. Financial  
(c) Ex ante (forecasts) vs. Ex Post 
(historical) 
 
8 Merchant (1984) Budgeting “.. the primary financially oriented organizational 
control mechanism” (1984, p. 291)” 
 
“Budgeting is approached at a broad system level..” 
(1984, p. 291) 
• Investigate the relationships the 
budgeting System and three contextual 
variables, and explores how 
organizational performance is affected 
by different uses of budgeting in 
different settings (via simple 
correlations). 
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9 Macintosh and Daft 
(1987) 
Management 
Accounting 
Systems 
 
 
 
Management 
Control Systems 
(MCS) 
“The role of management accounting systems in 
organizational control traditionally has been studied 
in isolation from characteristics of the total 
organization and from other non-accounting based 
control systems” (1987, p. 50) 
 
“..the package of formal controls in an organization 
typically includes accounting reports, the budget, 
formal hierarchy and supervision, job descriptions; 
rules and standard operating procedures; statistics 
for measuring performance, organization structure; 
employee performance appraisal systems and 
corporate culture.” (1987, p. 50) 
Investigate the relationship between the 
organizational characteristic of 
departmental interdependence and the 
design and use of three elements of MCS, 
namely: 
• Operating Budget 
• Statistical Reports (Periodic Operational 
Reports) 
• Standard Operating Procedures and 
Policies (How Managers should handle 
operational situations that might arise) 
 
 
 
10 Amat et al. (1994) Management 
Accounting 
Systems 
“….to professionalise Spanish organizations and 
introduce formal control mechanisms such as 
MAS”  (1994, p. 109) 
 
 
 
• Case Study of the design and 
implementation of MAS in a Spanish 
organization. 
• Study attempts to analyse MAS changes 
from a two-fold social and 
organizational perspective. 
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11 Mia and Chenhall 
(1994) 
Management 
Accounting 
Systems 
“Conventionally, the design of management 
accounting system has been confined to financial 
information internal to the organization with an 
historic orientation” (1994, p. 1) 
 
“However, the increased role of MAS to assist 
managers ….has resulted in the evolution of MAS 
to incorporate external and non-financial data”. 
(1994, p. 1) 
 
 
• Organizations functionally differentiate 
their activities to limit the effects of 
uncertainty. 
• Using measures of task uncertainty to 
identify the extent of routine and 
exception in the Production and 
Marketing Departments 
• Hence, the relationship of Use of MAS 
Information (Broad Scope Only) and 
Effectiveness is moderated by functional 
differentiation.  
12 Chia (1995) Management 
Accounting 
Systems 
“In particular, MAS, which is considered as a 
subsystem within the control systems of the 
organization..” (1995, p 811) 
 
‘The MAS is an organizational control mechanism 
which facilitates control by reporting and creating 
visibility in the action and performance of its 
members” (1995, p. 812) 
 
 
• This study examines the effects of a 
combination of control subsystems 
(MAS Information Characteristics and 
Decentralization) on managerial 
performance.  
• The study uses all the four Chenhall & 
Morris (1986) MAS characteristics (as 
perceived by users) and Decentralization 
on managerial performance (Using 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis)  
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13 Abernethy and Lillis 
(1995) 
Management 
Control System 
This paper focuses on “..two critical aspects of a 
firm’s management control system (MCS) : The 
Performance Measurement System, and the 
structural arrangements required to coordinate 
production activities” (1995, p. 241) 
 
• This study examines the impact of 
manufacturing flexibility on the design 
of MCS. 
• Manufacturing flexibility is reflected in 
a firm’s ability to respond to market 
demands by switching from one product 
to another through co-ordinated policies 
and actions and a willingness to offer 
product variations. (Nemetz & Fry, 
1988; Buffa, 1980; Bowen et al. 1989) 
 
 
14 Fisher (1995) Management 
Control Systems 
‘Management control is defined as the control 
managers exercise over other managers. It is the 
process by which corporate-level management 
ensure that midlevel managers carry out 
organizational objectives and strategies (cited from 
Merchant, 1989). 
 
• Review of Contingency Based Research 
on Management Control Systems. 
• Focuses on cybernetic (formal) control 
systems  
 
 
15. Simons (1995) Management 
Control Systems 
“…are the formal, information-based routines and 
procedures managers use to maintain or alter 
patterns in organizational activities” (1995, p. 5) 
 
• Simons (1995) identifies four basic 
levers of control, namely belief systems, 
boundary systems, diagnostic control 
systems and interactive control systems  
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16 Fisher (1996) Management 
Information 
Systems 
“.. to facilitate more efficient use of expensive 
management information resources…” 
• Argues that personality of the user of 
information interacts the relationship 
between PEU and Perceived Usefulness 
of Information (Timeliness and Scope) 
i.e. people do not respond in a similar 
way to a perceived level of uncertainty. 
• Personality is measured by LOC (Locus 
of Control) 
 
17 Chong (1996) Management 
Accounting 
Systems 
Typical definition: characteristics of MAS design 
(scope, aggregation, integration, timeliness) 
 
 
 
• Examines the interactive effects of MAS 
design and task uncertainty on 
managerial performance.  
• Only extent of Broad Scope MAS 
information was used in the study. 
18 Chow et al. (1996) Management 
Control System  
“A Control System can be defined to include all 
devices that help ensure the proper behaviour of 
people in an organization.” (1996, p. 176) 
 
 
• Cross Country (US vs. Japan) 
Comparison using Cultural Dimensions 
to relate the effects of using 
organizational controls on data 
manipulation/mgt myopia. 
• The measure was control system 
tightness based on various categories of 
controls (headcount, financial 
procedural, and directives) 
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19 Langfield-Smith 
(1997) 
Management 
Control Systems 
“..encompassing the largely accounting-based 
controls of planning, monitoring of activities, 
measuring performance and integrative 
mechanisms..” (1997, p. 208) 
 
“This traditional definition may not be sufficiently 
broad to capture more modern approaches to 
effective control..” (1997, p. 209).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Reviews studies that have examined the 
relationship between MCS and Business 
Strategy.  
20 Sim and Killough 
(1998) 
Management 
Accounting 
Systems 
‘Given the importance of workers’ role in TQM and 
JIT practices, Management Accounting Systems are 
often used as mechanisms to motivate and influence 
workers’ behaviour…. As such, the MAS that we 
focus on are those that are directly linked to control 
issues on the manufacturing shopfloor” (1998, p. 
326) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Study of interactive influence of 
manufacturing practices  (TQM & JIT) 
and management accounting on systems 
on performance (Customer & Quality-
based), using two-way interactions.  
• Paper focuses in three components of 
MAS (a) Performance Measures 
(including Frequency of Reporting) 
(b) Performance Goals (were they 
provided to managers?) 
(c) Workers’ Performance Contingent 
Rewards (fixed pay or different types of 
non fixed pay) 
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21 Anthony and 
Govindarajan (1998) 
Management 
Control Systems 
“The system used by management to control the 
activities of an organization is called its 
management control system. Management Control 
is the process by which managers influence other 
members of the organization to implement the 
organization’s strategies”.  (1998, p. 17) 
 
 
 
 
 
• Textbook definition which excludes 
informal controls:“.. we focus primarily 
on the systematic , i.e. formal, aspects of 
the management control function.”  
• Authors clearly link Strategy 
Formulation (Goals, Strategies, Policies) 
to Management Control (implementation 
of Strategies), which in turn is linked to 
Task Control (efficient and effective 
performance of individual tasks) – 
(1998, Exhibit 1.2, p. 7) 
 
 
22 Mia and Clarke 
(1999) 
Management 
Accounting 
Systems 
“For purposes of this study, the MAS is viewed as a 
system which provides benchmarking and 
monitoring information in addition to the internal 
and historical information traditionally generated 
by MAS.” (1999, p. 138) 
 
The above is “..not to deny that a MAS in an 
organization can also provide information relating 
to measurement, control, evaluation and reporting 
of costs, activities and performance”. (1999, p. 
138). 
• Relationship between intensity of market 
competition and business unit 
performance, using MAS information 
Use as a mediator (indirect effect of 
market competition on performance via 
MAS information use) 
• Instrument for MAS Use was developed 
by the authors (3 item instrument) and is 
provided in annex. Instrument captures 
extent of use of benchmarking and 
monitoring information (external and 
internal). 
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23 Mauldin and Ruchala 
(1999) 
Accounting 
Information 
Systems  
“AIS encompass systems that are either used by 
accountants, by other decision makers employing 
accounting information, or in tasks that involve the 
application of accounting data”. (1999, p. 319) 
 
 
 
• To articulate a model for accounting 
information systems by building on 
existing theoretical perspectives 
(technological, organizational and 
cognitive) 
• Enhances the dimension of information 
technology (Systems Design) in AIS  
24 Shields et al. (2000) Control Systems “Control systems as researched in the accounting 
literature are usually based on a cybernetic model in 
which performance standards (e.g. budget, goal, 
target) and performance measures are compared as 
the basis for corrective action and performance 
evaluation” 
 
 
• Investigating direct and indirect (via job 
related stress) relationships between 3 
performance-based control systems and 
job performance. The three control 
components are participative standard 
setting, standard-based initiatives and 
standard tightness. 
25 Davila (2000) Management 
Control Systems 
“The study also goes beyond the narrow definition 
of management control systems around financial 
information to add formal but non-financial 
information”. (2000, p. 384) 
• Investigates the design of Management 
Control Systems as a dependent variable 
(function) of the following: product 
strategy, product uncertainty and 
organisation structure. 
 
26 Chenhall (2003) Management 
Control Systems 
“MCS is a broader term that encompasses MAS and 
also includes other controls such as personal or clan 
controls……..Conventionally, MCS are perceived 
as passive tools providing information to assist 
managers” (2003, p. 129) 
 
• Critically reviews the contingency-based 
MCS studies over the past 20 years. 
• Derives a taxonomy of MCS (organic vs. 
mechanistic) 
• Proposes the integration of ‘alternate’ 
theories in contingency studies. 
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Appendix 2.3 – Classification of Management Control Systems: Systems, Sub-Systems and Mechanisms 
 
Control System  Dimensions/Mechanisms General Control 
Attributes Being Tested 
(Assumed or Specified) 
 
Reference 
Control Systems  
(Generic 
Attributes 
Sought) 
1.Tailored to departmental specificities 
Cost Control: Extent of use cost analysis techniques & controls 
Goals related to output effectiveness 
 
2. Monitoring Capabilities of Control Systems: 
Specific Action Controls 
Results-of-Decisions Controls 
Personnel Controls 
 
3. Management Control Sub-Systems  
Strategic Planning Review 
Financial Goals 
Budget Preparation and Review 
Budget Revisions and Updates 
Program Reviews 
Evaluation and Reward 
 
4. Levers of Control 
Belief Systems (four items on mission statement and values) 
Boundary Systems (four items on code of conduct) 
Diagnostic Control System (11 items describing the use of 
performance measures, from a diagnostic perspective) 
Interactive Control System (6 items describing the use of 
control system from an interactive perspective) 
Individual vs. Group 
Low vs. High 
Behaviour vs. Outcome  
 
 
Low/High 
Low/High 
Low/High 
 
Not Applicable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low/High 
Low/High 
Low/High 
 
Low/High 
Simons (1987a) 
 
 
  
 
Kren and Kerr (1993), based on 
Merchant (1982) 
 
 
Simons (1990) – Case Study 
Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simons (1995) 
Widener (2007) 
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Appendix 2.3 (continued)  
Control Sub-Systems and Control Mechanisms: 
 
  
Structuring of 
Activities 
4. Extent to which authority has been delegated for major 
types of decisions (e.g. acquisition of capital equipment and 
other inputs, hiring of staff). i.e. Extent of Decentralisation. 
(Chow et al. 1999, p. 458) 
Loose vs. Tight Chow et al. (1999) 
Govindarajan (1988) 
Standard 
Operating  
Procedures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Extent of procedures and manuals to be applied in 
managerial activities (e.g. acquisition of capital equipment and 
other inputs, hiring of staff) 
 
6. SOP Characteristics: 
Number of Books 
Number of Pages 
Percentage of Departmental Work Covered 
Percentage of Time Necessary to follow SOP 
Adherence to SOPs used to evaluate performance 
Influence of SOPs on department activities and operations 
 
 
Low vs. High 
 
 
 
Low vs. High 
Low vs. High 
Low vs. High 
Low vs. High 
Yes/No 
Low vs. High 
 
Chow et al. (1999) 
 
 
 
Macintosh and Daft (1987) 
Budgeting  
Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Extent of Subordinate Participation in Budget/Target Setting 
(Low/High) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tight vs. Loose 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chow et al. (1999) 
Nouri and Parker (1998) 
Brownell and Merchant (1990) 
Dunk (1992) 
Brownell and Dunk (1991) 
Dunk (1990) 
Mia (1988) 
Shields et al. (2000) 
Brownell (1985) 
Govindarajan (1986) 
Kren (1992a) 
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Appendix 2.3 
(contd) 
Budgeting 
Process (contd) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Standard Tightness (Low/High) Achievability 
 
 
 
9. Operating Budget Characteristics (Subordinate’s View): 
Frequency 
Target Difficulty 
Influence in Target Setting 
Importance in Planning, Coordination and 
Monitoring/Measuring 
Emphasis on Meeting Targets 
Response to Negative Variances 
Influence on Daily Activities 
 
10. Statistical Reports - Described as operational reports, 
displaying non-monetary outputs and performance measures. 
Operationalised in terms of the same characteristics and 
attributes of the operating budget, mentioned above (i.e. 
representing the non-financial dimension of the “target setting” 
process).  
 
11. Budget-Related Behaviour Items (extent of the following) 
Required Explanations of Variances 
Subordinate’s Influence on Budget Plans 
Interactions with Subordinates 
Reactions to Expected Budget Overruns 
Interactions with Superiors 
Personal Involvement in Budgeting 
 
 
Loose vs. Tight 
 
 
 
Frequent vs. Infrequent 
Low vs. High 
Low vs. High 
Low vs. High 
 
Low vs. High 
Extent of Explanations 
further to variances 
Low vs. High 
 
Same as Operating 
Budget Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low vs. High 
Low vs. High 
Low vs. High 
Low vs. High 
Low vs. High 
Low vs. High 
 
 
Chow et al. (1999) 
Simons (1987a) 
Shields et al. (2000) 
 
Macintosh and Daft (1987) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macintosh and Daft (1987) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Merchant (1984) 
Merchant (1985c) 
Macintosh and Williams (1992) 
Williams et al. (1990) 
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Appendix 2.3 
(contd) 
Performance 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Extent of Subordinate Participation in Performance 
Evaluation (Low/High) 
 
 
13. Extent to which controllability filters are used in 
performance evaluation (Low/High) 
 
 
14. Reliance on Accounting Performance Measure for 
Performance Evaluation (Budget Emphasis) 
 
 
 
 
Tight vs. Loose 
 
 
 
Mechanistic vs. Organic. 
 
 
 
Accounting vs. Non-
Accounting Evaluative 
Style 
 
 
Chow et al. (1999) 
 
 
 
Chow et al. (1999) 
Simons (1987a) 
 
 
Harrison (1993) 
Hirst (1983) 
Brownell and Hirst (1986) 
Brownell and Dunk (1991) 
Dunk (1992) 
Imoisili (1989) 
Govindarajan (1988) 
 
Compensation 
Schemes 
 
 
 
 
15. Extent to which financial rewards depend on budget/target 
performance (Low/High)  
 
 
 
 
 
16. Determination Criteria for Bonus Payment 
 
 
 
Short Term vs. Long 
Term 
 
 
 
 
 
Objective vs. Subjective 
Shields et al. (2000) 
Chow et al. (1999) 
Walker and Johnson (1999) 
Simons (1987a) 
Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) 
Fisher (1994) 
 
Govindarajan (1984) 
Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) 
Fisher and Govindarajan (1993) 
Kren and Kerr (1993) 
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Appendix 2.4 - Summary of Otley and Pollanen’s (2000) Replications 
 
 
Study Null hypothesis being 
tested 
Original results Otley and Pollanen’s 
results 
Brownell 
(1982a) 
No interaction between 
supervisory style and 
budgetary participation 
affecting performance or job 
satisfaction 
Job satisfaction - No 
significant interaction 
Managerial Performance – 
significant positive 
interaction 
Job satisfaction – 
negative and (almost at 
5%) significant 
interaction 
Managerial performance 
– non significant and 
negative interaction 
Brownell 
and Hirst 
(1986) 
No interaction between 
budget emphasis, budgetary 
participation and task 
uncertainty affecting JRT or 
performance 
JRT – three-way interaction 
was significant and 
negative.  
JRT – three-way 
interaction was not 
significant and positive.  
Dunk 
(1989) 
No interaction between 
budget emphasis, budgetary 
participation affecting 
performance 
Significant and negative 
interaction term 
Not significant and 
negative interaction term 
Brownell 
and 
Dunk 
(1991) 
No interaction between 
budget emphasis, budgetary 
participation and task 
uncertainty affecting 
performance 
Significant and negative 
interaction term 
Note: Two-way interaction 
participation x budget 
emphasis significant only in 
low task uncertainty 
Three-way interaction - 
same as original results 
Two-way interaction not 
significant 
Harrison 
(1992)  
No interaction between 
budget emphasis and 
participation affecting job 
satisfaction and job-related 
tension.  
Not applicable – original 
study focused on cultural 
differences  
Significant two-way and 
negative interaction 
between budget emphasis 
and task uncertainty 
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Appendix 2.5 – Previous Dysfunctional Behaviour Measures 
 
Manipulation of Performance Measures  (Merchant, 1990 and 
Chow et al, 1996) 
 
How frequently you (or someone within your organization) took the 
following actions in order to comply with controls? (from 1=never 
to 4=frequently): 
 
(1) Pulled profits from future periods into the current period by 
(a) deferring a needed expenditure 
(b) accelerating a sale 
 
(2) Shifted funds between accounts to avoid budget overruns 
 
(3) Bought equipment from outside the company so that the design 
portion of the expenditure could be capitalised, even though the job 
could have been done as well within the company.  
 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
 
Not Available 
(Merchant,1990) 
 
Range 0.57 to 0.86 
(Chow et  al, 1996) 
 
 
Short Term Orientation (Merchant, 1990 and Chow et al, 1996) 
 
1. What percentage of time do you devote to working on matters 
which will show up in the profit & loss statement within 1 month or 
less, 1 month to one quarter, 1 quarter to 1 year, and 1 year to 5 
years?*  
 
2. What are the effects of controls on new ideas for expenditures of 
the following types (1=great encouragement to 5=great 
discouragement): new product development, product engineering, 
manufacturing process engineering, basic research, capacity 
expansion, advertising and sales promotion, employee development, 
information systems. 
 
 
 
Not applicable 
 
 
 
 
0.69 (Merchant, 1990) 
 
Range 0.57 to 0.86 
(Chow et al, 1996) 
 
Dysfunctional Behaviours (Jaworski and Young, 1992) 
 
Scale the following statements on a 5-point scale (1=Never to 
5=Always)  
1. I tend to ignore certain job-related activities simply because 
they are not monitored by the division.  
 
2. I have adjusted marketing data to make my performance more 
in line with division goals. 
 
3. When presenting data to upper management, I try to emphasize 
data which reflect favourably upon me. 
 
4. When presenting data to upper management, I try to avoid 
being the bearer of bad news. 
5.   Even if my productivity is inconsistent, I still try to make it 
consistent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.75 
 
* Originally developed by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). Also, Van de Stede (2000) used only this 
question to measure short-term orientation, and the first three time periods (i.e. up to ‘1 quarter to 1 
year’) are summed to indicate extent of managerial short-term orientation. 
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Appendix 2.5 (continued) 
Slack Attitudes (Onsi, 1973) 
5 point Likert scale (Never to Always) 
 
1. To protect himself, a manager submits a budget that can safely 
be attained 
2. The plant manager sets two levels of standards: one between 
himself and production (sales) manager, and another standard 
between himself and top management, to be safe. 
3. In good business times, the plant manager accepts a reasonable 
level of slack in a departmental budget 
4. Slack in the budget is good to do things that cannot be 
officially approved 
Reported Cronbach 
Alpha 
 
0.70 (Merchant, 1985a) 
0.74 Govindarajan (1986) 
0.75 (Nouri, 1994) 
0.75 (Nouri and Parker, 
1996a) 
0.75 (Nouri and Parker, 
1996b) 
0.74 (Lal et al, 1996) 
 
Slack Manipulation (Onsi, 1973) 
1. With some skill, a manager can make his performance unit just 
as he wants. 
2. The plant controller is “considerate” to the departmental 
manager who needs to attain budget. 
 
 
 
 
Not Applicable 
Budgetary Slack (Dunk, 1993a) 
7 point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree/Strongly Agree) 
 
1. Standards set in the budget induce high productivity in my area 
of responsibility** 
2. Budgets set for my area of responsibility are safely attainable 
3. I have to carefully monitor costs in my area of responsibility 
because of budgetary constraints** 
4. Budgets for my area of responsibility are not particularly 
demanding 
5. Budget targets have not caused me to be particularly concerned 
with improving efficiency in my area of responsibility 
6. Targets incorporated in the budget are difficult to reach** 
** reverse-scored items 
 
 
0.68 
(only items 2, 4, 5 ,6 
were selected by Dunk, 
1993a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 2.6 - Data Collection Methods (1995 – 2001 Studies) 
 
Study  Control System/ 
Mechanisms 
under study 
Data Collection 
Method 
Usable 
Sample 
Size (%) 
Cross-sectional Study 
(CS) or respondents  
from few firms (non-
CS) 
Lau et al. 
(1995) 
(AOS) 
RAPM Questionnaire 112 (47%) CS – Random 
Sampling 
O’Connor 
(1995) 
(AOS) 
BP Questionnaire 125 (44%) CS – Convenience 
Sampling 
Gul et al. 
(1995) 
(ABR) 
BP Questionnaire 37 (22%) CS – Convenience 
Sampling 
Abernethy & 
Lillis (1995)  
(AOS) 
Manufacturing 
Performance 
Measures 
Semi-
structured 
interviews  
42 (52%) CS – Random 
Sampling 
Chow et al. 
(1996) (AOS) 
Tightness of 
Controls 
Questionnaire 54 (95%)-
US 
28 (76%)-
Japan 
Non CS – from two 
groups of companies 
Perera et al.  
(1997) (AOS) 
Non-Financial 
Performance 
Measures 
Questionnaire 105 (53%) CS – Random 
Sampling.  
Nouri and 
Parker (1998) 
BP Questionnaire 135(67%) Non CS – from one 
large multinational 
Chenhall & 
Langfield 
Smith (1998) 
(AOS) 
Management 
Accounting 
Practices 
Questionnaire 78(56%) CS – Random 
Sampling 
Abernethy & 
Brownell 
(1999) (AOS) 
Interactive 
/Diagnostic Use 
of Controls 
Questionnaire 63(75%) CS – Random 
Sampling (Hospital 
Industry) 
Chow et al. 
(1999) (AOS) 
Management 
Controls 
 
Questionnaire 159(41%) Convenience 
Sampling 
 Appendix 2.6 (Continued) 
 
Ghosh & 
Lusch (2000) 
(AOS) 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Controls 
Internal 
Reports  
secondary data 
N/A Non CS – case study 
Davila (2000) 
(AOS) 
MCS Design Questionnaire 56(77%) Convenience 
Sampling (Medical 
Devices Industry) 
Shields et al 
(2000) (AOS) 
Standard-Based 
Controls 
Questionnaire 358 (75%) Non CS – from a auto 
multinational  
Lau and 
Buckland 
(2000) (ABR) 
BP, RAPM Questionnaire 71 (47%) CS – Random 
Sampling from 
mining industry 
Tsui (2001) 
(AOS) 
BP and MAS Questionnaire 89 (72%) CS – Convenience 
Sampling 
AOS – Accounting, Organizations and Society 
ABR – Accounting and Business Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 5.1  
Sample Selection and Profile of Companies 
(Extracted from Kompass Directory – Australia) 
   
        
  Employee Size Categories   
Code Manufacturing Industry Descriptions 
200-
499  
500-
999 
1,000 
to 5,000+ Total %  
  
  4,999    
  
      
20 Food and Tobacco 13 12 13 1 39 10.9% 
21 Beverages 3 1 3   7 1.9% 
22 Leather, Skins, Fur and Related Products 6   2   8 2.2% 
23 Textiles 11 2 2   15 4.2% 
24 Clothing and Textile Products 11 7 3   21 5.8% 
25 Wood and Cork 5 2 3   10 2.8% 
26 Furniture 4 5 1   10 2.8% 
27 Cellulose, Paper and Board Industries 5 2 3   10 2.8% 
28 Printing and Publishing 8       8 2.2% 
29 Rubber Products 4 2 1 1 8 2.2% 
30 Plastic Products 11 3 3   17 4.7% 
31 Acids, Alkalis and Pharmaceuticals 8 6 2   16 4.5% 
32 Agricultural Chemicals, Insecticides, 
Detergents 15 6     21 5.8% 
33 Non Metallic Mineral Products 3 4 2   9 2.5% 
34 Base Metal Products 5 7 3   15 4.2% 
35 Metal Containers, Cables, Wires 9 7   1 17 4.7% 
36 Metal Pipes 7 2 1   10 2.8% 
37 Nuclear, Electrical and Electronic Products 7 3 6   16 4.5% 
38 Measuring, Testing, Optical, Photographic 
and Surgical 5 2 2   9 2.5% 
39 Transport Infrastructure Equipment 8 7 4 1 20 5.6% 
40 Hydraulic and Pneumatic Equipment 15 2 1   18 5.0% 
41 Agricultural, Food and Drink, Tobacco 
Equipment 4 2     6 1.7% 
42 Chemical, Rubber Plastics, Waste and 
Water Equipment 7   1   8 2.2% 
44* Pulp and Paper, Printing and Office 
Equipment 6   3 1 10 2.8% 
45 Mining, Oil, Gas Extraction and Offshore 
Equipment 10 2     12 3.3% 
46 Metal Working Plant and Equipment 5       5 1.4% 
47 Wood and Cork Plant and Equipment 1       1 0.3% 
48 General Mechanical Engineering 2 3 1   6 1.7% 
49 
Clocks, Jewellery, Souvenirs, Religious 
Items 3 2 2   7 1.9% 
        
Total  201 91 62 5 359  
 
 
Identified Potential Respondents  
Commercial/Marketing/Sales Managers 301 
Operations/Technical/Manufacturing/Production Managers 267 
 568 
 
* There were no companies that were selected from the manufacturing code #43, since no of the ones 
listed matched the selection procedures.  
 Appendix 5.2: Template Survey Letter and Questionnaire 
 
Title FirstName LastName  
Title 
Company 
Address 
Region Postcode 
State 
 
Dear Title LastName 
 
Re: A Survey on How Managers Work with Control Systems in Manufacturing 
Companies 
 
We are conducting nationwide research on the use of management control systems in 
manufacturing industries.  
 
The aim of our study is to better understand the internal and external influences and 
demands which impact on the way senior managers work with various control systems 
in their organization. The control systems under investigation relate to the operations, 
budgeting and performance aspects of the business. This study will provide findings 
that can be of practical relevance to the design of control systems and the effectiveness 
of production and marketing managers.  
 
Companies listed in Australian manufacturing business directories have been selected 
for this survey. The confidentiality of your response will be paramount to us. Your data 
will be used in statistical aggregates and no reference will be made to specific persons 
or companies. The researchers will take personal responsibility to ensure your identity 
is protected.  
 
The validity of the results is heavily dependent on your individual participation. The 
attached questionnaire will not take more than 20 minutes of your time to complete. 
Should you need any further clarification, please do not hesitate to contact the 
undersigned on (08) 9266 7309 or email us at soobarot@cbs.curtin.edu.au. 
 
Your participation is very important to the completion of this major project in 
Australia. It will also allow you to win a $500 cash gift (see questionnaire cover). 
Should you wish to receive a copy of the results of this study, we would be pleased to 
oblige. Please return the completed questionnaire using the enclosed self-addressed, 
reply paid, envelope, by Monday, June 18th. 
 
Thank you. Yours faithfully 
 
     
Professor Dennis. W. Taylor   Teeven Soobaroyen 
School of Accounting    School of Accounting  
 
 
  
Appendix 6.1: Factor Loadings for Applicable Variables 
 
 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) - Total Variance Explained 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.333 46.670 46.670 2.333 46.670 46.670 
2 
.896 17.920 64.590       
3 
.713 14.264 78.853       
4 
.557 11.130 89.984       
5 
.501 10.016 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 Budgetary Participation (BP) - Total Variance Explained 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.336 58.402 58.402 2.336 58.402 58.402 
2 
.721 18.021 76.422       
3 
.510 12.746 89.168       
4 
.433 10.832 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 Dysfunctional Behaviour Gaming (DBGA) - Total Variance Explained 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.686 56.193 56.193 1.686 56.193 56.193 
2 
.720 24.012 80.205       
3 
.594 19.795 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 Dysfunctional Behaviour Information Manipulation (DBIN) - Total Variance Explained 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.765 69.129 69.129 2.765 69.129 69.129 
2 
.593 14.836 83.965       
3 
.391 9.765 93.730       
4 
.251 6.270 100.000       
  
 
 
Appendix 6.1 (continued) 
 
 Task Uncertainty (TU) - Total Variance Explained 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.180 54.508 54.508 2.180 54.508 54.508 
2 
.803 20.068 74.576       
3 
.618 15.460 90.036       
4 
.399 9.964 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 Interactive Use of Controls (INT) - Total Variance Explained 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.587 79.359 79.359 1.587 79.359 79.359 
2 
.413 20.641 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 Legitimating Nature of Controls (LNC) - Total Variance Explained 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.419 56.984 56.984 3.419 56.984 56.984 
2 1.000 16.662 73.646       
3 
.601 10.020 83.666       
4 
.479 7.981 91.646       
5 
.316 5.260 96.907       
6 
.186 3.093 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
